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OSD provided $1.6M, and allowed eighteen months, for the W2COG research initiative 
to learn and apply lessons from the world of “open” e-business on the worldwide web to 
accelerate GIG development. Compared to a typical DoD Think Tank “study”, W2COG 
more than returned value of OSD’s investment by delivering a number of successful 
process pilots for: 1. Rapid (30-60day), low cost (10s of $K), objective, expert, industry 
analysis of net-ready issues; 2. Community of interest (COI) for “semantic data strategy”; 
3. Rapid demonstration, validation, and fielding of bundled interoperable “net-ready” 
edge-of-the-GIG network components. These pilots performed by the members of a 
functioning community of international government and industry experts proved the 
hypothesis that an “open” e-business approach can team mutually motivated government 
and industry partners in ventures to find accelerated “good enough” paths to GIG 
functionality. Obvious recommendations are for W2COG sponsors and their constituents 
to harvest the benefit of their successful by establishing a governmental process that 
exploits the W2COG as follows:  
 
a. Single point of contact for immediate access to a spectrum of broad cross-industry, 
government, and academia information processing expertise 
 
b. Honest broker (e.g. Underwriters’ Lab), per status as 501(c)3 tax-exempt 
charitable/scientific activity, to evaluate, validate, and verify information processing 
capability 
 
c. Risk mitigation and low-cost, rapid turnaround on information processing concepts, 
pilots, and prototypes 
 
d. Means to certify and immediately field successful information processing reference 
implementations broadly via consumable off-the-shelf model 
 
e. Means to establish “netcentric productivity metrics” per operational COI information 
processing performance targets.  
 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
BACKGROUND AND OPERATION CONSTRUCT .............................................................................. 1 
W2COG OUTCOMES................................................................................................................................. 2 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO OSD ............................................................................................................. 5 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................................. 6 
1. ADF IPV6 TRANSITION STRATEGY................................................................................................. 7 
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................... 9 
TRANSITION STRATEGY ANALYSIS........................................................................................................... 18 
RECOMMENDED IPV6 TRANSITION STRATEGY ......................................................................................... 41 
IPV6 ADDRESS SPACE REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................... 51 
IPV6 TRANSITION GOVERNANCE .............................................................................................................. 59 
ADO IPV6 WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................... 67 
RISK MANAGEMENT.................................................................................................................................. 74 
DEPENDENCIES AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................................. 76 
CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................................... 77 
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 80 
ANNEX A INTEROPERABILITY OPTIONS.................................................................................................. 81 
TRANSLATION .......................................................................................................................................... 88 
ANNEX B PHASE 1 DETAILED PLANNING ................................................................................................. 90 
ANNEX C RISK LOG ............................................................................................................................... 92 
ANNEX D DCP PROJECT SUMMARY ............................................................................................... 100 
ANNEX E IPV4 ........................................................................................................................................ 101 
ANNEX F CIOG ORGANSATIONAL CHART................................................................................... 102 
ANNEX G MOBILE IP ........................................................................................................................... 103 
MOBILITY IN IPV6 .................................................................................................................................. 103 
GENERAL MIPV6 BENEFITS ................................................................................................................... 104 
MIPV6 STATUS....................................................................................................................................... 104 
GENERAL MIPV6 ISSUES........................................................................................................................ 104 
NETWORK MOBILITY.............................................................................................................................. 105 
2. GES SOA STANDARD REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 106 
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM AGENCY ........................................... 107 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 109 
SUCCESS CRITERIA................................................................................................................................. 109 
ENDORSEMENT OF XML BASE PROTOCOL STANDARDS......................................................................... 109 
BENEFITS AND CAVEATS OF A STANDARDS-BASED APPROACH ............................................................. 110 
PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS TAXONOMY................................................................................................. 111 
AP ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................... 112 
REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................... 114 
TESTING AND VALIDATION..................................................................................................................... 115 
CALL TO ACTION ................................................................................................................................... 115 
OMG COMMENT ON PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR IMPLEMENTING GIG ENTERPRISE SERVICES............. 119 
STATEMENT OF WORK FOR REVIEW OF DISA DRAFT STANDARDS FOR IMPLEMENTING GIG ENTERPRISE 
SERVICES................................................................................................................................................ 120 
3. NORTHCOM WIRELESS STUDY TASK ORDER ........................................................................ 121 
 vi
4. TOWARDS A RICH SEMANTIC MODEL OF TRACK: ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR 
INFORMATION SHARING................................................................................................................... 124 
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................. 125 
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................ 126 
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF TRACK, BY EXAMPLE........................................................................ 130 
AN INITIAL SPECIFICATION OF TRACK SEMANTICS ................................................................................ 135 
USING THE TRACK MODEL TO ACHIEVE THE STATED OBJECTIVES ........................................................ 141 
THE R&D AGENDA TO ACHIEVE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS .................................................................. 143 
RELATED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY................................................................................................ 145 
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 146 
5. MODEL-BASED COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND VIRT: FILTERING INFORMATION 
BY VALUE TO IMPROVE COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING ......................................... 147 
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................................. 148 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW............................................................................................................. 148 
THE BASIC PROBLEM WITH CURRENT APPROACHES: STATELESS NETWORKING.................................... 149 
VIRT IMPROVES TIME-STRESSED COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING ................................................ 151 
OVERALL TECHNICAL STRATEGY AND HIGH-LEVEL ARCHITECTURE..................................................... 153 
PRODUCT-LINE, COMPONENT-BASED TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE......................................................... 157 
RELATED RESEARCH .............................................................................................................................. 166 
PRINCIPAL REMAINING CHALLENGES..................................................................................................... 167 
NEAR-TERM EXPLOITATION OPPORTUNITIES ......................................................................................... 168 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 169 
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 169 
6. TWO THEORIES OF PROCESS DESIGN FOR INFORMATION SUPERIORITY: SMART 
PULL VS. SMART PUSH......................................................................................................................... 171 
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................................. 172 
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................ 173 
PROPOSED APPROACHES ........................................................................................................................ 174 
ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................................... 176 
MONITORING CONDITIONS OF INTEREST ................................................................................................ 183 
DISCUSSION............................................................................................................................................ 186 
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 188 
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 189 
7. VALUABLE INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME (VIRT) TEAM MISSION STATEMENT
.................................................................................................................................................................... 191 
THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................................................................ 192 
THE OPPORTUNITY ................................................................................................................................. 193 
OBJECTIVES & GOALS............................................................................................................................ 194 
BENEFITS................................................................................................................................................ 195 
TECHNICAL WORK REQUIRED ................................................................................................................ 196 
MODELS, SEMANTICS, INFERENCE.......................................................................................................... 196 
8. REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN PRIVACY-
PRESERVING COLLABORATIVE NETWORK ............................................................................... 198 
HP NETTOP™ DEMONSTRATION ........................................................................................................... 199 
HP NETTOP™ DEMONSTRATION CONCEPT............................................................................................ 199 
HP NETTOP™ REFERENCE INSTALLATION ............................................................................................ 200 
TWO ENCLAVE HP NETTOP™ INSTALLATION ....................................................................................... 201 
9. BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE INCUBATOR 
PROPOSAL .............................................................................................................................................. 203 
 vii
W2COG BACKGROUND AND OPERATION CONSTRUCT: ......................................................................... 205 
W2COG INSTITUTE VALUE PROPOSITION TO BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY ........................... 206 
10. REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTATION OF GIG-LITE ON-LINE 
ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................................................... 208 
TAB A: EQUIPMENT, DATA, AND INTERFACES....................................................................................... 211 
TAB B: HOW TO PUBLISH TO A GIGCAST CHANNEL............................................................................. 217 
TAB C: MISSION SCENARIOS AND THREADS.......................................................................................... 221 
YOU ARE THERE WORKSHOP: HUMANITARIAN DISASTER RELIEF......................................................... 221 
YOU ARE THERE WORKSHOP: BORDER CONTROL ................................................................................. 221 
11. DOCUMENTATION OF TRUSTED AUTHORIZATION (ROLE BASED) POLICY ENGINE
.................................................................................................................................................................... 222 
12. NETCENTRIC CERTIFICATION OFFICE STATEMENT OF WORK.................................... 233 
13. SELECTED MEDIA CLIPPINGS ................................................................................................... 237 
CONSORTIUM JUMP STARTS NETWORK-CENTRIC INTEROPERABILITY ................................................... 238 
NETCENTRIC WARFARE LOOKS LIKE COMMERCIAL E-BUSINESS. JUST ASK AL QAEDA. ...................... 240 
DOD TURNS TO INDUSTRY FOR THE INTERNET IT WANTS ...................................................................... 242 
14. VALUABLE INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME (VIRT) AND VALUE OFF THE SHELF 
(VOTS) A FORMULA FOR NETCENTRIC ENGINEERING........................................................... 244 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 245 
A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO DEFINING INFORMATION VALUE...................................................... 246 
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST AND THE INTERNET MODEL ....................................................................... 248 
NETCENTRIC OPERATIONS PILOT PROCESS ............................................................................................ 248 
A NETCENTRIC OPERATIONS “INCUBATOR”........................................................................................... 250 
PROPOSED INCUBATION PROJECTS ......................................................................................................... 251 
MOBILE COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS ................................................................................................... 252 
"PRIVATE" BUT UNCLAS CROSS COALITION COLLABORATION NETWORK........................................... 253 
VALUED INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME (VIRT) ............................................................................. 254 
DISTRIBUTED, ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS .................................................................................................. 256 
NETWORK-CENTRIC COMMAND AND CONTROL—A LOGISTICS APPLICATION ...................................... 256 
NETCENTRIC BUSINESS PROCESS: ...................................................................................................... 257 
NETCENTRIC PREPARATION OF BUDGET EXHIBITS FOR MULTIPLE BUDGET REVIEWERS:........................ 257 
15. MANAGED SERVICE GIG, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR NETCENTRIC 
TRANSFORMATION ............................................................................................................................. 258 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 259 
CHALLENGE/OPPORTUNITY.................................................................................................................... 259 
BUSINESS MODEL AND TARGETS ........................................................................................................... 260 
E-BUSINESS CONTRACTUAL PARTNERSHIPS ........................................................................................... 262 
CHOOSE CONTRACT PARTNERS CAREFULLY.......................................................................................... 264 
COLLABORATIVE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SOA................................................................ 264 
CONVERT LEGACY CAPABILITY ............................................................................................................. 265 
TAB A: PANEL OF EXPERTS ................................................................................................................... 266 
TAB B: EXAMPLES OF E-BUSINESS ECONOMY OF SCALE AND INNOVATION.......................................... 267 
TAB C: LIST OF ACTIONS....................................................................................................................... 268 
TAB D: VALUABLE INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME (VIRT) ECOSYSTEM........................................ 270 
16. COLLABORATIVE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SERVICE ORIENTED 
ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................................... 271 
17. HARD PROBLEMS IN NETWORK OPERATIONS .................................................................... 276 
 viii
18. COMMAND RESILIENCY: AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR COMPLEX 
INCIDENTS.............................................................................................................................................. 286 
19. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS................................................................................................. 288 
20. BROCHURE FROM W2COG SYMPOSIUM ................................................................................ 295 

























BACKGROUND AND OPERATION CONSTRUCT 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) represents a fundamental shift by the DoD in 
information management, communication, and assurance to meeting the timely needs of 
both the warfighter and the business user. Senior OSD leadership recognized that 
implementing this vision would require vastly higher levels of collaboration across 
heretofore autonomous organizations and would need leveraging of commercial 
technologies augmented to meet DoD's mission-critical user requirements. They also 
recognized that the current DoD acquisition landscape neither provides incentive to nor 
convenient processes to encourage cross domain collaboration. They were encouraged by 
successes in the e-business private sector that have found ways to adopt collaborative 
practices to achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
 
Accordingly, the Office of Force Transformation, ASD Networks & Information 
Integration, DUSD Advanced Systems and Concepts, and DARPA, collectively provided 
$1.6M “angel money” to the Naval Postgraduate School to establish the World Wide 
Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) research initiative. The project objective is to create a 
self-sustained not-for-profit consortium that applies the Internet “open” e-business 
process to accelerate the GIG. A successful “open” forum is one wherein participants are 
motivated for their own reasons to make voluntary contributions to rapidly achieve 
mutually desired “good-enough” approaches to interoperability.    
 
The W2COG research initiative discovered that the principles of netcentric operations 
(NCO) can be effectively applied to engineering. That is, self-synchronized teams of 
vendors taking their cue from the Open Source movement can rapidly bundle their 
separate products to create incrementally more powerful information processing 
capability. This idea led to two central themes: The first is Valuable Information at the 
Right Time (VIRT); the power of NCO is in enhancing information utility, not moving 
data. The second is Value off the Shelf (VOTS); the power of netcentric engineering is in 
creatively re-using interoperable (i.e. off-the-shelf) components. Hence, W2COG projects 
demonstrate quantifiable improvements in information processing capability by bundling 
excellent off-the-shelf components.  
 
The W2COG research initiative spawned the not-for-profit W2COG Institute in July 
2005 to establish and maintain the infrastructure required to achieve the goals of the 
W2COG vision. 
 
The tenets of the W2COG Institute are to 1) create a forum and facility to discover 
commercial and government best practices and solutions for network and collaboration 
technologies; 2) establish and maintain a readily searchable data base of government, 
industry, and academic experts in operational, engineering, and programmatic aspects of 
net centric operations required to create the solution(s) required; 3) demonstrate the 
utility of off-the shelf network and collaboration components, and how they can be 
bundled and used to rapidly satisfy NCO requirements, to include placing them on 
commercial or government procurement schedules; 4) produce documentation that 
accompanies the successfully demonstrated bundled capability, and to perform 
independent testing and validation of the solution (“Underwriters Laboratory” function); 
and 5) sponsor Research and Development projects and provide grants in areas pertinent 
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The $1.6M dollars of OSD W2COG seed funds, equivalent to the cost of a typical DoD 
think tank study, has spawned a functioning global community of experts who have 
delivered a number of successful and well documented netcentric pilots. The aggregate 
value of these pilots far exceeds the investment, and proves the hypothesis that the 
W2COG “open” e-business model can accelerate GIG development. . A partial list of 
these successes follows:     
 
1. Delivered rapid, concise, cost-effective, impartial and expert analysis of important 
“net-ready” issues.  
 
a. Developed an IPv6 transition strategy document adopted by Australian Defense Force. 
Project took about six weeks, was conducted asynchronously by government and civilian 
experts in UK, US, and AU. (See appendix (1)) 
 
b. Provided focused comment by a team of world-class SOA experts on DISA proposed 
standards for enterprise services. Project took about two weeks and delivered consensus, 
concrete, recommendations from broad commercial and academic perspective for 
achieving DoD’s specific objectives. (See appendix (2))  
 
c. Formed a team of world-class experts to conduct a critical, rapid turn around, review of 
commercial trends and best practices as applied to NORTHCOM requirements for 
wireless and hastily formed networks. We are awaiting final adjustments to statement of 
work by NORTHCOM. (See appendix (3)) 
 
 A “net-ready” analysis document, prepared by a W2COG panel of 4-12 distributed 
experts, and informed by a global community of hundreds of additional experts, will 
typically cost a few tens of $K, and take 30 to 60 days to prepare. Industry studies used 
to support DoD decisions generally cost $1-3M and take six to eighteen months to 
prepare.  
 
2. Created a functioning GIG “data strategy” community of interest (COI). Semantic web 
technology is critical to the netcentric objectives of the GIG, but is immature. DoD has 
determined that federated GIG COI semantic data strategies are required, and is 
developing policy on COI formation and governance. Meanwhile, big software 
companies are looking for a “killer app” to take semantic web products to market. 
W2COG has succeeded in selling DoD C2 “semantic track” as that killer app to an 
impressive COI of IT industry giants, small innovative companies, and government labs. 
The W2COG Valuable Information at the Right Time (VIRT) COI is applying semantic 
web technology to model and monitor C2 track data among distributed sensor, weapon, 
and command & control systems to selectively and automatically populate User-Defined 
Operational Pictures (UDOP). (See appendixs (4) – (7)) 
 
VIRT COI members have invested their own R&D resources, conservatively estimated 
at $1.5M, to translate the concept into a pragmatic architecture. The team has put 
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together functioning hardware and software and is ready to apply it to DoD 
requirements. W2COG is in the process of establishing a similar “Tactical Chat” COI 
around open source bandwidth-efficient collaborative-service-over-IP tools, methods, 
and mission threads. 
 
3. Created “netcentric incubator” process to demonstrate, validate, and rapidly field net-
ready components for a coalition tactical “edge of the GIG” network. 
 
a. Bundled a suite of COTS web services that allow participants to control multi-level 
access to collaborative networked “private enclaves.” Information Assurance (IA) is a 
critical issue in any netcentric activity. First responders to a disaster, or soldiers fighting 
insurgents, need to share and/or protect information selectively depending on the 
situation. This reference implementation deliberately demonstrated the capability at an 
UNCLAS level. It uses NSA-approved commodity-based technology that offers identity 
management and information assurance similar to that used to conduct on-line Wall 
Street transactions. This cross domain solution, accredited for SECRET-high if desired, 
can be reproduced by any government consumer by adhering to the reference 
implementation documentation and purchasing the hardware and software components 
from the GSA schedule.  (See appendix (8)) 
 
b. Partnering with First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to rapidly field 
COTS/GOTS sophisticated, covert, wirelessly networked perimeter protection devices for 
US forces in Iraq. This project links COCOM, government labs, vendors, operators, and 
MARCORSYSCOM in the same engineering team that will deliver net-ready working 
product, suitable for DoD-wide off-the-shelf procurement, within six months.  
  
c. Enlisted Prof. Brian Steckler’s NS Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response 
(HA/DR) project to serve as a field lab for W2COG. HA/DR is a principal focus of 
W2COG because not only is it a vital concern for homeland security, it also offers a high 
stress UNCLAS test environment and a proxy domain for Stability Operations. The 
HA/DR response COI of voluntary vendors and government researchers assembles COTS 
components on the fly to provide “instant internet” in places with no power or 
communications infrastructure.  Team members were on the ground providing internet 
connectivity and basic C2 capability to first responders in the post-Katrina disaster zone 
three days after the Hurricane hit.  Positive response to Prof Steckler’s work among the 
W2COG community and others in DoD led to a thematic focus on Hastily formed 
Networks (HFN) by the NPS Cebrowski Institute and a continuing body of work highly 
relevant to accelerating fielding of netcentric capability to support, e.g. homeland 
defense. (See appendices (9) – (10)).  
 
d. Responded to a request for proposal from the Business Transformation Agency (BTA). 
Mr David Scantling is the senior executive brought in to government from industry to 
establish BTA’s methodology for certifying and fielding DoD enterprise level software. 
Mr Scantling had envisioned creating a process similar to the W2COG Netcentric 
Incubator and was pleased to learn that he can simply apply it to his requirements. We are 
awaiting BTA review of the proposal at appendix (11).   
 
e. Built a functioning model for a “GIG-lite” on line run-time repository of network-
enabling components. These components can be evaluated in context with embedded 
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mission threads. GIG-lite idea can be scaled to serve as a shared “sand box” for industry 
and government GIG developers.  (See appendix (12)) 
 
f. Fielding a reference implementation documentation of a scaleable Netcentric 
Enterprise Service for multi-level secure PKI identity authentication and performs 
dynamic role base access authorization, and post event audit. The reference 
implementation will be developed as part of a PMW160 Limited Objective Experiment 
last summer 2006 and will be built in partnership with SPAWAR System Center 
Charleston as an upgrade to capability originally fielded in the Horizontal Fusion project. 
The technology is described in appendix (13). 
 
g. Proposed a plan to establish a DoD Netcentric Certification Office to work in 
conjunction with the W2COG Incubator. Function is to provide government validation, 
verification, certification, and/or accreditation as an embedded activity of the netcentric 
incubator. The proposal was accepted and funded by DISA Joint Interoperability Test 
Command. (See appendix (14)).  
 
h. Fielding a reference implementation of a wireless “microserver” netcentric architecture 
around the aviation industry just-in-time maintenance use case. 
 
Netcentric “incubator” projects will typically spiral in 90 day increments from 
demonstration to prototype to product. Sponsor seed funds, usually less than $500K, 
will leverage partnering vendors’ internal development resources. Successful pilots will 
deliver government-approved net-ready information processing components 
immediately to the GSA or other approved procurement vehicle for immediate use by 
other operational units and/or program managers.     
 
4. Executed a public relations campaign for accelerating GIG development.  
 
a. Conducted a hands-on W2COG formation symposium at George Mason University 
in May of 2005. Received mandate from ~130 expert participants to create the W2COG 
Institute and establish an NCO incubator process. Forty nine large and small companies, 
government labs, universities and individuals joined the Institute to write its charter. (See 
appendix (20). 
 
b. Populated “war fighter panels” for multiple NCOIC and AFEI conferences. These 
panels, wherein uniformed warriors with recent combat experience interact directly with 
industry, are inevitably hailed as exceptionally valuable. A particularly compelling 
example was BG Huggins, Chief of Staff of the XVII Airborne Corps, joining one of 
these panels, net-centrically, live from Iraq.  
 
c. Delivered invited presentations to conferences of the Object Management Group, 
AFCIA, NDIA, Global Grid Forum, American Institute of Avionics and Astronautics 
(AIAA), AFEI, CxO Forum, NCOIC, and IPv6 Forum. Published more than a dozen 
articles and/or interviews. Established a web site that consolidates information about GIG 
and/or netcentric technical reference, literature, programs, experiments, experts, and 
activities.  Drafted and/or invited, collected, and circulated several expert white papers 




Recommendations to OSD 
 
1. Establish a dedicated level of effort of at least one DoD civilian FTE (direct hire, IPA, 
or continued NPS research) to perform full time outreach to the e-business sector, and to 
coordinate inherently governmental validation functions of W2COG NCO incubator 
activities.  
 
2. Encourage DoD engineering activities to employ W2COG Institute as follows: 
  
a. Single point of contact for immediate access to a spectrum of broad cross-industry, 
government, and academia information processing expertise 
 
b. Honest broker (e.g. Underwriters’ Lab), per status as 501(c)3 tax-exempt 
charitable/scientific activity, to evaluate, validate, and verify information processing 
capability 
 
c. Risk mitigation and low-cost, rapid turnaround on information processing concepts, 
pilots, and prototypes 
 
d. Means to certify and immediately field successful information processing reference 
implementations broadly via consumable off-the-shelf model 
 
e. Establish “netcentric productivity metrics” per operational COI information processing 
performance targets.  
 
f. Focus GIG semantic data strategy COI activity in general, and leverage VIRT UDOP 
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Scope             
The scope of this IPv6TP covers the Australian Department of Defence, Defence Information 
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upon the Information Infrastructure. Information is currently transported around the fixed and 
deployed infrastructure by a mix of IPv4 and other non-packetised and/or switched-circuit means. 










































































































Figure 1 Defence Information Environment 
 
ADO IPv6 Transition Policy 
The ADO issued the policy “Transition To Internet Protocol Version 6” [1] in February 2005. The 
policy states that the transition process will have broad reach across the DIE and involve all1 
Defence computer operating systems, network operating systems, network services, information 
services, core and distributed networks, and many of Defence’s corporate applications. 
 
Policy Statements 
The policy states; 
• all DIE networks to have completed IPv6 transition by 2013; 
• no IPv6 capable hardware or software shall be installed on ADO networks carrying 
operational traffic unless a risk assessment has been completed, the result approved by 
the CIOG and use is authorised by the CIOG in consultation with Headquarters Joint 
Operations Command (J6); 
• no IPv6 capable hardware or software shall be installed on ADO networks carrying 
operational traffic unless a risk assessment has been completed and the result approved; 
• the cost of transitioning will be reduced by leveraging information technology (IT) 
refreshment programs; 
• DIE IP enabled hardware and software procured or upgraded that is likely to be in service 
after 2013 shall be acquired with an IPv6 capability or an upgrade path that will allow it to 
be upgraded prior to 2013; 
• from 1 March 2005 all DIE IP enabled procurements should be both IPv4 and IPv6 
capable provided the cost of procurement or the marginal increase in the whole of life 
cost is acceptable and 
• current in-Service ADO equipment that has a scheduled end-of-life before 2010 is 
exempt from the policy. 
The drivers for ADO transition to IPv6 are stated in the policy as follows; 
• improved end-to-end network security over IPv4; 
                                                 
1 It is assumed that “all” relates to all the mentioned systems (e.g. Defence computer operating systems etc) 
within the DIE. 
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• better support for the expected growth in the number of mobile IP enabled devices, 
compared with that provided by IPv4; 
• the ability to improve the QoS for IP communications compared with IPv4; 
• simpler network management through more efficient hierarchical addressing and routing 
processes compared with that provided by IPv4; 
• is an enabler for the ADO’s vision of NCW; 
• will aid interoperability with Allies and 
• will reduce the likelihood of suffering from technology obsolescence. 
The policy also advises that: 
• IPv6 migration planning will also develop a consolidated ADO IPv6 address space 
management strategy to ensure that the ADO’s requirements are satisfied and to 
maximise Allied interoperability and 
• the CIOG will manage the transition planning and provide enterprise level guidance on 
IPv6 transition issues. 
This document covers the above “address space management strategy” point in Section 8 and 
this document as a whole is a part of CIOG’s transition planning guidance. 
 
Policy Limitations 
The “Transition To Internet Protocol Version 6” policy [1] is aimed at and limited to components of 
the DIE that; 
• are currently IPv4 enabled and will stay IP enabled into the future, or 
• components that are not currently IP enabled but will be IP enabled in the future. 
The policy does not explicitly mandate2 the transition to IP per se of components of the DIE that; 
• are currently not IP enabled and are not planned to be made IP enabled in the future3. 
Additional Steps To Realising the Policy Objectives 
The IPv6 benefits stated in the policy [1] and above in 1.2.1 are not wholly dependent on 
migration to IPv6, nor will they be guaranteed by migration unless the following significant 
additional steps are taken: 
• Network security 
o High grade IP network encryptors are available now for IPv4 networks. IPv6 
capable high-grade products are not yet available off-the-shelf. There is work 
under way in the US to upgrade the HAIPIE standards to include IPv6.  
o For high grade security there is no significant improvement to be expected from 
IPv6. 
o The IPSec standards are applicable to both IPv4 and IPv6. Implementations of 
these standards are widely available, including in Windows 2000 and XP and in 
most routers. The advantage of IPv6 is that support for IPSec is mandatory and 
should therefore be provided in all IPv6 capable devices. 
o IPSec VPNs implemented in hosts or routers can be used to provide 
confidentiality where a lower grade of security is acceptable, for example for 
‘need-to-know’ separation of personnel or financial data. 
                                                 
2 Although the policy does not explicitly mandate this, it is recommended that some governance measures 
should be put in place to ensure that all the required elements of the DIE achieve a routable status in the 
future to enable NCW, see section 1.2.2. 
3 For completeness sake only, there is also the scenario that DIE components that are currently IP enabled 
could revert “back” to switched circuit (and would therefore not be covered by the policy), however this is 
not considered as a sensible alternative. 
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o A public key certificate infrastructure (PKI) is necessary to exploit IPSec. It is 
expected that the ADO will wish to deploy its own PKI (rather than relying on 
commercial certification authorities). There may already be a PKI in place to 
support secure messaging in the ADO, but it would most likely require 
enhancement to support the more extensive demands of a large IPSec 
implementation. 
• Mobility 
o Mobility is a complicated issue involving potentially many layers of the protocol 
stack and not just the IP layer. However IPv6 does offer features that can 
contribute toward improved mobility. If the ADF expects to have increasing 
movement of users and platforms between networks where the impact is realised 
at the IP layer, then this feature will be valuable. Please see Annex G for more 
information on Mobile IP (MIP) and MIP version 6 (MIPv6). 
• Quality of Service 
o There is no difference between IPv4 and IPv6 in their support for basic QoS. 
Although IPv6 packets include a field for flow labels, its use has not been 
standardized. The QoS field carries the same diffserv code points (DSCP) in 
IPv4 and IPv6. 
o Effective use of QoS in IPv4 or IPv6 requires ADO-wide agreement on traffic 
classes, and considerable detailed planning of capacity allocations for each 
traffic class. If existing service provision contracts do not provide for consistent 
DSCP definitions, then re-negotiation will be needed. 
o Provision of QoS for Allied networks is an open topic. Currently it is understood 
that some US networks place Coalition traffic in a different QoS class. 
• Network management 
o It is not clear that IPv6 will offer any benefit to network management. There may 
be potential for some routing efficiencies because of the larger address space, 
but it will need considerable care in address allocation to achieve this, and the 
necessary administrative/management overhead may not be justified. 
o The ability of IPv6 to support auto-configuration is often cited as leading to a 
reduction in management effort. In military secure networks, this must be 
balanced against the need to have effective control over who or what may 
connect. 
• Address space 
o Although this will be a problem for organizations requiring additional address 
space, it may not be an immediate problem for the ADO. Unless there are plans 
to significantly increase the numbers of network elements, then the current 
allocation should be sufficient. A decision to provide IP capability to all land 
tactical units would be an example where a significant increase in address space 
would be required. However, even in this case, a private address range could be 
used (as the UK MOD is doing within Bowman). A forward-looking long-term view 
of the potential IPv6 address space requirement is provided in Section 5. 
• Interoperability 
o IPv6 everywhere is not essential for interoperability. The extent to which this is 
required depends on how far the ADF requires network-level interoperability with 
its Allies.  
• Obsolescence 
o Eventually this will be the driver for IPv6 transition. All other issues can be 
worked around, but at some point it is anticipated that commercial support for 
IPv4 will be discontinued. The ADO must ensure that all its projects take 
appropriate action to avoid problems of obsolescence. In most cases this will be 
dealt with by normal technology refresh activities, although it is noted that refresh 
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in military systems run over much longer timescales than most commercial IT 
systems. 
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This Internet Protocol Version 6 Transition Plan (IPv6TP) has been developed by BSG in 
collaboration with a Panel (“the Panel”) of world-leading IPv6 subject matters experts from the 
IPv6 Forum, QinetiQ, the Naval Post Graduate School and the World Wide Consortium for the 
Grid (W2COG). The scope for this IPv6TP includes the whole of the ADO’s Defence Information 
Environment (DIE).  
 
This plan commences in Section 3 by using a Systems Engineering methodology to develop the 
“context” for Internet Protocol (IP) generally within the DIE and the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 
specifically. The results of this “context” setting analysis proposes that “modularisation” is the key 
to achieving interoperability and “net centricity”. Two crucial overall design principles were 
generated, Principle 1 : Unit Level LANs and Principle 2 : Routable WANs. These principles are 
used throughout as a basis for many section of this IPv6TP. 
 
The Section 3 analysis also produced derived design requirements for the end-systems that 
connect to the DIE. The context setting analysis concluded with a definition of the boundary 
between the non-DIE and the DIE, this is important because the boundary often extends into the 
ADF’s tactical environment and its platforms where many of the “legacy” issues will be 
encountered in the future.  
 
Section 3 also summarises the IPv6 activities being conducted by the UK MOD, NATO and the 
US DOD. It was concluded by the Panel that because IPv6 has yet to progress to a sufficient 
state (anywhere in the world) there are currently no “off-the-shelf” strategies that could be applied 
to the DIE. As a result of this IPv6TP, the ADO is likely to be in advance of many organisations 
with regard to its IPv4 to IPv6 transition, and potentially better placed to meet its desired time-
schedule if the governance mechanisms can be smoothly and successfully implemented. 
 
The current and future DIE was also analysed with specific emphasis on the DWACN. The future 
DIE architecture was covered by specifying the DCP projects that will move the DIE from its 
current baseline to its future state. 
 
Section 3 concluded by providing relevant challenges, opportunities and emerging technologies. 
The ADO can expect to find its major challenges in the areas of transitioning its non-routable 
networks and security. 
 
The recommended IPv6 transition strategy is provided in Section 4 and depicted in Figure 15, this 
shows seven overlapping phases commencing from now until 2013. Importantly this strategy 
allows for a progressive roll-out of IPv6 whilst recognising that some parts of the DIE may never 
transition and small enclaves of IPv4 will be required past 2013. The strategy has also been 
designed to be cost-effective, to have no impact on defence operations and not to degrade 
interoperability with Allies, justification for this is provided in 4.3. 
 
To reduce the level of risk and ensure a successful transition Section 4.4 proposed a range of 
information assurance and test activities The recommended strategy section concludes with 
some specific advice for the key DCP projects. 
 
Section 5 provides a detailed step by step analysis method for constructing a robust IPv6 address 
plan, this indicates that the IPv6 address range could be anywhere between 34 bits (/30 address) 
and 46 bits (/18 address). Although this analysis requires further work, it is recommended that the 
ADO attempt to gain access to the largest contiguous block of addresses possible. 
 
Section 6 details a recommended governance structure for the ADO to transition the entire DIE. 
Two new organizational offices are proposed to ensure that the governance regime is 
implemented in an astute and timely fashion and that the actual implementation of IPv6 is 
appropriately funded and scheduled. 
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The IPv6 Transition Office (IPv6TO) is proposed to be part of the CIOG, its prime responsibility 
will be as the “interoperability custodian”. The IPv6TO will become the ADO’s centre of 
excellence for IPv6 and will also offer technical guidance to the whole of the ADO. 
 
The IPv6 Program Office (IPv6PO) has been proposed to act as the Program Manager for the 
implementation of IP across the whole DIE. Functionally the office must cover the scope of ADO 
projects from inception through to second pass (where they are under the control of the CDG) 
then on past second pass and into service (where they are under the control of the DMO). The 
IPv6PO is envisaged as an Integrated Product Team (IPT) with members from CDG and the 
DMO. Its creation, function and lines of reporting are seen as crucial to a successful transition. 
Section 7 details the organisational structure of the IPv6TO and IPv6PO. Each position within 
these offices is provided with a position description and details of the required competencies and 
experience. 
 
The conclusion to the process of developing this IPv6 transition strategy was to assess all its 
elements (including the proposed governance structure and workforce) for risk, see Section 8. 
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Transition Strategy Analysis 
The section applies a top-down methodology and provides several lead-in and supporting topics 
(Sections 3.1 to 3.5) in order to generate the “Recommended IPv6 Transition Strategy” which is 
presented in the following Section 4. 
Setting The Context For IPv6 
In dealing with narrow topics like how to implement IPv6, it's rather difficult to grapple without a 
clear and detailed context. Indeed, the justification for IPv6 is weak without this context.  
It's not clear when or if the ADO will ever run out of IPv4 addresses, therefore the usual address 
exhaustion reason for justifying IPv6 work is not convincing in the light of real world usage. But 
placed into an industrialization and network centric context, the case for IPv6 becomes stronger, 
particularly as a risk mitigation activity. 
In order to set an appropriate context we shall use a systems engineering approach, apply a top-
down methodology and analyse the following subjects in order: 
• Transitioning from artisan-based to industrial based information systems. 
• Defining the GIG. 
• Over all design principles (These are the principles needed to achieve net-centricity). 
• Defining Radio-WAN interface and performance requirements. 
• Defining the DIE boundary. 
Transitioning from artisan-based to industrial based information systems 
A review of the mechanical Industrial Revolution of the 1790s shows us the following: 
A. Use of chemical energy to extend man's muscles (steam and internal combustion 
engines). 
B. A transition from artisan to industrial methods of building systems. This transition requires 
an overall design, but then is able to take advantage of specializations of labour to ease 
constraints on quality and quantity.  
a. Modularisation of components is essential to the assembly line. 
b. Standards (e.g. bolt threads) are necessary to the modularisation. 
c. Technical training is required in the workforce. 
C. Rise of universal public education, where the focus shifted away from Latin and towards 
maths, chemistry and physics. 
These characteristics mirror almost perfectly into the Information Revolution chapter of the 
Industrial Revolution, this time from the 1990s onwards: 
A. We are using the network and the computer to extend man's mind. 
B. In a muddling way (because we lack historical perspective), we are shifting to a more 
industrial method of building information systems. This requires an overall design (see 
the principles below). 
a. Modularisation is critical to horizontally integrated information systems. 
b. Standards do not solve the modularisation problem (it's entirely possible to use 
the correct standards, mis-modularise a system and build a non-functional 
artisan information system), but the standards are essential to defining the 
modular boundaries. IP (and IPv6) is one among a handful of critical standards 
necessary to the modularisation problem. 
c. We need a technically trained workforce to manage our information systems. The 
divisions of labour show up on the job survey analyses but not yet in our skill-set 
definitions and training.  
C. The information technology skill-sets exhibit some patterns that can be capitalised in 
workforce planning throughout both the commercial and military environments. 
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Defining The GIG 
The US DoD has developed the concept of a Global Information Grid (GIG), however the 
PowerPoint definitions that are used to describe it are often confusing. For our purposes, the GIG 
can be defined as the ADO's internet and the definition can be further divided into the following 
components: 
A. Terrestrial WAN. This is analogous to the backbone services provided by the DWACN. 
B. Unit level LANs. In the US Navy4 there is a good existing proof in the form of the LANs 
installed their ships. Base/campus area networks are also considered as a good fit into 
this category. 
C. Radio-WANs. The purpose of the radio-WAN is to reach from the terrestrial WAN to 
mobile platforms (that contain the unit level LANs).  
D. End-to-end security. Familiar link and enclave security techniques must be 
complemented by end-to-end (or object level, or layer 7) security measures as the GIG 
grows. 
E. End-to-end management. It is no longer suitable to manage a network unto itself, the 
network segment inevitably routes into other network segments and we need to manage 
end-to-end. 
F. Upper layer protocols. The advent of reach to mobile platforms will trigger a new 
generation of upper layer protocols (MANET, NORM, device-aware, IPv6 and others). 
This topic remains rather moot until some of the above prerequisites appear (especially 
the radio-WANs), but is mentioned for completeness. The shortcomings of TCP over 
satellite networks is a well-known example of current-generation symptoms that need to 
be addressed in due time.  
The GIG is essentially the plumbing for the DIE. What we deliberately leave outside the GIG 
'cloud' is the end-systems that attach to it. These end systems (many in mobile platforms) define 
specific applications. And the end systems also consume IP addresses.  
 
The network plus end systems attached to it can represent information systems (sense, decide, 
act functions with the communications to connect them together).  
 
Overall Design Principles 
This section uses the “industrialisation” observations from 3.1.1 and applies a top-down method 
to develop a set of core “principles”. In this section we focus on how information systems should 
be assembled, where the aim is to describe a modularisation pattern that all of the ADO's 
information systems should adhere to. 
 
A modularisation pattern is important to ensure that our systems achieve interoperability across 
platforms, programs and also with Allies. We can observe that as a side effect of the 
industrialisation process the life cycles of information systems have become more rational and 
the cascading maintenance5 issues have become much better controlled.  
 
Therefore, we need two principles of 'network centric' to apply to the design and implementation 
of our information systems. 
 
                                                 
4 In the Blue Navy i.e. the part of the US Navy that sails the open ocean. 
5 Cascading maintenance: The problem caused when one component (that is tightly coupled) in a system 
requires maintenance (or replacement) and because of the tight coupling the requirement for maintenance 
cascades or flows into the other system components.  
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Principle 1 : Unit Level LANs  
  
Principle 1 : Unit-Level LANs 
End-systems (e.g. sensors, weapons, Allies etc) are connected to “the network” and 
not to each other. They are attached to unit-level LANs which are in turn connected via 
a router to either a radio-WAN or a terrestrial WAN. 
 
The Unit-Level LANs principle implies that no end systems are connected to each other (e.g. by 
point-to-point serial links) and no end systems in a platform are connected to off-board entities, 



















Figure 2 Example application of Principle 1 
 
As the implementation of this principle is outside the program scope of the CIOG, it must be 
captured as a governance issue where the CIOG has directive authority over the ADO’s Program 
Managers to ensure this modularisation and systems view is realised uniformly across the whole 
DIE (see Section 6). 
 
The end-goal is “modularisation” and it should be kept in mind that “standards”, although 
important, are only one of the means to that end. Part of the “modularisation” goal is creating 
what we term “good network citizens”. To become “good network citizens” our end-systems must 
encompass the following: 
 
• a LAN interface (which implies a protocol stack, which may in turn imply an IPv6 protocol 
stack); 
• an enveloping (wrapper) definition (MIME or XML are good examples), this provides all 
end-systems (that need to be interoperable) with a common language;  
• a means for authentication and encrypting data (e.g. S/MIME); 
• setting of DSCP on exiting data-grams for QoS purposes and 
• an SNMP agent that affords both local and remote manageability.  
Reasonable exceptions 
There are some reasonable exceptions to the Unit-Level LAN principle. 
The objective is to place the mission sensors, the mission decision support systems and the 
mission actors (weapons) in an 'inherently interoperable' position. If the platform is, for example, 
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an aircraft, we should note that this category does not necessarily include the platform's avionics 
(the information system necessary to fly the aircraft). A mindless enforcement of the above rules 
on the avionics package yields no interoperability benefits and is likely to be detrimental to issues 
such as flight safety. How far these rules penetrate into the platform's own control systems should 
be a decision properly left to the program manager acquiring the platform. 
  
Principle 2 : Routable WANs 
 
Principle 2 : Routable WANs 
Make Radio-WANs and terrestrial WANs routable. 
 
The WAN, both radio and terrestrial, can be viewed (SV-1) as a network cloud with routers at the 









Figure 3 Routable Network 
CIOG has some direct programmatic control over this segment (e.g. DWACN)(which is different 
to the US CIO organisation), so the issue for this principle is one of self-governance. 
The next section develops the interoperability requirements for radio-WANs. There are specific 
requirements (such as for covertness) that are considered to be outside the scope as they are not 
interoperability related. However if the CIOG is also acting as the Program Manager, then these 
other specific requirements will also have to be considered.  
 
Defining Radio-WAN interface and performance requirements 
The next step is to develop the interoperability and performance requirements for the radio-
WANs. Note that it is not necessary to know the specific uses to which these radio-WANs will be 
put, our approach is to make them part of the general purpose “internet plumbing”.  
Placing the radio into the rest of the GIG context enormously simplifies the protocol design. By 
defining a radio-WAN as a network cloud with routers at the edge, we find that we only need to 
get the protocols in the bottom two layers of the ISO Reference Model correct. Indeed, worrying 
about layers 3-7 of the Model constitutes an attempt to reinvent the internet (which is clearly a 
retrograde step) rather than extending the internet to mobile platforms.  
 
There are at least a two ways to analyse the protocol requirements for radio-WANs: 
 
• Operational views (Use Cases). This approach is a useful place to start, but it tends to 
be incomplete.  
• Taxonomic approach: e.g. look at the IEEE 802 protocols and hypothesize that if a 
requirement exists here, it's probably something that our military radio-WANs should 
consider 
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Operational Views (Use Cases) 
Let us consider an infantry soldier as an example. Recalling “Principle 1” (all end-systems attach 
to a LAN) and applying this to the soldier, he now “wears” the LAN as a part of his uniform. There 
will be several end-systems that will attach to his LAN: 
• his rifle scope (which doubles as a camera and becomes a sensor); 
• other cameras (in counterinsurgency operations, it's often useful to snap a picture of a 
person interrogated and send it somewhere); 
• his radio navigation receiver (e.g. GPS) which both tells him where he is and tells his 
allies where he is (blue force track, or, in USMC-ese, EPLRS); 
• his voice communications system (e.g. a VoIP equipment, the microphone and headset 
of which are part of his helmet) and 
• an instant messaging pad (a PDA or something similar that is strapped to his forearm).  
For reality check reasons, note that there are voice applications here, but there are also several 
“data” applications. In order to not burden this soldier with multiple communications systems, the 
“converged bandwidth” (also known as “all-IP”) solutions are absolutely required.  
The infantryman's equipment includes, a router and subscriber station of at least one radio-WAN 
which plugs into that and becomes the edge of the radio-WAN cloud. Because routers can have 
multiple ports, this is not mutually exclusive. 
 
Taxonomic6 Approach 
In applying a taxonomic approach it is useful to dissect the IEEE 802.x protocol architecture. In 
doing this we are hypothesizing requirements by finding their presence in existing network 
standards.  
 
Working down from the top of the stack (see Figure 4), all IEEE 802.x protocols (Ethernet, WiFi, 
WiMAX, etc.) use the IEEE 802.2 Logical Link Control (LLC). This interface definition (known as a 
SAP – service access point) provides an interface to the “higher layers” in the protocol stack. It is 
the LLC's presence that makes an 802.x network, a routable one.  
 
Figure 4 Protocol Architecture 
 
Below the LLC interface is the MAC (Media Access Control) function. The MAC defines how 
multiple subscriber stations on an 802.x network segment take turns transmitting. There are two 
kinds of access methods in IEEE 802.x: 
• contention based access (Ethernet and WiFi both use carrier sense multiple access) or 
                                                 
6 Taxonomy : “The science, laws, or principles of classification; systematics.” 
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• non-contention based access (Token systems (including FDDI) and WiMAX (802.16) 
use this method, these are necessarily more complex, but are more efficient in bandwidth 
usage and are stable under overload). Non-contention queues also offer ability to control 
QoS, something that contention based access does not do.  
Below the MAC functionality is a security sub-layer. This is a new appearance in IEEE 802.16 
and is a reaction to the poorly designed, band-aid approach to security in WiFi (802.11) that 
turned out to be easily exploitable. The purpose of the 802.16 security sub-layer is to protect the 
MAC layer messages that pass between subscriber and base stations to control the MAC state 
machine7. The presence of this security sub-layer in 802.16 is an area for further design when 
considering the additional security measures that should be built into a militarised version of the 
protocol. 
 
At the bottom of the MAC layer is an interface definition (another SAP) that provides a modular 
interface to the physical layer (Layer 1) beneath it. This is reflected in some COTS chipsets, 
particularly for 802.16. Some chip-set vendors have a MAC device and a Physical layer device so 
the interface has a real-world rendering. This interface is important to us when considering two 
things: 
 
• adapting COTS technology to military purposes (we want to minimize the parts we have 
to change) and 
• adapting to new technology over life cycles and controlling cascading maintenance (e.g. 
Ethernet has gone through a half dozen generations in the past 30 years by keeping the 
MAC stable and changing the Physical layer specification. Even here, the Physical Media 
Independent (PMI) part of the Physical layer specification has remained stable). 
IEEE 802.x splits Layer 1 into two parts: 
 
• PMI layer. This is the upper half of the physical layer and contains the frame structures. 
Essentially all COTS LAN protocols actively used today (e.g. cable modems and DSL) 
use the Ethernet framing standard. Aside from the COTS reuse aspects, use of Ethernet 
frames, and the necessary Ethernet addressing scheme, supports multicast. The frame 
structure is also “protocol independent” meaning that the frame cares not whether the 
data grams inside the frame are IPv4 or IPv6 or something else. 
• The Physical layer. This is the lower half of the physical layer and is Physical Medium 
Dependent. Potential media include wire, glass or the aether. For radio systems (i.e. via 
the aether), the Physical layer specification includes RF characteristics such as 
frequency, spectrum, modulation and, if existing, link crypto. Of these, the first three are 
covered in the IEEE 802.x specifications, usually in exhausting detail.  
Management interface 
Management interfaces do not map cleanly onto the tightly specified layered protocol stack 
design despite the fact that IEEE 802.x networks do have management interfaces. In earlier 
networks (e.g. FDDI) the management interface was captured as a modular specification. In 
802.16, the management interface is expressed as a MIB (Management Information Base) within 
the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) context.  
 
Mapping to radio-WAN programs 
There are two major points to consider when mapping to the radio-WAN programs:  
 
1. All of these programs should yield routable networks. This is supported by the GIG 
context definition, it matches the use case (assuming voice = VoIP) and the presences of 
the 802.2 LLC in all IEEE 802 networks indicates that this is a solid requirement. We 
have therefore, necessarily expanded the scope of ‘transitioning to IPv6’ to include the 
requirement to transition radio-WANs to ones that yield routable networks. 
                                                 
7 For readers familiar with current and older generation military satcom systems, these are analogous to 
orderwire messages.  
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2. Within the radio-WAN cloud we need to meet four requirements: 
a. A stable MAC that allows for QoS control. All radio networks can look forward to 
being saturated, so MAC stability (and consequent bandwidth efficiency) are 
important. Military networks clearly need to support QoS privileges to some users 
in some situations (e.g. official business over morale traffic, contact reports over 
logistics requests, everything else over PowerPoint). 
b. Multicast. For the “Supply-side”, Multicast is the only offset to the limited 
bandwidth that radio-WANs will have compared to the wired networks they route 
into. For the “Demand-side”, a lot of military data (e.g. the blue force track in the 
use case) is multicast in nature. 
c. Layer 2 and 1 security. Clearly we have LPI/LPD (Low Probability of Intercept 
and Detection), TA/TFA (Traffic Analysis and Traffic Flow Analysis) and jam 
resistance requirements. 
d. Management. The ability to manage the components in a radio-WAN is critical, 
both within the radio-WAN itself and for end-to-end across an internet in which 
the radio-WAN is a network segment. In the early design stages, its not 
necessary to derive management requirements via operational concepts, what's 
important is that all radio-WAN components have SNMP agents embedded in 
them so that their management interfaces (controls, dials, knobs) can be “read 
from”/”written to” both locally and remotely in a secure manner. 
COTS Re-use 
Of the protocols surveyed, IEEE 802.16 offers the best place to start adapting from: 
1. Like all other IEEE 802 protocols, it uses the 802.2 LLC so we have a routable network. 
2. And most of the objective criteria above is met within the network: 
a. 802.16 uses a scheduling MAC layer that is highly bandwidth efficient, stable 
under overload and allows QoS control.  
b. 802.16 reuses the Ethernet framing protocol and addressing so multicast is 
easily accommodated. 
c. The layer 2 security measures in 802.16 are far superior to anything in previous 
commercial network protocols. 802.16 does not provide layer 1 security – this is 
one of the adaptations we need to make (neither does any other commercial 
network spec). 
d. 802.16 specifies an SNMP MIB.  
There are several adaptations required to make 802.16 suitable for use in military information 
systems, the obvious ones reside in the Physical layer: 
• Military users routinely use different spectrum allocations and modulation methods than 
those used by commercial users. Commercial 802.16 uses higher frequencies and 
OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplex) modulation. But these changes are 
confined below the MAC/Physical Layer SAP and do not affect anything above that in the 
protocol stack (Note: the 802.16 structure could not be used with a HF Physical layer 
implementation because of the bandwidth requirements). 
• Security needs to be added at Layer 1. This can take the form of spread spectrum (which 
affords covertness in addition to TA/TFA protection). Or it can take the form of link 
encryption (providing TA). If these protections are provided, we can re-examine whether 
the incompleteness in the layer 2 (802.16 security sub layer) require further design effort. 
Other than the Physical layer there is also one MAC layer problem that needs to be dealt with in 
adapting 802.16 to a military context. Some of the MAC messages (including some critical ones 
like the upload map) are transmitted in one frame and are required to be acted upon in the next 
frame. The existing protocol works (and has been tested by developers to show adequate 
headroom) as long as frame length exceeds propagation time. In geo-synchronous Satellite 
Communications situations, the COTS 802.16 protocol would see many frames 'in flight' at any 
point in time which will cause the timing constraints to be broken. This issue is being studied in 
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the United States where there is a proposal to solve the problem by simply stretching the MAC 
frame in time (from the current 0.5 – 2 msec spec in the standard) to whatever the maximum 
propagation time is. 
 
Use of radio-WANs based on IEEE 802 protocols places the addressing issue beneath layer 3, so 
the IPv4/v6 questions do not apply. 
 
Managing Legacy 
For the purposes of this discussion we put non-routable but current technology (e.g. Link 11 and 
Link 16) in the same class as legacy technology (i.e. non-routable out-dated technology). TADILs 
are classed here as legacy because the same methods are used to make them routable as would 
be used for a pure-legacy system (e.g. Raven CNR). There are two proven methods for handling 
legacy: 
 
• Cocooning. This method uses an 'IP wrapper' around a non-internet communications 
system. The US Navy's ADNS system employs this method to put IP cocoons around 
non-IP communications channels such as MILSTAR EHF and SHF channels. There may 
be cases where the ADO could use this technique, but in the main it is judged to be of 
limited use. 
• Layer 7 gateways. These gateways (see Figure 5) provide a means of “entire-protocol-
stack” translation from one domain to another. For instance, we can use a layer 7 
gateway to translate from the 'pure IP' illustrated above and a platform that has, perhaps, 






















Figure 5 Layer 7 Gateway 
 
The objective is to keep in tact Principle 1 and the “Good Network Citizenship” rules. If either of 
these is corrupted, all the modularisation benefits will be lost. The means is to add a Layer 7 
gateway outside the router, as illustrated. This gateway receives IP data grams with XML-tagged 
track data from the router. It translates that data into, for example, a Link 11 track transaction and 
encloses it in a Link 11 frame per all the Link 11 standards. This makes the Link 11 side of the 
gateway wholly interoperable with a Link 11-equipped platform. 
  
Gateways are not new, nor are they new in this kind of application. But the familiar form may not 
be immediately recognizable as a gateway. There are a large collection of 'connectors' in Global 
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Command & Control System (GCCS), including a connector for Link 11. It's a computer-centric 
implementation of the same tool where this is a network-centric implementation. 
 
Good Network Citizen Data Wrapper 
Our definition of a “Good Network Citizen” included the need for an enveloping data wrapper. The 
list of end-systems must now be expanded to include any layer 7 gateways as well. There is 
however a severe scalability problem to be avoided. This is because the number of gateways can 
increase with the square of the number of end-systems to be integrated, e.g. one gateway is 
required to integrate two end-systems but three gateways are required to integrate (add) a third 
end-system 
 
The increasingly accepted approach (in the US) seems to be to use XML tagging as the wrapper, 
if a common wrapper language (e.g. XML) is used, then the exponential effect can be avoided 
and the number of gateways only expands linearly with the number of end-systems.   
 
DIE Boundary 
The DIE does not include the ADF’s sensors or weapons but does include the interfaces to allow 
information to flow between them and the rest of the DIE. Figure 6 illustrates the DIE boundary 
using the example of a Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft. This shows that the DIE includes the ground 























DIE Influence  
 
Figure 6 DIE Boundary Example 
 
Figure 7 expands upon the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) and details examples of both 
the user applications and the communications systems that make up the static and deployed 





























CIF, PMKeyS, ROMAN,SDSS, etc
Office grade workstations, palmtops, phones Ruggedised, protected or 
milspec devices
Centralised storage systems, RAID, central
and distributed servers, mainframes, SANs
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or milspec storage and server systems
W/L/B/AN devices, protocols, boundaries, 
routers, hubs, firewalls, crypto devices
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Figure 7 DII (Defence Information Infrastructure) Detailed 
 
Figure 8 shows (an example of) the full extent of the boundary between DIE and non-DIE 
components of the ADF where Principles 1 and 2 have been followed. In this figure we can see 
the “mission-thread” from another platform (implementing the decide function) through the radio-





































The above two Principles (3.1.3.1 & 3.1.3.2) will be referred to throughout this IPv6TP. 
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Execution of these principles modularly separates end-systems and the network infrastructure. 
This increases modularity, reduces cascading maintenance problems and allows technology 
insertion8 in both the network infrastructure and in the end-systems independent of each other. 
Implementing these principles does not automatically achieve interoperability, but it does lay the 
enabling foundation. Conversely, avoiding these principles may lead to interoperability problems 
within the ADF and between the ADF and it’s Allies. 
IPv6 Background 
Current or Previous IPv6 Transitions 
The world-wide experience with transitioning to IPv6 from IPv4 is such that the Panel is of the 
opinion that fully-completed/previous transition strategies do not exist because no organisation 
has yet completed a transition. The UK, NATO and US defence organisations are in the process 
of planning their transitions, however the Panel is not able to provide substantial details (beyond 
what is available in the public domain) of these current transitions strategies because this 
information either cannot be shared under the existing arrangements and or is classified (See 
1.3.2 for a list of Government-to-Government documents). 
 
The Panel has a range of views concerning the actual state of completeness of the MOD and 
DOD plans. Details of these transition plans can me made available to the ADO by direct liaison 
between the ADO and the relevant members of these organisations. The Panel will be able to 
assist the ADO to make the necessary contacts. 
 
The following paragraphs summarise what can be advised concerning the progress with current 
IPv6 planning within the UK, NATO and US defence organisations. 
 
UK MOD IPv6 Transition 
The UK MOD is in the process of developing an IPv6 transition strategy that will be followed by a 
detailed IPv6 plan9. A study undertaken in 200410 explored the key drivers for transition and 
highlighted critical issues. In summary the report concluded that: 
 
• the primary driver for MOD transition is UK – US interoperability; 
• there is no pressing UK national need for IPv6 migration; 
• the primary UK national driver is to avoid obsolescence; 
• the UK MOD has ample address space; 
• the features of IPv6 (when compared with IPv4) do not lead to obvious enhancements to 
military capability and 
• security is a critical issue which has yet to be fully explored. 
About eighteen (18) months ago the UK MOD set about to quickly determine a strategy for IPv6 
transition, and initially settled on a preference to use the Dual-Stack11 approach. That early 
decision is now being re-appraised and questions have been raised.  
 
In 2004 the MOD Defence Interoperable Network Services Authority (DINSA) was tasked to 
acquire IPv6 address space. It is our understanding that DINSA do not see this acquisition as a 
high priority and consequently they have not made significant progress. They are however 
looking at the request generated by the US DOD with the intention of using it as a template and 
initially requesting a small allocation with the view to expanding this at a later stage. 
To our knowledge there have been no studies to ascertain the address space size or address 
hierarchy required by the UK MOD. The MOD’s current fixed IPv4 network infrastructure is 
                                                 
8 IPv6 is one such technology that can be inserted. 
9 It is understood that the UK MOD and US DOD are considering demonstrating IPv6 at CWID 60/07. 
10 This study was undertaken by a team of two consultants within the Integration Authority from within the 
MOD’s Procurement Agency. One of the consultants was replaced by John Pennington in August 2004. 
11 See Annex A for a description of the Dual-Stack approach, it’s advantages and disadvantages. 
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provided by British Telecom (BT) who are responsible for technical management of the network 
including addressing structure. 
 
The UK MOD has yet to allocate funding to conduct an IPv6 study (similar to the one that has 
generated this Plan/Strategy) and therefore the ADO is likely to be more advanced than the UK 
MOD in its planning by the time this report is complete. 
 
NATO IPv6 Transition 
The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) has been tasked to develop an 
IPv6 transition plan by early 2006. This is aimed at transition for the NATO command chain, 
which largely operates at the strategic level (between NATO and national defence headquarters). 
The scope is NATO funded communications and information systems and interfaces to national 
systems, including national systems deployed in support of NATO operations. NATO is 
developing a definition of IPv6 conformance and related procurement guidance and a STANAG 
for IPv6 interoperability may be produced in the future. Initial studies have reached the following 
conclusions: 
 
• there is no overarching technical reason for NATO to transition to IPv6; 
• the drivers are national transition plans and the pace of commercial developments; 
• current NATO policy is to prepare for IPv6; 
• maintaining operation and interoperability within the complex NATO infrastructure are 
crucial issues; 
• systems will be fully functional and tested prior to cut-over from IPv4; 
• a strategy being considered is to cut-over each distributed information system separately 
and selecting the transition mechanism from a range of options in order to fit the 
characteristics of the subject system being transitioned; 
• the NATO strategy implies that IPV4 and IPv6 networks will be supported in parallel for 
some considerable time and 
• the parallel support of IPv4 and IPv6 will result in increased cost and the chosen 
transition profile may significantly affect the overall cost, however a detailed cost analysis 
must be conducted to quantify the cost implications. 
This NATO view was reinforced by a presentation at the recent Coalition Summit for IPv6 
conference in Reston USA [7]. 
 
US DOD IPv6 Transition 
The US DOD issued the memorandum “Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)” [6] in 2003. This 
document provides policy for enterprise-wide deployment of IPv6. IPv6 is specified as the next 
generation network layer protocol of the Internet as well as the Global Information Grid(GIG)12, 
including current networks such as the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications 
System (JWICS), as well as emerging DOD space and tactical communications. The DOD has 
the goal of completing the transition by the end of the 2008 US financial year. A summary of 
some of the major elements of the policy include: 
 
• from 1/10/2003 all GIG assets being developed, procured or acquired shall be IPv6 
capable; 
• transition of the GIG will occur between 2005 and 2007 (US financial years); 
                                                 
12 US definition: The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated 
processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on 
demand to war fighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all owned and leased 
communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security 
services, and other associated services necessary to achieve Information Superiority. 
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• IPv6 was not permitted on networks carrying operational traffic from 2003, subject to 
further review; 
• DISA to acquire IPv6 address space to meet five years of requirement; 
• DISA specified as agency to manage DOD IP addresses and 
• DOD Chief Information Officer to develop an IPv6 transition plan. 
As stated in 3.2.1 the ADO will require direct liaison with the US DOD to share the full extent of its 
IPv6 planning. The Panel is also aware that the company Electronic Data Systems (EDS) is 
working on IPv6 for the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and that the state of this IPv6 
planning could be obtained through the appropriate government-to-government links.  
 
The international organisation the IPv6 Forum (www.ipv6forum.org) and the North American IPv6 
Task Force (www.nav6tf.org) have provided input to the US DOD to help with their IPv6 transition 
planning. These two organisations are a significant source of publicly available documentation 
and work supporting the benefits of transitioning to IPv6. 
 
The paper “IPv6 Response to National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Final V2.0” [11] highlights 
many of the problems with today’s Internet architecture (IPv4 and NAT) and is supportive of 
transitioning from this architecture to IPv6. 
 
The paper “NAv6TF PCIPB Input Part II” [12] agrees with the benefits (put forward in the DIMPI 
[1]) of adopting IPv6, e.g. 
 
• larger address space for end-to-end global reach ability and internet scaleability; 
• simplified IPv6 data packet header; 
• support for routing and route aggregation, making Internet backbone routing more 
streamlined and efficient; 
• server less (“stateless”) IP auto-configuration, easier network renumbering, and much 
improved plug and play support13; 
• security with mandatory implementation of IP Security (IPSec) and 
• improved support for IP mobility inherent in IPv6. 
The paper also puts forward a (US) business case for the transition to IPv6 and makes a series of 
recommendations for US Government and US Industry, some of those recommendations 
included: 
 
• application providers to support Dual IPv4/IPv6 stack (see Annex A for more detail) to 
begin delivery of IPv6 services coexistent with IPv4; 
• take early steps to obtain adequate IPv6 address allocations and 
• consider in their (industry) manufacturing plans that the majority of mobile devices, and a 
growing number of household and consumer-electronic devices will require some form of 
IP connectivity. 
The paper “NAv6TF NTIA IPv6 RFC Response” [13] also supports the previously cited benefits 
for the transition to IPv6. This paper was generated in response to the NTIA’s request for 
comment (RFC) on IPv6 and provides a view on the costs of transitioning to IPv6 including 
“Hardware Costs, Software Costs, Training Costs and Other Costs”. 
 
Although the US DOD IPv6 transition is mandated by [6] to be completed by 2008, it is the Panels 
view that the actual transition of all IP based systems will take some years longer than 2008. The 
emphasis for the US is to transition selected IP networks and entities to be IPv6 capable by 2008. 
                                                 
13 [12] specifies that, “This is the most important future benefit for the Department of Defense and Home 
Land Defense communications.” 
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The Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) IPV6 transition strategy is summarised in 
Figure 9 [3]. 
 
 
Figure 9 DISA’s IPv6 Strategy 
 
DISA does not own any sensors or weapons or decision support nodes (other than their own 
network operations sites) and therefore the scope of this strategy cannot be considered as a 
complete US DOD IPv6 strategy. Even if it were completely and successfully executed it would 
not address the issue of the many artisan14 data links (e.g. tactical data-links) that are closely 
coupled to sensors within platforms (Refer to “Principle 1”). 
 
Potential Transition Strategies 
It is the Panel’s view that there are no “off-the-shelf” strategies that could be applied to the DIE, 
however some elements of the MOD, NATO and US experiences may have potential for 
incorporation into an effective strategy for the ADO and the DIE. More importantly however the 
strategy should draw on the principles suggested in 3.1 and work within the timetable and 
constraints of the DCP programs that will shape the DIE into the future. 
The remainder of this transition plan therefore calls upon the collective expertise of the Panel and 
an analysis of the DIE to provide strategic options and a recommended strategy in Section 4.  
Defence Information Environment (DIE) 
As an input to forming a suitable transition strategy, it is first necessary to understand the current 
baseline DIE and then explore where it is likely to progress over the period to 2013. Another view 
of the DIE (compared with Figure 1) and its interfaces is the view that shows the command 
support environment, see Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 DIE Command Support System Environment 
 
This view indicates that the command support systems are divided along service (Army, Navy, 
Airforce & Special Operations) lines and each of these systems contains a unique set of legacy 
DIE infrastructure. 
 
The rest of this section focuses on the current and future configurations of the infrastructure 
components (DII) of the DIE. 
 
DII Baseline Configuration in 2005 
The current (in 2005) DII configuration and architecture description is divided into “fixed” and 
“tactical” components as follows. 
 
DII Fixed Infrastructure Configuration 
A generic view of the Defence Communications Network (DCN) is depicted in Figure 11 and 
consists of: 
 
• Defence Wide Area Communications Network (DWACN) and 
• tactical networks. 
The DWACN component of the DCN consists of: 
 
• Defence owned wide area communications equipment/services, 
• Telstra owned wide area communications equipment/services, 
• Singtel/Optus owned wide area communications equipment/services, 
• satellite provider owned wide area communications equipment/services, 
• Defence owned local area networks and 

























































Figure 11 Generic DCN 
 
Defence Wide Area Communications Network (DWACN) 
The high level relationships for the DWACN are illustrated in Figure 12. The DWACN provides 
voice, video and data services via: 
 
• the Defence Restricted Network (DRN), 
• the Defence Secret Network (DSN), 
• the Defence Voice Network (DVN) and 
• other networks. 
 
 
Figure 12 High-level Overview of the existing DWACN Relationships15 
 
The DWACN interfaces to Carrier Networks (Telstra & Singtel/Optus) and to Defence owned 
carrier-grade infrastructure. The DWACN provides connectivity between approximately three 
hundred (300) sites16, most of which are located within Australia, see Figure 13. 
                                                 
15 Source = [4] DWACN FPS 




Figure 13 High-level External Interfaces17 
 
DWACN sites include nearly all DOD establishments (bases, barracks, headquarters, offices etc) 
that are regularly staffed and a small number of Other Government Organisations (OGOs). There 
are also approximately twenty (20) overseas sites within the DWACN. 
 
The DWACN has a hierarchical structure and is managed centrally. ATM is used extensively to 
aggregate different types of traffic and traffic from different sources. Commercial 
telecommunications carrier services (Telstra & Singtel/Optus) are utilised for most of the inter-site 
transmission. 
 
The core of the DWACN (see Figure 14) consists of fourteen (14) large switches and these in-
turn are connected around the core by approximately 150 smaller (Nortel Passport) switches. 
There is just “one network” and all the DRN, DSN and DVN traffic is handled over this network, all 
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Figure 14 DWACN Core 
                                                 
17 Source = [4] DWACN FPS 
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The DRN consists of the following environment18: 
• Users:  79,000, 
• Platforms: 55,500, 
• Servers:  1300, 
• LANs:  500 and 
• Applications: 50 Corporate 600 Others. 
The DSN consists of the following environment19: 
• Users:  13,000, 
• Platforms : 10,500, 
• Servers:  395, 
• LANs:  70 and 
• Applications: 50 Corporate 600 Others. 
DII Tactical/Deployable Infrastructure Configuration 
The tactical infrastructure consists of: 
Airforce Infrastructure 
Operational Link 11 in aircraft. Installed but not operational LINK 4A in some aircraft (FA-18) and 
ROCs. 
Army Infrastructure 
Raven - Combat Net Radio (CNR) + Parakeet + VHF/UHF/Satellite Trunks. 
Navy Infrastructure 
Link 11 in some ships (FFGs + FFHs). Extant HF and UHF. 
Common Infrastructure 
JP2043 HF Modernisation Project. The purpose of the High Frequency (HF) Modernisation 
Project (JP 2043) is to provide the ADF with a secure, cost-effective information exchange 
capability for the command and control of deployed forces as a primary survivable system and as 
a parallel system to satellite communications. The Modernised High Frequency Communications 
System (MHFCS) comprises a nation-wide network of distributed HF radio stations (the Fixed 
Network) with a central network management system in Canberra. The Project includes 
upgrading of HF radio systems in selected mobile platforms and transportable HF communication 
shelters (the Mobiles). The MHFCS is replacing some of the existing single Service HF fixed-
mobile tactical HF gateways. 
 
DII Future Configuration 
The future DIE will be shaped by a number of current, ongoing and future projects20. 
 
DII Fixed Configuration 
The future configuration of the fixed component of the DII will be formed by the extant 
components and will be most influenced by the changes implemented by the following DCP 
projects: 
• DEF 7013  Joint Intelligence Support System (JISS), 
• JP 2008  Military Satellite Communications , 
• JP 2030  Joint Command Support Environment, 
                                                 
18 Source = [5] plus information provided by DOD Information Systems Division 
19 Source = [5] plus information provided by DOD Information Systems Division 
20 See Annex D for a detailed list of the DCP projects 
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• JP 2047  Defence Wide-Area Communications Network (DWACN), 
• JP 2068  DNOC, 
• JP 2069  High Grade Cryptographic Equipment (HGCE) and 
• JP 2090  Combined Information Environment.  
DII Tactical/Deployable Configuration 
The future configuration of the tactical component of the DII will be formed by the extant 




• AIR 5276 Ph 6 Data links for AP3-C Orion aircraft, 
• AIR 6000  Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 
• AIR 7000  Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). AP3-C replacement and 
• AIR 9000  Helicopters. 
Army Infrastructure 
• JP 2072  Battlespace Communications System (Land),  
• LAND 75  Battlefield Communications Support System (BCSS) and 
• LAND 125 Soldier Combat System. 
Navy Infrastructure 
• SEA 1442  Maritime Communications Modernisation and  
• SEA 4000  Airwarfare Destroyer. 
Common Infrastructure 
• JP 2089 Tactical Information Exchange Domain (TIED) (Data Links). 
Challenges 
This section identifies the major challenges faced by the ADO in transitioning the entire DIE to a 
network that will support the concepts of Network Centric Operations. The scope of this section 
extends beyond simply considering the transition of IPv4 networks to IPv6 ones, but also 
considers to transition of the entire DIE to IP.  
 
Transitioning Non-Routable Networks 
Outside of the DWACN the extant DIE is featured by many non-routable networks21. Presuming 
that there is an aspirational goal (past 2013) to provide routable connections from the network all 
the way out to the very edge (i.e. to the sensor/shooter), the largest concentration of non-routable 
entities within the ADF is likely to be in the Army. 
 
Potentially the most significant challenge will be, not only transitioning the extant DIE IPv4 
networks to IPv6, but also transitioning the entire DIE toward an all-IP network. Specific 
challenges are likely to be realised in DIE related DCP programs where: 
 
• they have been in progress for an extended period prior to generation of the ADO’s IPv6 
policy and a non-routable design has already been chosen; 
• there is a DIE component, but the DCP program is ostensibly a platform purchase 
(Foreign Military Sales (FMS)) where the solution (non-routable) is part of the FMS 
design or 
                                                 
21 Non-routable networks are those networks that do not use IP. 
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• where the program has sufficient time but insufficient budget to implement a more-costly 
routable solution. Note that if the design decision is made early enough, the routable 
solution can be cost-neutral.  
For the above cases it is expected that these networks will be very slow to transition to IP and 
IPv6 with some networks remaining non-routable well past 2013. 
 
The implementation of IP and routable networks is an enabler for interoperability, but does not 
guarantee it, this leads us to the next challenges. 
 
Interoperability 
IP occupies just one layer (layer 3)22 of the seven layer ISO communications model and 
interoperability between nodes across a network requires all layers at either end of the circuit to 
be compatible and interoperable. 
 
The transition process will involve the rolling out of hardware and software from various vendors 
by various organisations at varying points of time. Simply stating that a network component is 
IPv6 capable will not ensure interoperability with other “IPv6 enabled” components and 
mechanisms will need to be in-place to test components prior to their insertion into the DIE. 




The security mechanisms in place today within the DIE and Allied networks use a mix of physical 
separation and encryption at the Data Link layer (2) or Network layer (3). Layer 2 solutions have 
to do with covert communications and link security. The scope of these solutions is limited to 
single links or network segments where the applied security must be reversed at the nearest 
router. Layer 3 solutions are those yielded by Virtual Private Network (VPN) equipment as well as 
firewalls, intrusion detection devices, passwords and physical security measures. Everything 
within an enclave must run up to the same security level (e.g. Secret). Layer 3 solutions can be 
vulnerable to insider attacks. 
 
Continuing to solely rely upon these security methods may lead to a future where there is 
insufficient interoperability within the ADF and between the ADF and Allies to achieve the degree 
of network centric operations desired. It is not recommended that current security tools be 
discarded. Link security measures are necessary for covertness and traffic analysis immunity in 
at least some situations and enclaving (provided by layer 3 security tools) is necessary for 
infrastructure protection/separation. 
 
It may be possible to improve the flexibility, power and interoperability of the DIE by transitioning 
to an end-to-end network model with security implemented at the Application layer (7), or “object-
based”. This is offered as an “opportunity” and is discussed in 3.5. 
 
Taking this approach and modifying the security architecture would present major challenges (for 
the ADO and Allies) as it is a fundamentally different approach with potentially large ramifications 
across the entire DIE. It would need to be very carefully planned by experts and would need to 
consider both the technical impacts of implementation and the requirements for the development 
of new policies, practices and training. 
 
Although the concept of object-based security can be recommended for its advantages, it is not 
placed within scope or on the timeline for the purposes of this IPv6TP. Considering this, the only 
requirement identified by this plan for IPv6 transition will be to ensure that any cryptographic 
equipment (implemented at the IP layer) within the security architecture is IPv6 enabled, 
equipment which only implements security at layer 1 or 2 is not affected. 
                                                 
22 There are other protocols (e.g. MANET ones) that can also occupy layer 3. 
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Opportunities 
This section discusses the lessons learnt and emerging technologies that may influence the 
transition to IPv6. 
 
Lessons Learnt 
Transitioning to IPv6 is yet to have sufficiently progressed anywhere in the world to be in a 
position to provide any substantial “lessons learnt”. However the Panel has other experience that 
is worthwhile relating to this IPv6TP: 
 
• Mandating the transition to a new, complicated and competing protocol (e.g. GOSIP) over 
a short time frame is likely to lead to significant cost with a high probability of failure. 
o Therefore it is recommended that the IPv4 to IPv6 transition is long and over-
lapping and made as easy as possible. 
• The initial “wired” IEEE 80x.x LAN standards (802.3, 803.4 & 802.5) all use a common 
Layer 2 Logical Link Control (LLC) interface (802.2). As well as all these standards being 
routable, the use of a common LLC allows all these LAN standards to interoperate and 
be bridged together. This is also true of the subsequent wireless 802.x standards. The 
LLC framing standard includes a “payload” field which in the context of this IPv6TP 
means that any Layer 3 can be interfaced to the Layer 2 and 1 that sits below, in other 
words these IEEE standards are IPv6 ready. Some of the LAN standards (e.g. 803.4 and 
802.5) have faded from popularity but Ethernet (802.3) has continued to evolve with the 
underlying Layer 1 (PHY) being improved whilst leaving the upper specification virtually 
unchanged. This success has meant that other standards (e.g. FDDI23 & DOCSIS24) have 
reused large amounts of the 802.x standards. Therefore: 
o the features of the 802.x protocol architecture forms a significant basis for the 
requirements of military wireless networks, with some components being directly 
applied whilst others will require modification and 
o the 802.x networks are “IP agnostic” and therefore largely immune to the 
success/failure of narrowly scoped IPv6 transition initiatives. 
• The Defence Message System (DMS)25. DMS was conceived in 1988 as a secure 
messaging system where confidentiality was provided by encrypting parts of the email 
body. This was designed to provide confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation on an end-to-end, media independent basis. The system took fourteen years 
(2002) to begin fielding despite the fact that it is essentially a software system. Therefore: 
o there are significant risks in diverging too far from the general trends being 
followed and developed by the rest of the information technology community and 
o re-inventing an essentially COTS product (email) to provide just one feature 
(security) has major acceptance risks, on the other hand, adapting essentially 
COTS products to the same end tends to leverage existing technology and eases 
user acceptance.  
• There are millions of IPv4 nodes in existence today with a very large investment in IPv4 
applications, the consequences of this will be that: 
o some IPv4 nodes will never upgrade to IPv6, 
                                                 
23 FDDI Fibre Distributed Data Interface. 
24 DOCSIS Data Over Cable Service Interface. 
25 DISA’s description of the DMS. “The Defense Message System (DMS) is the designated messaging 
system created by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and supporting agencies. It is a flexible, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) based application providing 
multimedia messaging and directory services using the underlying Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) 
network and security services.” 
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o IPv4 and IPv6 will coexist for an extended period (beyond 2013) that will be 
heavily dependent on commercial interests and the pace of technological 
change, 
o transition should prevent the isolation of IPv4 nodes and 
o it is very unlikely that there will be a “flag day”26. 
Emerging Technologies 
The following emerging technologies are taking hold within the general Internet and may have 
some application and advantages for the DIE. 
 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
Public Key technology is used in a variety of places and is becoming extremely important within 
the Internet. The uses are far more than just securing email and include: 
• email security is an excellent example of object level security and as already stated, 
object-level security is possibly one of the most important enablers for cross-Allied 
interoperability; 
• PKI is used within SNMPv3 (Simple Network Management Protocol). Remote 
management of a network with any protocol involves exposing data to risks from 
interceptors and spoofers. PKI enables get, set and trap messages to be authenticated 
and confidentiality-protected in an end-end, media-independent fashion. This will be 
increasingly important as networks become more integrated; 
• IEEE 802.16 added a security sub-layer in its specification (as a result of the exploits that 
emerged once IEEE 802.11 WiFi became popular). This layer secures certain MAC-layer 
messages that pass between the terminal and the base station. The purpose of this 
security is to increase resistance to man-in-middle attacks which result in theft or denial 
or service. In the case of 802.16, the PKI is to be managed very similar to the MAC 
addresses in Ethernet, the X.509 certificates will be factory-installed just like a MAC 
address and 
• various technologies under the general heading of “over-the-air”, such as re-keying 
cryptographic devices, are using some form of PKI.  
IP-over-DWDM 
IP over DWDM applies only to the terrestrial WAN part of the large infrastructure. It is not part of 
the “end-systems”, LANs or radio-WANs which are all on the other side of at least one router. 
Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing involves an array of laser diodes at one end of a piece of 
optic fibre. Each laser is tuned to a different wavelength of light, at the other end of the fibre is 
found a matching set of photoreceptors, tuned to the same respective wavelength/frequency. This 
enables very large data-rates to be transmitted down the fibre, 2.4 Gbps and greater. 
 
The great advantage with this technology is that the optic interface can reside inside a core IP 
router without any intervening technology (other than optic repeaters every ~30 km) between 
routers, just the fibre optic cable. Switching (frame relay, ATM etc) and ISDN structures (e.g. 
SONET) are not needed. This leads to a greatly simplified architecture. 
 
Most backbone US ISPs as well as the GIG Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) programs within 
DISA are using IP-over-DWDM. 
 
Ethernet as a WAN protocol 
As IP-over-DWDM was evolving from telephone technology, a parallel development was evolving 
from the Ethernet community. Particularly with the advent of gigabit Ethernet, the idea of using 
Ethernet as a long-haul mechanism developed. The basic fibre optic characteristics of Ethernet 
(e.g. usable distance) are the same as DWDM and the capacities are similar (the industry today 
                                                 
26 A nominated date when IPv4 is turned-off. 
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has gigabit Ethernet and 10-gigabit Ethernet products that compare well with OC-48 and OC-192 
capacities common in IP-over-DWDM implementations.27 
 
Object Based Security 
Although it is assumed that the current DIE security architecture will not be radically altered within 
the period up to 2013, object based security is offered here as an “emerging technology” that may 
find application in the DIE over the longer term. 
 
By moving the security/encryption function up the protocol stack (from layer 2/3 up to layer 7) to 
the application layer, it may be possible to improve interoperability between applications. There 
may also be a performance improvement due a distribution of the encryption function to many 
terminals. 
 
However a major disadvantage of the “big-cloud” architecture is that the cloud lacks the same 
type of diversity that exists within the DWACN which currently has several degrees of 
segmentation that provide diversity and isolate problems. Another issue is that object based 
security is still immature when applied to austere (radio-WAN) links (<64 kbit/sec) as the issue of 
validating large certificates has the potential to significantly impact data throughput performance. 
 
IEEE 802.x Based COTS Infrastructure 
The IEEE28 has been successful at developing a range of networking standards for wired and 
wireless physical layer communications. These standards have been turned into successful 
products (productised) and broadly taken up by the commercial networking community. 
Successful 802.x standards include 802.3 Ethernet, 802.11x Wireless LAN (WiFi) and 802.16 
Wireless MAN (WiMax)29. 
 
One of the keys to their adoption by the networking community has been in their design where 
the layered communications model30 has been adopted and successful components from earlier 
standards have been reused in the newer standards, e.g. the 802.2 LLC31. This means that the 
Layer 1 and 2 parts of these standards are payload and Layer 3 agnostic, i.e. IPv6 ready. 
Some appealing features of these standards include: 
 
• WiMax (802.16) enables routable wireless networks (seamless interconnection to the 
internet) by virtue of the use of the 802.2 LLC; 
• WiFi and more so WiMax, offer wireless broadband at data rates far in excess of those 
typically in use by the military today32 and 
• Large-scale manufacturing, technology advances and commercial adoption have lead to 
very low cost devices, when compared to military equivalents. 
In applying these COTS standards to the military domain the following issues need to be 
considered: 
 
• range (distance) capability, WiFi’s range is purposely limited, WiMax is a better standard 
here; 
                                                 
27 www.neptune.washington.edu illustrates one program that plans to use gigabit Ethernet as it's (ocean 
bottom) WAN protocol.  
28 IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
29 802.16 is just starting to gain popularity. 
30 Ideally each layer (ISO 7 layer model) should only interface one layer up and one layer down, this 
enables portability between different application at the top and physical transmission mediums at the 
bottom. 
31 802.2 Logical Link Control (LLC) is a Layer 2 protocol (used in 802.3 Ethernet) and can therefore 
interface to IP (Layer 3). 
32 802.16 has been investigated for use in broadband wireless maritime communications [8]. 
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• WiFi uses a contention based access Media Access Control (MAC) as does Ethernet 
which becomes unstable under overload and oversubscription and does not allow for 
QoS mechanisms; 
• the requirement is then for a stable MAC that supports QoS33. WiMax uses a scheduling 
MAC which provides stability and positive QoS control; 
• protocol layer security. WiFi used poor security that was easily broken. WiMax added a 
security sub-layer (PKI) which provides security for the MAC messages and prevents 
denial or service and theft of service type attacks and 
• physical layer security. None of the commercial wireless standard provide this type of 
security which is a definite requirement for the military domain (e.g. WiFi uses spread-
spectrum which is good for jam-resistance but has a high probability of interception). 
Requirements such as Low Probability of Intercept/Detection (LPI/D) and techniques 
including link crypto could be “bolted onto” these standards by replacing/modifying the 
applicable layer. This is possible because of the adherence to the layered protocol 
model. 
• Timing. Only applies to satellite systems where the (Physical) frame length is exceeded 
by the return trip propagation time.34 
• Multi-cast support. 
 
Recommended IPv6 Transition strategy 
This section is the core of the IPv6TP and provides a recommended strategy for the ADO to 
transition the DIE from IPv4 to IPv6 before 2013. 
Strategic Options 
Potential options (4.1.1 to 4.1.3) are considered and analysed in the following sections prior to 
making a final recommendation in 4.2.  
 
Big Bang Transition Option 
A big-bag transition would involve the entire DIE being switched from IPv4 to IPv6 almost 
instantly at some point prior to 2013. This approach would not include a period where IPv4 and 
IPv6 were run side-by-side. Such an approach is considered to be not only far too risky but it 
would lead to significantly higher cost than other approaches and is not consistent with the IPv6 
DIMPI [1].  
 
Incremental/Phased Transition With Hard Milestones Option 
A less risky approach would allow a significant period where IPv4 and IPv6 were allowed to co-
exist side-by-side using some or all of the transition/interoperability technologies/mechanisms 
introduced in Annex A (e.g. Dual-stack, Tunnelling etc).  
 
Implementation of the selected interoperability mechanisms could be mandated “hard milestones” 
to ensure that the transition is tightly managed and tracked using standard project management 
techniques. However this approach also does not comply with the DIMPI [1], which specifies that 
the transition process should leverage technology refresh programs and take advantage of the 
“natural” progress of “commercial” technology.  
 
Forcing the transition follow a specific timetable could lead to increased cost, interoperability gaps 
and potentially retard the role-out of IPv6 if commercial technology outpaces any ADO specified 
milestones. The specified timetable may also limit the ADO’s capability to respond to rapidly 
changing operational requirements. 
                                                 
33 802.16 uses scheduling protocols that meet this requirement. 
34 Because some MAC messages are sent in frame x and must be acted upon in frame x+1, otherwise the 
link is broken and fails. 
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Incremental/Phased Transition With Soft Milestones Option 
The recommended approach is to phase in IPv6 over a long period (between now and 2013) and 
operate it side-by-side with IPv4. Broad windows “soft-milestones” should be provided to indicate 
when the various components of the DIE should introduce IPv6 and phase out IPv4, this should 
be done in accordance with the provisions of the DIMPI [1]. 
 
These windows must leverage from technology refresh programs and the planning must be 
flexible enough to cope with the progress of commercial technology. Currently the core 
infrastructure within the DWACN (including the Cryptographic equipment) is averaging a five to 
six year refresh period. With the DWACN being upgraded (JP2047) in the near future it can be 
expected that there will be up to two hardware refreshes between now and 2013 (see Figure 15). 
It will also be important to recognise that some IPv4 components will never transition to IPv6 and 
allowances must be made to continue to support them past 2013. 
Recommended Strategy 
The recommended strategy is divided into seven phases, these are illustrated in Figure 15 and 
detailed in the following paragraphs. It is expected that (for DWACN equipment) there will be up 
to two technology refresh cycles over the period between 2005 and 2013. 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Phase 1 - Planning
This Strategy / Plan
IPv6 Transition
Complete
DWACN Technology Refresh Cycle 1
DWACN Technology Refresh Cycle 2
DIE Equipment End-Of-Life (DIMPI does not apply)
DIMPI Exemption Date
All DIE Equipment IPv6 Capable
Phase 7 - End
State
Phase 6 - Cloud
Expansion
Phase 5 - IPv6
Clouds
Phase 4 - Overlay
Networks
Phase 3a - National
Application Gateways







Initial Phase On-Going  Phase
Phase 3b - Allied
Application Gateways
 
Figure 15 Recommended Strategy Phases for ADO Transition to IPv6 
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Phase 1 Planning 
The planning phase consists of i) initial planning and ii) detailed planning. The ADO IPv6 
Transition Plan (this document) forms the foundation of the initial planning phase and provides 
the big picture view of the whole IPv6 transition process from now until 2013. 
 
A period of detailed planning should then follow the initial phase and this work will seek to answer 
more detailed questions, see Annex B. 
 
Once information from the detailed planning phase is gathered and understood it will be possible 
to select the actual IPv6 transition mechanisms and assure network interoperability. This work is 
likely to be conducted by individual projects but will need high-level coordination by the CIOG 
(IPv6TO and IPv6PO, see Section 6). 
 
The planning phase will be periodically revisited over the life of the transition to ensure that 
technology changes are carefully monitored and the state of IPv6 transitions external to the ADO 
are also considered. 
 
Phase 2 Network - Security 
Once the level of detailed planning is sufficiently mature, the Network Security phase will 
commence. Security will be addressed using two phases: 
 
During the initial phase, security will be enhanced across the DIE to protect against potential 
threats from the introduction of IPv6. Security will be enhanced by; 
 
• Initial IPv6 threats assessments, 
• initially blocking all IPv6 traffic to prevent unauthorised use of IPv6 until protection is 
adequate) and 
• deploying and configuring firewalls, cryptos and intrusion detection systems to provide 
adequate control of both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. 
This phase is very important to the success of this strategy and should be initiated as soon as 
possible. 
 
The second phase of Network Security is on going and continues for the life of the DIE. The 
baseline DIE is continually analysed for vulnerabilities and any threats are treated with counter 
measures. New network capabilities are thoroughly analysed from a security perspective and only 
released for use (creating a new DIE baseline) once they are “trusted”.  
 
Phase 3a National Application Gateways 
Phase 3a and 3b are not contingent on the previous phase and can commence as soon as 
enough detailed planning has been completed. National Application-level Gateways are intended 
to be used intra-DIE, i.e. between disparate DIE networks that need to exchange information. 
This phase ensures that the various branches of the ADO (see Figure 10) can interoperate at the 
application level with each other by implementing Application Gateways (AGs) at the network 
edges. These gateways also decouple the networks, so in principle they also protect against 
network level threats. 
 
These AG’s will allow IPv4 applications (e.g. Email, FTP etc) and IPv4 DIE infrastructure to inter-
change application level information with like applications on the other side of the AG, 
independent of the version of IP (4 or 6) being used on the other side of the AG. 
 
These AGs will need to support the range of applications to be used jointly and there will need to 
be a process of negotiation to determine where the gateways will be hosted and who will be 
responsible for providing and maintaining them, see 6.3.1. 
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The AGs could potentially be hosted in any of the ADF support systems e.g. ACSS, MCSS, JCSS 
(see Figure 10) etc.  
 
Prior to the commencement of this phase of the transition the DIE is completely IPv4. Any 
infrastructure (routers, switches, servers, hosts etc) that contains an IPv6 capability (e.g. a dual 
IPv4/IPv6 stack) will have that capability disabled. As AGs are added the matching parts of the 
DIE can start to transition to IPv6, but as for the Security phase, this phase may need to be run in 
parallel with the other phases for many years and potentially for-ever if some parts of the DIE or 
Allied environments (for Phase 3b) never transition to IPv6. 
 
Phase 3b Allied Application Gateways 
Allied Application gateways are intended to function in the same way as the National Application 
Gateways described in Phase 3a, except that they provide a gateway between the DIE and Allied 
information environments at the application level. 
 
The commencement of Allied Application Gateways is expected to be dependent upon a period of 
interaction/negotiation with the required Allied IPv6 Transitioning bodies. Because of this, it is 
recommended that Phase 3a is commenced first followed by an independent Phase 3b that is 
allowed to run in parallel with the other phases. In this way if the international negotiations take 
longer than expected, the progress of IPv6 transition within the DIE will suffer no significant 
impact. 
 
Phase 4 Overlay Networks 
The Overlay Networks35 phase can commence in parallel with Phase 3 and begins with the small-
scale use of IPv6 applications/systems36 in parallel with a mostly IPv4 DIE, i.e. this phase can 
commence well prior to 2010. The systems elected to switch to IPv6 are chosen because they 
need to (or will benefit from) interoperating with other DIE or Allied/Coalition IPv6 systems. 
Because of the associated coordination issues, it is recommended that the ADO commence with 
Overlay Networks within the DIE only and then progress to interoperating outside of the DIE with 
Allies. 
 
For the chosen IPv6 systems, IPv6 data is tunnelled across the DIE’s IPv4 infrastructure, through 
Tunnel-End Points37 and on to the IPv6 end-system, see Figure 17.  
 
There may be some benefit in using “IPv4 compatible IPv6 addresses”38, however this is unlikely 
to be an effective long-term solution as it may reduce flexibility. 
 
                                                 
35 These Overlay Networks are intended to be created by tunnelling, which is one way of creating a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN). VPNs can however be created by other means (e.g. Multi-Protocol Label 
Switching (MPLS) and this is why we have not used the term VPN. Also, VPNs are sometimes associated 
with a security function (“private networks”) and the Overlay Networks here do not propose any security, 
just the use of IP tunnels.   
36 A small scale IPv6 application/system could consist of anything between one up to several hosts 
interconnected by a WAN. 
37 Functionally either a 4 –over-6 or a 6-over-4 tunnel-end point. Note that physically the function usually 
resides on a router but could also reside on the same machine as a security gateway for instance. 
38 “IPv4 compatible IPv6 address is described as “This type of address is used to tunnel IPv6 packets 
dynamically over an IPv4 routing infrastructure. IPV6 nodes that use this technique are assigned a special 
IPv6 uni-cast address that carries an IPv4 address in the low-order 32 bits.” [2] pg 37. 
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IPv4 Only Network






















































Figure 16 Tunnelling Options 
 
Phase 5 IPv6 Clouds 
This phase can overlap with the previous phase and can start whilst the DIE is still migrating to 
IPv6. This next stage concentrates on migrating larger portions of the DIE to IPv6 along logical 
boundaries, e.g. complete communication systems, these become the “IPv6 Clouds”. 
Additional AGs and network translation servers are added within the DIE to allow the new IPv6 
clouds to inter-work with the rest of the DIE which is still substantially IPv4. 
 
Networks are connected to other networks by using “4 over 6 tunnels”39 and IPv6 clouds are 
interconnected by using “6 over 4 tunnels”40. 
 
Alternatively there may be benefit in taking a dual stack approach41 (see Figure 16 option (b)) 
within the IPv6 clouds rather than using tunnelling, especially if bandwidth is an issue or there are 
security and or fragmentation problems with the tunnelling implementation. The dual stack 
approach however needs to be analysed for cost (of managing dual stacks) before being 
considered. 
 
Phase 6 Expanding The Clouds Towards IPv4 Phase Out 
The next stage expands the reach of the IPv6 networks within the DIE whilst at the same time 
shrinking the IPv4 segments, this phase can overlap with the previous phase. This could be 
achieved by joining together suitable IPv6 systems (implemented in Phase 4) and reducing the 
number of gateways and tunnels. 
                                                 
39 “4 over 6 tunnels” This assumes that IPv6 only networks are in place and IPv4 packets are required to be 
sent via the IPv6 infrastructure (See Figure 16 option c). 
40 “6 over 4 tunnels” (See Figure 16 option a). 
41 Dual-stack is the favoured approach in the UK but may not be necessary or desirable for the DIE. 
 46
The expansion process continues until most of the DIE has migrated to IPv6. 
 
Phase 7 2013 End State 
This is the 2013 state where ideally all IPv4 systems within the DIE have transitioned to IPv6, 
however there is likely to be some legacy systems that either cannot be migrated or need to be 
kept in place because an external party (e.g. Other Government Organisation) is very slow to 




The proposed strategy is considered cost-effective as it leverages the natural commercial (COTS 
infrastructure) refresh cycles that are likely to occur between now and 2013. The strategy does 
not force any hard-requirements for transition and uses an overlapped phasing plan that will allow 
for flexibility and co-existence between IPv4 and IPv6 networks and systems. 
 
Impact on Defence Operations 
The proposed IPv6 transition strategy is designed to have almost no impact to the ADO at the 
operational and tactical level. The gradual and phased strategy that allows the co-existence of 
IPv4 and IPv6 networks should not require any lost capability or “down-time” that is typically 
associated with large-scale “big-bang” hardware and or software upgrades. 
 
Impact on Interoperability With Allies 
An essential feature of the transition strategy is that Allied interoperability will not be degraded 
during migration, and where possible it should be enhanced. The migration plans of the US DOD 
will have a major impact in this area, although the ADO will need to co-ordinate with the plans of 
its Asia-Pacific partners. At present, it is understood that there are few Allied networks. Much of 
the inter-working is conducted at the application level through appropriate gateways.  
 
For example, the Griffin network currently exchanges information using e-mail with attachments. 
It would be possible for part of the network to migrate to IPv6, whilst the rest remained on IPv4, 
with a mail server acting as the interface gateway. This would introduce some additional 
management cost, and a potential single point of failure. Migration would be simpler if all the 
Griffin participants agree to transition the network at the same; it should be noted that eventually 
the e-mail application will need to be transitioned as well as the network. 
 
Other networks in which the ADF participates are CENTRIX and COWAN. These are managed 
and provided by the US DOD, which will presumably make its plans for transition in consultation 
with its Allies. If the ADO has application gateways available, it will be possible to maintain 
interoperability even if the migration timescales are not exactly aligned. 
 
In the future, as the concepts of network-centric warfare are increasingly adopted, there will be 
increasing requirements for network-to-network interoperability with Allies at the operational and 
tactical levels. The Allied maritime tactical WAN described in ACP 200 is an example. Migration 
plans will need to be closely co-ordinated in the appropriate forum. In the maritime case this 
would be the AUSCANNZUKUS C3I organisation. 
Information Assurance and Test Activities 
Information Assurance (IA) 
It is essential that migration to IPv6 shall not prejudice the security of ADO systems. In this 
context security includes confidentiality, integrity and availability. It is noted that the US DOD 
does not yet approve the use of IPv6 networks for operational traffic. 
Continuing efforts are required to explore and understand any vulnerabilities which may be 
introduced by the new or improved features of IPv6. It is recommended that the ADO exploit its 




IA devices, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, must be provided with the capability 
to handle IPv6 traffic. It is expected that on initial migration to IPv6, including to dual-stack 
capability, end systems and networks will have some IPv6 features locked down (e.g. neighbour 
discovery, mobility support). These will only be enabled once appropriate IA protection 
mechanisms are in place. 
 
Systems migrating to IPv6 (applications, LANs and WANs) will need to be appropriately 
accredited. It is likely that some systems will only be accredited for IPv6 operation in a stand-
alone mode, or only for interconnection over IPv4 networks using secure tunnels. 
Initially, it is expected that the built-in IPSec features in all IPv6 compliant devices will be used to 
provide “need to know” separation between communities, rather than military grade security 
separation. A PKI (public key infrastructure) certificate authority and distribution system will be 
required to support this. 
 
Military grade IPv6-capable network encryption devices will be required. The ADO may wish to 




The ADO will need to gain experience on the behaviour of IPv6 before relying on its use for 
operational military systems.  
 
It is recommended that the ADO consider taking part in multinational experimental programmes. 
The CFBLNet (see Figure 17) initiative on IPv6, led by Germany, may be a candidate42. This work 
should focus on IPv4 – IPv6 inter-working mechanisms. The ADO should also initiate a 
programme to investigate the availability of IPv6 capable network elements and, more 
importantly, applications. 
 
Initial migration of ADO systems should preferably on a pilot, supporting non-operational 
information systems, in order to gain confidence.  
 
As systems (applications as well as networks) are migrated to IPv6, they will need to be tested to 
confirm that the operational requirements are met for performance and inter-working with IPv4. 
The IPv6 Transition Office (see Section 6.3.1) will oversee this testing, and should be able to 
reduce the testing requirements as confidence is gained and best practice is shared between 
projects. 
 
                                                 























































































































































Figure 17 CBFLNet 
 
Key Projects For Transition 
A number of current ADO projects will have a key role in implementing the IPv6 transition. This 
section highlights the actions that these projects should be taking.  
 
• JP 2047 Defence Wide Area Communications Network  
This will be the core programme for transition at the network level. It should develop a 
strategy and plan for transition including support for IPv6 and IPv4 over an extended 
period. It is expected that the DWACN plans will drive the planning timelines of other 
network and application projects. Initial studies should also consider how QoS will be 
delivered and supported in ADO networks – it is anticipated that “diffserv” will be the 
underlying technology. This project should also consider how VPN services will be 
provided, and whether the IPSec features in IPv6 can be effectively exploited. It may well 
be appropriate for this project to study the provision of mobility services in a general 
sense across the DWACN area of interest. 
 
The DWACN IPv6 Plan should aim to provide a staged process, where confidence in the 
reliability and security of the IPv6 service can be gained in a limited environment before 
extending the scope of the service. 
 
The DWACN currently employs a core ATM switching fabric, based on Nortel passport 
switches, with Cisco routers at the WAN boundaries. This architecture lends itself well to 
migration to IPv6, as the underlying connections between core switches use ATM 
permanent virtual circuits (PVCs). The PVCs are agnostic to the flavour of IP carried over 
them. 
 
For initial experimentation with IPv6, it is suggested that a small number of dual-stack 
LANs would be deployed, with edge routers carrying the IPv6 traffic in manually 
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configured 6 over 4 tunnels. The existing DWACN could provide interconnection between 
these LANs, using its current IPv4 service. 
 
The second step would be to configure a few DWACN edge routers to provide the 6 over 
4 tunnels. Once initial testing is complete, the DWACN could offer a limited IPv6 service 
to ‘early adopter’ IPv6 applications. This may also be a useful option for interconnection 
to allied IPv6 systems. 
 
Step three would be to configure a number of the core Passport switches to support IPv6 
as well as IPv4. It might be appropriate to allocate separate PVCs for the IPv6 traffic; this 
would provide a degree of separation and avoid any inadvertent denial of service to the 
critical IPv4 traffic. 
 
Once sufficient operational experience has been obtained to provide adequate 
confidence in the IPv6 service, the fourth step would be to configure all the core switches 
to support dual stack operation. 
 
A final stage, likely very much later, would be to withdraw IPv4 service and require any 
legacy IPv4 systems to provide their own tunnels over the DWACN IPv6 service. 
 
• JP 2008 Military Satellite Communications 
If this project includes the provision of services at the network level, then it should 
develop plans to support IPv6 as well as IPv4. It should be left to this project to determine 
whether the solution is to be dual stack or tunnelling. The project must also consider QoS 
support, following the architecture developed in JP 2047. On the other hand, if this 
project deals with bearer services only, then transition is not an issue. 
 
• JP 2068 Defence Network Management System and Computer Network Defence 
(CND) 
It is critical that this project can put in place a CND capability for IPv6. It will be necessary 
to conduct studies on network management during migration. Desirably, a single system 
should manage both IPv4 and IPv6 network services. Management of tunnels and 
gateways will also need to be considered. 
 
• JP 2069 High Grade Cryptographic Equipment 
This project will need to ensure that IPv6 capable network cryptos are provided. The 
capability to pass IPv6 header fields from “red” to “black” is highly desirable, but the 
security implications will need to be considered. 
 
• JP 2072 Battlespace Communications System (Land) 
For the tactical trunk component of this project, plans should be developed for migration 
to IPv6. It is probable that these will include support for IPv4 and IPv6, for some period of 
time, depending on application transition and interoperability issues. The project should 
be given freedom to determine the preferred approach. QoS must also be provided.  
The combat net radio (CNR) part of this project will need to give close attention to the IP 
data capability. IPv6 capable CNR equipment may not be available off-the shelf within the 
procurement timescale of this project, in which case it will be important to develop plans 
for migration during a mid-life upgrade. 
 
• SEA 1442 Maritime Communication and Information Management Architecture 
Modernisation 
It is understood that the maritime tactical WAN will be required to support inter-
networking with Allies (ACP 200). Studies on IPv6 migration should take account of the 





• JP 2030 Joint Command Support Environment 
It is important to recognise that IPv6 transition impacts applications as much as networks. 
This project should develop plans for transitioning applications. It should also study how 
to make use of the QoS capabilities being offered by the networks. 
 
• LAND 75 Battlefield Command Support System 
The same considerations apply to this project as for JP 2030. 
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Ipv6 address space requirements 
Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide the ADO with an analysis method for the DIE in order to 
make a recommendation for the total IPV6 address space required. The analysis method is 
designed to ensure that the results enable the expected benefits provided by IPv6.43 
The analysis method is demonstrated by providing a worked example (see 5.4), however the 
results can only be considered as preliminary. It is recommended that the analysis method is 
revisited as part of the detailed planning phase44 (see 4.2.1) and becomes the subject of a 
specific workshop. 
A Case For More Addresses 
In direct response to the position that IPv4 address space will meet the world's IP address needs 
for decades to come, the NAv6TF45 has produced the work titled “e-Nations, The Internet for All” 
[14] (Annex E also provides a view on IPv4 address space exhaustion). This work uses data 
available from the Regional Internet Registries (RIR) and takes into account the growing adoption 
of the Internet and networking technologies on a global basis. The NAv6TF view this as a strong 
and accurate argument for the adoption of IPv6 as the only viable way to sustain the growth of 
the Internet for all the world's inhabitants. 
IPv6 Address Space Analysis Outline 
To arrive at an address space plan that meets the long-term need of the ADO, it will be necessary 
to have a long-term vision for every conceivable network device, node, sensor, and person that 
may have a requirement for an IPv6 address. It will then be necessary to determine the structure 
of the network topology that all these addresses will operate from and then interoperate with at 
other network attachment points. This will determine the prefix size required for the entire ADO 
IPv6 address space. It is highly recommended that the ADO select an IPv6 prefix large enough to 
encompass all future addressable network points of attachment. 
 
The IETF IPv6 address architecture document [9] provides the following guidance: 
 
IPv6 addresses are 128-bit identifiers for interfaces and sets of interfaces. There are three types 
of addresses: 
 
• Uni-cast: An identifier for a single interface. A packet sent to a uni-cast address is 
delivered to the interface identified by that address. 
• Any-cast: An identifier for a set of interfaces (typically belonging to different nodes). A 
packet sent to an any-cast address is delivered to one of the interfaces identified by that 
address (the "nearest" one, according to the routing protocols' measure of distance). 
• Multicast: An identifier for a set of interfaces (typically belonging to different nodes). A 
packet sent to a multicast address is delivered to all interfaces identified by that address. 
There are no broadcast addresses in IPv6, their function being superseded by multicast 
addresses. IPv6 addresses of all types are assigned to interfaces, not nodes. An IPv6 unicast 
address refers to a single interface. Since each interface belongs to a single node, any of that 
node's interfaces' unicast addresses may be used as an identifier for the node. 
All interfaces are required to have at least one link-local unicast address (see Section 2.8 [9] for 
additional required addresses). A single interface may also have multiple IPv6 addresses of any 
type (unicast, anycast, and multicast) or scope. Unicast addresses with scope greater than link-
scope are not needed for interfaces that are not used as the origin or destination of any IPv6 
                                                 
43 The ADO could also seek a copy of the US DoD IPv6 Address Plan [23], through Government to 
Government channels. 




packets to or from non-neighbours. This is sometimes convenient for point-to-point interfaces. 
There is one exception to this addressing model. A unicast address or a set of unicast addresses 
may be assigned to multiple physical interfaces if the implementation treats the multiple physical 
interfaces as one interface when presenting it to the Internet layer. This is useful for load sharing 
over multiple physical interfaces. 
 
Currently IPv6 continues the IPv4 model that a subnet prefix is associated with one link. Multiple 
subnet prefixes may be assigned to the same link. 
 
The available and current IPv6 Global Unicast Address Format is defined in IETF RFC 3587 [10], 
and is being used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). 
 
The general format for IPv6 global unicast addresses as defined in "IP Version 6 Addressing 
Architecture" [10] is as follows: 
 
 
|     n bits       |  m bits  |    128-n-m bits      | 
+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+ 
| Global routing prefix  | subnet ID |    interface ID       | 
+-------------------------+-----------+----------------------------+ 
 
Where the global routing prefix is a (typically hierarchically-structured) value assigned to a site (a 
cluster of subnets/links), the subnet ID is an identifier of a subnet within the site, and the interface 
ID is as defined in Section 2.5.1 of [9]. The global routing prefix is designed to be structured 
hierarchically by the RIRs and ISPs. The subnet field is designed to be structured hierarchically 
by site administrators. 
 
After the ADO has determined its IPv6 address requirements and Global routing prefix, it will then 
need to work with the Asia Pacific RIR (APNIC www.apnic.net). The current work from the IETF 
regarding Network Address Protection (NAP) [NAP] should also be reviewed. This provides a 
view of how to define IPv6 networks for privacy and maintain the tenets of end-to-end. 
 
Requirements For Address Space Determination 
The important requirements to be met by the address space analysis method include: 
 
• The address space shall be sufficient to permit efficient allocation of addresses to users, 
equipments and interfaces. 
• The allocation process, including registration of names to addresses (populating the 
DNS) must be fast and easy to manage. 
• The address space should be distributed in a hierarchical manner, in accordance with the 
network topology. This is necessary to facilitate aggregation of routing information, so 
that the size of the routing advertisements can be minimised. Where networks use limited 
bandwidth bearers (e.g. long haul links to deployed forces, or tactical nets) this is critically 
important. 
• The address space should be contiguous and therefore the complete allocation will need 
to be applied for as soon as IPv6 is brought into service. 
The requirement to use hierarchical addressing implies that the total address space requirement 
may be significantly greater (by orders of magnitude) than the total number of addressable 
interfaces actually used. However, the savings which result from efficient administration and route 
aggregation will far outweigh the additional cost of address ownership46.  
                                                 
46 /32 $2,500 per year (2nd and subsequent years) /20 $40,000 (2nd and subsequent years) 
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Analysis Method 
Analysis Method Steps 
The following is a sequential list of analysis steps that can be followed to design a generic IP 
network addressing scheme: 
 
i) Specify the lifetime for the network topology. This is an important step as it will drive 
the size of the address range required. To ensure that routing efficiency is maximised 
it is recommended that a single contiguous address space is sought and utilised. It is 
assumed that the size of the network will only continue to expand from the present 
day through its lifetime. 
ii) Design a hierarchical network topology to meet the specified lifetime. Start with the 
network core (parent/top level of hierarchy), then add child/lower level sub-nets in 
accordance with the operational, security, physical and legacy systems requirements 
and constraints. Continue adding subnets in a hierarchical manner until the lowest 
“IP” addressable entity is reached at the end of each of the network’s branches. 
iii) At each level in the hierarchy specify the maximum number of interfaces. This is 
achieved by analysing each branch on the subject level and using the branch that 
yields the largest number of interfaces. The final result is achieving by rounding up 
this number to the nearest power of two. This will determine the number of address 
bits required (e.g. 2 bits = maximum of 4 interfaces, 4 bits = maximum of 16 
interfaces etc). In general it is expected that the number of interfaces will increase as 
one moves down each level of the hierarchy (i.e. Level 2 may have more interfaces 
than Level 1 and Level 3 may have more than Level 2 and so on). 
iv) Review the address prefix structure and size. If the size is too large then re-visit the 
levels of the hierarchy where the allocated binary address size is just larger than a 
binary increment (e.g. 17 is just beyond 16) and review the assumptions to see if one 
or more bits can be saved by slightly reducing the allocated size to below the 
previous binary increment. 
Worked Examples 
In each example, we have followed the usual practice of allocating 64 bits to the interface ID. 
Typically the interface unique MAC address is used, which allows stateless auto-configuration47 
to be used, if permitted by the security policy. 
 
Using the analysis steps provided in 5.4.1 we provide the following worked examples for 
reference.  
 
A Large Network Example 
i) Lifetime is specified as 15 years, this assumes that the design meets the 2020 needs 
of the ADO. 
ii) The DWACN is assumed to be at the core (Level 1) in the highest level of the 
hierarchy (see Figure 18). The subsequent levels are populated as follows: 
a. The next level (Level 2) is occupied by the virtual (uses the same core 
infrastructure) and other physical security domains. The virtual domains include 
the DRN, DSN and DVN48, the other security domains could include multiple 
coalition domains, other Australian government domains and the Internet etc. 
b. The next level (Level 3) is occupied by a number of Base Area Networks (BANs) 
and a number of Long-haul sub-nets to meet operational requirements. The 
number of Long-haul subnets will be determined by assessing the number of 
geographic areas required to be covered and the actual coverage of the available 
                                                 
47 RFC2462 
48 It is recommended that the use of addresses to provide security separation be expressed differently when 
making the application to APNIC. 
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Long-haul service options. The Long-haul subnets could be IP transit services 
provided by ADO, allied or commercial networks. 
c. The next level (Level 4) is occupied by a number of LANs connected to their 
parent BANs and a number of Tactical area sub-nets connected to the parent 
Long-haul subnet. The Tactical area sub-nets represent IP service provided over 
a system such as Parakeet (JP2072 in the future). These sub-nets provide 
service to a number of deployed headquarters (HQs) as well as transit service to 
mobile sub-nets. 
d. The next level (Level 5) is only utilised on the Long-haul branches and is 
populated by a number of mobile sub-nets. The mobile sub-nets could comprise 
a number of routers installed in land vehicles (Australian Light Armoured 
Vehicles (ASLAVs), Command vehicles, Jeeps etc). In the future a group of 
aircraft, or a swarm of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) might also form 
a mobile sub-net. 
e. The last level (Level 6) is also only utilised on the Long-haul branches and is 






































































                                                 
49 Except for Australia, these countries are only an example. 
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iii) The number of interfaces at each level of the hierarchy is depicted in Figure 19 and 
detailed as follows: 
 
BAN (1) Long-haul sub-net (n)Long-haul sub-net (1)
LAN (1) LAN (2) LAN (n) Tactical areasubnet (1)
Mobile subnet
(1)






BAN (2) BAN (n)
Tactical area
subnet (n) HQ LAN (1) HQ LAN (n)
Mobile subnet
(n) HQ LAN (1) HQ LAN (n)
Core Network (DWACN)
Security Domain  (1) Security Domain  (2) Security Domain  (4) 2
 
 
Figure 19 Example Network Hierarchy 
 
a. Level 1 interfaces. Assuming that there are up to 4 ADO security domains 
(including DSN, DRN and DVN), 3 coalition domains, 2 other government 
domains and 2 miscellaneous domains, this equals 11 interfaces, rounding up to 
nearest power of two equates to 16 interfaces (4 bits). 
b. Level 2 interfaces. Assuming that there are 300 BANs50 and 4 Long-haul sub-
nets and 600 internal routers, this equals 904 interfaces, rounding up this 
equates to 1024 interfaces (10 bits). 
c. Level 3 interfaces. For the BAN branches, it is assumed there would be a 
maximum of 4 LANs and 10 internal routers, for the Tactical sub-net branches, it 
is assumed that there would be a maximum of 4 Tactical sub-nets, 4 attached 
Headquarters and 20 internal routers. Therefore the Tactical sub-net branch has 
the largest number of interfaces (28), rounding up this equates to 32 interfaces (5 
bits). 
d. Level 4 interfaces. As both the (BAN/LAN) and the (Long-haul sub-net/HQ LAN) 
branches have terminated we only need consider the attachments to the Tactical 
area sub-net branches. For these branches we assume that there will be a 
maximum of 4 mobile sub-nets, 40 HQ LANs and 50 trunk routers, therefore 94 
interfaces and rounding up this equates to 128 interfaces (7 bits). 
e. Level 5 interfaces. As the (Tactical area sub-net/HQ LAN) branches have 
terminated we only need consider the attachments to the Mobile sub-net 
branches. For these branches we assume that there will be a maximum of 100 
vehicle LANs, therefore 10051 interfaces and rounding up this equates to 128 
interfaces (7 bits). 
f. Level 6 interfaces. At each vehicle LAN we assume that the maximum number of 




                                                 
50 Source = [4] 1.2.4 DWACN FPS 
51 The figure of 100, could well be argued and is very much a forward looking number assuming that in 15 
to 20 years time there could be many entities requiring and IP address. 
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iv) The address structure uses 40 bits (a /24 address) as follows: 
 
4 bits 10 bits 5 bits 7 bits 7 bits 7 bits
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
 
Figure 20 Address Size 
 
A Future Large Network 
We now consider expanding the previous example by considering potential areas of growth. 
 
i) Lifetime is also specified as 15 years. 
ii) The same topology and hierarchy is assumed. 
iii) The same number of interfaces at each level is assumed except for those at Level 6. 
It is likely that major increases in demand from address space will only arise from 
significant changes in technology. One potential for the additional of an address-
hungry sub-network could come from the addition of unattended sensors. These 
sensors (small low-power seismic, acoustic, RF sensing etc) could be scattered from 
the air in their thousands across a tactical area. This could lead to a sub-net at Level 
6 with say 5000 nodes/interfaces. Assuming that the sensor control station branches 
from a mobile sub-net this would be rounded up to a maximum of 9182 interfaces (13 
bits).  
iv) The address structure uses 46 bits (a /18 address) as follows: 
 
4 bits 10 bits 5 bits 7 bits 7 bits 13 bits
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
 
Figure 21 Address Size 
  
A Modest Network 
We now consider the previous “Large Network” and revisit each level in the hierarchy to 
investigate how the network could be reduced in size to a network with a more modest address 
space requirement. 
 
i) Lifetime is also specified as 15 years, this is viewed as the minimum requirement. 
ii) The number of interfaces at each level of the hierarchy is as follows: 
a. Level 1 interfaces. Assuming that there are just 3 ADO security domains (the 
DSN, DRN and DVN), 2 coalition domains (Restricted and Secret), 1 other 
government domain and 2 miscellaneous domains, this equals 8 interfaces, 
rounding up to nearest power of two equates to 8 interfaces (3 bits). 
b. Level 2 interfaces. Assuming that there are still 300 BANs52 and just 2 Long-haul 
sub-nets and 200 internal routers, this equals 502 interfaces, rounding up this 
equates to 512 interfaces (9 bits). 
                                                 
52 Source = [4] 1.2.4 DWACN FPS 
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c. Level 3 interfaces. For the BAN branches, it is assumed there would be a 
maximum of 4 LANs and 10 internal routers, for the Tactical sub-net branches, it 
is assumed that there would be a maximum of 2 Tactical sub-nets, 2 attached 
Headquarters and 12 internal routers. Therefore the Tactical sub-net branch has 
the largest number of interfaces (16), rounding up this equates to 16 interfaces (4 
bits). 
d. Level 4 interfaces. As both the (BAN/LAN) and the (Long-haul sub-net/HQ LAN) 
branches have terminated we only need consider the attachments to the Tactical 
area sub-net branches. For these branches we assume that there will be a 
maximum of 2 mobile sub-nets, 20 HQ LANs and 30 trunk routers, therefore 52 
interfaces and rounding up this equates to 64 interfaces (6 bits). 
e. Level 5 interfaces. As the (Tactical area sub-net/HQ LAN) branches have 
terminated we only need consider the attachments to the Mobile sub-net 
branches. For these branches we assume that there will be a maximum of just 64 
vehicle LANs, therefore 64 interfaces and rounding up this equates to 64 
interfaces (6 bits). 
f. Level 6 interfaces. At each vehicle LAN we assume that the maximum number of 
interfaces is just 64 and rounding up this equates to 64 interfaces (6 bits). 
v) The address structure uses 34 bits (a /30 address) as follows: 
 
3 bits 9 bits 4 bits 6 bits 6 bits 6 bits
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
 
Figure 22 Address Size 
Regional IPv6 Addressing 
IPv6 address allocation is managed on a regional basis (by ARIN, RIPE, APNIC). It is the aim 
that global routing will be more efficient by allocating address blocks in relation to the location of 
the organisations requesting the allocation. 
 
The ADO has a fixed infrastructure, but also expects to be engaged in operations with a regional 
or occasionally global reach. Will this create a problem? 
 
The short answer is no. The ADO will use addresses for deployed networks which are sub-netted 
from those allocated to the fixed network. The connectivity to deployed networks will be over 
long-haul networks (or bearers), so that the routing path will be from Australia, even if the 
deployed forces are in a different region. 
 
If a deployed ADF network needs to connect to a network belonging to a coalition partner, which 
could have addresses from a completely different range, this is not a problem. It is likely that an 
exterior gateway routing protocol (e.g. BGP) will be used at the boundary. This will need to be 
configured appropriately, it will normally be necessary to avoid a situation where, for example, 
traffic from the deployed ADF unit to a destination in Australia is routed over the ally’s networks to 
their home nation and thence to Australia. Similar issues apply today with routing in IPv4, and will 
be solved in the same way in IPv6, by careful and intelligent router configuration. 
 
If a deployed ADF network uses IP transit services from a coalition partner, or commercial ISP, 
then it is most probable that tunnelling will be used. This separates the routing domain of the 
ADO from that of the service provider, so again no addressing problem should arise. 
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Address Space Conclusion 
The three worked examples of the previous section suggest that a wide-range of network sizes 
could be realised using a 6 level hierarchy. The example analysis shows that the network size 
can vary quite dramatically between 34 bits (/30 address) and 46 bits (a /18 address). 
Because we have specified a lifetime of 15 years and we assume that we are more likely (at this 
point in time) to have under-estimated the potential for growth over that period, it is recommended 
that the ADO apply for a minimum allocation of a /18 address. 
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Ipv6 Transition Governance 
This section details the recommended ADO IPv6 transition governance structure that should be 
used to manage and coordinate all the ADO’s IPv6 transition activities. 
Introduction 
This section is introduced by revisiting our important high-level network centric principles and by 
providing some background to the potential difficulties that have been experienced as the result 
of other organisations approaches to their information environment governance structures. 
 
As a starting point, the ADO’s DIE governance structure must support the ability of the various 
ADO organisations to work together to achieve network-enabled operations by following our two 
(previously espoused) crucially important principles (see section 3.1.3 for further explanation of 
the principles): 
 
Principle 1 : Unit-Level LANs 
End-systems (e.g. sensors, weapons, Allies etc) are connected to “the network” and 
not to each other. They are attached to unit-level LANs which are in turn connected via 
a router to either a radio-WAN or a terrestrial WAN. 
 
Principle 2 : Routable WANs 
Make Radio-WANs and terrestrial WANs routable. 
 
In general other organisations have tended to cast their CIOs into one of two roles, or in some 
cases the job description is a mix of these two roles, i.e.: 
 
a) as the program manager for the implementation of various information infrastructure 
projects, with responsibility for their budget and schedule, or 
b) as the interoperability custodian across a diverse range of projects and programs, some 
information environment related and some not (i.e. end-systems and platforms). 
Both roles introduce major challenges, especially if the role encompasses responsibilities as both 
a program manager in the information environment space and as the interoperability custodian 
across the whole defence environment, including for the end-systems and platforms. 
 
If a CIO is cast with only program manager responsibilities (e.g. hypothetically, DWACN, JP2072 
and others) it is likely that: 
 
a) The CIO will have the potential to be successful at achieving Principle 2, but because 
their responsibility does not extend to the end-systems, it will be difficult to achieve 
Principle 1. Whilst the result may be a highly capable information network (the plumbing, 
routers, servers, cable etc), it is highly likely that the desired capability of network centric 
operations will not be realised to the extent required by the ADO. In this context the fact 
that the network is IPv6 capable largely becomes irrelevant. 
The OSD CIO in the US DoD has gone down this path and has attempted to solve the resultant 
problem by splitting its organisation into a CIO’s office, who looks after standards compliance, 
and the Networks and Information Integration (NII) office who is the networking advocate. This 
has however resulted in the CIO becoming the advocate for the very programs that he’s 
supposed to have oversight for. There is every possibility that this could create many conflicts of 
interests with the result being less than fully successful. 
 
We recommend that the optimum situation will be formed by instituting a governance structure 
(for IPV6 transition) that focuses on the CIO being the “interoperability custodian” where:   
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b) The CIO has measures in place to ensure that Principle 2 is applied by the “information 
infrastructure53” projects managers and Principle 1 is applied by all other project 
managers. These other project managers will be delivering projects that connect to the 
DIE in some way, they will be the end-systems and will include the platform projects (e.g. 
JSF, AWD etc). As long as the existing projects/programs are suitably structured and of a 
manageable size, then it is recommended that their program structures be left intact. The 
important concept is to put measures in place that allow the interfaces between projects 
to be become compatible and interoperable. 
Ideally the sequence of events in the process that should be adopted to achieve the optimum 
result is: interoperability, followed by modularity and modularisation followed by standardisation. 
Management and Organisational Structures 




















































































Figure 23 ADO Stakeholder Organisations From an IPv6 Perspective 
The roles of the existing lead organisations and their existing subordinate organisations are 
described as follows. 
 
Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG) 
The CIOG is divided into the Information Systems Division (ISD) and the Information Capability 
Management Division (ICMD), for a complete CIOG organisational structure please see Annex F. 
Within these two divisions the following branches will have an IPv6 role as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
53 e.g. DWACN, JP2072 etc. 
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Network Infrastructure Development (NID) Branch 
As part of ISD, NID is an important organisation from an IPv6 perspective as responsibility for all 
the ADO’s software applications have recently been centralised within the branch. 
 
Technical Improvements (TI) 
As part of NID, TI is expected to play a role in the development of an ADO pilot/test-bed54 
capable of implementing IPv6 for the purposes of evaluating the technology and the strategies for 
transition. 
 
Information Architecture & Management (IAM) Branch 
As part of ISD, IAM Branch is responsible for developing and maintaining the enterprise 
architecture and governance processes and tools that support the Defence Information 
Environment. Using its specialist staff and innovative support arrangements, IAM Branch assists 
Defence's Groups and Services in establishing and supporting their individual architecture offices 
and practices within the federated approach mandated by the Defence Architecture Framework. 
 
Information Systems Security Assurance Branch 
As part of IAM, ISSA will have responsibilities for the accreditation of applications and systems to 
the ADO IPv6 standard. 
 
Information Policy and Plans (IPP) Branch  
As part of ICMD, IPP branch executes the CIO’s principal responsibilities as Coordinating 
Capability Manager of the Defence Information Environment (DIE). The Branch is responsible for 
the management and coordination of the DIE capability on a short-to-mid term basis (typically 0-5 
years). The Branch is responsible for the short-to-mid term prioritisation of the information 
capability investment program (including minors) and oversight of portfolio DIE expenditure. 
 
Scientific Advisor - Joint (SA-J) Branch  
As part of ICMD, The Scientific Adviser - Joint (SA-J), represents the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation (DSTO). SA-J advises the Australian Defence Joint Warfare, 
Information, Intelligence and Strategic communities on science and technology (S&T) issues and 
trends relevant to the development of capability and conduct/support of operations.  
 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) 
DSTO provides the ADO with scientific advice and supports the CDG and DMO through providing 
specialist scientific reports and conducting risk-analysis work and experiments in the support of 
these organisations.  
 
Capability Development Group (CDG) 
CDG is the ADO’s capability manager and is responsible during the start-up phase of projects 
through to the completion of second-pass where the projects are handed over to the DMO. In 
Figure 23 we are showing this relationship for the Navy, Airforce, Army and Joint projects where 
there are links back to both CDG and DMO. 
 
Network Centric Warfare Program Office (NCWPO) 
The NCWPO has been established within the Integrated Capability Branch of CDG where it has 
authority to integrate projects into the force in being and the future force. The NCWPO is 
expected to be closely involved with ensuring that Principles 1 and 2 are followed. 
Rapid Prototyping Development Environment (RPDE) 
The Mission of the RPDE Program is “To enhance ADF war fighting capacity through accelerated 
capability change in the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) environment”. The RPDE concept aims 
                                                 
54 This was suggested by the Commonwealth at the IPv6 workshop. The hardware for this test-bed may 
already be in existence. 
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to create a collaborative, non-competitive environment where Defence and industry can seek 
opportunities where rapid enhancement to capability can be achieved, principally by incremental 
enhancement of existing capability. 
 
Defence Materiel Organisation 
Fleet Information Systems Support Organisation (FISSO) 
The FISSO takes responsibility for Navy projects. 
Command & Intelligence Systems Sustainment Office (CISSO) 
The CISSO takes responsibility for Airforce and Army projects. 
Tactical Information Environment Integration Office (TIEIO) 
The TIEIO provides a support service to the DMO where it performs integration services for the 
ADO’s tactical information environment including Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs), e.g. 
Link-11, Link-16 and Link-22 etc. 
 
Other ADO Stakeholders 
DII Focus Group 
This group currently does not exist. It should be formed as a virtual/matrix organisation of existing 
O6/EL2 level ADO members who will be responsible for leading the detailed planning phase, for 
making the required executive decisions in support of this IPV6 Transition Plan and tasking the 
JTWG (see 6.2.5.2). The DII Focus Group will have wider DII responsibilities than just IPv6. It 
should be noted that there is currently a Tactical Gateway Focus Group and it is recommended 
that this group is subsumed into the DII Focus Group55. 
 
Joint Technical Working Group (JTWG) 
This group currently exists and should be expanded to receive IPv6 related tasking by the DII 
Focus Group. The JTWG will undertake further IPv6 related analysis and technical work to 
determine solutions and make more detailed proposals. It should be noted that at the time of 




The ADO’s Defence Security Authority (DSA) is the ADO’s internal security authority with 
oversight over security for the whole of the ADO. 
 
The ADO’s Defence Signal Directorate’s (DSD) purpose is to support Australian 
Government decision-makers and the ADO with high-quality foreign signals 
intelligence products and services. DSD also directly contributes to the military 
effectiveness of the ADF, and provides a range of information security services to 
ensure that their sensitive electronic information systems are not susceptible to 
unauthorised access, compromise or disruption. 
 
The ADO’s IPv6 transition organisations (see section 6.3) will need to closely interact 
with both DSA and DSD on the security aspects of the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. 
  
Others 
The remaining stakeholders within the ADO fall into the category of users of the DIE and DII and 
the owners of applications that reside within the DIE. These users will be the subject of IPv6 
communications (see section 6.3) and training programs.  
 
                                                 
55 These recommendations are in accordance with Commonwealth comments to the draft IPv6TP. 
56 This was advised by Commonwealth comments to the draft IPv6TP. 
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Other Stakeholders 
Stakeholders external to the ADO include: 
 
• the Allied IPv6 organisational elements (e.g. US IPv6TO), 
• the US National Security Authority who the ADO will need to interact with to achieve 
interoperability and 
• other government organisations. 
IPv6 Transitioning OrganisationS 
To support the goal of providing a governance structure which: 
 
i) champions interoperability through policy measures and ensures that Principles 1 
and 2 are implemented and 
ii) avoids an organisational structure (from an IPv6 transition view) like the US DoD CIO 
and NII offices, 
We recommend that two new organisations are created as indicated in Figure 23. 
The first organisation, the IPv6 Transition Office (IPv6TO), will sit within the CIOG and will provide 
the CIO with the governance measures to ensure that the CIOG becomes the “interoperability 
custodian” for the transition of the ADO’s DIE and its end-systems from IPv4 to IPv6 i.e. to 
support Principles 1 and 2 being implemented by CDG and DMO. 
 
The second organisation, the IPv6 Program Office, will be functionally responsible to the CDG for 
projects during the start up phase and to the DMO for projects post second pass. It is enabled (by 
way of budget and schedule responsibility) to actually implement Principles 1 and 2. It is 
recognised that such an arrangement may be difficult to achieve and the resolution may be to 
create one program office within CDG and a second within DMO. 
 
The roles and responsibilities of these two organisations are provided in more detail in the 
following sections.  
 
IPv6 Transition Office (IPv6TO) 
The prime function of the ADO’s IPv6TO is to operate as the “interoperability custodian” for IPv6 
transitioning activities (please see section 7 for the recommended office organisational structure 
and position descriptions). 
 
The ADO IPv6 Transition Office will be established to carefully plan and manage, at the 
enterprise level, Defence’s transition to IPv6 and will document this planning in the ADO IPv6 
Transition Plan. This plan will be developed through broad consultation with key stakeholders. 
The ADO IPv6 Transition Office will be responsible for co-ordinating transition planning, analysis, 
testing and implementation efforts across Defence, promoting knowledge sharing, ensuring 
needed infrastructure is provided, and implementing a systematic program of outreach within 
Defence. The office will ensure that critical enterprise transition issues are prioritised and 
addressed. 
 
The Transition Office will be responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to services, 
groups and projects/IPTs, and for defining procedures for approval and testing of 
migration/transition implementations. 
 
The Transition Office should be structured to provide direction and guidance in the following 
technical areas: 
 
• Security: this is a critical area; procedures must be in place to ensure that policy is 
enforced. System accreditors must be engaged to ensure that IPv6 issues are 
understood. There should be close co-ordination with ADO defence security 
organisations. 
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• Networks: this will cover both WANs and LANs. The provision of IPv6 service by 
individual component networks within the DIE will need to be co-ordinated. Issues 
relating to the provision and management of 6 over 4 and 4 over 6 tunnels and/or dual 
stack operation will need to be resolved. It will be important to reach agreement on where 
the responsibility for inter-working lies at network boundaries. This will probably need to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
• Address allocation: the Transition Office will be responsible for the management of IPv6 
address allocation and the naming and addressing policy. It will also be responsible for 
the establishment of a root IPv6 Domain Name service (DNS). In performing these tasks 
the Transition Office will liase with the Network Architecture Office. 
• Applications: initially this area will be concerned with the provision of application layer 
gateways between IPv4 systems and IPv6 systems. Subsequently it will be important to 
address migration of applications to IPv6. This will apply to common services (e.g. e-mail) 
as well as specific applications. Over the long term, this may become the major effort in 
the transition process. 
• Allied interoperability: the Transition Office should provide a central focus for 
discussions with Allies (principally the US DOD) on the co-ordination of IPv6 migration 
where necessary for interoperability. 
• Scheduling: the overall schedule for IPv6 migration will be maintained by the transition 
Office, which will need to co-ordinate the schedules of DIE component networks and 
information systems. 
• Standards: IPv6 is currently a general term used to describe a wide range of technical 
standards. The IPv6TO will be responsible for defining the IPv6 standards baseline for 
the ADO. 
• Testing: it will be necessary to set technical specifications and standards to ensure inter-
working of DIE components as they migrate to IPv6. The Transition Office will produce 
high-level test plans and have oversight of the testing process, this will include 
interoperability testing and IPv6 certification. The IPv6TO will also set criteria for the 
assessment of performance and inter-working. 
• Test-bed: it is recommended that the ADO commence migration with a pilot 
implementation, in order to gain understanding and confidence before going forward to 
migration on operationally critical systems. The ADO IPv6 Transition Office should have 
close oversight of this pilot project. This pilot test-bed could either be newly constructed 
specifically for the purpose or hosted on one of the existing ADO test-beds57. 
IPv6 Program Office (IPv6PO) 
The IPv6PO’s prime function is to act as the Program Manager for the implementation of IP and 
the implementation of the transition of IPv4 to IPv6, ensuring Principle 2 is implemented. This 
program level responsibility will extend to end-systems and platforms (outside the scope of the 
DIE), where the role is to ensure that Principle 1 is implemented. As such the IPv6PO will have 
allocated budget to carry out its duties and will have schedule responsibility. 
 
As the IPv6PO is expected to have minimal staff, individual projects/IPTs (Navy, Army, Airforce 
and Joint) will be required to contribute staffing resources to help the development of the 
Transition Plans, particularly in the area of cost and schedule estimates. The IPv6PO will work 
with the IPv6TO who will provide guidance and consultancy to assist the projects/ IPTs and to 
ensure reasonable consistency in the estimating process. The IPv6PO will have the following 
responsibilities: 
 
• Program level responsibility (budget and schedule) for the implementation of IPv6 across 
all the ADO’s projects.  
                                                 
57 This issue was discussed at the IPv6 workshop. There are many test-beds within the ADO, 28 in ISD 
alone, there are J-series message test beds in the TIEIO and another 6 test-beds in the RPDE. There is also 
the ADO’s involvement in the CFBL test-environment. 
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• High-level participant on the IPv6 Detailed Planning Phase in collaboration with the 
IPv6TO. 
• Development, management and maintenance of the ADO’s IPv6 Implementation Project 
Plan including cost and schedule. 
• Responsibility for complying with the IPv6 governance measures and technical standards 
as set by the IPv6TO. 
• Take direction for IPv6 related implementation tasks from various CDG and DMO 
managers. 
• Overall management responsibility for the IPv6PO at an organisational and 
program/technical level. Will monitor progress against schedule and budget. 
• IPv6 implementation interface with all CDG and DMO projects. This duty will require the 
incumbent to liase with all impacted projects and programs (DWACN, JP2072, SEA1442 
etc) to construct and maintain an overall ADO IPv6 schedule with inter-program/project 
dependencies. This schedule will also extend to Allied and other government programs. 
Relationships with other IPv6 Transitioning Bodies 
The ADO IPv6TO should establish and maintain close links with transition management 
organisations in Allied national defence departments. The prime link should be to the US DOD 
and DISA. The CCEB can facilitate this linkage and links to similar bodies in UK and Canada. It is 
expected that the US will wish to deal with Allies in multilateral bodies, rather than through many 
bilateral arrangements. The IPv6TO should also establish and maintain links with other Australian 
organisations (including industry) to achieve a whole of Government approach to the transition of 
IPv6.  
Hierarchy of Documents 
This section proposes a hierarchy of documents to be used by the ADO to manage and 
coordinate the IPv6 transition activities. This IPv6TP is the top-level parent document. The 
IPv6TO will maintain this document with changes and additions as required. Other IPv6 transition 
planning documents (including project budgets and schedules) will be subservient to this plan as 


















Figure 24 IPv6 Document Hierarchy 
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Lower Level IPv6 Transition Plans 
The IPv6PO is assigned to coordinate the management of the implementation of IPv6 within the 
individual Defence Services, groups and projects. The IPv6PO will work closely with the IPv6TO 
and the projects being run by CDG and the DMO to develop an IPv6PO Transition Plan. A key 
function of the IPv6PO Transition Plan is to capture an integrated (whole of ADO) budget and 
schedule for the implementation of IPv6. The development of the top level integrated schedule 
(and budget) and the derived lower level (per project) schedules will require significant 
coordination and iteration between the IPv6PO and the individual projects. Also, because the 
transition strategy is leveraging off normal technology refresh cycles, these plans will require 
continual maintenance into the future. 
 
These lower-level plans will be consistent with the overarching ADO IPv6 Transition Plan but will 
be focused on the planned transition within the Service/Group/Project, and will identify 
Service/Group/Project-specific issues and how they will be addressed. Critical dependencies and 
disconnects will be identified and worked through the DII Focus Group and the JTWG as 
appropriate. Individual Service/Group/Project plans would be endorsed by the ADO IPv6 
Transition Office and approved within the individual Service/Group/Project.  
 
These lower-level Transition Plans will include schedule and cost information. As they are 
produced it will become possible to refine the overarching ADO IPv6 Transition Plan, and the co-




Ado ipv6 workforce requirements 
To effect the ADO’s transition to IPv6 over the period from now until 2013 will require effort to be 
applied in three major areas: 
 
i) Level of effort undertaken by staff within the IPv6TO, 
ii) Level of effort undertaken by staff within the IPv6PO and 
iii) Results/milestone based effort undertaken by other ADO staff (or contractors) to 
transition the DII’s applications (software) and hardware. 
The following sections propose a suitable workforce to cover the above areas of effort. 
ADO IPv6 Workforce 
The IPv6TO and IPv6PO will need to perform a number of functions that can be allocated to one 
or more of the respective office’s staff members. 
 
IPv6TO Functions 
The functions to be performed by the IPv6TO include: 
 
i) Management and update of the ADO IPv6 Transition Policy [1]. 
ii) Planning, management and implementation of IPv6 governance measures and 
processes. 
iii) Management of the transition of all DII applications and hardware from IPV4 to IPv6. 
iv) Management of the IPv6 Test Program, this includes management and oversight of 
an IPv6 Test-bed. 
v) Management of the IPv6 Security Program. 
vi) Management of the IPv6 Allied Interoperability Program. 
vii) Management of the IPv6 Communications Plan. 
viii) Definition and management of the ADO’s IPv6 standard.  
ix) Provision of IPv6 technical specialist services. 
IPv6TO Organisational Structure 
The above functions of the IPv6TO could be fulfilled by an organisation with between three and 
four full time positions. The IPv6TO Lead may be a part-time (50%) position. 
 
IPv6TO Lead









The IPv6TO Lead will perform the following duties: 
i) Take direction for IPv6 related tasks from various CIOG managers and the DII Focus 
Group. 
ii) Overall management responsibility for the IPv6TO at an organisational and 
program/technical level. Will monitor progress against schedule and budget. 
iii) Planning and management of the IPv6 governance measures and processes. This 
will include involvement in First and Second Pass project review processes from an 
IPv6 perspective. 
iv) Management of the IPv6 Communications Program. This duty will involve planning 
and performing IPv6 related education and information dissemination initiatives 
throughout the ADO, Allied organisations and other government organisations. The 
aim of the Communications Program is to ensure that the level of awareness within 
the ADO is sufficiently high across all the impacted ADO organisations to ensure an 
astute and timely transition from IPv4 to IPv6. 
v) IPv6 Coordination. This duty will require the incumbent to liase with all impacted 
projects and programs (DWACN, JP2072, SEA1442 etc) to construct and maintain 
an overall ADO IPv6 schedule with inter-program/project dependencies. This 
schedule will also extend to Allied and other government programs. 
vi) Management of the IPv6 Allied Interoperability Program. This duty will involve 
planning and performing the various initiatives required to support Allied 
interoperability from an IPv6 perspective. The incumbent will be responsible for 
liasing with Allied IPv6 transition offices and ensuring that Allied related information is 
past onto ADO projects as well as putting the case for ADO IPv6 requirements to 
Allies.  
Owning Organisation 
Each IPv6TO position is part of the CIOG organisation. 
Competencies and Qualifications 
The incumbent will need to be a competent manager of technology in a defence environment and 
is expected to hold a minimum of a diploma or degree qualification in engineering and preferably 
with a specialty in communications and network engineering. They will be capable of 
understanding the technical issues of transitioning the DIE to IPv6 and directing the technical 
effort within the IPv6TO. 
Experience Required 
The incumbent will need to have several years experience managing related projects within the 




This position will be required for the life-time of the IPv6 transition. 
 
Test Manager Position 
Position Duties 
The IPv6TO Test Manager will perform the following duties: 
i) Take direction for IPv6 related testing and related tasks from the IPv6TO Lead and 
from various CIOG managers and the DII Focus Group in consultation with the 
IPv6TO Lead. 
vii) Overall management responsibility for the ADO’s IPv6 test program at the program 
and technical level. The incumbent will be responsible for ensuring that the required 
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“IPv6 test-bed” assets are in place within the ADO. It is expected58 that the Combined 
Forces Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet, see Figure 17) will have a major role in the 
IPv6 test program. 
ii) Overall responsibility for the program to assess all the DII’s applications and 
hardware for transition to IPv6. This includes managing and undertaking all the 
recommended assessment activities listed in section 7.2. 
Owning Organisation 
Each IPv6TO position is part of the CIOG organisation. 
 
Competencies and Qualifications 
The incumbent will need to be a competent manager of technology in a defence environment and 
is expected to hold a minimum of a diploma or degree qualification in engineering and preferably 
with a specialty in communications and network engineering. They will be very capable of 
understanding the technical issues of transitioning software applications and hardware within the 
DIE to IPv6. 
 
Experience Required 
The incumbent will have experience in the acquisition, test and acceptance of complicated 
hardware and software systems in the areas of communications and networking. It is preferable 
that they also have experience in the development and implementation of integrated hardware 
and software systems. It is also preferred that this experience extends across both the terrestrial 
(DWACN) and deployed/tactical environments. 
 
Tenure 




The IPv6TO Security Manager will perform the following duties: 
i) Take direction for IPv6 related security tasks from the IPv6TO Lead and from various 
CIOG managers and the DII Focus Group in consultation with the IPv6TO Lead. 
ii) This position will be responsible for coordinating and liasing with the ADO’s security 
organisation including the Defence Security Authority (DSA), the Defence Signals 
Directorate (DSD) and the Information Systems Security Assurance (ISSA) branch of 
the CIOG. 
iii) The position will also be responsible for liasing with other security authorities and 
administrations, most importantly the US and UK authorities. 
Owning Organisation 
Each IPv6TO position is part of the CIOG organisation. 
 
Competencies and Qualifications 
The incumbent will need to be a competent manager of technology in a defence environment and 
is expected to hold a minimum of a diploma or degree qualification in engineering and preferably 
with a specialty in communications and network engineering. They will be very capable of 
understanding the security issues with the transitioning of software applications and hardware 
within the DIE to IPv6. 
 
Experience Required 
The incumbent will have experience in assessing software and hardware systems from a security 
perspective in a defence environment. They will need to have prior experience working with 
                                                 
58 As advised by the Commonwealth during the IPv6 Working Group meeting on 29 June 2005. 
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similar issues with the ADO’s security organisations and it is preferable that they have experience 
working with at least one other external security organisation e.g. the USA’s NSA. It is also 








The IPv6TO Technology Specialist will perform the following duties: 
i) Take direction for solving IPv6 technical issues from the IPv6TO Lead and from 
various CIOG managers and the DII Focus Group in consultation with the IPv6TO 
Lead. 
ii) Provide IP specialist technical support to the IPv6TO and to the ADO as a whole. 
iii) IPv6 is currently a general term used to describe a wide range of technical standards. 
The incumbent will be responsible for defining the IPv6 standards baseline for the 
ADO. 
iv) Be actively involved in designing and performing IP related tests (general areas and 
security related) and assessment activities on the IPv6 Test Bed and the DII. 
v) Liase with software engineers to evaluate application code for compliance with IPv6 
and assessment of the level of effort required to move an IPV4 application to IPv6. 
Perform the same function with the relevant hardware engineers for the transition of 
hardware to IPv6. 
Owning Organisation 
Each IPv6TO position is part of the CIOG organisation. 
 
Competencies and Qualifications 
The incumbent will be the prime technical point of contact for IPv6 within the ADO and as such 
they must in the first instance have a very good overall technical competency in the areas of 
communications and networking technology. They will have general knowledge of IPv6 and will 
over a short period of time become the ADO’s subject matter expert in IPv6. 
They are expected to hold a minimum of a degree qualification in engineering with a specialty in 
communications and network engineering. 
 
Experience Required 




This position will be required for the life-time of the IPv6 transition. 
 
IPv6PO Functions 
The functions to be performed by the IPv6PO include: 
i) Program level responsibility (budget and schedule) for the implementation of IPv6 
across all the ADO’s projects, within the realms of the Capability Development Group 
and the Defence Materiel Organisation.  
ii) High level participant on the IPv6 Detailed Planning Phase in collaboration with the 
IPv6TO. 
iii) Development, management and maintenance of the ADO’s IPv6 Implementation 
Project Plan including cost and schedule. 
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iv) Responsibility for complying with the IPv6 governance measures and technical 
standards as set by the IPv6TO. 
IPv6PO Organisational Structure 
The IPv6PO is conceived as an Integrated Product Team (IPT) with lines of reporting back 
through to CDG and DMO as required by the stage of the project (with an IPv6 requirement) 
being managed. The IPT would be staffed by members of both CDG and DMO and is estimated 
to be equivalent to one full-time position. 
 
Although only consisting of nominally one new full-time position, the IPv6PO IPT will be 
supported by individual projects who will allocate resources to support the responsibilities of the 
IPv6PO (see IPv6 Project Managers below). 
 
IPv6 Program Manager 
Position Duties 
The IPv6PO Program Manager will perform the following duties: 
i) Program level responsibility (budget and schedule) for the implementation of IPv6 
across all the ADO’s projects.  
ii) High level participant on the IPv6 Detailed Planning Phase in collaboration with the 
IPv6TO. 
iii) Development, management and maintenance of the ADO’s IPv6 Implementation 
Project Plan including cost and schedule. 
iv) Responsibility for complying with the IPv6 governance measures and technical 
standards as set by the IPv6TO. 
v) Take direction for IPv6 related implementation tasks from various CDG and DMO 
managers. 
vi) Overall management responsibility for the IPv6PO at an organisational and 
program/technical level. Will monitor progress against schedule and budget. 
vii) IPv6 implementation interface with all CDG and DMO projects. This duty will require 
the incumbent to liase with all impacted projects and programs (DWACN, JP2072, 
SEA1442 etc) to construct and maintain an overall ADO IPv6 schedule with inter-
program/project dependencies. This schedule will also extend to Allied and other 
government programs. 
Owning Organisation 
Each IPv6PO position nominally reports back through to either the CDG or the DMO depending 
upon the stage of the subject project. As stated above, because of the difficulties with creating 
such a dual reporting structure it may be necessary to have two separate IPv6POs. 
 
Competencies and Qualifications 
The incumbent will need to be a competent manager of technology in a defence environment and 
is expected to hold a minimum of a diploma or degree qualification in engineering and preferably 
with a specialty in communications and network engineering. They will be capable of 
understanding the technical issues of transitioning the DIE to IPv6 and directing the technical 
effort within the IPv6PO. 
 
Experience Required 
The incumbent will need to have several years experience managing related projects within the 




This position will be required for the life-time of the IPv6 transition. 
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IPv6 Project Manager 
There will be many IPv6 Project Managers spread across the range of Army, Navy, Airforce and 
Joint projects. The level of effort required to support each position within a project will vary 
between a small part-time role to a larger part-time role depending upon the scale of the IP 
implementation. 
 
Each IPv6 Project Manager will be responsible to the IPv6 Program Manager and will have 
responsibility for either: 
• the implementation of IP within their project, if they are DIE related, or 
• the implementation of Principle 1 for end-system/platform projects. 
Workforce to Transition Applications and Hardware 
The depth of DIE analysis conducted in support of this IPv6TP has been insufficient to allow an 
accurate estimate of the total effort in man-years to transition the DIE’s thousands of applications 
and hundreds of thousands of hardware items. What is provided here is a sequence of steps that 
needs to be followed during the detailed planning phase to formulate a quantifiable measure of 
the effort required. Management of this work will be the responsibility of the IPv6TO. 
 
DII Applications 
Each DII application needs to be assessed using the following steps: 
i) The first step is to define the set of applications that will need to connect to the IP 
network either now or into the future. 
ii) Applications are then categorised as either COTS or in-house/specialist developed. 
For those that are COTS, the vendor should be queried as to the IPv4/IPv6 roadmap. 
If the application is scheduled for IPv6 transition as part of the normal product 
development cycle then the additional level of effort (over that expended for any 
other product upgrade) is limited to that required to meet the conformance standards 
which verify that the application meets the ADOs IPv6 standard. 
iii) For COTS applications where IPv6 is not on the applications developmental roadmap 
or the date for delivery of IPv6 is too far in the future, the vendor should be requested 
to provide a price and schedule for inclusion of IPv6 specifically for the ADO. If the 
cost and schedule is acceptable to the ADO then the upgrade would proceed with the 
normal conformance testing process being applied. 
iv) For in-house or specialist applications where the ADO has ownership of the source-
code and design documentation for the application, it should be possible for qualified 
software engineers to inspect the quality of the software design and implementation 
for transition to IPv6. This process will determine the level of effort required to 
perform that software upgrade including documentation and testing. The outcome of 
this process will determine the cost effectiveness of upgrading the application. If it is 
cost effective to upgrade the application then the upgrade should be undertaken and 
the software put through the same acceptance into service processes as any other 
IPv6 enabled application. If it turns out to not be cost effective then there are two 
options, the first is to continue to use the application (and therefore continue to 
provide IPv4 support) or to seek an alternative application that is IPv6 capable. 
v) Should the above steps not lead to an acceptable solution, the alternatives include 
maintaining IPv4 support for the application or potentially seeking an alternative 
application that is IP agnostic i.e. a web-based application where the IP requirement 
falls to the browser application. 
DII Hardware. 
The DII hardware will have many of the same issues as software applications, except that some 
hardware items (usually peripheral devices) will possess an embedded IP stack where the stack 
cannot be upgraded via software (e.g. printers). The steps and solutions are the same for 
software except that it is most unlikely that it will ever be cost effective to upgrade lower cost 
peripheral hardware devices. In these situations where the hardware item cannot be replaced, the 
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The completed risk log is included in Annex C. The remainder of this section summarises the 
results of the risk log. 
Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Risk mitigation strategies are included in the “Treatment Strategies” column of the risk log in 
Annex C. 
Risk Summary 
With cognisance of the ADO IPv6 Transition context (see 3.1), the risk analysis process 
generated a risk log containing twenty six (26) risks, the log includes contributions from 
stakeholders who attended the IPv6 Workshop and others generated by the IPv6 Panel. The risks 
were rated for “Likelihood” and “Consequence” using the process from the ADO’s Project Risk 
Management Manual, a summary of the outcome of the rating process for these risks is provided 







Figure 26 Risk Ratings Summary Matrix 
 
As Figure 26 indicates, there were no “Extreme” level risks identified, fourteen (14) “High” level 
risks, eight (8) “Medium” level risks and four (4) “Low” level risks. The most common “Likelihood” 
rating was in the “Possible” category where 19 of the risks were classed. The most common 
“Consequence” rating was in the “Major” category where 11 of the risks were classed, although 
there was almost a 50/50 split between risks classed from “Insignificant” to “Moderate” and those 
in the “Major” to “Severe” category. 
 
Each risk was also classified for the “Sources of Risk”59 using the standard list of sources from 
the ADO’s Project Risk Management Manual. As this IPv6TP is the very first step of a transition 
activity that is currently scheduled to run over the next eight years until 2013, the results for the 
most common sources of risk highlight the critical importance of the governance structure and 
                                                 
59 See Annex C for the complete list of Risk Sources. 
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controls employed by the ADO to effect the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. The most common 
sources of risk (in order of frequency) were: 
 
• “Management activities and controls” followed by, 
• “Technology and technical issues” followed by, 
• ”ADO project offices”. 
Whilst much of the risk is sourced internally within the ADO, the reliance on COTS to effect the 
implementation of the transition and the need to interface with external bodies that lie outside the 
governance structure (e.g. Allied IPV6 transitions) means that there is also a large body of risk 
that lies outside the direct control of the ADO. The reliance on COTS is reflected by the next two 
most common sources of risk being in the classified areas of “Defence contractors” and “Maturity 
of technology required”. 
 
Therefore the most sensible (and likely best value for money) mitigation/treatment strategies will 
concentrate on maintaining flexible governance structures, plans and technical architectures to 
allow the ADO implementation to cope with COTS IPv6 and Allied transitions that fail to meet the 
expected (and planned) timelines and budgets. A large part of this flexibility will be achieved by 
the wide-spread (across the ADO) adoption of Principles 1 and 2 (see Section 6.1). 
 
Therefore a large part of the risk mitigation activity will be effected by the ADO (IPv6TO) 
periodically and continually revisiting this plan and maintaining a flexible stance to ensure that it 
can compensate for the effects of any realised risks during the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. 
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Dependencies and Key Assumptions 
Key Assumptions 
The key assumptions used to compile this document are as follows: 
 
• Ubiquitous IP : Although it appears that it is not yet specific ADO policy to include in the 
architectural baseline requirements specifying that all Networks / Data-links / Bearers 
within the DII become routable by implementing IP, it is a key assumption that the 
requirements for NCW and the general push toward maximising the usage of COTS will 
mean that system designers will consider IP as a candidate technology wherever 
possible. Further to this it is also assumed that IP will be the first “Layer 3” technology 
considered by system designers and if it is not chosen for DIE system past 2013, it will be 
because of other reasons e.g. cost, interoperability or performance. 
• IPv6 Program Synchronisation : Although the ADO will liase and coordinate with Allies 
and their programs to transition from IPv4 to IPv6, the coupling between these programs 
will be loose and not necessarily synchronised. This implies that the ADO must be 
prepared to inter-operate with Allies using both IPv4 and IPv6 for an extended period, 
probably well past 2013 and potentially up until any IPv4 flag day60, should one be 
pronounced. 
• Security : The security mechanisms in place today within the DIE and Allied networks 
use a mix of physical separation and encryption at the Data Link layer (2) or Network 
layer (3). Despite this there are techniques in place that allow a certain degree of 
interoperability between the ADF and its Allies. Ideally though, the most flexible, powerful 
and interoperable networks would be achieved if the DIE and Allied networks completely 
progressed to implementing the end-to-end network model with all security implemented 
at the Application layer (7), or “object-based”. As object-based security is yet to be 
mandated for the DIE and there is significant momentum in the DCP toward expanding 
the current security mechanisms (e.g. $50 mil JP 206961), it is assumed that there will be 
no fundamental change to the DIEs security architecture up until 2013. 
                                                 
60 It is the Panel’s view that an IPv4 Flag Day is almost certain to never occur. 




The ADO issued the policy “Transition To Internet Protocol Version 6” [1] in February 2005, this 
policy requires the DIE to transition to IPv6 by 2013 and importantly the policy states that IPv6 is 
an enabler for the ADO’s vision of NCW. 
 
This IPv6TP has been developed by BSG in collaboration with a Panel (“the Panel”) of IPv6 
subject matters experts from the IPv6 Forum, QinetiQ, the Naval Post Graduate School and the 
W2COG over the period from May through to July 2005. A draft of this plan was discussed at a 
workshop on 29 June 2005 and was attended by members of the Panel and various 
Commonwealth members. This Plan is considered to be a living document that will require 
revision and maintenance in order to keep pace with the rapid changes in networking technology. 
The scope for this IPv6TP includes the whole of the ADO’s DII and DIE.  
 
Although the ADO’s IPv6 Policy was in place at the start of this task, the “context” for Internet 
Protocol (IP) (and the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 specifically) within the DIE was not apparent. 
Therefore the Panel’s first response was to use a top-down system engineering methodology and 
develop the “context”, this is the focus for Section 3. 
 
The methodology in Section 3 analysed transitioning from artisan-based to industrial based 
information systems and then developed a definition for the GIG. The key observation from this 
analysis is that “modularisation” is the key to achieving interoperability (Note: Standards are also 
important but not key). To achieve modularisation (and then “net centricity”) the following crucial 
overall design principles were generated: 
 
Principle 1 : Unit-Level LANs 
End-systems (e.g. sensors, weapons, Allies etc) are connected to “the network” and 
not to each other. They are attached to unit-level LANs which are in turn connected via 
a router to either a radio-WAN or a terrestrial WAN. 
 
Principle 2 : Routable WANs 
Make Radio-WANs and terrestrial WANs routable. 
 
The analysis also produced derived design requirements for the end-systems (these connect to 
the DIE) and classified end-systems that comply with these requirements as “Good Network 
Citizens”. The analysis also defined performance requirements for radio-WANs and proposed 
potential candidates for COTS re-use, i.e. IEEE 802.x standards are recommended as prime-
candidates for consideration, even though some of the standards (e.g. WiMAX) will require 
modification to suit military systems. Two methods of dealing with legacy technology (during the 
IPv6 transition) were also considered, Cocooning and Layer 7 gateways, of the two Layer 7 
gateways are viewed as more useful. 
 
The context setting analysis concluded with a definition of the boundary between the non-DIE and 
the DIE, this is important because the boundary often extends into the ADF’s platforms where 
many of the “legacy” issues will be encountered in the future. The use of the developed DIE IP 
context extended beyond just the technical (implementation) domain and was pivotal to the 
generation of the governance structure and workforce plan to support the transition from IPv4 to 
IPv6. 
 
Section 3 also summarised the history and plans of the IPv6 activities being conducted by the UK 
MOD, NATO and the US DOD. Much of the detailed information concerning these plans was not 
available to BSG but should be available to the ADO through its Government-to-Government 
links. A list of known IPv6 documents is provided in 1.3.2 and the Panel is pleased to offer its 
assistance to the ADO with obtaining access to this material. It was concluded by the Panel that 
because IPv6 has yet to progress to a sufficient state (anywhere in the world) there are currently 
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no “off-the-shelf” strategies that could be applied to the DIE. In fact the implementation of the US 
DOD’s IP governance structure is viewed as containing a few lessons learnt and attributes that 
should be avoided by the ADO. As a result of this IPv6TP, the ADO is likely to be in advance of 
many organisations with regard to its IPv4 to IPv6 transition, and potentially better placed to meet 
its desired time-schedule if the governance mechanisms can be smoothly and successfully 
implemented. 
 
The next input to the development of the IPv6 transition strategy was to analyse the current and 
future Defence Information Environment (DIE), see 3.3. The 2005 architecture and network 
magnitude was detailed with a specific emphasis on the DWACN, the DWACN is seen as a core 
element of the transition activity. This information was used an input to the development of an 
IPv6 numbering plan in Section 5. The future DIE architecture was covered by specifying the 
DCP projects that will move the DIE from its current baseline to its future state. 
 
Section 3 concluded by providing relevant challenges, opportunities and emerging technologies. 
The ADO can expect to find its major challenges in the areas of transitioning its non-routable 
networks and security. To ensure that the ADO can rise to these challenges, the IPv6TO is 
proposed to be staffed with positions (Technology Specialist & Security Manager) that specifically 
address these areas of challenge. 
 
The recommended IPv6 transition strategy commenced in Section 4 by considering three options. 
A “big bang” strategy was deemed too risky and costly, an incremental approach with hard-
milestones did not comply with the approach of leveraging off the natural technology refresh 
cycles and so this led to recommending an incremental transition with soft milestones. The 
recommended strategy is depicted in Figure 15, this shows seven overlapping (soft milestone) 
phases: 
 
• Phase 1 Planning, 
• Phase 2 Network Security, 
• Phase 3 National Application Gateways & Allied Application Gateways, 
• Phase 4 Overlay Networks, 
• Phase 5 IPv6 Clouds, 
• Phase 6 Cloud Expansion and 
• Phase 7 End State. 
Importantly this strategy allows for a progressive roll-out of IPv6 whilst recognising that some 
parts of the DIE may never transition and small enclaves of IPv4 and links to external IPv4 
networks will be required past 2013. The Planning phase extends for the life-time of the transition 
and it will be the IPv6TO and IPv6PO who will be responsible for conducting this planning effort 
and maintaining the over-arching IPv6 documentation. Also, the Network Security, National 
Application Gateways and Allied Application Gateway phases will also span the entire transition 
period (although having staggered starts) due to their importance and need to iterate with 
changing conditions both within the DIE and those of influence external to it. 
 
The strategy has also been designed to be cost-effective, to have no impact on defence 
operations and not to degrade interoperability with Allies, justification is provided in 4.3.  
To reduce the level of risk and ensure a successful transition Section 4.4 proposed a range of 
information assurance and test activities that will need to be conducted. These are designed to 
help ensure that ADO security is not prejudiced and experienced can be gained by the ADO with 
IPv6 before rolling the capability out into the DIE and operational environment. The 
recommended strategy section concludes with some specific advice for the DCP projects that are 
seen to be key to the IPv4 to IPv6 transition. Included in the list of key projects is JP2047, 
JP2008, JP2072, SEA1442 and JP2030. 
 
At this early stage of the planning process it has not been possible to develop an IPv6 address 
space plan that can withstand the test of time i.e. from now until 2020 and beyond. However 
Section 5 provides a detailed step by step analysis method that can be used during the detailed 
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planning phase to construct a robust IPv6 address plan for the ADO. The method is illustrated 
using several examples, these are related to the ADOs current DIE architecture and consider 
future technologies that may be taken up by the ADO and consume addresses. These examples 
suggest that the ADO’s IPv6 address range could be anywhere between 34 bits (/30 address) 
and 46 bits (/18 address). However the ADO should attempt to gain access to the largest 
contiguous block of addresses (e.g. /18) it can as the cost of using these addresses is likely to 
outweigh the costs of modifying the network in the future to suit a smaller (and or fragmented) 
address range. 
 
Section 6 details a recommended governance structure for the ADO to transition the entire DIE 
and to ensure that the end-systems that attach to the DIE also conform to this IPv6TP. The “Unit-
Level LANs” and “Routable WANs” principles (see above) are used again as the basis for the 
development of the governance structure. The CIOG organisation has recently undergone some 
significant changes and these are captured in the plan, the recent transition of the DMO to a 
prescribed agency may also have some impact on implementing these governance measures. 
Two new organizational offices are proposed to ensure that the governance regime is 
implemented in a astute and timely fashion and that the actual implementation of IPv6 is 
appropriately funded and scheduled. 
 
The IPv6 Transition Office (IPv6TO) will be part of the CIOG, its prime responsibility will be as the 
“interoperability custodian” where it will complete the detailed planning of IPv6, promote 
information sharing across the ADO and ensure that the critical enterprise transition issues are 
prioritised and addressed. The IPv6TO will become the ADO’s centre of excellence for IPv6 and 
will also offer technical guidance to the whole of the ADO. The IPv6TO will be staffed with up to 
four full-time positions. 
 
The IPv6 Program Office (IPv6PO) has been proposed to act as the Program Manager for the 
implementation of IP in general and the transition of IPv4 to IPv6 across the whole DIE. 
Functionally the office must cover the scope of ADO projects from inception through to first pass 
(where they are under the control of the CDG) then on through second pass and into service 
(where they are under the control of the DMO). It is recognised that this may be a difficult 
proposition and if a single (one-person) office cannot be created, then the solution may be to 
have one office within the CDG and the other within the DMO. The IPv6PO will also require each 
project to allocate budget and schedule to the implementation of IPv6 as required. Although the 
office is small, its creation, function and lines of reporting are seen as crucial to a successful 
transition. 
 
Section 7 details the organisational structure of the IPv6TO and IPv6PO. Each position within 
these offices is provided with a position description and description of the required competencies 
and experienced required to fulfil the role. 
 
Although some quantification of the magnitude of the elements (hardware and software) of the 
current baseline DIE are provided in 3.3.1, it has not been possible within this IPv6TP to provide 
any detailed estimates for the level of effort required to transition software applications and 
hardware. Section 7.2 does however provide a detailed step by step procedure for assessing the 
hundreds of applications within the DIE with the aim of determining the effort/cost of making the 
IPv4 to IPv6 transition. It is also recognised that some applications may not be cost effective to 
transition and will be maintained as is in IPv4 enclaves within the DIE. 
 
The conclusion to the process of developing this IPv6 transition strategy was to assess all its 
elements (including the proposed governance structure and workforce) for risk, see Section 8. A 
risk log capturing 26 risks was developed, each risk was assessed for likelihood and 
consequence and mitigation strategies were proposed. As the IPv6 transition will be heavily 
dependent upon COTS, there is a large degree of risk that will be beyond the direct control of the 
ADO. The responsibility for managing this risk will rest with the IPv6TO who will need to 





This IPv6TP is the first major step in an eight-year project to transition the entire DIE to IPv6 by 
2013. As such the ADO will be required to complete many inter-linked activities and work with a 
variety of external organisations during the lifetime of the project. 
 
The following is a list of recommendations for the immediate term: 
 
• the ADO endorse this IPv6TP, 
• the ADO endorse the governance and organisational components of this IPv6TP and 
commence resourcing the IPv6TO and IPv6PO, 
• continue to engage the community of IPv6 subject matter experts to ensure that the 
progress with other organisations is tracked and lessons learnt are continually captured, 
• sponsorship of combined Defence/Industry IPv6 forums to expand Defence’s 
engagement with industry and whole of government, 
• commence the Detailed Planning Phase including an initial IPv6 threat assessment and 
• review the ADO’s DWACN as-is and future architectures descriptions for the impact of 
this IPv6TP. 
The following is a list of recommendations for the medium term: 
 
• maintain and update this IPv6TP and its associated policies, 
• undertake a detailed review each of the “Key Projects For Transition” (see 4.5), 
• conduct a more detailed study and workshop in support of extending the work in this 
IPv6TP and developing a future looking IPv6 address plan and 
• undertake specialist IPv6 and Network Centric focussed (See principles 1 and 2) training 




ANNEX A Interoperability Options 
62IPv6 and IPV4 will coexist for many years. A wide range of techniques has therefore been 
defined that make the coexistence possible and provide a path toward transition. These 
techniques fall into three main categories: 
 
• Dual-stack, 
• Tunnelling and 
• Translation. 
Dual stack techniques allows IPV4 and IPv6 to coexist in the same devices and networks. 
Tunnelling techniques allow the transport of IPV6 traffic over the existing IPv4 infrastructure. 
Translation techniques allow IPv6-only nodes to communicate with IPv4-only nodes. 
Dual-stack Techniques 
Using the dual-stack nodes throughout a network provides complete support for both IPv4 and 
IPv6 protocol versions. 
 
In communication with an IPv6 node, such a node behaves like an IPv6-only-node, and in 
communications with an IPv4 node, it behaves like an IPv4-only node. Implementations probably 
have a configuration switch to enable or disable one of the stacks. Therefore dual stack nodes 
can have three modes of operation: 
 
• IPv4 enabled and IPv6 disabled – Behaves like an IPv4 only node 
• IPv4 disabled and IPv6 enabled – Behaves like an IPv6 only node 
• IPV4 enabled and IPv6 enabled (IPv4/IPv6) – Node can use both protocols 
An IPv4/IPv6 (both stacks enabled) node has at least one address for each protocol version. For 
IPv4 it will configure by using either static configuration of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP) and for IPv6 it will use either static configuration or auto-configuration. 
 
Domain Name System (DNS) is used with both protocol versions to resolve names and IP 
addresses. An IPv4/IPv6 node needs a DNS resolver that is capable of resolving both types of 
DNS addresses records. In some cases, DNS returns only an IPv4 or an IPv6 address. If the host 
that is to be resolved is a dual-stack host, DNS might return both types of addresses. Generally, 
applications that are written to run on dual-stack nodes need a mechanism to determine whether 
it is communicating with an IPv6 peer or an IPv4 peer. 
 
A dual-stack network is an infrastructure in which both IPv4 and IPv6 forwarding is enabled on all 
routers. The disadvantage of this technique is that a full network software upgrade is required to 
run the two separate protocol stacks. This means all tables (e.g. routing tables) are kept 
simultaneously, routing protocols being configured for both protocols. For network management, 
there are separate commands (e.g. Windows OS - ping.exe for IPv4 and ping6.exe for IPv6). 
Other problems include higher memory and power consumption. 
 
Dual-Stack Advantages 
• Easy and flexible to use. 
• Hosts can communicate with IPv4 hosts using IPv4 or with IPv6 hosts using IPv6. 
• When the IPv6 upgrade is complete the IPv4 stacks can simply be disabled or removed. 
                                                 
62 Most of this Annex has been sourced from [2] and the IPv6 Forum 
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Dual-Stack Disadvantages 
• Two stacks require more CPU power and memory than one stack (not such a big issue). 
• Requires two tables, one for each protocol, increased management effort. 
• Requires two sets of commands, one for each protocol, increased management effort. 
• A DNS resolver running on a dual-stack host must be capable of resolving both IPV 4 
and IPv6 address types. 
• Applications on a dual-stack host must be capable of determining whether this host is 
communicating with an IPv4 or IPv6 peer. 
• Should use a firewall to protect the IPv4 network and the IPv6 network. 
Tunnelling 
Tunnelling is used to carry IPv6 traffic be encapsulating it in IPv4 packets and tunnelling it over 
the IPV4 routing infrastructure. 
 
Tunnelling 
There are two types of tunnelling63: 
 
• Manually configured tunnels. IPv6 packets are encapsulated in IPv4 packets to be 
carried over IPv4 routing infrastructure. These are point-to-point tunnels that need to be 
configured manually. 
• Automatically configured tunnels. IPv6 nodes can use different types of addresses (e.g. 
IPv4-compatible-IPv6 addresses, 6to4 or Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Address Protocol 
(ISTAP)) to automatically tunnel packets over the IPv4 routing infrastructure. These 




Figure 27 Tunnelling (6-over-4) Example 
Tunnelling Advantages 
• Flexibility, there is no specific upgrade order that needs to be followed. 
• Single hosts or single sub-nets within a corporate network can be upgraded to IPv6. 
• Continue to use IPv4 core network (Telstra & Singtel/Optus), core doesn’t need to 
support IPv6. 
                                                 
63 For more info see IETF RFC2893 
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Tunnelling Disadvantages 
• Additional load placed on the router (a vendor design problem only). 
• Tunnel entry and exit points need time and CPU power for encapsulating and de-
capsulating packets (a vendor design problem only). 
• Single point of failure (can be overcome by better network design). 
• More complex trouble-shooting as may develop “hop count”, MTU size or fragmentation 
issues. 
• Less flexibility when using IPv4 compatible IPv6 address, as the limitations of the IPv4 
address space remain in place. 
• Potential for the number of tunnels to become very large and unmanageable. 
Manually Configured Tunnels64 
A manually configured tunnel is an IPv4 or IPv6 tunnel configured between two end-points to 
carry IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. This allows for example two IPv6 networks to be connected even when 
the infrastructure between those two networks is not IPv6 capable, or later in the transition two 
IPv4 networks to be connected that are separated by an IPv6 network. 
Advantages 
• Simple to deploy inside a network 
• Allows transport of IPv6 packets over an IPv4 network 
• Available on most platforms 
• Also supports IPv4 traffic over IPv6 
• Permits end-to-end interoperability 
• Permits end-to-end secure trust model 
• IETF Standard and specified solution 
Disadvantages 
• Must be manually configured 
• Due to management overhead does not easily scale to be used in end-hosts 
• May not scale without automation for many users across routing fabric 
 
Figure 28 Manually Configured Tunnelling Example 
                                                 
64 ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-07.txt This document 




Automatically Configured Tunnels 
The following automatic techniques, 6to4, ISATAP and Teredo are expected to be more 
applicable for the commercial domain where more flexibility is required, mostly because it is 
common for the other end of the tunnel to be beyond the control of the network administrator. For 
defence applications it is expected that manual tunnelling methods will be more appropriate 




This is a mechanism that requires a single, globally unique IPv4 address. By embedding this 32 
bit IPv4 address into a reserved IPv6 prefix, a router can create a globally unique /48 IPv6 prefix. 
The IPv6 packets are encapsulated in IPv4 packets without using explicit tunnels but automatic 
tunnelling mechanisms. Thus, making this low configuration overhead mechanism especially 
useful in IPv6 capable end-hosts. The usage of the special 6to4 address format, however, 
prevents the usage of an operator’s own address space. Thus, 6to4 is impractical in roll-outs 
beyond single host configurations or very small networks. 
 
Advantages 
• Relatively easy to deploy. 
• Supported on numerous platforms. 
• Provides an address block for an AS without dealing with any registry. 
• An existing standard (RFC 3056). 
• Permits end-to-end interoperability. 
• Permits end-to-end secure trust model. 
• Public 6to4 relays exist today. 
Disadvantages 
• Operator’s allocated IPv6 address space cannot be used. 
• Impractical in network based roll-outs when entity has their own IPv6 prefix. 
 
Figure 29 6to4 Example 
                                                 




ISATAP is a solution to provide IPv6 connectivity to sparsely located hosts in an IPv4 network. In 
this solution, the IPv6 capable hosts use automatic IPv4 tunnels to connect to an ISATAP router, 
which is connected to further IPV6 networks.  
 
The ISATAP addresses are created by using a special ISATAP interface identifier derived from 
the host’s IPv4 address. Once the ISATAP router is reached, standard IPv6 stateless  
 
Autoconfiguration is used over the automatic tunnel to create the IPv6 address. This mechanism 
allows the usage of operator allocated IPv6 address space in the prefix. In addition, the hosts can 
be in private address space as long as there is not Network Address Translation (NAT) between 
the hosts and the ISATAP router. Intra-site communication can be done directly between hosts 
using the IPv4 address in the interface identifier. 
 
Advantages 
• Provides for easy incremental deployment of IPv6 to disparate nodes in a site. 
• Supported on many platforms. 
• Works in sites that use private addresses when NAT is not present. 
• Permits end-to-end interoperability. 
• Permits end-to-end secure trust model. 
• IETF work in progress, but unknown if it will be standardised by any entity. 
• Supported by some platforms 
• ISATAP will self-deprecate (i.e. turn itself off) when IPv6 is dominant and in use without 
the network operators having to dismantle the ISATAP mechanisms. 
Disadvantages 
• Caution has to be used when deploying the ISATAP routers to make sure they are not 
used to hide a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. 
• ISATAP does not provide for multi-cast support 
 
Figure 30 ISATAP Example 




Teredo provides IPv6 connectivity to hosts that are located behind NAT-devices in networks 
without IPv6 support. Teredo uses a special address format where the IPv6 prefix is created 
using special Teredo prefix, IPv4 address and a UDP port number. The IPv6 packets are 
encapsulated in UDP allowing NAT traversal. The IPv6 address is automatically configured to the 




• Easy to implement on a “one-off” basis. 
• Provides a solution that works through NATs. 
• Provides a solution for networks with no IPv6 support. 
• IETF standardized solution in process 
Disadvantages 
• Uses a special IPv6 address format. Thus, operator’s own allocated address space 
cannot be used. 
• Uses UDP to force hole in the client firewall. 
 
Figure 31 Teredo Example 
 
Tunnel Broker Overview68 
Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP) is a tunnel broker based solution where the TSP client connects to a 
TSP broker that sends the client configuration information for setting up the tunnel between the 
TSP client and a tunnel server. TSP works both for a single host and a router. In addition, of 
providing IPv6 connectivity TSP supports authentication of the user and supports tunnelling of 
IPv4 over IPv6.  
 
TSP is a good solution for connecting IPv6 networks as it supports IPv6 prefix delegation. In 
addition, TSP supports UDP encapsulation of the packets enabling NAT traversal of the tunnel. 
TSP can use operator’s own address range for the terminals. 
 
                                                 
67 ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/internet-drafts/draft-huitema-v6ops-teredo-05.txt. 
68 ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3053.txt & ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/internet-drafts/draft-
blanchet-v6ops-tunnelbroker-tsp-02.txt 
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TSP has not been standardized in any standardization body, yet. However, there are activities 
on-going to bring TSP to the IETF. 
 
TSP is an instance of the Tunnel Broker model (RFC 3053). The TSP allows authentication of the 
user at tunnel setup. 
 
Advantages 
• Smaller configuration overhead than manually configured tunnels. 
• Works also in dynamic environments. 
• Supports NAT traversal. 
• Support tunnelling of IPv4 over IPv6. 
• Supports DSTM (below). 
• Referenced as method to review by U.S. DoD. 
• Strong industry support for deployment 
Disadvantages 
• Large signalling overhead. 
• Heavy solution. 
• Not standardized yet, but in process. 
 
Figure 32 Tunnel Broker Example 
Dual Stack Transition Mechanism (DSTM)69 
DSTM has a different assumption to transition than the other mechanisms. DSTM assumes an 
IPv6 dominant deployment where most of the hosts are IPv6 capable and the network is mostly 
IPv6 only. In DSTM, IPv4 is transported over IPv6 tunnel to an IPv4 network. 
 
IPv6 deployment in some operational networks will use an IPv6-dominant network deployment 
strategy. What IPv6-dominant means is that the network will transition to IPv6 using only IPv6 
routing to transfer both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. 
 
Advantages 
• Provides IPv4 connectivity in IPv6 networks without explicitly configured tunnels. 
                                                 
69 http://www.rfc-editor.org/cgi-bin/iddoctype.pl?letsgo=draft-bound-dstm-exp-03 
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• Maintains end-to-end security for IPv6 connectivity and for IPv4, when enough IPv4 
global address space is available. 
• Has had industry implementation and some testing. 
• Referenced as method to review by U.S. DoD. 
• Strong Industry support for this method. 
Disadvantages 
• Not standardized, yet, but in process. 
 
 
Figure 33 DSTM Example 
Translation70 
Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) uses address translation. Basically 
NAT-PT translates IPv6 packets to IPv4 packets and visa versa. The NAT-PT device has to keep 
state information of the flows passing the device to perform the protocol translation. The 
mechanism relies on a DNS Application Level Gateway (ALG) to translate IPv6 address queries 
to IPv4 queries and to build up the state in the NAT-PT device. The usage of the DNS-ALG is 
seen problematic due to various reasons. Thus, the IETF is in the process of moving the NAT-PT 
standard to experimental RFC.  
 
The NAT-PT solution allows IPv6 only nodes in an IPv6 network to communicate with IPv4 nodes 
without being directly connected to the IPv4 network. However, it does have the same short-
comings and restrictions than regular IPv4 NAT has. Thus, applications that do not work well with 
NATs do not work with NAT-PT either. 
 
Translation Advantages 
• Transparent to end nodes. Easily provide IPv4/IPv6 interoperability. 
• Mechanism that allows the continued use of mission critical application or services that 
may be undesirable to have ported for use with IPv6. 
Translation Disadvantages 
• Single point of failure/bottleneck. 
• Added administration. 
• Has the same shortcomings of a traditional NAT. 
                                                 
70 ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-v6ops-natpt-to-exprmntl-01.txt 
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• DNS-ALG is seen problematic. 
• Does not permit the end-to-end network model  
 
Figure 34 Translation Example 
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Annex B Phase 1 Detailed Planning 
IPv6 Address Planning 
Using the framework provided in Section 5 “IPv6 Address Space Requirements”, an address plan 
will be developed for the whole of the DIE. 
Non-routable network Planning 
Detailed planning for the DIE’s non-routable networks will consist of the following tasks: 
• Determine ingress and egress points to the Non-Routable networks within the ADF DIE. 
• Determine if interfaces can be specified with IP from those ingress and egress interfaces. 
• Determine the data structures for those interfaces, and then a network proxy or gateway 
will have to be developed to support those input and output interfaces. 
• Determine what semantics relative to the network are contained within those interfaces. 
• If IPv4 is assumed in those interface semantics, then IPv4 should be used to input to this 
network. 
• For an IPv6 Transition when a packet flows into or through a Non-Routable network the 
Transition should assume it should be presented an IPv4 packet, this implies potentially 
translating IPv6 to IPv4. This could have great cost and affect end-to-end interoperability 
for any IPv6 context and assumptions for security end-to-end. 
• It would be best if possible to redefine the Non-Routable network interfaces to support 
IPv6 from the beginning if at all possible for the IPv6 Transition. 
Interoperability Planning 
Detailed planning to achieve the required interoperability will mostly be conducted by individual 
projects where they will need to perform a range of tasks including: 
• Determine set of network applications71 that must be ported / invented.  
• Determine the geography the network applications must span. 
• Identify Network components that must support IPv6. 
• Identify Network components that require IPv6 Transition Mechanisms. 
• Identify Network components that can be initiated with IPv6 using IPv4 as scarce 
resources only. 
Determine the packets required over the DIE within the scope of the IPv6TP: 
• Packets over a local link, a site, an intranet, an Internet and over a mobile IPv6 network. 
• Packets from IPv6 Network thru IPv4 Cloud to IPv6 Network. 
• Packets from IPv4 Network thru IPv6 Cloud to IPv4 Network. 
Determine the points of network communications for the IPv6TP Node Types: 
• Clients, Servers, Routers, Switches, Printers, Gateways, Firewalls, Proxies, and any 
network device or applications platform. 
• Management Nodes (e.g. Network, Security, Mobility, QoS). 
• Any Node supporting Transition Mechanisms. 
• Public Key Infrastructure Nodes for Security. 
Determine the points of network communications for the IPv6TP Software Components: 
                                                 
71 In general it is expected that most applications within the DIE will need to migrate to IPv6, except for 
those completely stand-alone applications including those which do not connect to a LAN. 
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• Network Management and Utilities. 
• Network Internet Infrastructure Applications. 
• Network Systems Applications. 
• Network End User Applications. 
• Network High Availability Software. 
• Network Security Software. 
Costing 
Once the above detailed planning is completed, each individual project should have a sufficient 
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of Risk     
0     
1 
Commercial and legal 
relationships 
Between the organization and other organizations, e.g. 
suppliers, subcontractors, lessees. 
2 Economic circumstances 
Of the organization, country, internationally, as well as factors 
contributing to those circumstances e.g. exchange rates. 
3 Human behaviour 
Of both those involved and those not involved in the 
organization. 
4 Natural events   
5 Political circumstances 
Including legislative changes and factors which may influence 
other sources of risk. 
6 
Technology and technical 
issues Both internal and external to the organization. 
7 
Management activities and 
controls   




Materiel System requirements, as defined in the OCD and FPS 
(noting that inadequate requirements are identified as the No 1 
cause for project failure); 
10 Operating environment 
Operating environment (i.e. how similar is the operating 
environment for which equipment was designed with the 
envisaged operating environment?); 
11 Interfaces   
12 
Software development and 
management 
Software development and management, including software 
support; 
13 
Degree of development 
required for the system   
14 
Maturity of technology 
required   
15 Specialty engineering areas 
Specialty engineering areas, such as growth and obsolescence, 
safety, security, electromagnetic environmental effects, human 




Government Furnished Material (GFM), which includes 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), Government 
Furnished Data (GFD) (i.e. warranted data), and Government 
Furnished Information (GFI); 
17 Integrated Logistic Support 
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) issues, including: Support 
System requirements, support contract requirements, linkages 
between the acquisition and support contracts, and costing and 
resourcing the envisaged support arrangements; 
18 
Transition from an existing 
Materiel System 
Transition, particularly the transition from an existing Materiel 
System (or part thereof) to a new Materiel System (while 
maintaining capability); 
19 ADO project offices 
ADO project offices, particularly with respect to the right balance 
of personnel numbers, skills and experience; and 
20 Defence contractors 
Defence contractors, particularly with respect to capability to 
undertake the required work (i.e. process maturity and the right 
balance of personnel numbers, skills and experience). 









DEF 7013 Joint Intelligence Support 
System (JISS) 
Further development of the JISS for 
support of the Australian Defence 
intelligence community. 
AIR 5276 Ph 6 Data links for AP3-C Orion 
aircraft. 
Upgrade aircraft communications suite 
and data links. Note: Currently use 
Link-11. 
AIR 6000 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Comms/Radios will come as part of 
this platform acquisition 
AIR 7000 Multi-mission Maritime 
Aircraft (MMA). AP3-C 
replacement. 
Comms/Radios will come as part of 
this platform acquisition 
AIR 9000 Helicopters. Comms/Radios will come as part of 
this platform acquisition. 
JP 2008 Military Satellite 
Communications 
Expanded capability including use of 
Optus/Singtel C1 satellite. 
JP 2030 Joint Command Support 
Environment 
Consolidating existing Command 
Support Systems into a single 
environment. 
JP 2047 Defence Wide-Area 
Communications Network 
Multi-phase project with ISDs between 
2005 and 2014. Providing enhanced 
encryption services, enhanced 
protocols transmission and switching 
equipment and providing guidance of 
on-going development. 
JP 206872 DNOC –Defence Network 
Management System and 
Computer Network Defence 
Improving management, monitoring, 
security and visibility of the DIE. 
JP 2069 High Grade Cryptographic 
Equipment (HGCE). 
Replacement HGCE. 
JP 2072 Battlespace Communications 
System (Land) 
Replacing the Army’s CNR and Tactical 
Trunk Communications with an 
advanced communications system. 
JP 2089 Tactical Information Exchange 
Domain (TIED) (Data Links) 
Delivering Link-16 and VMF on Ships 
and Planes/Helicopters and associated 
land-based platforms. 
JP 2090 Combined Information 
Environment 
Establish permanent “information” 
connectivity between ADF and key 
Allied Command and Control networks 
and systems to support future 
Coalition operations.  
LAND 75 Battlefield Communications 
Support System (BCSS) 
Role out of BCSS below Brigade level. 
LAND 125 Soldier Combat System Acquire advanced capabilities for the 
combat soldier. 
                                                 
72 It was advised during the IPv6 Workshop that Phase 2A of JP2068 has been cancelled and that JP2047 
will provide NMS functionality enhancements. 
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SEA 1442 Maritime Communications and 
Information Management 
Architecture Modernisation 
Introduction of Maritime Tactical Wide 
Area Network and IP Networking to a 
range of RAN vessels. 
SEA 4000 Airwarfare Destroyer Comms/Radios will come as part of 
this platform acquisition 
 
ANNEX E IPv4 
IPv4 Address Space Exhaustion 
One of the potential consequences of failing to transition from IPv4 to IPv6 may be the exhaustion 
of IPv4 addresses. Figure 15 plots the allocation of IPv4 addresses against time and shows that 
prior to 1995 addresses were being allocated at a steep linear rate, these were mostly Class B73 
allocations. Since 1995 a CIDR methodology has been used to allocate addresses and Figure 27 
also plots a prediction (green line out to 2015) of address allocation using an exponential model 
starting in 1995. 





Figure 35 IPv4 IANA Allocations - Projection using Exponential Growth Model75 
It should be noted that the above does not necessarily relate to the IPv4 address usage 
within the ADO.
                                                 
73 A Class B address range will support up to 65,534 Hosts. 
74 Source http://bgp.potaroo.net/ipv4/ , this chart is automatically updated each day. 
75 Source http://bgp.potaroo.net/ipv4/ , this chart is automatically updated each day. 
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ANNEX F CIOG Organsational Chart 
 
Chief Information Officer (CIO)
AVM John Monaghan






































































































































































































Figure 36 CIOG Organisational Structure 
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ANNEX G Mobile IP 




























Figure 37 Edge Mobility 
 
Mobile IPv6 is designed to support individual roaming mobile hosts. The aim of MIPv6 is to 
maintain reach-ability to a node as it moves to various points in a network. The mobile node can 
be reached via a constant “home address” when it is on a different network. Active sessions can 
be maintained as the node moves from one network to another.  
 
Mobile IPv6 has three main components: the mobile node (MN), the home agent (HA), and the 
correspondent node (CN). The way Mobile IPv6 works is as follows. The mobile node registers 
with a specific home agent. When the MN moves to a new network (presumably by connecting to 
some sort of access point), it must detect that it has moved to a new network, and obtain a new 
IP address. While a new address can be obtained via DHCPv6 after being triggered by some sort 
of movement detection process, the more common method uses router advertisements (RADV) 
to detect movement and automatically assign a new address using stateless auto-configuration. 
Once this new address is obtained, the mobile node sends a binding update (BU) to the HA and 
any correspondent nodes it is currently communicating with, notifying them of its new care-of 
address (CoA). 
 
There are two possible modes of communication between the mobile node and a correspondent 
node. The first mode, bi-directional tunnelling, does not require MIPv6 support at the 
correspondent node. In this mode, the home agent intercepts all packets destined for the MN 
using proxy neighbour discovery, and tunnels them to the MN. Packets that the MN sends to the 
CN are also tunnelled back through the home agent. The second mode of communication, route 
optimisation, requires the correspondent node to have Mobile IPv6 functionality. This process 
starts out the same as the bi-directional tunnelling mode, with the HA intercepting packets 
destined for the MN, and tunnelling them to the MN’s Care-of Address (CoA). With route 
optimisation, the MN then informs the CN about its CoA, and the CN and MN can then 
communicate directly, without the aid of the HA. As long as a session is active, the MN needs to 
send a binding update (BU) to the CN when it moves to a new network, so that they may continue 
direct communications. 
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General MIPv6 Benefits 
Here are the primary similarities and differences between MIPv6 and MIPv4: 
 
• Foreign agent. Both standards rely on a home agent and a mobile node, but MIPv6 does not 
define a foreign agent to issue a care-of address (CoA), since routable address constraints 
are not an issue in IPv6 networks. Instead, MIPv6 derives the CoA directly from auto-
configuration schemes. This approach enables the mobile node to operate in any location 
without requiring special support from the local router. 
• Route optimisation. MIPv6 enables direct-packet routing between the mobile node and 
corresponding nodes located on an IPv6 network. When the mobile node moves into a 
foreign network, it obtains a new CoA and reports this to its home agent. The home agent 
intercepts all packets destined for the mobile node and tunnels them to its registered CoA. In 
a MIPv4 scenario, a corresponding node’s traffic must pass through the home agent, but 
MIPv6 route optimisation allows the mobile node to send binding updates to an IPv6-based 
corresponding node. The corresponding node caches the current CoA and then sends 
packets directly to the mobile node. This is an optional procedure for MIPv4 that requires 
special options to be enabled on each corresponding node, and is rarely implemented or 
used. 
• Security. MIPv4 and MIPv6 will often be used with a VPN (virtual private network) solution 
for data security when the user is roaming into networks outside the corporate firewall. Both 
protocols will in theory allow the use of a v4 IPsec (Internet protocol security) VPN solution, 
providing in the case of the MIPv6 client that the IPv6 protocol stack includes a 6-to-4 
function. In addition, the MIPv6 client allows the use of a v6 IPsec VPN solution. 
• Home agent address discovery. Using the IPv6 anycast feature, the mobile node can send 
a binding update to the home agent anycast address. The mobile node will get only one 
response from one home agent even if several are present on the network. This is an efficient 
way of keeping track of multiple home agents, which may be required in many networks for 
redundancy or scalability. 
MIPv6 status 
MIPv6 has mature IETF standards-track specifications for its core functionality, as well as for the 
added ability to use IP Security (IPSec) to encrypt signalling between the MN and the HA. There 
are a few reasonably mature MIPv6 implementations available covering the Linux, BSD, CISCO 
IOS, and Windows operating systems, as well as simulation environments. 
There is still significant evolving research being done in the area of MIPv6. Emerging 
enhancements and modifications, such as Hierarchical MIPv6 (HMIPv6) may help improve the 
performance and scalability of the protocol. 
General MIPv6 Issues 
MIPv6 is only necessary for mobile end systems which require a stable IP address for 
identification or to maintain in-progress sessions while roaming between networks. If these 
conditions need not be met, and it is acceptable to obtain a new address and restart current 
sessions, then the combination of DHCP and dynamic DNS, as one possible example, may be 
sufficient to meet mobility criteria, and MIPv6 maybe unnecessary. 
 
The main MIPv6 specification includes a mechanism for Dynamic Home Agent Address 
Discovery (DHAAD), which can be used for avoiding a manual configuration of the Mobile Node 
with the Home Agent’s address. However, the current mechanism that allows a Mobile Node to 
detect the prefix of its home network when attached to a visited network, requires additional 
operational administration. This must currently be done manually, though there is work underway 
to address this aspect in an automatic way using the Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA) infrastructure, and new methods to identify new link prefixes from work on 
Detecting Network Attachment (DNA) which is work in progress. 
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If tunnelling is used between the MIPv6 Home Agent and Correspondent the standard tunnelling 
overhead for any protocol will exist, but this can be avoided using the MIPv6 route optimisation. 
Additionally, fast handoff of a mobile node has significant limitations due to the required local 
interface protocol standards. 
Network Mobility 
Network Mobility (NEMO) is essentially an extension to Mobile IPv6. NEMO is designed to apply 
to entire networks in motion, rather than just individual nodes in motion. It is still an area of work 




2. GES SOA Standard Review 
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20 January 2006 
Memorandum for Director Defense Information System Agency  
 
From: Executive Director, W2COG Research Initiative 
 
Ref: (a) DISA Proposed Standards for Implementing GIG Enterprise Services 
 
Encl:  (1) W2COG Institute Response to Reference (a)  
(2) Prof Rick Hayes-Roth, Naval Postgraduate School, Response to Reference (a)  
(3) Object Management Group (OMG) Response to Reference (a) 
(4) Proposed Statement of Work for Phase II Evaluation  
 
Subj: W2COG Review of Proposed Standards for Implementing GIG Enterprise Services 
 
1. Thank you for the opportunity to review ref (a). Appendix (1) is a good faith W2COG Institute quick 
look, pending opportunity for a more thorough effort. It provides a collaborative industrial perspective that: 
endorses your use of non-proprietary standards to achieve an interoperable, affordable, and leading (not 
bleeding) edge Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS)-based solution that avoids interoperability problems and 
vendor lock-in; agrees that your proposed list is a viable beginning; and opines that industry will marshal 
behind DISA in support of a non-proprietary framework. The Institute suggests an expansion of the 
framework with special attention to building distributed, high performance, highly secure and highly 
reliable systems using fundamental SOA concepts. It comments briefly on the issue of test and validation 
for SOA-based enterprise services, noting that it makes little practical sense to be able to implement a 
SOA-based solution in a matter of months only to be forced to spend years in testing it and validating it 
prior to deployment. Finally it strongly suggests follow-on review by carefully selected expert team.  
 
2. Encl (2) provides an opinion that frames the essential basis of the W2COG value proposition. Its author 
is a renowned expert in industrial software and architecture and is one of the founders of the W2COG 
project.  His point is that “(choosing) standards (before demonstrating enhanced capability) puts the cart 
before the horse. Instead, we should focus on high-value transactions that achieve information superiority, 
and then choose tools, including, but not chiefly, standards that reduce time to value.”  
 
3. Appendix (3), provided by the president of a very large and respected software standards body, suggests 
that software standards for architectural design, e.g. UML(2), should be included along with standards for 
architectural implementation..  
 
4. Appendix (1) demonstrates how quickly and cost-effectively government can apply the not-for-profit 
umbrella of the W2COG to leverage on going commercial investment in software architectural 
development. Accordingly, appendix (4) suggests the parameters of a phase II review of reference (a).  
 
5. I personally endorse all the above and add further comment. One could argue that identification and 
implementation of COTS software standards will mostly “just happen” agnostic of DoD’s efforts to 
mandate its list of standards. On the other hand, DoD must be vitally concerned about its process for 
dynamically selecting and applying the situationally appropriate standards to field the capability it desires. 
It seems to me that the NCES technical references cited in reference (a) address the former more than the 
latter. To close this gap we might look at past lessons learned. For example, we could take an approach 
similar to the Defense Acquisition University “breathalyzer” test for software development from the days 
of MIL-STD-2167. Software developers were required to answer a short list of tough questions keyed to 
acquisition imperatives before fielding capability.  If you agree that DISA’s technical reference material 
should facilitate creation of a dynamic SOA standard implementation process, you might take a fresh look 
at the “breathalyzer’s” list of ten questions and apply them to design technical reference for dynamic NCES 
software implementation process. If you are interested in pursuing this line of thought, we have some ideas 
and can role them into the phase II evaluation. 
 





World Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) 
1895 Preston White Dr 
Reston VA 20191 




January 20, 2006         via email transmission to john.rosenbaum@disa.mil 
 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
Attn: Dr. John Rosenbaum 
PO Box 4502 
Arlington, VA 22204 
 
SUBJECT: Proposed Standards for Implementing GIG Enterprise Services 
 
Dear Dr. Rosenbaum: 
 
Please accept this input as the W2COG Institute preliminary response to LTG Charles 
E. Croom, Jr. Memorandum of 27 December 2005, subject as above.  
 
W2COG Institute and its affiliated companies are pleased to submit this response as 
part of our continuing research program directed toward accelerating the 
development and availability of tools to support secure, net-centric operations. 
 
We share with you a congruence of goals centered on four mutually reinforcing 
characteristics for enterprise service standards: 
 
• Non-Proprietary. Enterprise services built using a Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) must guarantee interoperability to achieve information 
sharing in a net-centric environment. 
• Distributed. SOA-based services must satisfy the needs of a Global 
Information Grid and operate seamlessly when mobile or forward deployed. 
• High Performance. SOA-based services must support high transaction rates 
and large volumes of enterprise data, and still exhibit low latency. 
• Secure and Reliable. SOA-based services must be secure and ensure high 









Executive Summary  
W2COG Institute concurs with comment to the proposed list of standards for implementing Global 
Information Grid (GIG) enterprise services. We endorse the use of non-proprietary standards to achieve an 
interoperable, affordable, and leading (not bleeding) edge Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS)-based 
solution that avoids interoperability problems and vendor lock-in.  
 
We believe that the list of standards proposed by the Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) Program 
Office is a viable beginning to achieving the goal of a non-proprietary instantiation of Service Oriented 
Architectures (SOA). We further believe that industry will marshal behind DISA in support of a non-
proprietary framework. 
 
In this paper we will build upon the work of the NCES Program Office to briefly suggest an expansion of 
the framework to better support the net-centric environment with special attention to building distributed, 
high performance, highly secure and highly reliable systems using fundamental SOA concepts.  
 
We comment briefly on the issue of test and validation for SOA-based enterprise services, noting that it 
makes little practical sense to be able to implement a SOA-based solution in a matter of months only to be 
forced to spend years in testing it and validating it prior to deployment. 
 
To ensure widespread industry and defense stakeholder support for an expanded list of standards, we also 
explicitly suggest a Phase II comment period, not to exceed 60 days, during which a more complete 
analysis and architectural review could occur. We offer industry support from W2COG Institute and its 
affiliates to participate in such a review. 
 
Success Criteria  
In reviewing the list of standards proposed by the NCES Program Office, the W2COG Institute applied the 
following success criteria: 
 
• Industry Support.  Will private industry support the proposed standards? The premise of the 
NCES effort is that core enterprise services of the Department of Defense can be implemented 
using proven commercial technologies from the Internet and electronic business. Because of its 
network of members and affiliates, W2COG Institute is in a prime position to judge whether the 
proposed standards will garner sufficient industry support to realize this goal. 
• Sufficiency and Practicality. Can high performance systems with excellent security and 
reliability be built with these standards? We asked experts who have actually built multiple high 
performance SOA-based systems for private industry to comment on perceived gaps and overlaps. 
• Sustainability. Does the proposed list of standards lay a solid foundation for sustainable, 
manageable effort? Or, will it die of bureaucracy and overhead? We again looked at commercial 
best practice to compare, but we also critically examined the theory of SOA to determine potential 
strengths and weaknesses. 
• Testability. Can a SOA-based enterprise service which is based on these standards be efficiently 
tested and validated? We examined the standards carefully to determine if technological solutions 
or industry best practices to deal with the testing issue could be supported. 
 
Endorsement of XML Base Protocol Standards  
To level-set our understanding of a SOA-based enterprise service, we begin by providing a graphical 
depiction of what we mean by a Service Oriented Architecture. Briefly, a services approach to system 
design, implementation and provisioning is based on the following definitions: 
 
 110
Service – a coarse-grained (i.e. “moderately large”) business or technology capability unit with 
well defined interface boundaries that interacts with end users and other services through industry 
standard, message-based protocols. 
SOA – Service Oriented Architecture – technical architectures based on event-driven collections 
of loosely-coupled software components which implement services. 
SOE – Service Oriented Enterprise - An organization which uses the concept of a service to 
optimize its enterprise architecture. A “service” orientation implies a layered architecture with 
support for a business processes layer, a service oriented application architecture (SOA) layer, a 
service oriented infrastructure (SOI) layer, and a service management layer. 
SOI – Service Oriented Infrastructure – a virtualized “landing zone” for SOA solutions in which 
hardware, storage, security and network resources are virtualized and managed as a utility. 
 
As part of establishing this definition we explicitly accept the standards for XML base protocols as 
essential elements in any mandatory list of SOA implementation standards. The XML base protocols are 
SOAP, WSDL and UDDI.  We note that these standards are shown in the NCES Program Office suggested 
list. The relationship and interaction among the XML base protocols are shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
Figure 1 -- XML Base Protocols 
 
Benefits and Caveats of a Standards-Based Approach  
The W2COG Institute agrees with your desire to use standards to achieve an interoperable, affordable 
COTS-based solution that avoids individual vendor lock-in. Standards can define a common conceptual 
taxonomy for describing the problem space and encourage the use of modular, and thus re-usable and 
upgradeable solutions. 
 
Unfortunately, dedication to standards alone does not guarantee success. Standards may be in flux, may be 
overly cumbersome, may be implemented differently by different vendors, and do not assure optimal 
performance, lowest cost of implementation, or efficient manageability.  Consider the following extremes: 
 
• Several of the web services standards listed by the NCES Program Office have been changed 
frequently by their approving bodies in the last two years. One best practice is to build an 
architectural layer of reusable implementation capabilities below the WS-* standard in order to 
more rapidly accommodate specification changes in the standard itself.  
• Several of the standards proposed remain incomplete or unapproved by their authoritative body, or 
they remain unchanged when in fact they desperately need updates.  The reasons for this are 
varied. Standards bodies do not always achieve perceived improvements in successive versions, 
particularly when a standard becomes more complex. In addition, once a critical mass of vendors 
has adopted a standard, there is often little business advantage to keeping up with changes. 
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In relation to the issue of updates and ever changing standards, we would like to call your particular 
attention to the following considerations: 
 
• ebXML Registry is now a mature OASIS Standard and incorporates all the important trading-
partner interaction standards such as OASIS Collaboration Protocol Profile Agreement (CPPA). It 
also enables the discovery of users and SOA Artifacts such as WSDLs and WS-Policy files. It 
should be listed alongside UDDI Registry. 
• WS-Security has just gone to vote on Version 1.1. It should pass by end of this month at the latest. 
The standards should be updated to include support for this standard and version.  
• While not currently being adopted for SOA Security functions, XrML is being evaluated for use to 
provide Content and Services rights management. It is also being looked at as a potential method 
of applying Policy rules to the use of Services and the data being served. 
• The use of SOAP 1.1 should be re-evaluated relative to SOAP version 1.2. Technically, SOAP 1.1 
is not a standard, in that it was superseded by SOAP 1.2 before it could be approved.   
• We take cautionary exception to WebDAV, and suggest it be reconsidered. We believe it is 
relatively proprietary and presents a security vulnerability. 
 
Thus, while we support the use of standards in designing and implementing the NCES architecture, our 
approach must first be based on meeting the desired results of achieving mission effectiveness: secure, 
deployable, reliable, and manageable solutions that meet service level agreements and maximize benefit 
versus cost. 
 
Proposed Requirements Taxonomy  
In order to examine the list of standards for gaps and overlaps, we propose the following taxonomy of 
functional requirements for SOA standards: 
 
Figure 2 -- SOA Technical Domains 
Based on our experience, we feel that every requirements area in this taxonomy should be covered by one 
or more standards. We say one or more, because the standards listed in the NCES proposed list are not all 
at the same level of abstraction. Some of the more abstract standards are implemented using the more basic 
standards. In order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies, we will map the above requirements taxonomy 
to a “protocol stack” which is a logical framework showing the relationships among top level protocols.  
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Our logical framework is shown in the next diagram: 
 
 
Figure 3 -- Logical Framework for SOA Standards 
 
Then, while keeping in mind that the XML base protocols are ubiquitous and therefore assumed to be 
omnipresent in the logical framework, we can overlay the standards from the NCES proposed list, and 
augment it with additional standards that we feel are necessary to completely cover the requirements 
graph. The result is shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
Figure 4 -- SOA Standards Overlay 
AP Analysis  
By comparing the original NCES proposed list to the coverage overlay from the requirements depicted in 
the logical framework, we can inventory the standards needed to complete the set. The following table 
outlines this gap analysis more precisely: 
 
With the logical framework shown above to provide a visual context for related standards, this table 
directly responds to your list of proposed standards. It lists the architectural components of a SOA, related 
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standards, and the proposed standards you listed. When shown in red, we believe the standard is either an 
implicitly included implementation sub-standard, or it is a tool or technique and not a standard, per se. 
 
Architectural Component Related Standards Proposed NCES 
Standard 
Management 
o Distributed Management 
o Provisioning 
 







o Security Policy 
o Secure Conversation 
o Trusted Message 










o WS-Security  





o SAML  
o XACML  
Portal and Presentation o WSRP CSS 
o WEBDAV 
o XSLT transformation 
Transactions & Business 
Process 








o BPEL4WS, WS-CDL 
 
Messaging 
o Events and Notification 
o Multiple Message sessions 
o Routing / Addressing 
 
o Reliable Messaging 
 



















o Publication and Discovery 
 
o Policy 
o Base Service and Message 
Description 
o Metadata Retrieval 
 












o WS-I interoperability  
Table 1-- Gap Analysis 
 
It is our recommendation that the standards listed in the center column be considered, when not already 
listed, for inclusion in the NCES Program Office proposed list of standards. 
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Reference Architecture  




Figure 5 -- Services Reference Architecture 
 
This reference architecture was prepared with the assistance of W2COG Institute members and other 
industry partners including Accenture and CSC. We believe it is the best available depiction of standards-
based, non-proprietary support for SOA-based design. 
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Testing and Validation  
As an additional comment on the proposed list of standards, we suggest that special caution is required in 
the area of testing and validation. We suggest mimicking commercial best practice in order to shorten the 
testing and validation period prior to deployment. This is vitally needed because it makes little sense to 
shorten the development parts of the life-cycle and still not reap the rewards of COTS procurement because 
of excessively long testing periods.  
 
Our industry membership reports success with the following methods: 
 
• A technique known as “test-centered design” is particularly appropriate for use with SOA because 
SOA includes a rigorous definition of the interface specification using the XML base protocols. 
• Automated tools for the generation and execution of unit and integration tests are used to remove 
human factors and associated delays in tests prior to full system integration. 
• Where feasible from a business perspective, rapid roll-back procedures and the concept of a 
“stateless enterprise” are used to rapidly provision new systems in the actual production 
environment with the cautionary capability of rapid return to the previous system in event of 
catastrophic failure. 
• Continuous process improvement techniques such as “Six Sigma” are used to measure and lower 
defect rates in software production and system provisioning. 
W2COG Institute would welcome the opportunity to define these and other methods from industry in more 
depth in order to provide DISA with the requisite best practices in testing and validation. 
 
Call To Action   
W2COG Institute believes that the NCES Program Office proposed list of SOA standards should be 
adopted.  
 
We would also suggest that the standards gap analysis we have shown here may be of value in extending 
the list to a more complete and uniform list, and that our reference architecture provides a more meaningful 
way to depict and explain the interactions among the proposed standards. 
 
In order to socialize these proposed enhancements to the standards list, we propose a period of continued 
education, research and debate into the viability of the proposed additions and their respective versions as 
approved by their respective standards bodies and endorsed through industry use. Particular attention 




• Distributed Management. 
• Business Process Coordination. 
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      MEMORANDUM 
 
TO: Chris Gunderson, W2COG 
SUBJECT: Proposed Standards for Implementing GIG Enterprise Services  
FROM: Rick Hayes-Roth 
DATE: January 12, 2006 
 
I’ve read the DISA memo on proposed standards. I’m familiar with the proposed 
standards. While CTO/Software at HP, I had the opportunity to fund and oversee HP’s 
participation in several of these standards, as well as several others that might also have 
been usefully added to this list. In my current position as Professor of Information 
Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate School, I regularly analyze technology strategies and 
policies. I understand the intent and appreciate the value of standards. Nevertheless, I 
have mixed reactions to this proposal for these standards. In brief, I’m concerned that 
someone believes that a standards profile represents a significant, stable building block 
or, worse, that these standards can be a principal foundation for delivering significant 
value, quickly, to joint and coalition forces. I think standards put the cart before the 
horse. Instead, we should focus on high-value transactions that achieve information 
superiority, and then choose tools (including, but not chiefly, standards) that reduce time 
to value. Because such an opinion may sound heretical, in the section after next, I’ll 
expose my reasoning more fully. However, before explaining my criticism, I want to 
suggest a constructive approach for avoiding the perceived risks, leveraging appropriate 
standards, and achieving more significant results more quickly. 
 
Recommended approach:  
 Let’s put the horse before the cart: To achieve information superiority, the goal of 
the GIG/NCES, the Pareto-optimal approach is to implement the highest-value mission 
“threads” or “transactions” first, accumulating lessons, technology components, patterns, 
and architectural frameworks along the way. We should be “evolving” into the future, 
through a deliberate effort to emulate the key elements of natural selection. Specifically, 
we need to emphasize fielding “individuals” that embody available components and 
“test” their fitness by performing in challenging environments. From the successes of 
various “experiments,” we feed forward to reinforce the best components and create new 
ones where needed. This rate of evolutionary experimentation has to be short enough to 
adapt to changes in the environment and, ideally, to influence the rest of industry’s own 
evolutionary plans. All components, from software applications and software standards, 
to processors, storage, and communication devices are on an approximate 12-month 
generation schedule these days. Nothing is permanent, only the fittest live on, and all 
components are of limited life-time value. By focusing on rapid time to value, we put the 
horse in front. If we instead try to nail down some particular set of “answers” to the 
thousands of potentially pertinent but ephemeral technology questions, we merely 
increase friction without gaining leverage. Even the Object Management Group now 
recognizes the fluidity of standards and, for this reason, has attempted to shift architects’ 
efforts up a level, through use of MDA. In DoD, every choice needs to be open; we are 
running an investment portfolio, not building a cathedral for the ages. Standards and 






The General Critique:  
Few successful product lines or long-lasting complex systems have been 
developed without component-based, product-line architectures that generalized previous 
successful systems. The essence of such product-line architectures consists of an 
excellent understanding of key use cases or end-to-end transactions, the keen 
modularization of those into essential functions that combine effectively, a deep 
appreciation of challenging quality attributes (such as end-to-end latency), and a 
composition, connection and control strategy that assures that an appropriate 
configuration of specific implementation elements will perform acceptably in its 
particular target environment. In the era of web services, the same challenges remain 
although the infrastructure expands to include wide-area networks.  
 
Web services make some things easier and some things more difficult, as is the 
history with every other approach to distributed computing. Success still depends on our 
being able to put together solutions from various suppliers that do important things for 
their important users very well. For example, we might want to accomplish time-critical 
targeting in less than five minutes, using various information sources, analysis and C2 
tools, perhaps involving dozens of component-based capabilities and connections. 
Creating a system that does such important transactions well will depend upon domain-
specific issues, such as: what kind of information is required; how is it represented; how 
should it be translated; what kinds of pedigrees are available; which analysis or C2 tools 
are available; what access privileges are required; what resources are available and what 
are the constraints; how much time can be allocated to various process steps, etc. In doing 
this analysis, we might discover that some of the proposed standards are helpful and that 
others are useless or worse. We’d probably find that more than 95% of the work would 
be domain-specific, and that each of the standards proposed provided little guidance or 
lift for the bulk of that effort.  
 
 In short, to deliver value, it’s both necessary and sufficient that we demonstrate 
we can use networked services to do important things, using the best available off-the-
shelf technology and methods. It is not necessary, nor is it sufficient, that we frame the 
problems or the solutions in a particular generation of technology standards coming from 
an immature and emerging arena such as web services. Web service technology, broadly 
speaking, will ultimately constitute merely one aspect of the technologies combined to 
solve our important problems.  
 
Successful implementations that demonstrate information superiority, enabled by 
networked capabilities, are the foundations on which viable architectural approaches will 
be formulated. Successful, end-to-end, value-delivering processes are the “proof of the 
pudding.” Successful network-centric applications become the grist from which valid and 
valuable architectural frameworks will emerge. Moreover, in immature markets, such 
successes strongly affect evolution in both implementations and standards. Most of these 
proposed standards are immature, still evolving, and untested for the kinds of resource-
constrained, urgent and vital military operations that the GIG NCES should address first. 
The standards aren’t harmful per se, unless one assumes they are a practical, proven 
framework for delivering value. They aren’t. They’re a snapshot in time of a rapidly 
evolving marketplace that’s exploring new ways of interacting on the Internet. 
 
While CTO/Software at HP, I had the opportunity to fund and oversee HP’s 
participation in several of these standards, as well as several others that might also have 
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been usefully added to this list. For example, the proposed standards list omits Semantic 
Web standards, essential for machine-to-machine information sharing. However, all of 
these standards are coming in advance of important implemented solutions and represent 
speculative approaches to very big and diffuse problems. They should be viewed as 
“manual tools” in the engineers’ toolkit. When they fit an aspect of the problem well, are 
supported with good quality implementations, and are expected to provide stable 
advantages for the next few years, they probably deserve serious consideration for 
application. However, those qualifications significantly restrict the expected applicability 
of the proposed standards. Since the memorandum doesn’t include any such pragmatic 
qualification criteria, enforcing it uniformly can be expected to reduce productivity 
significantly.  
 
Imposing too many, inappropriate, or immature standards is a bad management 
practice in the IT field. Standards are potential aspects of any system architecture, no 
more or less important than other aspects. All implementation efforts should be judged in 
terms of expected benefits per cost, with a significant discounting for benefits not 
available until some time in the future. After all, we’re in the business of spending 
resources to improve productivity, so we should be focusing on the biggest opportunities 
for delivering value and looking for ways to do that as fast as possible, while keeping 
costs low. Immature standards usually rate poorly, among all other considerations, in 
trying to implement systems today that can deliver high-value tomorrow. The most 
successful and productive engineering teams emphasize wise selection of and 
commitment to products and standards that match the implementation objectives and 
provide leverage for realizing the value proposition. They eschew naïve embrace of 
relevant but immature standards, as experience shows that most evolving software 
“standards” never become generally important. 
 
One way to remedy the proposal’s greatest risks would be to consider standards 
compliance as one aspect of an overall project’s evaluation factors. An intelligent 
managerial approach would evaluate each potential project in terms of its (1) time to 
value, (2) benefit to cost, and (3) fitness for continuous evolution. Such an approach 
would give appropriate weight to the quality and applicability of various technologies, 
including standards. Because those are constantly changing, all efforts to forecast winners 
or to estimate long-term benefits are suspect. Uncertainty is unavoidable. Hence, a 
strategy that emphasizes immediate value, affordability, and agility should 
outperform any alterative. In particular, the GIG/NCES SOA proposal overemphasizes 
specific momentary technology standards, with the undesirable side-effect of creating a 
sink-hole that will absorb energy and resources through an inappropriate emphasis on and 
commitment to evanescent architectural precepts. 
 
In sum, we could minimize harm through a general recommendation to adopt 
“appropriate standards,” leaving the specifics open and fluid. However, to maximize bang 
for the buck, we must shift the focus from standards to outcomes. Specifically, we should 
be identifying the “transactions” or “processes” needed for superior mission performance 
and then commit to achieving these superior results as quickly as possible, with the most 
appropriate and adaptable technology. We must expect fluidity and turbulence in 






January 20, 2006 
OMG Comment on Proposed Standards for Implementing GIG Enterprise 
Services  
From : Dr. Richard Soley, CEO, Object Management Group 
Dr. Jon Siegel, Vice President, Technology Transfer, Object Management Group 
The NCES SOA WS memorandum and standards set addresses implementation of an 
interoperability architecture while ignoring design. Systems as large as these under 
consideration must be designed before they are built; otherwise it is certain that 
incompatibilities and inefficiencies will exist and be discovered later when repair is at best 
expensive and, at worst, impossible. Standards exist for design; the best of these, from the 
Object Management Group (OMG), feed the design semi-automatically into the 
downstream development workflow where it generates most or nearly all of the 
implementation.  
For structural and behavioral modeling, the industry standard is the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) 2.0. Sophisticated capabilities include nested structures, allowing a 
single model to represent every aspect of a system from the highest overall view to minute 
detail. Near the top of this hierarchy is the overall SOA-based system with its interacting 
major components, their interfaces, and the protocols and standards they use to 
communicate; zoom in on the model and the internal structure of the services emerges.  
Adherence to the MetaObject Facility (MOF) 2.0 standard provides model interoperability 
and allows models to be parsed and transformed by software; MOF compliance also 
enables models to be encoded into XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) for export, 
transmission over the network, and import into a repository or a transformation or other 
tool. The Model Driven Architecture (MDA), built on this foundation, makes formal the 
sequence of steps from platform-independent model, through choice of platform or 
platforms, to final implementation.  
Universally recognized throughout the industry, UML diagrams are the best and most 
efficient way for architects and designers to communicate system design, essential for 
quick and error-free implementation and deployment of large systems at multiple sites 
spread over a large area. That these diagrams also feed into the downstream 
implementation workflow is a plus. The OMG also runs a program that certifies architects 
on their knowledge of UML.  
 
 









Statement of Work for Review of DISA Draft Standards for Implementing 
GIG Enterprise Services  
 
DISA will provide to the W2COG Institute the draft Standards for 
Implementing GIG Enterprise Services for Consortium review. The W2COG 
Institute will then enlist leading experts knowledgeable in SOA to 
include architects, service providers and technology developers, and 
other industry standards bodies to assess and provide a critical review 
on how SOA standards strategy might be adopted into the fabric of NCES. 
  
The SOA standards review will, at a minimum, consider governance 
issues, maturity of technology, current state of implementation and 
future needs, and cost, schedule and implementation risks to success. 
Alignment with COTS trends and investments and compliance with other 
SOA/GIG documents will be included.” 
  
Review will take no more than 40 days, with report delivery 15 days 
later. 
  
Cost of project is 42 K. Contracting vehicle recommended is grant to 
W2COG Institute. 
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3. NORTHCOM Wireless Study Task Order  
 
TASK ORDER THIRTY (TO30) FOR UTILITY OF COMMERCIAL WIRELESS 
STUDY IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 
(USNORTHCOM) 
 
REFERENCE: The Statement of Work (SOW) for Utility Of Commercial Wireless Study 
In Support Of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (hereafter referred to 
as “the Study”) is described in Section 4.0 below. The SOW is the high-level base 
document that defines the work to be accomplished for the Program.  
 
1.0. PURPOSE. This document is a Task Order (TO) to the Prime Contractor 
outlining the necessary tasks required to deliver and support the Study. Task 
Orders are supplemental work orders that provide further definition of the work to 
be accomplished during each phase of the Program. 
 
1.1. THE CUSTOMER. The "Customer" is USNORTHCOM SJFHQ-N located at 
the following address: 
 
USNORTHCOM / SJFHQ-N 
Building 2 
Peterson AFB, CO 80914 
 
1.2. THE PRIME CONTRACTOR. The "Prime Contractor" or "Prime" responsible 




1 University Circle 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 




2.0. TASK ORDER APPROACH. The task order approach is to conduct a four 
(4) month study whose task description is delineated in Section 4.0 below. This 
task order will require Program Management, Research, Analysis and potentially 
some experimentation for scalability and validation purposes. 
 
The contractor will be required to deploy communications capability necessary to 
support deployed forces. Deployment will be directed by the customer either by 
air transport (C-130) or independent mobility.  
 
3.0 TASK ORDER OBJECTIVE: Analyze the state of the commercial 
wireless networking environments to understand market trends and 
direction as well as current and future technology.  The analysis should 
concentrate on capability that can be leveraged to enable fixed/mobile 
voice and data connectivity at the edge of the deployed network to provide 
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interoperability and seamless access to the USNORTHCOM collaborative 
information environment. Propose technology that is readily available with 
robust commercial base and market share; it should not rely on 
government support to maintain product viability in the market place. 
Capabilities will enable communication during quiescent daily and 
contingency operations with a focus towards increasing DOD’s 
responsiveness to the Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil 
Authority (HLD/DSCA) missions. 
Stakeholder users, to include military, NGO’s, and first responders will be 
identified. 
 
Communications for the USNORTHCOM HLD and DSCA missions fall into the 
following categories: 
 
1) Military command and control (normally fixed garrison communications) 
2) Interoperable mobile communications to enable seamless 
communications among DoD and federal mission partners 
3) Communications support to civil authorities to maintain civilian confidence 
in government 
 
4.0. TASK DESCRIPTIONS. 
 
4.1. TASK 1. Market Research: Perform market research of commercial 
communications technology including wireless and interface to wired 
infrastructure to enable hastily formed networks. Market research should address 
capabilities necessary to cover quiescent USNORTHCOM, HLD and DSCA 
operations as well as DoD efforts to reconstitute civil communications. 
 
4.2. TASK 2. Analysis:  Analyze and assess the market research and state of 
commercial technology for commercial wireless and networking in reference to 
the ability and applicability of increasing the effectiveness of the USNORTHCOM 
mission. Consideration of interoperable communications, Quality of Service per 
Class of Service, information security and frequency and network management 
will be included. Analysis criteria should include ability to absorb simply new 
wireless communications technology over 10 year life cycles. 
 
4.4 TASK 3. Recommendations: Provide recommendations and alternatives, to 
include new developments, test, and integration of current and new systems, to 
meet the USNORTHCOM mission. A cost benefit analysis should be included for 
each recommended system to allow proper ranking of alternatives. (i.e., Are the 
current and To Be military trunked radio solutions based on standards that permit 
interoperability with commercial wireless?) 
 
4.3 TASK 4. Roadmap: Develop a 10-year roadmap that enables a capability to 
increase communications interoperability incorporating new commercially viable 
communications technology. Include analysis of the trend in USNORTHCOM 
mission profile as it evolves and matures. Provide Courses of Action (COAs) to 
implement recommendations derived in Task 3. 
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6.0 DELIVERABLES. The contractor will provide deliverables, status updates 
and briefings throughout the contract period consistent with and IAW this 
USNORTHCOM Statement of Work (SOW). 
 
Deliverable Schedule Description 
Market Research NLT  
Receipt of 
contract + 30 
days 
Perform market research 
consistent with commercially 
acceptable standards. The 
report will be written in a 
mutually agreed upon 




contract + 60 
days 
Analyze research and provide 
a written report in a mutually 
agreed upon customer text 
and briefing format. 
Recommendations NLT 
Receipt of 
contract + 90 
days 
A report describing the future 
state of communications 
technology with 
recommendations written in a 
mutually agreed upon 




contract + 120 
days 
A roadmap to portray courses 
of action to implement 
recommendations written in a 
mutually agreed upon 




7.0 FACILITY ACCESS, PERSONNEL SECURITY AND LOGISTICS. The 
Government will be responsible for supporting the contractor by supplying all 
necessary equipment, facility access, including any badges, personnel security at 





4. Towards a Rich Semantic Model of Track: Essential 








Professor, Information Sciences, NPS 
April 27, 2005 (v. 0.5) 
Summary 
Many defense, homeland security, and commercial security objectives require continuous 
tracking of mobile entities. The systems that perform these functions produce information 
products called tracks. A track associates observations with the mobile entity and 
typically includes position, velocity, and other similar attributes. One of the best current 
tracking systems, the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) produces timely 
and accurate tracks for the aircraft it observes. In other domains of interest, such as 
seagoing surface ships, dangerous cargo and persons of interest, tracking systems are less 
mature and perform worse. In the near future, we will wish to share information among 
different tracking systems working in similar domains.  
To combine information from different sources, we will need a flexible framework that 
can tolerate and exploit data products from different systems, although these systems 
employ different representations and embody different assumptions. The most basic 
assumptions concern what the information is intended to mean and how it is intended to 
be used by a recipient. Semantics is the term we use to refer to meaning, and pragmatics 
is the term we use to refer to goal-oriented use.  
In accordance with best practices in the technology areas of the semantic web and 
knowledge representation, we seek to reduce the barriers to efficient sharing of 
information. Our approach is to identify a rich semantic model of tracks that can support 
multiple important functions: (1) represent a wide variety of meanings and support a 
broad array of pragmatic goals; (2) reduce the time and cost required to implement 
capabilities to reason about a new, specialized type of track; (3) simplify the 
understanding and importation of external sources of track information; (4) help 
operators describe what attributes of tracks they value in performing their tasks; (5) 
significantly improve our ability to combine multiple sources of track information; (6) 
provide a stable and evolvable base for key standards and best practices that support 
information sharing; and (7) improve bandwidth utilization, raising the proportion of 
communicated information that recipients consider significant, by delivering valued 
information at the right time (VIRT).78. 
The proposed rich semantic track model will be shared widely with appropriate 
communities of interest. We will also recommend methods and tools for using the 
semantic model to address all of the objectives just discussed. By focusing on one 
important example of rich semantic models, we hope to provide significant near-term 
                                                 
76 This work is supported in part by a contract to NPS from NAVSEA/IWS and the CEC program office. 
77 In performing this work, I have collaborated with members of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 
Laboratory who also support the CEC program office. I gratefully acknowledge their support and 
collaboration.  
78 F. Hayes-Roth, "Model-based communication networks for improved collaboration and decision-
making," presented at 12th International Conference on Telecommunication Systems - Modeling and 
Analysis, NPS, Monterey, 2004. http://doncio.ro.nps.navy.mil/icts12/  
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value and also pave the way for wider recognition and adoption of this essential 
foundation for information sharing.  
Background 
Much of the evolution of information systems has focused on improving the ability of 
applications to share data. In recent years, the emphasis has shifted to enterprise-wide 
sharing of information among systems. Most recently, with the emergence of concepts 
such as network-centric operations, aspirations have increased79. Now we want to be able 
to share information and services seamlessly across global networks of computer-based 
resources80. The Internet has suggested that we should be able to draw at will from a pool 
of available sources and easily combine and process information as needed.  
The reality of systems integration falls far short of these aspirations, however. To make 
systems interoperate today usually requires us both to significantly limit objectives and 
undertake extensive custom engineering effort. The “friction” impeding seamless 
interoperability arises from differences among the participating systems, including the 
types in Table 1.  
As Table 1 shows, two systems can differ in many ways. Most differences arise because 
the system developers made many assumptions appropriate to the original context for 
operating their particular system. Usually these assumptions were implicit, and often they 
aren’t even documented. Many correspond to developers’ “common sense” or 
conventions of contemporary engineering practice. In the U.S., many systems use dollars 
for currency and British units of measurement. Often these units are not explicitly 
represented. In the E.C., countries used to employ national currencies in addition to the 
metric system. Today, most European countries are adopting the Euro for currency. 
Occasionally, such system incompatibilities produce disasters, such as a mission to Mars 
that is destroyed because of measurement system incompatibilities. More often, the costs 
of incompatibilities are buried in the behind-schedule, over-budget integration projects 
that occur time after time. An entire industry has arisen in the commercial arena to 
address such Enterprise Application Integration engineering jobs, and this is a costly, 
labor-intensive business. 
In national defense and homeland security, the challenges are every bit as great and the 
industrial practices no better. “Best of breed” systems are those that do specialized 
functions better than all alternative products. While we would like to combine these 
easily into overall, unsurpassed “systems of systems,” this proves very costly. These best 
of breed specialists are never designed, from the outset, to work compatibly with every 
other potential federation partner. When called upon to make two systems interoperate in 
ways that had not been anticipated originally, the engineers go through the categories of 
differences and apply as many mitigating methods as required to bring the system of 
systems up to an acceptable level of performance. Systems of this sort always suffer, 
however, from an increase in overall uncertainty and error, because we lack powerful 
methods to assure that the semantics and pragmatics of the integrated system recognize 
and correctly handle all important situations. In all such integrated systems, we ultimately 
                                                 
79 Dave Alberts (et al.), OSD/ASD(C3I), CCRP, “Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging 
Information Superiority” (2nd ed.). http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/ncw_0801.pdf . 
 
80 Department of Defense, Directive 8320.2 (December 2004), ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, “Data Sharing in a 
Net-Centric Department of Defense.” 
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rely upon trial-and-error discovery to reveal important problems and then address them 
manually, one by one. 
Table 2. Sources of friction that make interoperability difficult. 
Type of Difference     
between Systems 
    
Resulting Difficulty 
Typical Method             of 
Mitigating Problem 
Data representation Identical bits differ in 
meaning 
Translate to a standard 
representation 
Data precision Incompatible 
approximations 
Reduce to minimum precision 
Data measurement 
systems 
Incompatible units and 
coordinates 
Translate to a standard 
reference 
Temporal calibration Presumed simultaneous 
data originate at different 
times 





positions vary in space 
Combine information with 
more uncertainty 
Attributes and scales Similar but non-identical 
aspects assessed 
differently 
Translate to a common 
framework and heuristically 
combine 
Concepts Similar names used for 
non-identical classes and 
relations 
Combine information with 
more uncertainty 
Events & Triggers Similar names used for 
non-identical conditions 
Combine information with 
more uncertainty 
Processes Similar names used for 
differing states, 
conditions, and actions 
Translate to a common 
framework with more 
uncertainty 
Resources Similar names for 
differing resources, costs 
and policies 
Translate to a common 




Inference, Belief and 
Uncertainty 
Different inductive 
methods to relate and 
combine evidence and to 
support inferred beliefs 
Adopt one preferred approach, 
adapt the compatible 
information to it, and drop the 
incompatible information 
We have basically three approaches to integrating systems and sharing information today: 
the standardized data-centric approach, the human translator approach, and the common 
intermediate hub-and-spoke approach. The first method standardizes all aspects of data, 
across all functions and applications. A single unified data model is created for all 
purposes, and all applications use it consistently. The second method relies upon people 
to translate information from one system into another one, thereby relying on human 
understanding to make appropriate mappings between underlying semantic models and 
associated pragmatics. The third approach is to create new standard information models 
that become the hub of a hub-and-spoke like interchange. Each system that produces 
information can publish and share its data using the same hub model for all recipients. In 
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this approach, each system translates its understanding of its own information into the 
semantic and pragmatic framework of the hub model. Likewise, each consumer of 
information finds relevant information through the hub and translates it into its own 
representations consistent with its understanding of the intended semantics and 
pragmatics.81  
Each of these approaches has significant deficiencies though. The first method is slow 
and brittle, because it requires every system to accord with a single integrated semantic 
and pragmatic model. Creating such a model can take forever, and it cannot evolve as 
rapidly as needs for new capabilities arise.  
The second method is labor-intensive, knowledge-dependent, slow and error-prone. In 
this case, we are asking people to do routine, repetitive data reading and writing tasks, 
often between systems whose semantic and pragmatic assumptions they don’t know well.  
The last method allows systems to develop in parallel, but it presupposes that the hub 
provides a single integrated semantic and pragmatic model. If multiple models exist, then 
every publisher needs to have its information specially translated to meet the contextual 
requirements of every consumer. The publisher doesn’t know all of the consumers that 
well. The consumers don’t know all of the publishers that well either. In any case, new 
publishers and new consumers continually enter the arena, and there’s no way for the 
expanding set of required translations to be melded into a single and stable hub. 
It’s no wonder then that most efforts to create seamless systems of systems remain 
pipedreams today. Our approaches to these lofty goals are reminiscent of people who 
want so much to reach the sky that they climb up the tallest tree as fast as they can. 
Instead of working harder, we need a radically different approach that can meet the true 
challenges of sharing information among systems that embody different semantic models 
because of different pragmatic concerns and operating contexts. Table 2 below identifies 
the principal requirements for efficiently sharing information among such systems.  
As Table 2 shows, we desire numerous qualities of the systems that share information. 
We want them to understand the meaning of data that arises from different contexts with 
different pragmatic concerns. We want to combine information in sensible ways. We 
want our systems to improve continually, because it’s impossible for them to be born 
perfect. Furthermore, since the sources and purposes change continually, we want our 
systems to be able to exploit new sources automatically, adapting to their associated 
semantics as appropriate. In the middle column of Table 2 we identify the principal 
functional capabilities that would achieve these desired qualities. Then, on the right-
hand-side of the table, we list the technical strategy proposed to implement each of these 
capabilities.  
                                                 
81 In each of these approaches, many important details are being glossed over. In the hub-and-spoke model, 
for example, the hub may be actual or virtual. Particular publish-subscribe systems may take different 
forms while accomplishing equivalent results. In many cases, it will make sense to have more than one hub, 
supporting each active community of sharers. Lastly, it might prove advantageous in some settings to create 
a multilingual translator that specializes in the hub’s semantic model and that can provide translation 
services for many different suppliers or consumers of information between their particular languages and 
the hub..  
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Table 3. Principal requirements for information sharing. 
Desired Quality of 
Information Sharing 
Capability Required to Achieve 
Desired Quality 
Basic Strategy to Achieve 
Required Capability  
Employ different 
semantic models 
Read and interpret a semantic 
model 
Use models based on 
formal meta-models with 
grammars 
Understand the 
meaning of data 
Parse data into its associated 
semantic model 
Use models based on 
formal meta-models with 
grammars 
Express meaning as 
data correctly 
Ability to generate data from 
its associated semantic model 
Use models based on 
formal meta-models with 
grammars 
Translate meanings 
between two systems 
Map from one semantic model 
to another 
Use models based on 





Read and interpret a model of 
task pragmatics 
Use models based on 
formal meta-models with 
grammars 
Verify that required 
information is 
expressible 
Assure a semantic model 
supports the required 
pragmatics, or continually 
improve it 
Map required conditions 
for actions into 
corresponding semantic 
expressions 
Tolerate and exploit 
diverse sources 
Operate simultaneously with 
multiple models 
Maintain segregated 
namespaces as required 
Handle ambiguity 
intelligently 
Recognize ambiguities, adapt 
to them, and continually 
improve 





adapt to them, and continually 
improve 




Recognize errors, adapt to 
them, and continually improve 
Accept negative feedback, 




Recognize differences in 
source qualities, adapt to them, 
and continually improve 
Use inconsistencies and 
errors to reduce 




Collate correlated information 
into coherent association sets 
Bundle assertions that are 
and are not consistent 
Exploit and eliminate 
redundancy 
Employ heuristic methods to 
reduce correlated information 
Implement best methods 
of empirical inference 
Justify results 
derived from various 
sources 
Track information pedigree, as 
required 
Retain histories of 
inferences and sources 
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The key strategic ideas in Table 2 are summarized here: 
• Use models based on formal meta-models with grammars, and automatically 
generate required input and output language systems. 
• Map between models as needed, especially when assuring that the semantics 
are adequate to support the pragmatics.82 
• Combine, reduce, and track83 information as appropriate. 
• Continually improve by recognizing problems and changing knowledge to 
reduce or eliminate them. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the problem and the strategic approach rather 
than providing a long, technically detailed treatment. Such an extensive technical 
treatment is premature, anyhow. We don’t currently possess well defined tools and 
methods for this work. That is where we want to go. 
In order to make these abstract and ambitious approaches more understandable, in the 
next section we’ll delve into some examples of important goals we have for tracks and 
will draw upon one of the best defined semantic models of defense concepts, namely 
those included in the C2IEDM model created by NATO’s Multilateral Interoperability 
Programme (MIP)84.  
Semantics and Pragmatics of Track, by Example 
Tracks are an important element of situation assessment in most command and control 
systems. In ground combat, commanders need to determine where enemy forces are, how 
to avoid them, how to counter their attacks, or how to attack them while they’re 
stationary. In air combat, similar decisions must be made and corresponding actions 
taken. Ground vehicles move at speeds between 0 and 100 mph. Air vehicles moves at 
speeds up to Mach 3 or so, although most move at speeds between 60 knots and 600 
knots. Surface ships move at speeds normally under 40 knots, though some small ones 
can go faster. Dismounted infantry moves at speeds under 10 mph. In all cases, 
commanders want to track these, anticipate their likely motions and potential threats, 
determine how best to counter threats, and then implement chosen countermeasures 
efficiently.  
From these specific examples of differing mobile entities and general pragmatic 
concerns, we can identify the following common pragmatic objectives for a mobile entity 
M with possible intentions and capabilities to do harm to our interests: 
1. Observe, detect, identify, classify and continuously monitor M. 
2. Infer M’s intent. 
                                                 
82 W. Ross Ashby coined the famous “law of requisite variety,” which basically states that any system must 
perceive situational distinctions sufficient to enable it to make appropriate differentiated responses required 
for success in its environment. Our requirement for systems that combine information is similar: the 
semantics must be sufficient for the pragmatics. Ashby, W. R. (1958), "Requisite variety and its 
implications for the control of complex systems." Cybernetica, 1(2), pp. 83-99. 
83 The word “track” in the above bullet is used to mean “keep a record of its origins and the processes that 
converted inputs into new products.” Such a record is sometimes called a “trace” or a “pedigree.” The rich 
semantic track model that’s the focus of this paper uses the defense domain concept of a “track” to mean 
the product of observing a mobile entity to identify it, monitor it, and predict its behavior. We will italicize 
this meaning of track throughout the paper.  
84 See http://www.mip-site.org/.  
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3. Determine M’s threats TM,D against domain D. 
4. Locate M. 
5. Predict M’s location and behavior. 
6. Alert agent A about M and threats TM,D. 
7. Determine countermeasures CM(TM,D) to threats TM,D. 
8. Inform agent A about countermeasures CM(TM,D). 
These eight pragmatic objectives define the general and common concerns of military 
and security agencies with potentially dangerous mobile entities. The whole purpose of 
sharing information among different sources is to support these common objectives. The 
premise of this paper is that we can best achieve that purpose by relating all information 
sources to those purposes. While individual processes might differ for each of these 
concerns, we should be able to express what the information requirements are for each 
process in terms of semantic capabilities. Further, we should be able to create translators 
to re-express various sources of information in terms of a hub semantic model that 
provides the capabilities our pragmatic processes require. 
Let’s consider how this can be done. To do this, we will write pseudo-code in the style of 
Prolog rules. Each rule will be of the form C(x,…,z) Å P(x, …, z) & … & R(x, …, z), 
with the following interpretation: To infer or conclude that C(x,…, z) is true, it suffices to 
conclude that P(x,…, z), …, and R(x, …, z) are all true. The variables x, …, z may be 
replaced by any specific term, as long as substitutions are done correctly.  
As a simple illustration, we might have a rule that says that a commercial aircraft from 
one’s own country, observed to be following its planned route, has the intention of 
completing its filed flight plan. We might write this roughly as follows: 
[Rule I1] Intention(M, Follow-its-filed-flight-plan, High-confidence) Å 
Commercial-aircraft(M) & Affiliation(M, ”U.S.”) & Following-planned-route(M, 
R) & Current-planned-route(M, R) 
Conversely, we might assume a hijacked aircraft has a variety of possible intentions, 
including using the aircraft as a missile to attack some target or diverting to a location not 
on the original planned route and landing there. Such an inference might be written in 
terms of two rules such as these: 
[Rule I2] Intention(M, Fly-into-a-target(M, t), Probable) Å Commercial-
aircraft(M) & Hijacked(M) & Target (t) & Can-reach(M, t) 
[Rule I3] Intention(M, Deviate-and-land(M, da), Probable) Å Commercial-
aircraft(M) & Hijacked(M) & Airport (da) & Can-reach(M, da)  
Rule I2 states that M intends to fly into an unspecified target t that it can reach. Similarly 
rule I3 states that M intends to deviate to and land at an airport da, where da is 
undetermined. The airport da is one that M can reach with available fuel. Both rules I2 
and I3 state that the inferred intentions are “Probable,” in contrast to rule I1 which rates 
its inferred intention as High-confidence.  
Any formal system for expressing rules such as these must follow some syntactic 
conventions. Here we’ve used the convention that lowercase terms are unbound variables 
that can ultimately be instantiated by specific constants. Uppercase terms, on the other 
hand, are constants that name various entities or concepts. For example, the constant 
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Probable stands for a degree of confidence or belief that is judged more likely than either 
impossible or unlikely.  
Any system of concepts will have its own nuances and best practices for modeling the 
world effectively. Our assumptions are that no system is perfect, perfection is both an 
unachievable and unwise goal, and that great benefits can derive from creating workable 
systems that significantly improve our speed and effectiveness. Therefore, while we 
could dwell on different approaches to representing each concept and reasoning about it 
logically or empirically, we won’t do that here. Instead, we wish to initiate use of 
evolvable semantics to support important pragmatics. Thus, the key capability we need is 
to do some things well while being able to improve continually. For that reason, almost 
any reasonable semantic system will be good enough for significant information sharing. 
The essential quality required is that the system distinguishes states that warrant different 
inferences and actions. In the above rules, for example, the predicate Hijacked(x) 
distinguishes a state sufficient to support different inferences about the intentions of the 
aircraft. Any system that makes distinctions that correspond to Hijacked(x) can be used 
through translation for the same pragmatic purposes. 
What the examples show is that pragmatics aims at performing important functions, such 
as the eight general ones cited above. Each of these objectives requires inference and 
problem-solving to assess available information and determine which inferences are 
warranted. The information required, initially, is conceptual, rather than particular or 
concrete. For example, one type of information required was “is an aircraft hijacked?” 
This is a question about the state of the world or, more precisely, about beliefs about the 
true state of affairs. Different information systems will represent and store such beliefs in 
different ways. What is necessary is that available information pertinent to this 
conceptual requirement is mapped it, somehow, so that the inference process can proceed 
as appropriate. 
Given a set of pragmatic objectives, the inference process relies upon conceptual 
categories. A semantic hub should make all of the conceptual distinctions required to 
support those categories and related pragmatics. The rich semantic Track model, 
therefore, should reflect aspects of state that most users of track information require for 
addressing expected pragmatic concerns. As we employ such a model to intermediate 
sharing among systems, we will inevitably discover additional concerns not yet 
adequately addressed in the current model. This will drive an iterative, evolutionary 
series of improvements to our model of Track.  
Table 3 below enumerates many of the required concepts to support the eight principal 
types of general-purpose pragmatics for Track.  
The most important point from Table 3 is that pragmatic concerns regarding Track are 
fairly generic, stable, and procedural. We should be able to create a mostly-hierarchical 
conceptual scheme working backwards from pragmatic objectives to required concepts to 
supporting distinguished data values. The ability to adapt this standard hierarchy rapidly 
to exploit a new source would be the operational test of value. This suggests both what 
types of products we need and also what types of methods will enable us to adapt these 
products to new situations. In the next section, we provide a sketch of the semantics that 
should provide the required scaffolding for this approach.  
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Table 4. Semantic concepts required to support Track pragmatics. 
Pragmatic 
Goals 
Assumptions  and 
Inferences 
               Required 
Concepts 





















Position and dynamics in 
relation to reference 
system; measurement 
systems, registration, 
and errors; behavior, 
states, and state 
transitions 
2. Infer M’s 
intent. 
Mobile platforms 












Plans; filed plans; 
modified plans; 








Plans as intended states 
and behaviors with 
dependencies and 
constraints; actors and 
resources in plans; 
actors’ goals, intentions, 
plans and resources; 
planned effects as 
expectations; behaviors 










threats to domains 
are possible ways 
to do harm to 
elements of the 
domain; the more 
probable and 
hurtful the 
damage, the worse 
the threat  
Domains and their 
resources, symbols, 
systems, centers of 
gravity and key 





harm; capability to 
inflict harm; threat 
Important entities and 
important attributes of 
them from a security 
perspective; 
vulnerabilities; attack 
methods and profiles; 
estimated success and 
consequences of attacks; 
time and other 
remaining barriers to 
the success of the attack 
4. Locate M. Ability to change 




objects in motion 









Reported position at 
time t; Inferred 
position at time t; 
Probability density 





Position and dynamics in 
relation to reference 
system; estimates of 
error and uncertainty 
about position, 







inferences in 1 
adjusted to reflect 
expected 
behaviors (from 2, 
3 and 4)  
Current state 




Variations in speed and 
rate of climb based on 
phase of flight; probable 
variations in execution;  
6. Alert 
agent A 
about M and 
threats TM,D. 




M or threats 
including those in 
TM,D; each agent 
has preferred 








agent context, state 
and focus; required 
quality attributes of 
reports 
Roles for monitoring 
routine behaviors, 
abnormal behaviors, and 
threat behaviors; 
assignment of agents o 
roles; communication 
methods and required 
protocols; current beliefs 
of agents; value of 










collect those and 
instantiate them; 
for others, 
determine ways to 
block attacks 
Threat types and 
countermeasure 
types; variables and 
substitution; ways to 
block causal chains 
by denying essential 
prerequisites, etc. 
Destroy an enemy 
vehicle prior to its 
attack; impede passage 
through a requisite 
space; eliminate 
resources required to 
sustain the attack; 
covertly move the target 







Use methods in 6, 
appropriately 
adjusted to 
address the agent 
responsible for 
countermeasures. 
As in 6, adjusted 
appropriately. 
As in 6, adjusted 
appropriately. 
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An Initial Specification of Track Semantics 
The first step in developing a rich semantic model of Track is to determine how it can 
support the pragmatic requirements, as indicated in Table 3. From that analysis, we can 
see that the track model must allow us to describe our beliefs about a mobile entity and 
its past, present and predicted future states. In addition, we will need to be able to justify 
inferences that we make as part of the tracking process. So the track model will 
necessarily consist of two principal types of information, one that describes our beliefs 
about the tracked entity and another that describes the qualities of those beliefs. This is an 
example of information and meta-information. 
Before giving a formal specification for this belief structure, it makes sense to present the 
structure as a conceptual hierarchy, introducing the names we propose for different 
categories of information and the relationships among these categories. In a conceptual 
hierarchy, which is much like a topic outline, the most general concepts are the outermost 
items of the outline. Successively indented topics represent specializations or 
subcategories under the topic they descend from. To illustrate these points, consider the 
following abbreviated hierarchy shown in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 6. The top-level conceptual hierarchy for Track. 
This fragment of a conceptual hierarchy describes the most general, or topmost, element 
called Track. The concept Track contains two principal component concepts, called 
Beliefs and Meta-Information, respectively. The parenthetical note on Meta-Information 
indicates that all of the components of Meta-Information may apply to each element of 
Beliefs. This indicates that when we use the conceptual hierarchy to create actual beliefs 
that are instances of Track Beliefs, we may find it useful to qualify every belief by using 
the sub-concepts of Meta-Information. While this creates an opportunity for significantly 
expanding the volume of data in our systems compared to traditional databases, the 
purpose of the semantic model is to make possible precise description of potentially 
important states. In general, our systems will create sparsely instantiated models, because 
many aspects will not be deemed relevant or material. Furthermore, most 
implementations will reduce the total volume of data by finding ways to compress and 
abbreviate bodies of information with inherent redundancies. In short, we should focus 




  Identity and Characteristics 
  Dynamic State at Time T 
  History of states (past “track”) 
  Predicted states (future “track”) 
 Meta-Information (applicable to each element of belief) 
  Evidence  
  Inferences 
  Error and uncertainty estimates 
  Temporal qualifications 
  Spatial qualifications 
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The first-level sub-concepts of Track are Beliefs and Meta-Information. By convention, I 
will use the plural form of English nouns or, in the case of Meta-Information, a collective 
noun to indicate that there may be any number of instances of those concepts in an actual 
application. Thus, we should expect in any given track, to find one or more beliefs. These 
beliefs will, in turn, instantiate the sub-concepts of Beliefs, which means they will 
describe the Identity and Characteristics, the Dynamic State, the History of states, or the 
Predicted States of the tracked entity. Typically, we should anticipate that each tracked 
entity will be described by one belief of each of these four types when the entity has been 
well identified and confidently tracked. For example, in a civilian air traffic control 
scenario, a general aviation aircraft following an IFR (instrument flight rules) flight plan 
would be so described. Specifically, the Identity and Characteristics would be the 
aircraft’s registration (“tail number”), type, make and model, and navigation capability 
(such as GPS-enabled). Its Dynamic State at the current time would describe its 
coordinates, altitude, heading, airspeed, groundspeed, number of passengers, fuel 
remaining, next waypoint, destination, and assigned transponder code, among other 
dynamic features. The History would contain a past record of such dynamic states, 
thereby enabling us to review where the plane had been and how it had traveled to its 
present state. The Predicted states would, for example, indicate expected arrival times at 
each of the waypoints along the planned route of flight. These predicted arrival times 
presumably would be updated to take into account effects of winds on groundspeed as 
well as anticipated changes in groundspeed that climbs or descents in future route legs 
will cause. In this way, people tracking the flight will have expectations, with some 
margins of uncertainty, around times that the plane will cross specific points along the 
planned route. Additional predictions could reasonably be made by interpolating between 
these specific predicted states. 
The simple example above was intended to illustrate how the top-level elements of 
Beliefs should be used to describe a simple tracked entity. One of the objectives in 
formulating this rich semantic model of Track is to make it easy for developers to create 
compatible tools and for users to describe the important aspects of the tracks they are 
concerned with in their particular domains of application. The well-identified, accurately 
tracked, pre-planned general aviation aircraft is probably the simplest possible case. As 
we increase the complexity of the entity, the uncertainty about its intentions, the errors in 
observation, and the challenge of predicting its future states, the information we must 
create becomes more complicated, uncertain, and voluminous. The same Track model 
should be able to represent all important aspects of beliefs in these cases as well. 
The second major sub-concept of Track in Figure 1 is Meta-Information, and this 
includes Evidence, Inferences, Error and uncertainty estimates, Temporal qualifications, 
and Spatial qualifications. The meaning of each of these categories is as follows. 
Evidence describes the observations, sensors and reporters that back up the belief. 
Inferences describe the additional beliefs that should be inferred from the initial belief, 
because they follow logically or empirically. Error and uncertainty estimates specify 
limitations and qualifications on the belief that should constrain how we employ the 
belief. Temporal qualifications further constrain our use of the belief to particular 
intervals of time when the belief is expected to be valid. In a similar way, use of beliefs 
might be constrained to particular regions of space, and Spatial qualifications specify 
such constraints. For example, a forecast for thunderstorms typically applies to a 
particular region. As another example, we might want to limit the predicted location of an 
aircraft to a range of altitudes between 200’ above ground level and 18,000’ if the aircraft 
is flying VFR (visual flight rules).  
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Now just to review briefly the main point of this paper, we want to use a semantic model 
of Track to make it easy for systems to share information. Using just the high-level 
concepts of Figure 1, this suggests that consumers of track data typically want to know 
one of four types of beliefs: (1) identity/characteristics; (2) current state; (3) past state; 
and (4) future state. Furthermore, since all beliefs are necessarily limited by the quality of 
the evidence and other limitations on when or where they can be appropriately employed, 
consumers want to know what qualifications/limitations apply to whatever beliefs 
suppliers provide to them. The point of this paper is that we can accelerate and improve 
sharing by providing a common basis for expressing these concerns so that all suppliers 
and consumers of track information can rely upon it as a semantic hub used in 
interpreting information from different systems85. Of course, the same approach should 
be useful for other types of information than Track. In the end, the communities of 
interest (COIs) that are concerned with each important concept should take ownership of 
the process by which key concepts are formalized, how translation is operationalized, and 
how inevitable evolutionary changes are supported. Our focus on Track should provide a 
solid foundation for an important class of sharing. Many elements of the semantic model 
should generalize to other concepts and other domains. In particular, the basic structure 
of Beliefs and Meta-Information should prove widely applicable and robust. 
Implicit in this general strategy for information sharing is the idea that members of COIs 
should find it easy to read and understand instances of the semantic models relevant to 
them. While simply stated, this is a profound objective. First, if practitioners find it easy 
to read and understand semantically rich information, this will reflect that the information 
has been structured and presented to them in ways they find natural and efficient. Experts 
and skilled personnel in nearly every domain of interest have developed ways of 
structuring and presenting information that simplify and improve their performance. 
Tracks, for example, are often shown as current location points with predicted future 
vectors. They may also include past positions as a series of connected points. Each track 
might be color-coded in a distinct way to indicate other key characteristics or simply to 
reduce confusion. All of these lines are superposed on a map, of a selected space and 
time, to make it easy for the operator to grasp quickly the state of affairs. In air traffic 
control, for example, the controller transfers this information into his own mind where he 
or she mentally maintains the dynamic model, often called “the bubble.” 
So there are two aspects of the profundity alluded to above. First, regardless of the 
detailed, perhaps complex, semantic model that underlies the information being 
maintained in our systems, the human’s view is often highly tailored. The view converts 
information from representations that designed for use by computerized reasoners to 
forms that are quickly and effectively grasped by humans. The second profound aspect is 
that the usefulness of a semantic hub isn’t fully evident until these human-oriented 
viewers and editors are in the hands of operators who demonstrate their value. Semantic 
models should make it possible to create better viewers and editors more easily, and 
should also support the need to continually evolve and improve them. Often in the history 
                                                 
85 While it would be nice if only one hub were required for all purposes, this seems unlikely. A semantic 
hub is, in essence, a “language” to support a community of people who share information because of 
overlapping interests. It’s rare that one language supports all interested parties. There are many reasons 
why we routinely find multiple languages among peoples, even when they have common interests. Two 
concepts are fundamental in the anticipated process: (1) any community of interest should be able to have 
its own language and should be able to control its evolution; (2) communities with overlapping interests 
will constitute a higher-level aggregate community that, in turn, will need to use an agreed semantic hub to 
interoperate. Thus, languages will evolve, within and between communities, probably forever. 
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of information systems, the first excellent viewers and editors come into existence as part 
of a proprietary, integrated stovepipe system. Later, as technology evolves, data is 
separated from code, and eventually data is more explicitly modeled semantically. This 
allows competitive approaches to be pursued for viewing and editing information.  
Semantic hubs for important information will accelerate the development of superior 
viewers and editors for humans. This will pay double dividends. In addition to improving 
their ability to grasp and exploit information productively, it will also enable practitioners 
to identify quickly and effectively shortcomings in the information itself, hence 
accelerating the debugging and evolution of the semantic models. As an important 
consequence, the rate of continuous improvement in information sharing will increase. 
The full proposed Track conceptual hierarchy is described in Table 4. In this table, the 
level of indentation indicates degree of subordination in the hierarchy. That number is 
shown explicitly in the first column. The second column contains the corresponding 
concept. The last column briefly specifies the meaning of the concept.  
Table 5. Concept hierarchy in Track semantic model. 
Level Concept Notes on Meaning 
1 Beliefs Collection of believed assertions 
2  Identity and Characteristics Identifies the tracked entity 
3   Owner Who owns the entity? 
4    Affiliation What is the owner’s affiliation? 
3   Operator Who operates the entity? 
4    Affiliation What is the owner’s affiliation? 
3   Registration number The entity’s registration 
number 
3   Communications call sign The entity’s call sign  
3   Weight The weight of the entity 
3   Observable features Features one can observer 
3   Aggregation Is the entity a set of entities? 
4    Components What are the contained 
entities? 
4    Structure How are they structured? 
3   Construction features How constructed and of what? 
3   Class Broadest classes of vehicles 
3   Category Broad sub-classes of vehicles 
3   Type Specific make & model of 
vehicle 
3   Capacities How much can it carry? 
4    Fuel How much fuel? 
4    Load How much weight in total? 
3   Capabilities standard for type Specifications for the vehicle 
4    Take-off Parameters about its take-off 
4    Landing Parameters about its landing 
4    Range Parameters about max.trips 
4    Altitude Parameters about its altitudes 
4    Speed Parameters about its speeds 
4    Operation in icing conditions De-icing capabilities? 
4    Maneuver Turns, maximum loads, etc. 
4    Evasion Capabilities for evasive action 
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4    Stealth Capabilities for stealth 
4    Defense Capabilities for self-defense 
4    Offense Capabilities for inflicting harm 
4    Support Capabilities for supporting 
others 
4    Diversion Capabilities to divert from 
plans 
4    Turnaround  What’s needed to start new 
plan? 
4    Differences from standard type Special attributes of this entity 
3   Operational Characteristics How it performs normally 
4    Limitations Constraints on operations 
4    Resource requirements and 
consumption 
Resources consumed for 
various activities 
2  Dynamic State at Time T Values of variables, at time T 
3 Time T The time index T of the state 
3 Temporal coordinate system The coordinate system for T 
3   Position, velocity, acceleration, etc. Location and time rate of 
changes 
4    Spatial Coordinates  Fixes on various dimensions 
5     Spatial Coordinate system Dimensions and origin 
4    Error of measurement Estimate of uncertainty or error
3   Operations How it’s being operated 
4    Control Who or what is controlling it? 
5     Possessor Who or what is in possession? 
6      Affiliation What is his/her/its affiliation? 
5     Crew Who are the crew members? 
5     Non-crew  Who else is augmenting the 
crew? 
4    Intent What is the controllers’ intent? 
5     Peaceful Is it peaceful? 
5     Threatening Is it threatening? How? 
4    Plan The plan to achieve intent 
5     Route  The route the plan incorporates 
6      Waypoints Key points along the rout 
6      Corridors Key pathways between 
waypoints 
5     Timing When do key events occur? 
5     Tactics What tactics will be used? 
5     Resources What resources will be used? 
6      Personnel What personnel will be used? 
6      Consumables Other resources consumed 
6      Systems Other systems required 
6      Weapons Weapons required 
4    Carried load Load that is actually carried 
5     Electronic equipment Electronic equipment carried 
5     Weapons Weapons carried 
5     Crew Crew members carried 
5     Passengers Passengers carried 
5     Cargo Other cargo carried 
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4    Other Behaviors Other behaviors that can occur 
4    Other Qualities Other qualities that 
characterize or limit operations 
4    Transponder code The identifying code assisgned 
4    Dynamic variations in Identity 
and Characteristics (if any) 
Changes over time in typically 
static attributes 
3   Owner A changed value for owner 
4    Affiliation A changed value for affiliation 
3   Operator A changed value for operator 
4    Affiliation A changed value for affiliation 
3   Registration number A changed value for 
registration 
3   Communications call sign A changed value for call sign 
3   Weight A changed value for weight 
3   Observable features A changed set of observables 
3   Aggregation A change in overall composition 
4    Components A change in units aggregated 
4    Structure A change in the structure or 
organization of aggregate 
3   Construction features Changed materials or manner 
3   Class A change in the broadest class 
3   Category A change in the broad category 
3   Type Changed value of defining 
aspect 
3   Capacities A change in its capacities 
4    Fuel A different amount of fuel 
4    Load Changed value of maximum 
load 
3   Capabilities non-standard for type Type properties changed 
4    Differences from standard type Ways different from type 
changed 
3   Operational Characteristics Changed operational properties 
2  History of states (past “track”) Past dynamic states for entity 
2  Predicted states (future “track”) Future dynamic states for entity 
1 Meta-Information (applicable to each 
element of belief) 
Information about and in 
support of the referenced belief 
2  Evidence  Evidence supporting the belief 
3   Observations Data from supporting observers 
4    Reported values Actual reported values used 
5 Time of observation When observation occurred 
5     Sensor Sensor making the observation 
6      Capabilities Capabilities of the sensor 
6      Dynamic state at time of 
observation 
State of dynamic aspects of the 
sensor when observation made 
4    Reporter Who or what reported the 
data? 
3 Evidentiary events Evidence from related events 
4 Confirming events Events that confirm the belief 
5     Confirming events to notice Events predictable from belief 
5     Confirming events detected Predicted events observed 
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5     Confirming events missed Predicted events not detected 
4 Disconfirming events Events incompatible with belief 
5  Disconfirming events to 
notice 
Events predicted to not occur 
5  Disconfirming events 
detected 
Events observed contrary to 
belief 
5  Disconfirming events missed Events not observed, as 
expected 
3   Related beliefs Other beliefs related to this one 
4    Incompatible beliefs  Beliefs not mutually possible 
4    Implied beliefs  Beliefs implied by this one 
4    Implying beliefs Beliefs that imply this one 
2  Inferences Beliefs inferred from others 
3   Quality of inferences Justification and assessment 
2  Error and uncertainty estimates Estimates of error and 
uncertainty 
2  Temporal qualifications Limitations on time of belief 
2  Spatial qualifications Limitations of location of belief 
Table 4 provides a table of contents for the Track model. It leaves out many details, such 
as the specification of permissible values and constraints among them. It also doesn’t say 
which of many alternative systems of measurement and description would be best for any 
of the various values. For example, there are several different standard frameworks for 
geospatial measurement and location. While it may prove useful to select one best 
coordinate system for the first semantic hub, our techniques should be open to the use of 
multiple alternative systems for any of the conceptual elements. It’s not really important 
which system is used, so long as we support translations into and out of the hub to meet 
the requirements for getting suppliers’ information to consumers in the form they need it.  
Furthermore, since the most constrained resource is likely to be the skilled human 
operator, the key factors in determining the effectiveness of any information sharing 
environment will be the naturalness and ease of use of the viewers and editors provided 
to the operator for each kind of information. Operators most familiar with one type of 
coordinate system should be able to view information from that point of view. There may 
be some loss of precision when translating between different frames of reference, but this 
increase in error or uncertainty should be easy to depict and explain. The most important 
thing is to relate all information to some hub model or models that can enable consumers 
to get the sources translated to the form they find most productive to work with.   
Using the Track Model to Achieve the Stated Objectives 
We will leave the details of how best to represent legal values and constraints among 
them for a future paper. There should be no doubt that all of the types of concerns 
included in the Track model can be expressed in terms of some grammar of permissible 
constructions and that legal values and other constraints can be expressed similarly. This 
means that we will be able to have at least one hub semantic model for the entire Track 
concept. If we find it desirable to allow multiple alternative formalisms within the hub, 
that also presents no special problems. Each component of the hub model must, however, 
be supported with two types of tools so the overall approach can prove valuable: (1) 
viewer/editors are required so people can create, understand and modify Track Beliefs 
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and Meta-Information; (2) translators must be written to and from the hub model to 
support valued consumers and suppliers of information. 
Once these two types of tools are available, the objectives are at hand. First, we make it 
possible for operators to access information supplied by others. The basic method used is 
to allow operators to specify the type of information they seek and then to provide 
relevant information to them. To specify what they seek directly, the operators can 
formulate “queries” using a viewer/editor adapted to the purpose of expressing 
information “goals.” A conventional approach provides forms that allow the user to fill in 
values of sought variables and other unconstrained variables that would be associated to 
these. Information is sought which matches the constrained variables, and the values of 
all the associated variables are presented to the user. In database systems this is often 
called Query By Example (QBE). Other query languages are also readily applicable.  
The user’s queries, stated in terms of the user’s view, must be translated into equivalent 
queries expressed in terms of the hub semantic model. That is done by one of the 
translators. A query planner then determines which aspects of the query to dispatch to 
various available information systems, based on its knowledge about the efficiency of 
asking various queries to the various systems. The query planner then would translate 
each sub-query it intends for each supplier system into a corresponding query expressed 
in terms of the semantic model of that system. One of the translators does that, translating 
hub semantics into the specific semantics of the targeted system. Once query responses 
are produced from each system, they need to be translated back into the hub semantics, 
combined by the query planner into an answer, and then translated back into the 
semantics of the operator’s chosen environment, where the operator’s preferred 
viewer/editor would display the requested information.  
The methods of the preceding paragraph address how answers to queries are found in 
existing information stores. A variant of this approach must be used to create monitors 
that will alert users when new information becomes available. This may mean setting up 
“standing queries” for database systems or selective filters for publish-and-subscribe 
systems. The essential operations are similar in this case. The standing queries or filters 
are best expressed in terms directly supported by the information systems used by the 
suppliers. In such a case, the queries are first formulated in user view terms, then in hub 
semantic terms, and finally in supplier system terms. Answers to queries are translated 
back through the reverse steps. Of course, different system environments might lead us to 
do translations and query processing in different orders, but these variations seem 
straightforward. 
One additional but significant way to improve this process is to have the user’s 
preferences for information work in a more automatic and efficient way. In an earlier 
paper, we explained how the VIRT concept should be used to limit bits communicated to 
each operator to the valued and timely information86. Specifically, information that 
materially affects expected outcomes should get priority, and information that is not 
relevant, no longer timely, nor different from what’s already believed should be 
automatically filtered out. This idea can be implemented by allowing operators who are 
concerned with various types of planned outcomes, for example, to register with an 
intelligent monitoring system their plans, their assumed situations and expected 
outcomes, and the inferences that support those expectations. The monitoring system can 
then take responsibility for continually reassessing the credibility of the assumed 
                                                 
86 Hayes-Roth (2004), op. cit. See footnote 3. 
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situations, expected outcomes, and supporting inferences. When new information arises 
from any source that undercuts those beliefs, that information can be communicated to 
the user promptly and highlighted appropriately in that user’s preferred viewer. While 
doing this well is an open-ended challenge, the semantic hub and associated translators 
constitute the essential foundation for exploiting multiple relevant sources. The hub and 
translators can make each source of information commensurate with each operator’s 
specific concerns, thus enabling intelligent filtering that will increase every operator’s 
productivity in network-centric operations.  
The R&D Agenda to Achieve the Potential Benefits 
So what needs to be done in research and development to implement the proposed 
methodology for information sharing? Because the proposed approach aims to address 
the useful exchange of information between all relevant suppliers and consumers, it 
covers a vast, open, never-closing space. For this reason, it makes sense to focus first on 
the highest-value problems where incremental progress can have significant impact. This 
explains the current focus on the Track concept. The inability to fuse information from 
diverse sources and agencies is a recognized critical weakness. Moreover, future defense 
and security systems aspire to creating and sharing track information on a much wider 
array of mobile entities than traditional military vehicles. 
To advance the agenda on track-related systems, we need to accomplish several 
intermediate objectives, as follows: 
1. Select a community of interest that recognizes the importance of this task. 
2. Based on high-priority missions, enumerate and prioritize information sharing 
scenarios. 
3. Determine a high-value near-term subset of the hub semantics. 
4. Identify the viewer/editors that operators will employ in these sharing 
scenarios. 
5. Determine the translator requirements to support the scenario. 
6. Implement an initial hub and related translators. 
7. Test the environment, and identify high priority requirements for 
improvements to the hub and translators. 
8. Identify operators for whom VIRT capabilities (reduced bandwidth, intelligent 
filtering) have highest value. 
9. Determine best methods to gain knowledge of operator’s context and identify 
valuable information. 
10. Implement query methods and notification methods to operationalize VIRT. 
11. Iterate, through earlier steps, to implement continuous improvement. 
12. Place responsibility for this continuous improvement process in the hands of 
an appropriate agent.  
This proposed agenda has much in common with Department of Defense initiatives and 
directives. DoD has committed to using semantic meta-data to describe information in its 
repositories so that next-generation systems such as the Global Information Grid and 
Network-Centric Enterprise Services can be used to assure that each operator gets the 
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right information at the right time to optimize task performance. The current proposed 
approach enhances those initiatives by addressing the semantic requirements for enabling 
interoperability that improves pragmatic outcomes. In a nutshell, we’ve pointed out that 
information from multiple sources will always exist, and these will need to be inter-
translated to address all operators and serve them with all sources. This approach reduces 
expense, risk, and “time to value” than attempting to create a single standard for 
representing all information. Even if it were possible, in principle, to formulate a single 
standard model, the pragmatic requirements would evolve faster than any standardization 
process could. We would forever be chasing our tails. 
In contrast, this R&D agenda provides an incremental approach that can provide 
immediate benefits and can quickly exploit learning to gain additional benefits. A 
continuously improving semantic hub will be part of a virtuous cycle. In this cycle, users 
will begin to benefit from sharing some of their information. They will discover that 
additional benefits are potentially obtainable through broader, deeper, or more precise 
coverage of the semantic and pragmatic concerns. Incremental investment will yield 
those benefits. As the range of benefits expands, additional consumers and additional 
suppliers will seek to participate. The “market” for valuable, sharable information will 
expand. The process will feed on itself, and information sharing will be converted from 
an intractable problem to a continually expanding arena of exchanged value. 
Going beyond Models of Track 
It should be clear that there are many other pragmatic concerns and related concepts 
outside the range of those discussed here. Track is interesting for several reasons: (1) it’s 
an established, if informal, concept throughout the military; (2) new threats are expanding 
the types of mobile entities we wish to track; (3) sharing of intelligence sources for these 
types of tracks is already extremely poor, so that new aspirations require a new technical 
foundation; (4) DOD and DHS leadership should readily understand the potential value 
of the Track as a paradigmatic focus for network-centric systems and the new emphasis 
on semantics and meta-information.  
What other concepts might provide excellent focal points for other similar efforts? The 
following brief list seems easy to justify as each concept is central to some key segment 
of the Federal Enterprise Architecture or defense systems: 














• Center of Gravity 
• Line of Communication 




Each of these concepts occurs in many different government agency systems, and it 
would prove valuable to be able to share information across such systems as well as 
reduce the costs of implementing similar functions in different systems. In short, 
wherever we have communities of interest, we’ll find an overlap in pragmatic and 
semantic concerns. Each such overlap defines a target of opportunity for the suggested 
approach. 
Related Research and Technology 
A major emphasis in the worldwide web community and enlightened parts of 
government-sponsored programs these days is on the need for semantic representation 
and exploitation. The “semantic web” is a principal focus of the W3C. Their main 
objective is use well-understood ontologies (conceptual hierarchies) to annotate a wide 
variety of documents available on the web. These ontologies would be modeled as XML 
schemas and the corresponding semantic tags would be used to add “meta-data” to the 
text and data embedded in documents. New search methods would understand these tags 
and be able to make reasonable inferences about which annotated documents best address 
queries. DOD has already mandated that meta-data be added to describe all information 
bases. 
Several books have appeared recently on the semantic web. One of the best is by Michael 
C. Daconta, Leo J. Obrst and Kevin T. Smith, entitled The Semantic Web: A guide to the 
future of XML, Web Services and Knowledge Management,Wiley, 2003. Daconta has 
recently taken on a leadership role in meta-data modeling for the Federal Enterprise 
Architecture.  
Many efforts have been undertaken to develop models of relevance to military and 
defense applications. NIMA has the lead in DOD to develop standard geographic 
information models. The Open GIS Forum has created the OGIS standard for GIS 
abstract data types. The NATO Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) has 
created an entity-relationship model for command-control of (mostly) ground warfare. 
Tracks are common presentation types in most situation assessment and command-
control database-centered systems. New initiatives in DOD are aimed at created a 
powerful, general Joint Track Manager. Many studies of the general fusion problem have 
led to a Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) four-level reference model describing 
different types of inference appropriate to combining information about military entities. 
This reference model has been the basis for generic architectures for fusion that could 
employ the type of Track model proposed here.  
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In short, there are many pre-existing attempts to use an understanding of semantics and 
pragmatics of tracks in various systems and applications. Our challenge is to make 
explicit the important elements of such work so that we can manifest it in computable 
semantic models. This will be a crucial step toward enabling systems of systems to 
interoperate and share this important kind of information in support of valued and timely 
decisions. 
Conclusions 
Many defense, homeland security, and commercial security objectives require continuous 
tracking of mobile entities. We wish to share information among different tracking 
systems working in similar domains.  
To combine information from different sources, we will need a flexible framework that 
can tolerate and exploit data products from different systems, although these systems 
employ different representations and embody different assumptions. Our approach is to 
identify a rich semantic model of tracks that can support a wide variety of objectives 
related to information sharing. The semantic model is developed to play the role of a hub 
amidst a variety of translators. These translators implement conversions between 
available sources of information and the hub as well as between the hub and various 
viewers and editors used by human operators. In short, consumers get information that 
meets their needs by extracting it from relevant sources, translating it first into the hub 
and second into the semantic system that the consumer requires. This approach allows us 
to achieve significant positive benefits incrementally and offers a vastly preferable 




5. Model-based Communication Networks and VIRT: 











Model-based Communication Networks and VIRT:           Filtering 




Professor, Information Sciences Department 







Command-control and other distributed, collaborative systems should achieve the best 
possible results with resources available. We should measure these systems in terms of the quality 
of decisions made. Better decisions lead to better outcomes, because superior choices are made 
about what to do, with what assets, where and when. Just as we measure manufacturing processes 
in terms of value added at each stage, we want each processing step in distributed collaborative 
operations to maximize the ratio of added value to cost. Both computerized agents and human 
personnel receive information from others, process it, and then produce additional information for 
others downstream in the operational processes. This paper shows that current architectures do 
not promote high productivity. Specifically, most current approaches encourage an increase in 
information supply and exchange per se, producing glut rather than value. This paper explains 
how we can significantly increase the productivity of each operator and the success of overall 
missions. The approach, called VIRT, treats collaborators as participants with shared models. 
These models determine which information is high value and for whom. The architecture gives 
priority to conveying high value information. Similarly, low value bits are filtered out, saving 
resources and optimizing value attained. 
 
Introduction and Overview 
Every modern organization aspires to improve its performance through better use of 
information technology. Organizations seek to increase their agility and make better, more 
adaptive responses to changing circumstances. As communication technology improves, 
organizations can operate over wider distances and can even assemble operational components on 
                                                 
87 This work was supported by a research initiation grant from NPS to the author. 
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an ad hoc basis to meet requirements of a specific objective. People and machine-based agents 
operating in these organizations must collaborate with other members of their mission-oriented 
teams. They send information to and receive information from each of their collaborators, and 
each collaborative team aims to process this information to reach an effective and timely 
decision. After Boyd[1], the cycle of information processing and decision-making is often 
referred to as an OODA-loop. To be effective competitors, organizations must close these loops 
faster than their opponents, so that they can drive rather than react to the opponents’ behaviors. 
 
Several trends work against our ability to close our decision loops quickly. First, the number 
of networked collaborators is increasing, meaning that we must process information from and for 
an increasing number of partners. Second, the number of relevant information sources and 
quantity of availability data are both increasing rapidly. Third, the times available for decisions 
are shrinking as we seek to compete with more agile adversaries. Where cycle times in the 
military were traditionally anywhere from 24 to 72 hours, our aspirations are now to identify, 
analyze, decide, and prosecute some targets within a few minutes. Thus, making information 
more available and increasing its flow among collaborators ultimately reduces the quality of 
decisions. Just as time-sharing computers “thrash” when they become overloaded with pending 
tasks, people can’t make good decisions when they are time-stressed and overloaded with 
information waiting for their attention. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe a fundamental shift in the way we approach 
communication among time-stressed collaborators often glutted with information. The new 
approach is called a “model-based communication network” (or MCN). Collaborators who 
employ an MCN can drastically reduce the amount of work required and can significantly 
increase their information-processing productivity. The major benefits of MCNs are delivered 
through services that filter what information people and machine agents receive. We call the 
services that deliver valued information at the right time VIRT, for short. VIRT services 
essentially filter information so that high-valued bits are prioritized and low-valued bits are 
deprecated or withheld. In this way, each collaborator’s incoming queue of messages is 
dynamically prioritized, enabling the person or agent to work on the most important information 
first. This “best first” approach produces the productivity gains organizations need to thrive in a 
networked, information-rich environment.  
 
This paper introduces a component-based architecture for VIRT and illustrates it with 
examples. I describe nine VIRT components and their interconnections. After that, the paper 
discusses related research, current challenges and opportunities, and conclusions. This paper 
should prove helpful to architects, designers and implementers of systems to support network-
centric operations or any environment for time-stressed collaboration and decision-making. 
The Basic Problem with Current Approaches: Stateless 
Networking  
The modern military, as other modern extended enterprises, aims (1) to exploit superb 
information (2) to achieve unprecedented levels of effectiveness through (3) agile, coordinated 
control of resources. These new enterprises form virtual organizations on an ad hoc basis, quickly 
assembling resources with needed capabilities and integrating them into a unified operational 
federation. To succeed, these organizations must collaboratively construct and consistently 
maintain a shared understanding of several important things: mission intent; alternative plans 
under consideration and those being executed; and the evolving situation, which includes the past, 
current, and future expected position and status of all relevant entities in the environment. The 
term common operational picture (COP) is sometimes used to mean this shared model of the 
battle space, but it usually connotes a more limited view. The term world model, meaning all of 
the facts and beliefs about the environment, is more apt. The key capability required to enable 
virtual organizations to coordinate and execute at maximum effectiveness in dynamic 
 150
environments is a shared world model. Any attempt to lay a new foundation for collaborative 
networks should be driven by this requirement, and putative improvements should demonstrate 
how they raise the quality of the shared understanding that enables synchronized, coordinated, 
intelligent real-time decision-making and control. 
 
Conventional approaches to communications have focused on laying pipes that move bits 
using stateless protocols. State refers to what a system remembers about what it has already done 
and that causes it to behave differently going forward. Stateless communication is very 
appropriate when we are focusing on connecting mostly independent entities, for limited 
interactions, which arise pretty much randomly. Whatever memory is required in these 
interactions is supplied by the interacting entities. Usually that means two communicators begin 
by establishing their identities and their credentials, and then they begin to work on establishing 
shared state. This requires that they describe their current beliefs, identify discrepancies, and 
determine how to resolve those. From that point on, as long as they stay synchronized, they can 
quickly process new reports by a kind of triage: repetitive and redundant information can be 
discarded; confirming information can be coalesced into the models that “explain” it; new but 
unsurprising information can be accepted and used to augment to the current model; and 
disconfirming information can be subjected to further tasking and analysis, as appropriate. This is 
the maximum possible level of efficiency for handling information communicated between two 
parties.  
 
Unfortunately, the actual situation in most military operations is much more complicated and 
much less efficient than in this idealized two-party on-going communication. Rather than 
maintaining continuous shared state, the communication is usually stateless. The parties don’t 
stay in continuous synchronized dialog. They effectively “hang up” after each short transmission. 
They send messages whenever they think they have information worth reporting. The longer the 
parties operate independently, the more their respective world models diverge. Each time a 
recipient receives a message, the recipient must now also attempt to determine whether 
differences in the senders’ world models affected what they’ve said, why they’re saying it, and 
how best to interpret and utilize their statements. Moreover, communications in net-centric 
organizations are not merely 1-to-1, but n-to-n, meaning that each party is receiving messages 
from others whose own states relativistically affect what they’re transmitting. Absent an absolute, 
common frame of reference, each communication requires the recipient to try to determine the 
meaning, relevance, validity, and significance for its own world model. In the fog of war, this 
process inevitably results in these problems: (1) many messages are sent repeatedly; (2) many 
recipients are overloaded; and (3) many incompatible and inconsistent views are held by different 
parties. The process is grossly inefficient. 
 
The ideal communication framework for network-centric organizations is like the blackboard 
architecture[2], in which each actor can see all previous inferences and all important ideas are 
woven into a structure of shared beliefs. In the original blackboard architecture, the posted ideas 
were called hypotheses and these were linked to represent various kinds of supporting logical 
relationships. Publish-subscribe architectures[3] are simplified abstractions of the blackboard. In 
these, recipients identify what information they are interested in, and the system routes matching 
items from publishers to them. Distributed blackboard architectures are actually the best model of 
the ideal communication framework[4, 5]. In these, copies of subsets of the logically global 
blackboard are distributed to provide fast local caches for each participant, and various processes 
are employed to keep the replicas synchronized and consistent.  
In extended and net-centric enterprises, collaborators need to share beliefs that consistently 
reflect their individual roles in collective plans and operations. Plans are an example of shared 
decision products best modeled as compound objects. These contain constituent objects that 
describe the elements of a plan, such as each aircraft’s mission, route, targets, refueling, weapons, 
etc. In addition to plans, the organizations need to share compound objects that describe their 
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situation analyses, including status and capabilities of blue and red forces, terrain, networks, and 
so forth. Each participant in intelligence, plans, and operations should be able to see a permitted 
view of current beliefs and should be able to make incremental adjustments to those when they 
have new information. Changes in beliefs should be propagated to replicas of the corresponding 
objects. When changes in some beliefs undercut current plans, either by nullifying some 
prerequisite or altering the relative desirability of a previously rejected alternative, this condition 
should trigger a process that reassesses the affected plans and associated analyses. By maintaining 
state, important news can be automatically detected in many cases, and this can allow the 
responsible parties to focus attention exactly where it’s needed 
 
The appropriate model for net-centric collaborative organizations should recognize their 
essential nature: they must be continuously synchronized though distributed, and they must be 
driven by significant events, those corresponding to changes that have material impacts on on-
going plans. Collaborators meld and share belief structures that describe the environment, 
resources, capabilities, plans, and expected results of plans. These belief structures correspond to 
compound objects with support relationships. The communications that people should experience, 
because these are the ones that matter, are those that signify a material change in beliefs. Other 
communications should be largely invisible, as they work mostly autonomously to maintain 
distributed, synchronized state. Thus effective collaborative problem-solving requires: (1) the 
ongoing, mostly unconscious, maintenance of melded world models; and (2) the event-driven, 
conscious assessment of how real “news” affects previous decisions and choices for future 
actions. In short, models enable us to know which bits convey information because they are 
“news,” and we must give priority to shipping those bits to consumers who value them. Knowing 
how “news” changes expected outcomes for various potential consumers enables us to target the 
news to the right consumers promptly. 
VIRT Improves Time-stressed Collaborative Decision-making  
DoD has committed to transform around concepts of Information Superiority (IS) and 
Network Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW)[6]. FORCEnet, as an example, aims to 
provide the Navy the capabilities required to support agile, rapid, precise, effective and efficient 
planning and operations. In these new concepts, warfighters can access and employ whatever 
information they need to perform their tasks. In short, every person should operate on the right 
information. One problem, however, is information glut. Too much information is available 
today, and the problem grows worse over time. Another problem is that people have to work hard 
to find the valuable information, either because it doesn’t automatically find them or because it’s 
buried amidst megabits of data and messages that are not important for their particular mission 
concerns.  
 
Thus, IS/NCOW depends on enabling each individual to receive valuable information at the 
right time and, in parallel, the automatic filtering out of low-value information. This requires 
improved means for allowing the needs of individuals to determine just what information finds 
them, so they can spend more of their time assessing and acting upon high-value information. 
This would have the effect of increasing individual productivity throughout the military and, as a 
consequence, help attain the goals of IS and NCOW. Without such a capability, moreover, 
increasing information loads will have the paradoxical effect of reducing mission effectiveness. 
 
To solve these problems we need a model-based communication network (MCN) that 
delivers to each of its customers tailored products that satisfy the objectives of “valued-
information at the right-time” (VIRT). The basic VIRT method adapts the information flow 
around an understanding of mission plans, their rationales or justifications, the assumptions and 
forecasts they depend upon, and their expected outcomes. In short, VIRT looks for information 
that materially affects expected outcomes and communicates that to decision-makers so they can 
consider and adopt preferable alternatives in a timely way. 
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Here’s a simple example from aviation, where a pilot’s route is planned at low altitude over 
low mountains. The planner considers many variables, constraints, and outcome possibilities in 
selecting an optimum route. For one type of mission, the goal may be the shortest flight; for 
another it might be the stealthiest flight; and for another it might be one with best line-of-sight 
communications to several parties along the route. The types of variables that must be considered 
include: terrain elevation; winds aloft; fuel consumption and capacity; routing waypoints and 
their relationship to other parties in the environment; precipitation and temperature; etc. 
Constraints include, for example: the flight must not consume all the fuel and, in fact, the planned 
flight must allow for an additional hour of emergency reserve; the flight cannot encounter icing 
and allow for ice accumulation; the flight must maintain safe clearance above terrain, especially 
when winds and steep terrain interact; etc. The planner considers many alternatives for the future 
flight, using forecast weather data and other information and assumptions. In light of the mission 
objectives and assumed information, the planner chooses the best alternative for the flight plan. 
 
Continuing with our example, considerable time usually passes between the moment when a 
flight is planned and when the flight actually begins. In some cases hours or even a day or more 
might pass. As time passes, the information available evolves and changes. Forecasts improve as 
their distance in the future shrinks; in addition, direct observations supply facts for what 
previously required assumptions. Information continues to flow into organizations like the Navy’s 
Fleet Numerical Meteorological and Oceanographic Command (FNMOC88) right up to the 
aircraft’s departure and throughout the planned flight. FNMOC “knows” when weather data, for 
example, differ from what had been previously forecast or assumed. Enabling FNMOC to 
“know” which changes are significant to the pilot will then enable it to supply valued information 
at the right time, i.e. implement VIRT services. 
 
In short, the supplier of information bits needs to understand its customer’s sensitivities. In 
this example, a change from a low probability of enroute icing to a substantial probability of 
enroute icing would be material to the pilot. Assuming the currently preferred plan didn’t violate 
a “no flight allowed into icing” constraint, a newsworthy violation of that constraint could arise if 
the forecast changes to anticipate a combination of sub-freezing temperature and visible moisture 
along the planned route at the planned flight time. For FNMOC to implement VIRT, it needs to 
know the planned route and time, constraints on acceptable flights, and a way to convey news to 
the operator. Each operator and plan can have its own sensitivities. Aircraft at high altitude 
usually are above the weather and have de-icing equipment, so they are unlikely to consider 
precipitation and subfreezing temperature important. On the other hand, their flight levels are 
more affected by “jet stream” winds and these can significantly affect fuel consumption, as just 
one example. 
 
So the essence of VIRT is knowing which consumers really care about what news. Suppliers 
of information should monitor for a change in their information (news) that would interest 
operators, because it changes their beliefs about expected outcomes. The final element of VIRT 
consists of the conveyance employed to transmit the valued news to the user. This should include 
a means to highlight news in an appropriate way. Preferably, the highlighting causes recipients to 
attend to news with a priority that closely approximates the importance they attribute to it. Urgent 
and vital information deserves high priority. Unimportant data and stale information deserve low 
priority. 
                                                 
88 I collaborated with FNMOC on the implementation of VIRT for their customers. I have been fortunate to 
have the knowledgeable and enthusiastic support of the former FNMOC Commander, Chris Gunderson 
(CAPT USN RET), and several of his talented staff, including: Bruce Gritton, FNMOC-CIO; Ensign Darin 
Keeter; and Doug Gentges, a contract architect/programmer. Gunderson is now Executive Director of the 




We can employ a range of possible methods to implement the essence of VIRT. In the ideal 
world, the plans and plan evaluation methods of the operators might be known to the information 
suppliers. Then whenever a supplier noticed a change in relevant information, it could “simulate” 
the operators’ thinking to determine whether the operators would alter their previously selected 
plans. In just those cases, it would alert the operators. Otherwise, it would not bother to pass 
along insignificant changes. As a much more modest objective, we have chosen to allow 
operators to tell us what kinds of changes are significant to them in light of specific plans they 
have considered and selected. The VIRT service then takes responsibility for monitoring the 
identified types of changes and conveying them promptly to the interested parties. 
 
Even this modest ambition for an initial VIRT service will produce substantial benefits. 
Every planner and operator is sensitive to some types of potential changes throughout the period 
leading up to and during plan execution. A typical pilot for a simple mission, for example, may be 
responsible for monitoring dozens of information types throughout a 12-hour period. An entire 
organization or a coordinated military mission force, for example, can make millions of “reads” 
to keep their plan justifications fresh. Usually, nearly all of those justification-maintaining 
examinations will turn up nothing valuable. As a consequence, the rare and important deviation 
from acceptable condition will often be overlooked. 
 
To make VIRT and model-based communication networks routinely available, we need to 
provide some generic capabilities that enable suppliers and consumers of information to 
understand what information is valuable. These generic capabilities can then be specialized for 
particular domains of application and communities of practice, as when weather specialists and 
aviators establish a shared understanding of concerns such as “enroute icing” and “headwinds.” In 
the next two sections, I explain what these generic capabilities are and illustrate how we 
specialize them for particular applications. 
Overall Technical Strategy and High-level Architecture  
In this section, we consider a high-level architecture for VIRT that exploits a set of semantic 
models that describe the information suppliers make available to consumers. The simplified 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 7. A simplified architecture for VIRT. 
The architecture in Figure 1 simplifies much of the complexity by focusing on just a single 
plan, apparently planned and periodically adjusted by only the one person illustrated. Of course, 




















and plans extant at any point in time. Nevertheless, the key elements of the VIRT approach 
appear in this simple view. 
 
The overall flow in Figure 1 starts on the left side, where a plan has been generated. Each 
plan describes time-phased actions that should accomplish the plan’s objectives. The planner 
considered what the state of the world would be at the time the plan executes, and his/her beliefs 
about that future state correspond to the “assumptions” recorded in the plan. When planners select 
a plan, they usually evaluate it and compare its costs and benefits to other alternatives. They can 
record their reasons for selecting one particular alternative in the form of a justification. A 
justification ordinarily explains how the planned actions should accomplish the objectives in a 
situation where the assumptions validly hold and, also, why the planners prefer the selected plan 
to the alternatives they considered. The justification often reflects that all of the alternatives 
considered had excessive risks or costs in comparison to the chosen one. 
 
Let’s consider a simple example. The planners might have an objective to rescue a small 
group of people on the ground in forested terrain. Their basic choices consist of reaching the 
people by ground or air and extricating them by ground or air. The likely options for ground 
transport include wheeled and tracked vehicles, horses, and humans. The likely options for air 
transport include rotorcraft v. fixed wing aircraft. Given a number of factors, they quickly reject 
all but the following skeletal plan:  
 
1. Survey the area by fixed wing aircraft to find the best landing spot for a helicopter.  
2. Send a helicopter with a search and rescue (SAR) team. 
3. Land the helicopter at the chosen site.  
4. Find and recover the party using the SAR team. 
5. Depart by helicopter and return the party to a chosen medical facility.  
 
Given this skeletal plan, the planners then focus on possible aircraft and routes, total expected 
flight times and associated fuel requirements, and possible time sequences for the flights. The 
flights become highly dependent upon the assumed wind, visibility, and icing conditions en route 
and at the search and rescue (SAR) area.  
 
Let’s complete the example plan. The planners assume that a 90-minute aerial survey will be 
required to choose the best landing site. They choose an available low-altitude aircraft that carries 
appropriate instruments and can reach the site with only a two-hour flight. The aircraft has 
adequate fuel for 6.5 hours which is just sufficient for two 2-hour legs, a 1.5 hour survey, and still 
leaves a 1-hour mandatory reserve. The winds in the area are forecast to be excessive between the 
hours of 1300 and 1800 local, and adequate sunlight is expected only from 1000 to 1900. For 
these reasons the flight is planned for early tomorrow morning, so that the survey begins 
promptly at 1000. Thus, take-off is scheduled for 0800. The helicopter is scheduled for a 3-hour 
flight to the search area, and is planned to depart at 0900, so that it can receive landing 
coordinates at 1130 from the SAR aircraft survey team 30 minutes prior to touching down.  
 
Even this example leaves out countless details, but it provides enough to illustrate the key 
VIRT architecture features. The VIRT dependency monitor takes the responsibility to watch for 
changes in forecast or actual conditions that threaten the plan by undercutting its justification. In 
the current case, the monitor needs to revalidate periodically the key assumptions regarding 
aircraft availability, aircraft capabilities, winds, visibility, icing and fuel consumption. Table 1 
shows a sample of possible changes in the world or our model of it that might undercut the plan’s 
justification and, for each, one or more information sources that the monitor needs to reassess 
periodically so it can re-assure the justification. 
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This table lists seven out of hundreds of possible vulnerabilities of the example plan. Aircraft 
often have maintenance problems that ground them. If either of the planned craft are grounded 
before the operation is complete, the whole plan may fail. Therefore, planners must continually 
monitor the readiness of the craft. Similarly, the survey mission assumes the availability of 
various instruments, and these must continue to function until an adequate helicopter landing area 
is selected. Thus, mission planners should monitor and revalidate the equipment’s functionality. 
The third item supposes that an aircraft substitution has occurred, as in response to a problem like 
the first or second ones discussed. In this case, the new aircraft must have as much range, load, 
and instrumentation capabilities as required of the one it replaced.  
 
The fourth and fifth problems challenge the ability of the aircraft to complete the planned 
flights, either because the new conditions might require excessive fuel or prohibit flight. These 
possibilities always exist, though at varying degrees of likelihood depending on locale and 
season. Nevertheless, the plan is vulnerable to changes in these meteorological conditions, so the 
dependency monitor should continually revalidate the ability of the aircraft to fly the planned 
route, maintain an adequate fuel reserve, and avoid flight into icing conditions. 
Table 6. Vulnerabilities and the associated dependencies monitored. 
Changes that Undercut Plan Justification Dependency that Must be Monitored 
1. Planned aircraft down for maintenance Readiness of planned aircraft 
2. Survey instruments inoperative Readiness of planned survey equipment 
3. Substitute aircraft has reduced capability Capacity and capability of replacements 
4. Increased headwinds eliminate fuel reserve Winds aloft and fuel consumption 
5. Enroute icing reported by other aircraft No icing conditions observed or forecast 
(temperature, precipitation, ice) 
6. Survey team finds no suitable landing area Survey objective accomplished 
satisfactorily 
7. Departure of survey aircraft delayed Survey objective accomplished on time 
The sixth and seventh problems undercut the logic of the plan, by making it impossible for 
the helicopter to depart at a fixed time, receive coordinates of a landing site en route, and land 
shortly thereafter to perform the rescue function. The system should monitor the continuing 
plausibility of the assumptions the helicopter plan depends on, including the timely and 
satisfactory completion of the survey objective to find a landing site in time.  
 
While there are many other ways this plan, and any plan, can be thwarted by violations of 
explicit or implicit assumptions[7], the point here is that machines should be employed to monitor 
as many important dependencies as possible. When unfolding events violate any of these key 
assumptions, planners should consider the consequences. The VIRT system monitors such 
dependencies and alerts planners when significant events occur. These significant events include 











Table 7. Significant Events Types and Illustrative Examples. 
Category of Significant Event Monitored Illustration from Example Plan 
Unavailability of required resource  Aircraft not grounded for maintenance 
Inadequate capability of employed 
resource  
Aircraft instruments operative, load adequate 
Adverse change in forecast weather Increased headwinds forecast en route 
Adverse observations reported Other pilots report high winds aloft and icing 
Plan’s justification negated or nullified Resources, capabilities, and time intervals now 
available probably can’t achieve an objective 
VIRT works by seeking significant events in dynamic data sources. To do this, it must 
understand what significant events undercut assumptions the plan depends on and how to access 
and query information sources for the events of interest. The illustrative examples in Table 2, for 
example, might be monitored by periodically examining aircraft readiness and capability 
databases, wind and icing pilot reports, wind and icing updated weather forecasts for the airways 
and times of our intended flights, and expected start and completion times for various planned 
tasks that other tasks depend upon. Given a very specific list of significant events, plan 
dependencies, and information sources, a specialized VIRT application could be easily designed 
and straightforwardly implemented. We would still need to specify the best way to alert the 
human planners when we detected particular categories of significant events. For example, if we 
computed that new wind forecasts undercut the ability to maintain an adequate fuel reserve, we’d 
want the specialized application to consider and compute some potential workarounds, such as 
changes in route, atltitudes, or time. The specialized VIRT application could then offer more than 
just “a new problem”; it could also constructively suggest a potential adaptive response. An 
excellent example of a specialized application prototype that addresses many of the challenges of 
monitoring weather for significant events and determining when and how to alert pilots is the 
AWARE system, described by Ruokangas and Mengshoel[8]. 
 
The simplified architecture we are describing is aimed at solving a broader generic problem, 
so that almost any planner can employ it for any kind of plan by seeking significant events among 
any pertinent information sources. Rather than a specific application, therefore, the VIRT 
architecture aims to provide a generic service for plan monitoring and for intelligent filtering of 
potentially relevant, dynamic information sources. In the generic architecture, the dependency 
monitor can infer what types of events to look for from any plan whose components include 
assumptions and a justification. The monitor can also be advised by an operator how to focus or 
optimize its functions. VIRT also employs a registry of available information sources to exploit 
whatever sources become available. VIRT is open to new information suppliers, who need only 
describe what their information sources are, how to access and query them, and how to reimburse 
or compensate the supplier if payment is required. Lastly, the architecture is open on the question 
of how alerts of significant events should be communicated. We expect there will be a variety of 
alerting methods, some more appropriate than others for particular types of users, tasks, 
information sources, mission objectives, significant events and equipment contexts.  
 
In addition to the type of example plan we discussed in this section, our work on VIRT with 
FNMOC currently focuses on two particular Navy operational scenarios. The first of these 
addresses the problem of assuring that submarines receive high-value information over their 
limited bandwidth channels. To do that, VIRT notices when dynamically changing data differ 
from previously conveyed information and then determines which changes have significant 
import for the sub given its current mission and plans.  
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The second Navy scenario we are working on addresses the question of helping special 
operations forces minimize their risk of detection and level of effort to penetrate an enemy’s 
defenses by minimizing their exposure to radar. In situations where the detection capability of 
radar depends of meteorological and oceanographic conditions, our VIRT application determines 
when weather and sea state change enough to justify replanning, and then triggers that replanning. 
In this way we hope to make SEAL missions less risky, less physically demanding, and more 
adaptive to dynamically changing environment parameters. 
 
In sum, the high-level architecture of VIRT aims to improve group synchronization by 
understanding how changing situation variables affect their plan, monitoring specifically for 
potentially important changes, and rapidly alerting them to significant events that undercut the 
logic of their plans. We envision a VIRT system that is open to suppliers and consumers of 
information. The suppliers can describe what information they supply and how to access it. The 
consumers can describe what assumptions justify their plans and how deviations from those 
assumed conditions signify plan vulnerability and portend problems. Our initial VIRT projects 
don’t try to automate the functions of re-justifying a plan in light of changing circumstances or re-
planning a no-longer-appropriate plan. Those goals would require a narrow focus that could be 
addressed by programming a computer to solve that class of problem. Instead, we defer such 
ambitious problem-solving capabilities to later. This enables us to focus immediately on a 
generic, relatively straightforward service that can be employed by many planners, consuming 
many types of information sources. 
Product-line, Component-based Technical Architecture  
When you anticipate addressing a variety of similar application requirements with mostly 
generic software, the best approach is to create a component-based, product-line architecture[9, 
10]. A product-line architecture defines a set of reusable generic components and specifies how 
data and control should flow among them to solve application problems. Over time, a successful 
architecture encourages developers to produce interoperable components of increasing quality 
and capability. Our hope is that such developments will occur to support MCN in general and 
VIRT services in particular. In this section, I’ll describe an initial component-based architecture 
for these purposes. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the principal components of the VIRT architecture. These have some 
similarity to the simplified view in Figure 1, but these generic components can supply VIRT 
services to many different parties, related to many different plans, at the same time. Each 
component shown is modeled as an object with some attributes and optional methods. Generic 
components such as those shown can be implemented in different ways, with various 
specializations and enhancements. I will describe the overall component collection and 
interactions first at a high-level, and then do a deeper dive into each one. 
 
We expect that VIRT services will most often be delivered in the context of organizations 
that plan and execute missions. A Planning Toolset component represents the types of functions 
and results that VIRT exploits in the planning environment. Most organizations have planning 
tools already, so the generic capabilities here will be obtained from existing functions augmented 
by some new ones. The Planning Toolset enables planners to generate candidate plans, evaluate 
alternatives, and justify the selections they make. Key assumptions record beliefs that a group of 
plans take as given. A dependency analyzer identifies particular underlying beliefs that a plan’s 
outcome seems sensitive to. A condition generator translates these dependencies into specific 
conditions that should be monitored, and those conditions are monitored by corresponding 
Condition Monitors. Example conditions would include: “no icing en route” or “adequate fuel 
reserve maintained throughout plan.” As time passes, elements of a plan or its assumptions may 
need to be updated, and a plan updater does that. This is particularly relevant as plans are 
executing and actual results come in to replace forecasts and expected results.  
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Figure 2. A component-based product-line architecture for VIRT. 
Each condition generated to check and assure a plan dependency is monitored by a Condition 
Monitor. The condition monitor examines the value of the designated condition over appropriate 
time and space coordinates and records when significant changes in the value of the condition 
occur. It also maintains an agenda for scheduled updates to these computations. When significant 
events occur, as when a significant delta indicates that a condition has gone from a satisfactory to 
an unsatisfactory state, the associated Condition Alerter has responsibility to notify appropriate 
parties who are concerned with this type of alert. The alerter can use whatever notification 
methods the concerned parties specified for reaching them.  
 
The Condition Monitor obtains dynamic situation data from sources described by entries in 
the Information Registry. Each information source provides dynamically changing data about 
particular variables. The variables, encodings, and other such data definitions are described in the 
associated meta-data. Sources may differ in terms of their perceived or rated quality and also in 
terms of the cost for use. Each source provides methods for accessing its data, such as particular 
query languages. Usually data is characterized in terms of data dictionaries or entity-relationship 
models.  
 
In the future, data will be further characterized by semantic schemas or more formal 
ontologies that characterize what each entity and attribute means and how different values 
support various kinds of inference. Ontologies will be used in two very different ways. One 
ontology will specify the semantics of an information source, as when an attribute such as “dew 
point” is explained as “a 1nm x 1nm grid of temperatures at successive 3000-foot altitude bands 
where airborne water molecules will precipitate into visible moisture.” Another ontology will pin 
down the semantics the planners and operators associate with terms they’ve used in plans and 
conditions. For example, they may specify that “en route icing” means a condition of “sub-
freezing temperature coupled with precipitation forecast in any area within 2 nm of the route 
occurring within 30 minutes of the planned flight through that area.” 
 
The last component of the VIRT architecture is a Domain Translator that can translate 
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example, an aviation-weather translator could translate forecast temperature and dew point 
information from a weather information source into “precipitation,” “sub-freezing temperature,” 
and “expected icing” that concern flight planners. In short, the Domain Translator relates 
concerns in the operational domain to data sources described in an Information Registry. 
 
For each of these generic components, in turn, we’ll now consider their functions, interface, 
interconnections, and key qualities. Any particular application could then be quickly addressed by 
combining and specializing available implementations of these components. Each generic 
component is described by a table addressing the principal facets: attributes, methods, interfaces, 
interconnections, and qualities. An example of each component’s function is also provided. The 
first component considered is the Planning Toolset, in Table 3. 
Table 3. Planning Toolset Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Planning Toolset Combines legacy planning aids with new methods 
for augmenting and annotating plans 
Attribute  Key Assumptions A list of conditions in the operational domain 
ontology underlying the plan 
Attribute  Plans A list of alternative plans, including actions to 
achieve the objective given key assumptions 
Method Plan Generator(obj) Generates candidate plans to meet objective obj 
given key assumptions 
Method Plan Evaluator(p) Assesses quality of plan p given key assumptions 
Method Plan Justifier(p) Justifies why plan p achieves its objective given 
key assumptions 
Method Dependency Analyzer 
(p) 
Determines how plan p results depend upon given 
key assumptions or other additional ones 
Method Condition Generator(p) Generates conditions to monitor to assure plan p 
achieves expected results given key assumptions 
Method Plan Updater Updates plans over time to reflect changes in key 
assumptions, actions or evaluation 
Interface User interface Planners create plans, view expected results, 
designate conditions, specify alerts 
Planners receive alerts and view expectations and 
results 
Interface Machine interface Creates condition monitor and condition alerter 
objects 
Provides access to key assumptions and plans 
Interconnection Uses operational 
ontology 
Generates condition 
monitors & alerters 
Receives alerts 
Planning tools express plans in ontology terms 
 
Each plan alternative has its own conditions 
 
Each plan continually revalidated by some parties 
Quality Planning tools generate 
good plans 
VIRT services easily 
requested with little 
increased workload 
VIRT alerts provide 
Good plans are expected to work when executed, 
given assumptions already made 
Requesting condition monitoring and alerting 
should be easy with a plan and its justification 
and dependencies on hand 
VIRT reduces bit-flow to parties by filtering out 
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concise important 
feedback quickly  
frequent redundant and immaterial data 
Example Use Flight plan created with 
conditions monitored 
for start time, icing, 
turbulence and fuel 
reserves 
The plan includes a route and rate of fuel 
consumption; route is compared to forecast 
weather data translated into icing, turbulence 
and fuel consumption values; key conditions 
monitored continually as time progresses 
 
The Planning Toolset component provides a set of functions to enable planners to formulate 
plans, to evaluate them, to discover and select conditions to monitor, and to update the plans as 
things evolve over time. The toolset component provides user interfaces to support human 
planners and machine interfaces to create condition monitors and alerters as well as provide 
access to plan and assumption attributes. The toolset component should support production of 
good plans and enable VIRT services to monitor important conditions without a great amount of 
additional work on the part of the planners.  
 
Table 4 describes the generic component for monitoring conditions. 
Table 4. Condition Monitor Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Condition Monitor  
Attribute  Condition (t, loc) The condition’s value at time t and location loc 
Attribute Significant Deltas Transitions (location, time, value changes) where 
condition value became significant 
Attribute Agenda for Updates Schedule to get updates from info sources 
Method Update Condition(t, loc) Using updated data, recompute condition’s value 
Method Get Update Access an info source to get updated data 
Method Accept Update Process asynchronous data updates received from 
info source 
Method Identify Significant 
Deltas 
Determine when significant changes in the 
condition occur 
Method Set Agenda Determine which info sources to access and when 
Interface Machine interface Allow planning tools to create and modify 
condition monitors 
Allow info sources to provide asynchronous data 
Interconnection Accesses Info Registry 
Accesses Info Sources 
Use Domain Translator    
 
Signal Condition Alerter 
Determines info sources to employ and how 
Accesses or queries relevant sources 
Assesses conditions and deltas in operational 
domain 
Notifies alerter when significant events occur 
Quality Effective at detecting 
significant events 
Efficient in use of costly 
resources 
Assures vigilant assessment of conditions and 
detection of significant deltas 
Schedules info accesses intelligently, computes as 
needed, and only generates significant alerts 
Example Use Change in forecast 
headwinds implies fuel 
reserve will be 
inadequate 
The operational domain condition of “adequate 
fuel reserve” is computed by assuring that the 
difference between fuel at takeoff and fuel 
consumed on all route legs is enough for 60 
minutes of additional flight; fuel on each route 
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leg is computed by multiplying average ground 
speed times fuel rate for that leg; ground speed 
is air speed minus headwind component 
In the preceding table, we see how the generic Condition Monitor component works. One 
such object is associated with each condition. The condition is updated as new data are accessed 
or provided asynchronously. The monitor determines an efficient schedule for periodically 
accessing data sources. In the example, the condition “adequate fuel reserve” is monitored. The 
estimated fuel reserve is the number of minutes the aircraft can fly with fuel expected to be 
remaining after all planned route legs are flown. Standard parameters are used for fuel 
consumption per hour for various flight profiles. The key unknown is the amount of headwind. 
As the headwind forecast changes or actual headwind data become available for the planned 
route, the monitor recomputes the expected fuel consumption and then the amount remaining for 
reserve. If this becomes less than the required minimum, the condition goes from “green” to 
“red,” and a significant delta is noted. This also means a significant event, “loss of adequate fuel 
reserve,” must be signaled to the associated alerter. 
Table 5. Condition Alerter Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Condition Alerter  
Attribute  Concerned Parties Identities/addresses of people or agents to 
notify 
Attribute History of Alerts Record of notifications to parties 
Method Notification Methods Means to convey alert to interested parties 
Interface Machine Interface Receive significant events from Condition 
Monitor 
Access communication channels to convey 
alerts using notification methods 
Interconnection Accept significant events 
from condition monitor 
Convey alerts via 
communication channels 
Receive, note, and disseminate criterial 
changes in conditions to concerned parties 
using notification methods 
Quality Alerts communicated 
promptly and concisely, 
avoiding annoying 
repetitiveness 
News of significant events best conveyed to 
users within the context where it’s most 
easily understood 
Repetition used only when acknowledgment 
required but not received 
Example Use The flight planner is 
notified with a short pop-
up message that shifting 
winds have undercut the 
planned flight’s fuel 
reserve requirement 
After a flight is initially planned, the planner 
may be difficult to reach, because he or she 
may not be at the same computer where the 
plan was created; in addition to a pop-up 
message in an active planning window, 
instant messages, email, and voice messages 
might be appropriate; acknowledgment of 





Table 6 describes the generic component for registering information sources. 
Table 6. Information Registry Generic Component Description. 
 162
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Information Registry  
Attribute  Information Sources Collection of information source objects 
Attribute Information Domain 
Ontologies 
Collection of information domain ontology 
objects 
Method Update Information 
Sources 
Add, delete or modify info source objects 
Method Update Domain Ontologies Add, delete or modify info domain ontology 
objects 
Interface Machine Interface Allow access to Condition Monitor 
Publish updates on asynchronous channels 
Interconnection Condition Monitor reads 
 
Domain Translator reads 
Monitor determines which information sources 
can best be used  
Domain translator uses info domain ontology 
and info source meta-data to determine 
which data relate to the conditions being 
monitored 
Quality Easy to update and 
administer 
Flexibly supports diverse 
and evolving sources 
Registry can add, delete, and change contents 
without limitations 
Meta-data are described using flexible meta-
meta-models, as are domain ontologies 
Example Use Registry incorporates three 
different sources on winds 
aloft, with different meta-
data, and different 
ontologies 
New sources of forecast and observed winds 
aloft are registered when available, and the 
condition monitor for “adequate fuel 
reserve” can employ whichever of these give 
best results for acceptable cost 
The Information Registry described in Table 6 above provides an open architecture for new 
sources of potentially relevant information. Most information sources today are described, at best, 
in terms of the data dictionary or database schema used to store and access data. However, meta-
data including semantic schemas are increasingly available utilizing XML. Moreover, 
standardized language systems for ontologies, such as OWL, make it likely that more semantics 
and domain logic will be explicitly represented and available for use. We have anticipated this 
trend in this architecture component. The basic role of the registry is to provide the foundation for 
an “open market” of information that condition monitors can access to do their work more 
effectively and more efficiently. Over time, suppliers should offer new and improved sources of 
information that planners and operate can use to monitor key conditions more accurately and 
cheaply. 




Name Information Source  
Attribute  Meta-data Describes data types, formats, accuracy 
Attribute Qualities/Cost Describes source’s performance, reputation, etc. 
Specifies costs for use 
Method Access/Query Methods Get dynamically updated data on request 
Interface Machine Interface Allow Condition Monitor to read 
Interconnection Condition Monitor 
reads attributes 




accesses & queries 
Asynchronous data 
updates to Monitor 
Monitor uses source’s methods to obtain the desired 
data 
Source uses appropriate channel to convey data 
updates asynchronously 
Quality Meta-data accurate 
Qualities/costs accurate 
Access/query methods 
reliable and produce 
concise results 
Contents consistent with descriptions 
Performance consistent with descriptions 
Methods work as advertised and don’t produce 
extensive amounts of extraneous bits that must be 
processed 
Example Use Winds aloft source Winds aloft relevant to a route are produced by 
NOAA; query gives a table of wind direction and 
speed, along with temperature, at the time of 
flight, at each altitude that is a multiple of 3000’, 
updated twice per day, reported by major air 
traffic regions 
Table 7 describes the generic component for an Information Source. Each information source 
provides an independent set of data appropriate to various concerns. Typically sources correspond 
to periodic products of organizations such as NOAA and FNMOC for weather, and military, 
financial, commercial, maritime and various other products from corresponding organizations. 
Each Information Source describes its own data using meta-data techniques like those of XML or 
OMG’s Model Driven Architecture (MDA). The source advertises its quality and costs, such as 
its reputation with consumers for timely, accurate, reliable performance. It provides ways to 
query and access its data. This may include techniques for posting “standing queries” that cause 
the source to transmit new, relevant information asynchronously to the requestor. In the example, 
a typical source for winds aloft is used by the monitor for the “adequate fuel reserve” condition. 
This source provides the wind direction and speed in a broad area at various elevations. The fuel 
reserve condition would use estimated headwinds by flight phase and route segment. It might 
employ piecewise linear approximations based on wind forecasts from different air traffic centers 
the route crosses. It could also interpolate between forecast altitudes as required to match a 
planned flight altitude. The example might have shown another information source that could 
provide more precise headwind estimates or, perhaps, an accurate fuel consumption estimate 
based on detailed wind modeling if those were available. When new sources become available, 
the architecture aims to make it easy to exploit them rapidly. 
Table 8. Information Domain Ontology Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Information Domain 
Ontology  
 
Attribute  Concepts Terms used and their semantic properties 
Attribute Conditions Propositions and operators used to specify important 
situational characteristics 
Attribute Significant Deltas Minimum changes in calculated conditions worthy of 
attention 
Interface Machine Interface Condition Monitor may read attributes 
Domain Translator may read attributes 




Monitor determines which concepts, conditions and 
deltas pertain to its tasks 
Translator maps concepts and conditions from 
information domain to the operational domain 
Quality Ontology expressive 
and interpretable 
Language used should simplify writing/editing 
Machines can easily perform required inferences 
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Deltas as small as 
necessary and as 
large as permissible 
Appropriate deltas reduce workload 
 
Example Use Winds aloft concepts, 
part of aviation 
ontology 
Winds aloft described as a dynamic vector field over 
3D space above surface; at each point, the variable 
has an amplitude in knots and a direction given 
with respect to true North; field is approximated 
by a grid, comprising spatial regions associated 
with air traffic centers and altitude levels, in 
multiples of 3000’ above mean sea level; forecast 
values are valid for six hour intervals; forecasts 
updated twice per day 
Table 8 describes the generic component for an Information Domain Ontology. Ontologies 
have been used in computing for more than a decade, but only recently have they become 
commonplace. An ontology is a description of the semantic concepts of a domain, including 
important relations among those concepts. The simplest, most familiar ontologies come from 
biology, where Linnaean taxonomies describe plant and animal class relationships. Ontologies 
reduce the complexity of organizing facts. They also economize the recording of inferable facts. 
For example, we know all mammals have fur and nursing females lactate; therefore we can infer 
that our own female dog will lactate when she gives birth to puppies.  
 
Our architectural component indicates that three attributes will be most important. We want 
to know the concepts addressed by an information source as well as the conditions it addresses. In 
the example, we can see how wind velocity and direction can be culled out of the data grid. With 
additional ontology definitions, we can relate these conditions to others of interest, such as 
headwind component along a route segment and, ultimately, the fuel consumed and the reserve 
remaining. Standards for ontology representations are emerging, and we expect the information 
domain ontologies will become increasingly standardized. Prior to becoming standardized, 
however, we should expect that ontologies will evolve through use and experience among a 
community of practice. Each important operational problem requires information suppliers to 
meet the needs of planners and operators. This means that the ontologies will become 
increasingly adapted for use in condition monitoring and translation. The value of information, in 
short, derives from its ability to materially improve expected outcomes of operators’ plans. 
Important and useful distinctions find their way into the concepts and conditions of the ontology, 
and these in turn determine the data that the suppliers report in their information sources. 
Table 9. Operational Domain Ontology Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Operational Domain 
Ontology 
Same structure as Information Domain 
Ontology, but reflects operator concerns 
Attribute  Concepts Terms used and their semantic properties 
Attribute Conditions Propositions and operators used to specify 
important situational characteristics 
Attribute Significant Deltas Minimum changes in calculated conditions 
worthy of attention 
Interface Machine Interface Planning Toolset can read attributes 
Condition Monitor can read attributes 
Domain Translator can read attributes 
Interconnection Planning Toolset reads 
attributes 
Condition Monitor reads 
Planning tools use operational concepts to specify 
plans, assumptions, conditions 
Monitor determines which concepts, conditions 
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attributes 
Domain Translator reads 
attributes 
and deltas pertain to its tasks 
Translator maps concepts and conditions from 
information domain to the operational domain 
Quality Ontology expressive and 
interpretable 
Deltas as small as 
necessary and as large 
as permissible 
Language used should simplify writing/editing 
Machines can easily perform required inferences 
Appropriate deltas reduce workload 
Example Use Winds aloft concepts, 
part of aviation 
ontology 
Take-off fuel quantity 
Fuel consumption 
Adequate fuel reserve 
Winds aloft described in terms of headwind and 
tailwind conditions along planned route of 
flight at planned time of flight; these decrement 
or increment airspeed to produce estimated 
groundspeed; groundspeed determines elapsed 
time for each route segment 
Table 9 describes the generic component for the Operational Domain Ontology. This 
ontology is entirely similar to the ontology for the information domain, but it describes directly 
the concerns planners and operators have, rather than using the terms and codes of information 
suppliers. In the example, winds aloft are conceived in terms of their impact on groundspeed, 
flight time, fuel consumption, and the concern for adequate fuel reserve. Most operators today do 
the translation from information sources into operational domain concepts in their heads, 
routinely, often many times per day. The VIRT architecture addresses the need to off-load such 
computation onto machines and to make it be “exception-driven” rather than intensive, repetitive, 
and usually immaterial. As the operational communities learn the value of making their concerns 
explicit, the planning tools will evolve to use the ontology concepts and conditions for human 
interface with the operators. In addition, dependencies will be converted into key conditions for 
monitoring. Lastly, the operational domain ontology will define the target range of the domain 
translator that can map source information into operational concerns. 
Table 10. Domain Translator Generic Component Description. 
FACET VALUE COMMENT 
Name Domain Translator  
Attribute  Conditions Conditions the translator can infer in the target 
ontology 
Attribute Significant Deltas Deltas the translator can infer in the target 
ontology 
Interface Machine Interface Condition Monitor may employ translator 
Interconnection Condition Monitor 
employs 
Condition Monitor evaluates operational 
conditions in part by inferring their values as 





Translations available for important conditions 
Machines can easily perform required inferences 
Translations and inferred values not erroneous 
Example Use Headwinds and 
tailwinds inferred 
from planned route, 
time, and winds aloft 
 
The tailwind for each route segment is computed 
by finding the appropriate forecast wind aloft 
vector and computing the component parallel to 
the direction of flight; the headwind is the 
negative of the inferred tailwind 
Table 10 describes the generic component for translating beliefs and values in one domain 
ontology into another. In many important applications, this is straightforward. Computations can 
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be arranged either as goal-driven or change-driven. Goal-driven programs are asked to determine 
some values of a parameterized description, such as Headwind(route-segment-1, ?speed?). The 
interpreter of the ontology mapping then determines the actual value for the parameter ?speed? 
and returns an assertion with the parameter replaced by the actual speed along route-segment-1. 
Data-driven programs respond to changed observations and propagate inferences to the parties 
who have indicated a continuing need to be informed. Thus, when the twice-daily winds-aloft 
forecast is published, the headwind along each segment of each plan could be recomputed to 
determine if any significant deltas occurred. In that case, the new headwind value for the affected 
route segment would be conveyed to the appropriate parties.  
 
Translation between formal languages has been a focus of computing research for decades. 
There are many simple to use language systems that can be used to build specialized translators. 
General-purpose, generic translators can also be built for a wide range of descriptive ontologies. 
The most general form of the translation problem is, in principle, not solvable, however. But that 
limitation isn’t expected to have any practical impact on most applications of VIRT services, 
because these are likely to address practical domains where operators already do translation of 
this sort routinely, usually in their heads. Automating that work and doing it systematically for 
important conditions should produce significant value for planners and operators.  
 
This completes the current description of the VIRT product-line architecture. We do not yet 
have much experience with actual implementations, and no off-the-shelf implementations exist 
for the components. We are, thus, at the start of what should be a long-term, fruitful cycle of 
evolution, continuous improvement, and architectural refinement. The goal of framing an 
architecture at the outset is to encourage an approach that favors openness, reuse of assets, and a 
focus on quality components. These should make the benefits of VIRT available to more people, 
sooner, at lower cost. 
Related Research  
Many people have touched on aspects of model-based communication networks, adaptive 
replanning, information filtering, and selective information push. The principal related research is 
summarized briefly here. 
 
Psychologists, sociologists, and students of decision-making and communication have 
demonstrated the importance of shared beliefs and shared context in interpersonal dialog and 
collaboration. We are all familiar with the phenomenon of communications becoming briefer 
among teammates, family members, and colleagues as familiarity and experience increases. In 
Shannon’s original treatise on information theory, he characterized a single bit as the amount of 
information required to reduce 50% of the receiver’s uncertainty. This means that the more 
communicating partners share beliefs, the less uncertainty they have, and the fewer bits they need 
to specify a preferred option.  
 
In military and business operations, planners work to achieve similar communication 
efficiencies. They do this in multiple ways. First, they adopt specialized terms to characterize 
problem contexts, relevant potential actions and resources, and criteria by which possible plans 
should be judged. In addition to defining concepts embodying the key distinctions that clarify 
choices, they often adopt short-hand jargon. The specialized language and methods of 
communities of practice has recently been recognized as an important foundation for building 
effective systems. 
 
Much of the shared context that simplifies communication between collaborators often 
consists of the perceived situation or its externalized representation. In the military, for example, 
we wish to provide all collaborators access to a common operational picture (COP) that portrays 
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the battle space, actors, behaviors and intentions. In some human activities, the externalized 
representations have high “ecological validity.” For example, in manufacturing, CAD/CAM 
technologies nearly guarantee that the “drawing” is the “part.” In mountaineering and war, 
however, the “map is not the terrain.” A COP is a constructed, compound, complex hypothesis. It 
never corresponds exactly to reality. Nevertheless, when teammates can see and share the same 
externalized representation, they can significantly reduce the volume of bits they exchange in 
order to designate an entity or characterize an option. 
 
Several trends are pushing people beyond the point at which they can perform adequately in 
these contexts. First, the volume of potentially relevant information is increasing exponentially. 
Second, the required cycle times for adaptive response are shrinking. And third, the teammates 
increasingly are geographically distributed, often culturally dissimilar, and unfamiliar with one 
another. In these contexts, the informal methods that have enabled people to exchange a few bits 
in a face-to-face interaction with familiar colleagues won’t suffice. Large portions of their 
collaborative work will have to be somewhat formalized so that computers can perform an 
increasing proportion of the information processing required. 
 
Research on “human-machine symbiosis” traces its heritage to a famous paper by Licklider, 
who was the director of ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). His vision 
continues alive today, and has already taken us through time sharing, personal computing with 
graphical user interfaces, the Internet and now the Web. Yet none of these developments have 
succeeded in enabling machines to off-load a great deal of the information filtering appropriate 
for planners and operators. This requires information consumers to clarify what they need to 
know and information suppliers to clarify what they provide. It then requires the machine to help 
translate from the source ontologies of suppliers into the operational ontologies of consumers. It’s 
my belief that the foundations exist for all the capabilities presupposed in the architecture, but a 
concentrated effort needs to be undertaken to implement these and refine them to the point that 
communities of practice can regularly employ them. Allowing operators and suppliers to “close 
the loop” is critical: ontologies, translations, and key conditions will all need to be refined 
through experience. Thus, all the tools need to be in the hands of the producers and consumers of 
information. Just as spreadsheet programs launched a revolution in business modeling and 
business use of interactive computing, I anticipate MCN and VIRT will launch a revolution in 
military and civilian use of ontologies and model-based information filtering for collaborative 
decision-making. 
Principal Remaining Challenges  
There are three principal challenges to making MCNs ubiquitous. First, we need practical 
ontologies for important domains. Second, we need leading operational communities to transform 
their processes around the “management-by-exception” style of VIRT. Third, we need open, 
evolutionary markets for information suppliers and consumers. While each of these has 
technological aspects, the more challenging aspects of each concern the managerial approach 
taken to business processes and the required transformations. 
 
Before PCs and the rise of the Web, computer users expected to obtain systems from 
professional programmers. Systems were specified and acquired through sizable and difficult 
contracting arrangements. Some successful systems were procured this way. Many procurements 
failed. The major causes of failure were delay, cost overrun, and lack of usability or effectiveness. 
Simply stated, what computer users want is difficult to state, is often unknown to them, and 
usually changes over the course of months or years. Procurements are thus shooting at an ill-
defined and moving target in many cases. Missing the target, then, should not be surprising. 
 
The PC, with its personal applications such as spreadsheets, and the Web, with its ubiquitous 
authoring, hosting, and editing tools, have created a vibrant community of information suppliers 
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and consumers. Many suppliers are professionals associated with businesses. Many suppliers are 
individuals. The trend is moving toward more suppliers, creating more sources, updating them 
more often: in short, more sources, more dynamism. 
 
Organizations need to transform around the potential of dynamic information, agile response, 
distributed virtual enterprises, and self-synchronization, as in NCOW/IS. This means 
organizations must engage in continuous evolution, shifting their processes increasingly around 
better uses of information and computing. The “learning organization” is an excellent description 
of the new “business as usual” enterprise. MCNs enable the far-flung partners in an enterprise to 
collaborate succinctly, relying on externalized representations of common beliefs to eliminate the 
need for much redundant information exchange. VIRT services enable each planner and operator 
to off-load responsibility for continuous, repetitive review of important conditions to machines. 
All of this depends only on the development and continuous improvement of the ontologies, the 
shared models of how important things work in the domains of interest. Finally, an information 
market will enable new suppliers to proffer innovative information sources that VIRT condition 
monitors can automatically access. As part of such a market, whether commercial or controlled, 
sources need to be rated for quality and cost, so that consumers can exploit the most 
advantageous ones. 
 
Organizations such as Navy FNMOC understand the importance of transforming from a 
traditional supplier of commodity information products to a key partner of operators who value 
important and timely information. FNMOC provides an excellent example of the leadership 
required to move into an important role in the network-centric future. 
Near-term Exploitation Opportunities  
I have identified several good opportunities for near-term exploitation of the VIRT services, 
including several with FNMOC as early collaborative partners in this effort. In essence, weather 
and oceanographic data are important to most soldiers, sailors and aviators. They examine 
copious amounts of data when generating plans, continually revalidating plans, and conducting 
operations. Many of these operations can achieve better outcomes with reduced risk if they can 
receive and exploit improved forecasts or more accurate, timely updates. However, operators 
can’t spend all their time looking at streams of dynamically updated weather data. For them to 
exploit the advantage of more and better information, they need vastly improved and automated 
filtering. VIRT is being applied to a number of applications within FNMOC. As one example, we 
aim to reduce the probability of detection of stealthy missions by assuring that the planners and 
operators receive valuable information at the right time. 
 
As Ruokangas and Mengshoel demonstrated with their AWARE prototype, almost everyone 
in the aviation business can benefit from automated filtering and condition monitoring. Everyone 
who plans routes that are subject to unpleasant surprises would benefit from VIRT monitoring. 
 
The DoD hopes to provide every level of command-control decision-making improved tools 
for situation awareness and real-time agile response. The COP is a foundation of this vision. The 
COP should be reconceptualized as a composite hypothesis of constituent models of the battle 
space and actors. Each component model, such as a blue-force flight or a neutral ship, can 
autonomously update its own expected state consistent with our knowledge of its plans and 
normal behavior. This obviates communication of unsurprising state changes. This allows the 
communication volume to be reduced to just those bits of information, corresponding to surprises 
or reductions in uncertainty. In this way, distributed collaborators can achieve a higher level of 
shared understanding with reduced volumes of communication. This, in turn, means they can 
spend more time on high-value activities, rather than being kept busy processing low-value data. 
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Organizations that exist to supply important information to planners and operators have a 
great opportunity to begin moving into the new paradigm that the VIRT architecture describes. 
Their products will be more valued if they are characterized by ontologies and if these are related 
to and translatable into operational domain ontologies. In the case of weather, as an example, the 
most successful organizations should be measuring their progress in terms of the import, ease, 
efficiency, and timeliness planners and operators attribute to their products. These are the kinds of 
ratings that will become advertisements and evaluation criteria as the open information market 
develops. Being first and best at the new game can establish significant, potentially permanent, 
competitive advantages and leadership. 
 
In short, the best opportunities will arise with the organizations most eager to accelerate the 
transformation into net-centric, information-superior enterprises. As with other generic 
technologies, the real question isn’t whether VIRT is applicable, but “Who’s ready now?” 
Summary and Conclusion  
This paper has described a vision of a transformed way of operating, especially for 
organizations that routinely plan and execute plans. The need for this transformation arises from 
both new problems and new opportunities. The new problems concern new kinds of competitive 
challenges and new pressures to behave with greater speed, agility, and precision. As the types 
and volume of potentially relevant information increase without bounds, the pressures on humans 
to produce excellent decisions and outcomes become unrealistic. Humans need to exploit 
computing power to reduce their tasks to a manageable level. For our organizations to get the best 
results, the human resources need to spend their limited time on the most important things. MCN 
and VIRT provide frameworks for doing that. This new architecture exploits several significant 
opportunities that have been developed over the last decade: (1) networked communication; (2) 
ontologies and inference; (3) information filtering by machines; and (4) incredibly cheap 
computers.  
 
The architecture proposed here must be implemented in specialized applications with 
particular supplier and operator communities to prove its worth and thus become “obvious” to a 
larger population. As with many new “obvious” technologies, the early successes require 
leadership and pioneering experiments. Some of this is now underway, but much more needs to 
be done. The point of this paper is to provide a simple trail map for pioneers to follow. 
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This paper asks how information should flow among networked entities in NCOW. In 
particular, should the entities actively seek, acquire and process relevant information or 
should they wait to react to information that others send to them? In short, should they 
pull information or should they rely upon others to push information to them? In most 
tactical contexts, smart push will improve efficiency by orders of magnitude compared to 
smart pull. Our analysis reveals that efficient information processing chains require a 
general capability to watch for key events. Humans and the computer applications 
supporting them will use this capability to detect events matching conditions of interest 
they specify. This capability plays a key role in transforming networks into integrated 
value chains. Where traditional networks aim at supporting unregulated exchanges for 
data bit flows best suited to random access and unpredictable process sequences, the 
capability to delegate condition monitoring enables us to transform networks into 
conveyers of timely, valuable information. To maximize efficiency, we must use 
processes where each successive step receives just such valuable information as its input. 
Thus, condition monitoring and its associated smart push constitute a required foundation 










Two basic alternatives exist for providing needed inputs to process steps, whether we are 
discussing supply chains of material goods or information processing chains associated 
with decision-making and control. Processing entities89 can seek out relevant inputs and, 
upon finding them, procure them. Or the entities can inform suppliers of their 
requirements and depend on the suppliers to deliver needed inputs at the right time and 
place. A major shift occurred in manufacturing over the last two decades associated with 
“just in time” (JIT) approaches and “supply chain integration.” Top-performing 
enterprises shifted from the former process design approach to the latter one. When 
suppliers have an excellent understanding of their customers’ processes, schedules, and 
ongoing process state, they can deliver valued inputs just when they are needed. In 
manufacturing, this reduces costs in significant ways, especially by reducing inventory 
and work in process (WIP) that consume space, time, and processing resources associated 
with storing, searching, and moving around those items not immediately required by the 
next processing stage. Thus, inappropriate or low quality inputs, as well as inputs 
received at an inopportune time, increase costs and may actually represent negative value. 
 
Systems designed to produce quality decisions have many parallels with manufacturing 
systems, though the former work by adding value to “bits” where the latter add value by 
transforming “molecules.” The key to high performance, in both cases, is to produce the 
most valued products as efficiently as possible. Value reflects the degree to which the 
products embody superior features and qualities and get to “market” promptly. 
Efficiency, on the other hand, means producing these valued products with a minimal 
consumption of resources. To achieve that efficiency we use the best tools within well-
designed processes. Usually, we improve efficiency by eliminating as many sources of 
friction as possible that consume resources unnecessarily or increase latency. Friction 
may be physical or virtual, as when differences in information systems introduce delays 
and difficulties in accomplishing successive steps. 
 
In moving to network-centric operations and warfare (NCOW), the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of reducing friction that makes sharing of 
information between different entities difficult. When information isn’t represented in a 
standardized way, an entity that wants to find it, procure it, and apply it can incur major 
delays and difficulties. So, DoD is moving to make all information readily locatable, 
readable, and interpretable (Wolfowitz, 2004). It hopes to establish consensual meta-data 
schemas to accomplish this. Even if this approach works, it leaves the question of 
information logistics still unanswered: how can the information supply chain be 
integrated most efficiently? In particular, should decision-makers seek out and pull the 
information they need, or should suppliers push the right information to them at the right 
place and at the right time? 
 
The current approach to the design of the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) and its 
Network-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) emphasizes pull. The work being done by 
my colleagues at the World-Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) and me, on the 
other hand, focuses on the alternative approach. In our approach, networks are designed 
                                                 
89 Some entities that make decisions and perform actions are human and others are information-processing 
machines. When the military performers are humans, we often call them operators. Frequently, we’ll just 
use the abstract term “processing entity” to ignore the nature of the process performer. 
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to optimize information logistics by implementing what we call Valuable Information at 
the Right Time (VIRT). In this approach, suppliers work with intelligent computing 
machinery to determine which bits should flow to which consumers, thereby integrating 
the information supply chain in a manner parallel to the recent advances in 
manufacturing.  
 
This paper aims to clarify the two alternatives and expose the conditions under which 
each provides a superior information logistics solution. 
 
Proposed Approaches  
 
The information logistics90 problem is concerned with optimizing the flow of bits to 
processing entities distributed across a network. We could formalize this, but it’s 
probably most useful to provide an informal, intuitive characterization of the problem. 
We consider any number of information producers, who can operate on various inputs to 
produce information outputs and, in addition, any number of decision-makers that 
convert selected inputs into outputs that correspond to choices. Some of those choices 
might trigger actions, through coupling to effectors. Other choices become information 
inputs to additional processing entities. Some of the entities are people and some are 
machines or software programs running on machines.  
 
In all systems various limitations constrain attainable results. In most of the distributed 
systems we are concerned with, constraints limit how much can be done, how well, and 
how quickly. If we are trying to conduct a battle or minimize casualties from a natural 
disaster, we typically have too few people, too little time, too little information, and too 
little available computing resources. Different systems in different contexts will 
experience these constraints in different orders, but the constraint induced by limited 
human processing resources typifies crisis response situations. The information logistics 
challenge is to optimize the quality of results obtained by such a system when resource 
constraints limit its effectiveness. The essential question facing system designers is how 
should we select and sequence information for each processing entity to maximize the 
value of our results?  
 
Very complex systems can’t be analyzed and optimized using a closed form approach. 
We must rely upon heuristics to guide our design in such cases. One obvious heuristic to 
embrace in systems of the sort being considered is as follows: “Whenever possible, favor 
behaviors that make better decisions faster.” Equivalently, we want to design processes 
that improve the quality of decisions and increase the speed of decision-making.  
 
For our analysis, we suppose that valued results are produced through the application of 
systematic processes. For example, manufacturers make many different mixes and 
different products as a result of each product instance flowing through a set of process 
steps specified for that type of product. In a similar way, we view information processing 
systems as producing information products. These products include decisions and 
associated actions, resulting from a series of process steps applied to appropriate inputs. 
A number of steps are performed by people, and others are accomplished by 
computerized agents. Regardless of the type of processing entity, each step transforms 
                                                 
90 Distributed information logistics is introduced and explained in Chow, et al. (2000). 
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input information into output information. The quality of the output can be assessed along 
various attributes. The single best measure, where we can obtain it, would be the value of 
the information. The value of an interim result corresponds to the expected improvement 
in eventual final products attributable to it. If final results improve because some interim 
decision was reached, the increase attributable to that decision is its value. While difficult 
to measure precisely, estimation of value added is a routine part of all mature supply 
chains. Processing steps and interim results that don’t improve expected outcomes may 
have zero or negative value, because they consume resources without producing benefit. 
 
In short, information logistics addresses the question of how information should flow 
among processing entities to optimize the value attained. While no definitive optimum 
may be obtainable, heuristics employed in supply chain integration seem applicable to the 
flow of information in NCOW chains. Some of these heuristics are listed below: 
  Desirable Behaviors 
− Keep your most specialized, expensive processing entities busy 
− Minimize lateness on the most valuable, time-sensitive products 
− Drop low-value products before sacrificing high-value ones 
− Minimize product quality problems that ensue from low-quality inputs 
− Minimize time lost to set-up and cut-over required to handle changes in 
products or changes in inputs 
  Undesirable Behaviors 
− Load your processing entities with more inputs than they can process 
− Allow some of your required processing entities to wait for needed inputs 
− Make processing entities filter out low-quality inputs 
− Make processing entities prioritize backlogged tasks 
− Make processing entities adapt to input variability 
Thus, the basic strategy in achieving optimum product output is to allocate as much of 
your resources as possible to adding value, working on the highest value tasks where 
possible. Actions or interim results that waste time, waste processing resources, or 
produce little or no value should be avoided. While this may not achieve a provable 
optimum result, systems that adhere to these heuristics clearly outperform those that do 
not. As a consequence, we will prefer the better systems to the poorer ones, moving up 
so-called Pareto frontiers as high as possible.  
 
 In the simplest, most extreme form, there are two alternative approaches to the question 
of managing information flow in these distributed NCOW systems:  
¾ Theory 1: Describe all information available using some type of meta-data 
description. Give each processing entity good search tools. Have each entity 
seek and acquire whatever information it needs, when and as needed. 
¾ Theory 2: Have each processing entity describe conditions that would make 
its current plans undesirable, because those conditions would contradict 
assumptions needed to justify the choice of the affected plan. Enable agents to 




In my classes, I have referred to these two approaches simply as Theory 1 and Theory 2. 
Here, however, we might benefit from recognizing that the first is actually a “pull” 
approach to information logistics, whereas the second is a “push” approach. In each case, 
when the tools and computing software exploit domain semantics, ontologies, rules of 
inference and similar elements of artificial intelligence to improve understanding and 
performance, we can readily refer to these as “smart,” “intelligent” or “knowledge-
based.” So when an operator in a Theory 1 system can ask for all recent reports about the 
geographic quadrant he currently occupies, the query processor can employ much 
knowledge and intelligent reasoning. Similarly, if an operator posts a planned route of 
flight, altitude, and expected waypoint times, an agent that filters spatially and temporally 
relevant pilot reports would illustrate a degree of intelligent push. 
 
So both approaches can simplify the work imposed upon a human operator by enabling 
that operator to express queries in terms of high-level semantic concepts and domain-
relevant conditions of interest. As a consequence, our analysis will mostly ignore any 
questions of whether or how knowledge-based intelligent processing might be performed. 
Another path we won’t explore concerns various ways to mix the two approaches. 
Instead, we want to focus on the relevant strengths and weaknesses of pull v. push 
approaches to the information logistics question. Our purpose is to develop a crisp 




Theory 1 is mostly consistent with current US architecture and management directives. 
Its proponents have been motivated by several observations. First, the US has notorious 
difficulty sharing information in a timely way, especially from intelligence sources to 
diverse military and homeland defense operators (National Commission, 2004). 
Significant backlogs of intelligence observations often sit for long periods before analysts 
can work their way through them. As a result, intelligence data often don’t get to people 
while they’re still current and valuable. The former DoD CIO, John Stenbit, 
recommended a new information logistics process that posts data as soon as they’re 
available, even before analysts could interpret them and convert “data” into 
“information” (Ackerman, 2003). Further, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz issued a directive mandating that all DOD entities possessing potentially 
useful data should describe those data using an appropriate XML meta-data schema as a 
first step toward enabling all operators to find and access those data (Wolfowitz, 2004). 
These steps have been leveraged by the DoD National Information Infrastructure (NII) 
plans for the Global Information Grid and Network-Centric Enterprise Services (Stenbit, 
2004). In their thinking, information superiority will be achieved by providing excellent 
search tools so that each operator can find and acquire information needed. 
 
Theory 2 was implicit in some of my earlier papers, such as [Hayes-Roth, 2004a, 2004b, 
2005a]. It represents a strategy for exploiting the exponential increase in the processing 
capacity of machines to enable humans with fixed, finite capacities to benefit from 
increasingly vast quantities of relevant data. Theory 2 aims to mitigate what humans 
experience as the “data glut.” Seeing the similarity between manufacturing supply chains 
and information decision chains also motivates us to ask how we can emulate the 
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efficiencies of just-in-time processes with lean, low-inventory processes. The challenge 
in achieving this kind of low-friction, efficient integration in manufacturing has been to 
make suppliers adapt their products and methods to optimize their customers’ 
performance. This requires that suppliers get smart about how their customers use the 
suppliers’ products and how users’ costs can be minimized. As a simple example, FedEx 
discovered that customers needed to schedule and track shipping from their own 
premises, so FedEx moved those capabilities to the customers’ workstations and adapted 
their own systems, schedules, and services so the customers themselves could view and 
control them. Thus, while shipping services were outsourced, each customer actually 
brought more control of adapted shipping capabilities into their own processes. 
 
The VIRT methodology assumes information supply chains are restructured in a manner 
akin to such manufacturing supply chain adaptations. In particular, it assumes that 
suppliers of information learn what customers actually need to know and provide just that 
information to them. Intelligent agents, playing the role of information brokers, accept 
statements from processing entities or operators describing “conditions of interest” 
(COIs). These conditions describe potential events that would motivate the operators to 
change their planned actions to achieve better outcomes.  
 
As an example, consider a helicopter pilot intending to fly a particular route in hostile 
territory. During planning, the pilot plots a low risk route. Subsequently, new 
observations about anti-aircraft emplacements along the planned route of flight would 
match one of the pilot’s COIs.  
 
In short, Theory 2 assumes many processing entities have a continuous need to know 
about things that undercut their previous decisions by violating some assumptions on 
which those decisions depend. Operators engaged in real-time plan execution consider 
such information vital and urgent. Those attributes, significance and timeliness, make the 
information high-value. Theory 2 sees information logistics as the challenge of (1) 
getting high-value information quickly to operators who are dependent on it and (2) 
assuring operators give priority to received high-value information so they adapt and 
achieve better outcomes. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 below diagram simple functional models of the value chains associated 
with the two different types of processing organizations. These models use a lot of 
informal shorthand to make them simple and easy to read. The first model is centered on 
the Processing Entities PE1,…, PEk that do work. The PEs add value by accessing various 
information sources IS1,…, ISn to produce valued products labeled v. Each PE acquires 
its inputs through interaction with a Query Specifier (QS). The function q on the link 
between the PE and QS represents the transaction that yields information products from 
QS with various levels of efficiency. So, for example, we can assume q gives a lot of 
information at low cost, as most query processing systems do. Google, for example, gives 
thousands of relevant answers to most queries.  
 
The rest of the process works roughly as follows. Once a query is specified, the 
transaction p translates the query into a query plan by working with the Query Planner 
(QP). The transaction p just passes back the responses to the query through QS and then 
through q. The Query Planner uses various Information Directories (IDj) to understand 
what kinds of information are available and how to access them. Information Stores (ISn) 
store, manage and access discrete bodies of information. The processes used by QP are 
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labeled r and s, representing the transactions that seek and retrieve relevant information 
needed to answer the query. 
 
Simple model of Theory 1 
 
Figure 1. A value chain of processing entities PEi producing products v 
as a result of specifying queries and planning and executing those 
queries through information directories to various information sources. 
 
Simple model of Theory 2 
 
Figure 2. A value chain of processing entities PEi producing products v 
as a result of specifying and monitoring COIs and then reacting 
adaptively to alerts. 
 
The second model is very similar, and it too focuses on the same Processing Entities 
PE1,…, PEk that add value by accessing various information sources IS1,…, ISn to 
produce valued products labeled v. In this model, however, VIRT processes are at work, 
enabling each PE to inform the system about the COIs the system should continuously 
monitor. Each PE conveys its needs through interaction with a Condition Specifier (CS). 
The function c on the link between the PE and CS represents the transaction that yields 
information products consistent with PE’s specification. So for example, we can assume c 
gives a minimal amount of information at low cost, because the PE specifies precisely 
what type of events it must be concerned with.  
 
The rest of the process works roughly as follows. Once a condition is specified, the CS 
conveys it to the Condition Monitor (CM) through w, and CM takes responsibility for 
monitoring it. The transaction w just passes back any new events matching the condition 
through CS and then through c. The Condition Monitor uses various Information 
Directories (IDj) to understand what kinds of information are available and how to access 
them. Information Stores (ISn) store, manage and access discrete bodies of information. 
The processes used by CM are labeled r and s, representing the transactions that seek and 































Let’s compare the two models. While Condition Monitoring differs a bit internally from 
Query Planning, the two functions use information directories and information sources in 
nearly identical ways. Thus the real differences between Models 1 and 2 are in the 
efficiency of Model 1’s u, q, and p in comparison to Model 2’s t, c, and w. In fact, we can 
simplify the analysis by viewing the valued products in each case as the output of 
composing the corresponding functions, so that: 
 In Model 1,   v = u ○ q ○ p (K),  
and in Model 2,  v = t ○ c ○ w (K),  
where K denotes all available information and meta-data .  
We read these informal equations to say, in the case of the first model for example, the 
value produced (v) equals what u extracts from what q extracts from what p extracts from 
all available information and meta-data. Equivalently, p finds relevant information in K 
and passes it to the next process step; this step applies q to find and pass along relevant 
information; finally, the process step u finds and identifies the valued information v. 
 
For our analysis, we’re assuming the valued products v are the same under the two 
models. These would correspond to identified threats requiring a helicopter pilot to divert 
from planned course, for example, or other “needles in the haystack” that operators 
would find worthy of selecting to act upon. In such a context, then, the two models 
produce the same end result, but Model 1 forces the Processing Entity to consider 
through process u vastly more inputs that result from query q. In Model 2, on the other 
hand, the Processing Entity has defined a precise COI that would materially affect 
expected outcomes. This means that the Processing Entity can mostly pass through 
results of c, eliminating any need for t to perform filtering and prioritization. 
 
Let’s consider a quantitative example. “Threats” that might affect a helicopter pilot can 
be natural or man-made in origin. The natural category would include high terrain, poor 
visibility, excessive winds, thunderstorms, or icing. Of course, these only affect the pilot 
if they intersect the helicopter’s route of flight. Man-made threats include ground-based 
anti-aircraft weapons, fixed or mobile surveillance assets, and enemy aircraft. These may 
pose a threat if the helicopter’s route intersects the volume of space these systems can 
observe or reach. When we speak of “intersecting,” we mean the threat occupies the same 
space at the same time as the helicopter. So, to compare our two models, let’s look at a 
helicopter pilot who’s concerned about these possible threats intersecting the planned 
route of flight. 
 
The terrain phenomena are relatively static, so there’s little value in considering terrain 
data repeatedly, unless the pilot changes the route of flight some time after planning it. In 
that case, terrain previously considered benign may become a threat. On the other hand, 
weather changes constantly so weather data are worth considering continuously. 
Similarly, enemy assets may move around and allied intelligence may also improve its 
estimate of their positions and capabilities. For this reason, information about enemy 
capabilities deserves continuous consideration. 
 
So how do the two alternative models address these needs? Each needs to look for 
relevant information and determine if it’s significant. Information about the different 
phenomena is represented in various ways, but a good simplification is that all 
phenomena are modeled as values of appropriate variables stored in some gridded 
geospatially indexed array. For example, winds aloft are reported in terms of direction 
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and speed at each latitude-longitude grid coordinate, at each of several corresponding 
altitudes (such as 3000’, 6000’, 9000’, etc.) The coarseness of the grid mesh differs for 
different types of variables in different types of systems. Usually, the geospatial data in 
one data array represent the expected values of the corresponding variable at a particular 
time. Data values that are forecast for different points in the future are stored in different 
arrays, each corresponding to one forecast time. When users need values that are 
intermediate between grid points or time points, they normally interpolate between 
adjacent values of the variable of interest. 
 
In a small square-shaped theater of operations that might measure 200 km on a side, let’s 
consider how much data is available. Let’s assume that all grid meshes are 1 km, so that 
we have 40,000 grid points for each variable corresponding to each pair of latitude and 
longitude grid coordinates. We’ll assume that in the vertical dimension we have data for 
every 500 m, from 0 (sea level) up to 6 km altitude, for a total of 13 altitude coordinates. 
Thus, for each variable of interest, for each moment in time, we have about 500K data 
values. Let’s consider missions that last 4.5 hrs for which we have forecast values for 
each 30 min, so initially we have 10 distinct time coordinates. This means that initially, 
our data universe is 5M values for each variable of interest. We’ll assume that we want to 
monitor just 10 variables in total, so that means 50 M values form our base of potentially 
relevant variable values. Normally, data are updated, based on new information and 
estimates, at least twice per hour, which means that every thirty minutes all of the data 
might potentially change. Because changes occur mostly asynchronously, the best 
strategy is to revisit the data of interest periodically, to be able to notice and respond 
quickly to important changes. Let’s assume that our pilot decides to reexamine data every 
10 minutes throughout a 4.5 hr mission.  
 
Model 1 suggests, then, that the pilot should retrieve all relevant data every 10 minutes. 
The data of interest are all values of the 10 variables that intersect the planned route of 
flight, in the sense of overlapping spatial volume of capability with the helicopter, at the 
same time91. For simplification, we’ll assume that 10% of the total data universe 
corresponds to the points in space and time where interactions might occur, if the 
variables indicate a threat such as a thunderstorm or enemy aircraft. So every 10 minutes, 
the pilot’s queries access and retrieve through processes r 10% of 50M values, perhaps 
further reducing them by 90% using filters in q to exclude insignificant items from all the 
relevant data values retrieved. This means that about 1% of 50M values are returned to 
the pilot, or 500 K relevant and significant data values92. Usually, a tiny fraction of these 
will justify a change in plan. Most of these values, in fact, won’t make a significant 
difference in expected outcome for the pilot. In addition, the pilot’s own process u will be 
overtaxed by this volume of data queued for human processing. As a result, most of the 
data will be ignored, reactions will be suboptimal, and the pilot will feel continually 
stressed by the repeated onslaught of data deluges arriving every 10 min.  
                                                 
91 The planned route occupies a series of 3D points over time. The data of interest describe variable values 
at 3D points over time. The two sources are intersected over the 4D coordinates of space-time.  
92 In today’s best systems human processing capabilities are optimized by presenting much geospatially 
indexed data graphically as multi-colored maps. This allows the human perceptual system to process much 
data in parallel and detect interesting phenomena visually. We’re ignoring special processing capabilities of 
particular machinery so we can focus on the more essential question of how to assure high-value 
information flows and represents an extremely high proportion of all communicated bits. All of the 




In contrast, Model 2 suggests that the processing system should take responsibility for 
monitoring COIs that would probably motivate and justify adaptive responses. These 
conditions correspond to changes in expected values of variables that the plan depends on 
for its success. So, for example, if there’s no risk associated with faster than expected 
ground speeds that could result from favorable tail winds, there’s no reason to monitor 
for tail winds. As another example, if fuel reserves are provided for 90 minutes beyond 
expected flight duration and are allowed to go as low as 45 minutes in all cases, only 
strong headwinds are worthy of considering. In fact, the system could compute the 
expected impact of headwinds on total flight time and only alert the pilot when the 
threshold of 45 minutes fuel reserve is in jeopardy. As another example, data on enemy 
capabilities that confirm previously considered information are insignificant to the pilot, 
because the system is looking for new threats.  
 
Model 2 exploits its awareness of the pilot’s prior and current knowledge, in addition to 
the pilot’s plan, to drastically reduce the information passed to the pilot. The model 
allows the pilot to convey that understanding through process c where the pilot 
formulates specific COIs. Simplifying a bit, the PE asks the system to notify it of changes 
in expected values, i.e. events, which negate or make questionable the ability of the PE to 
perform its mission successfully. In the current example, over each 10 minute interval the 
pilot will probably receive zero or a very small number of alerts stating that some 
variable values have changed in significant ways. The pilot, in Model 2, has plenty of 
mental cycles available to handle these rare and important alerts. Furthermore, the low 
rate of data avoids stressing the pilot, and that further enhances human performance. 
 
So Model 2 reduces the volume of information being communicated and also reduces the 
amount of work that the PE has to perform. This makes a PE in Model 2 much more 
efficient than in Model 1. In our example, Model 2 reduces the input volume to the PE by 
a factor of more than 100,000 (five orders of magnitude). If the PE in Model 1 had huge 
processing capacity, it could perhaps produce all desired valuable outputs v, just as well 
as in Model 2. Model 1 requires applying the “needle-in-the-haystack-finding” process u 
to about 500K items, every 10 minutes. This requires u to operate on 3M items suggested 
by the smart, excellent query p every hour. Typically, however, the PE is resource 
limited, because PE is a human and has limited cognitive bandwidth. Suppose 10% of the 
pilot’s mental capacity is available for this task, and that humans can consider 10 
significant variable values a minute. In an hour, the pilot could consider 600 reported 
relevant variable values, or just 1/50th of 1 % of all the retrieved information. Obviously, 
the pilot’s response will reflect a rather random or arbitrary selection of the relevant 
information.  
 
Model 2, however, requires that the pilot consider a small number of items, almost 
always well below the cognitive processing limits. Model 2 achieves this efficiency by 
conveying to condition monitoring agents a lot of “context” about the operator. For 
example, the Condition Monitor can take a set of assumed routes, way points, and 
required meteorological conditions for each pilot and continually compare and contrast 
the forecast weather with the required conditions. Only when weather degrades relative to 
a particular pilot’s requirements for a specific route at a specific time and place would the 
CM need to transmit data back to the PE. In contrast, a system built around Theory 1 
would require the pilot to ask for weather information periodically, to determine which 
returned values had changed significantly and, finally, to calculate which had degraded to 
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a point where the expectable mission outcome would no longer be acceptable.93 Theory 2 
suggests that all of that work should be avoided, and Model 2 shows that it can be 
avoided at low cost by delegating context-aware condition monitoring, as performed by 
CM. 
 
Are there any situations where Model 1 is as efficient as Model 2 or even better? Yes 
there are. Model 2’s superiority depends upon an ability to delegate to an agent the 
responsibility for monitoring all key assumptions expressed in terms of COIs. This 
requires an understanding of how outcomes depend on various variables and conditions. 
It also depends on capabilities to monitor those variables and compute those conditions. 
Furthermore, the monitoring system must be informed when plans and underlying 
assumptions are changed. All of this works best in contexts where plans are produced and 
maintained in digital, symbolic systems, and where planning processes make explicit 
rationales supporting decisions and choices. The military has many operations where 
these conditions apply, as in most tactical planning, maneuver, and logistics. However, 
even in these cases, the formalization of semantic concepts (ontologies), conditions of 
interest, pertinent information directories and information sources has not progressed 
very far. 
 
So Model 1 seems to be a better fit for activities where people are engaged in less 
structured tasks, as when they are trying to become familiar with a new area, trying to 
build an initial understanding of a new situation, or when they are looking for ill defined 
patterns to emerge from massive amounts of data. In such situations, data mining 
algorithms and human intuition and perception can often be superior. Browsing, in the 
absence of some clear notion of what one is looking for, seems not to be a function where 
machines have much competitive capability. 
 
Internet search engines, such as Google, have shown that Model 1 can be extremely 
valuable, especially for a wide variety of users who collectively have overlapping 
interests. By suggesting to the next person who asks the answers that previous 
investigators tended to value, search engines offer considerable advantages in comparison 
to human, manual, or unordered search. Model 1 seems to make concrete the idea that 
there are Processing Entities, usually human, that value shot-gun answers to general 
questions.  
 
In contrast, Model 2 promises enormous increases in productivity for operations that are 
engaged in performing defined processes, repeatedly, where resources are limited and 
outcomes are important. In such cases, we may routinely need to let some potential 
opportunities “hit the floor,” and there’s great value in assuring effective prosecution of 
the most important objectives on time and within budget. In these contexts, we want our 
                                                 
93 In this analysis, to make Model 1 as efficient as possible, we’ve assumed that the queries could be 
personalized and contextualized so that only relevant values of variables would be provided to the pilot. 
Thus, we’ve assumed in implementing Theory 1, the information universe would be honed to a small 
number of variables of interest and, further, that the values returned would be restricted to those where 
forecast values in space-time intersect with planned space-time coordinates for the flight. These 
assumptions go well beyond what actual systems offer or what is even being anticipated among Theory 1 
practitioners. However, such improvements are logically independent of the particular Theory. We are 
incorporating these improvements by assumption in Model 1 to make any claims for Theory 2’s advantages 
more vulnerable to rejection. The primary weather information systems for pilots, as just one example, 
afford pilots none of these beneficial improvements. By imagining Theory 1 is made as efficient as 
possible, we avoid any bias in an analysis which ultimately favors Theory 2.  
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people attending only to important issues. We do not want them spending time scanning, 
browsing, filtering, and prioritizing incoming queues that are overflowing with relevant 
but mostly insignificant information, or managing growing backlogs of unfinished tasks. 
To maximize their productivity, we want their input queues to be automatically 
prioritized continually so that the next item they process is, in fact, the one that has the 
highest expected value added. Model 2 makes that the routine process management 
approach. 
 
Monitoring Conditions of Interest  
 
When bandwidth is limited, we want to use it wisely. In any given system, bandwidth can 
measure the maximum possible rate of information flow through some component. 
Usually, of course, we think of communications bandwidth, a measure of the capacity to 
transport bits from one place to another per unit time. In other systems, we think of CPU 
clock rate or memory access rates, measures of the capacity to access or manipulate bits 
per unit time. As the preceding example illustrates, many processes depend on human 
thinking to succeed, but people can only consider a small number of variables or 
questions per unit time.  
 
All systems that process information exhibit an upper limit on the amount of useful work 
they can accomplish per unit time, because at some level of workload, one of their 
components hits its maximum rate of throughput. We refer to the component that limits 
the total system at that point as “the rate-limiting component” or “the gating factor.” 
After we exceed the capacity of the rate-limiting component, we incur other problems 
and costs. If inputs continue to arrive, they must either be stored in some temporary 
buffer, housed permanently in a more expensive or slower facility or, as often actually 
happens, they simply “hit the floor.” In that case, the inputs are damaged or lost, never to 
be recovered.  
 
When interacting with a dynamic environment or a quick enemy, it’s vital that our 
systems effectively focus on the most important inputs so they can implement adaptive 
responses before the environment or opponent creates the next problem requiring 
response. The basic idea in intelligent control is that one’s rate of considering and acting 
must be faster than the opponent’s. So, even when our systems have limited capacity, 
they must give priority to important information and assure their basic adaptive cycle is 
quick enough (Hayes-Roth, 2005c). As a result, many items may “hit the floor” when we 
act efficiently. However, we can’t afford to let chance determine which items the system 
ignores. Even when we have limited resources, we must attend to and respond to the most 
significant events. In our example above, the pilot in Model 1 couldn’t do this, because 
the deluge of inputs exceeded the resource capacity to recognize and act on the most 
significant information. 
To integrate efficient supply chains, suppliers learn what their customers need and how 
they should supply inputs to reduce the customers’ difficulty, cost, and delay (friction) in 
employing them. In our pursuit of NCOW and its corresponding information chain 
integration, we want to apply the same principles. This encourages us to focus on the 
basic function of supplying information to “customers.” By analogy to the supply chain, 
each processing entity should supply information in a manner that minimizes the friction 
incurred by the intended recipient. In addition, because most information chains will be 
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rate-limited, every processing entity will need to attend first to the most important bits. If 
suppliers can prioritize information for them, processing entities can spend their limited 
resources more effectively, assuring they process important items before unimportant 
ones. In this way, the entire system can maximize the resources it expends processing the 
most vital bits. 
To support this basic objective, we want the system to assure that processing entities 
receive prioritized information in a form that simplifies the recipient’s task of 
understanding it and reacting to it adaptively. This is what Model 2 does by allowing 
each processing entity to specify its own conditions of interest. Each COI corresponds to 
a potential event that undercuts the expectation of a successful process or mission. One 
broad class of COIs logically corresponds to the negation of a prerequisite. For example, 
sufficient fuel is a prerequisite for flight. Each planned route considers initial fuel, fuel 
consumption per hour, and total hours of flight, for example. When people consider, 
analyze and then select a plan, they assess fuel consumption and justify the plan by their 
calculations showing the aircraft will have sufficient fuel to execute the plan. The 
corresponding most general COI is “expected fuel consumption exceeds amount available 
(less required reserves).” Another general class of COI corresponds to the failure of an 
assumed salutary condition. An example of this might be “absence of enemy threat along 
route of flight.” While plans may not absolutely require such a condition, it’s obviously 
desirable. In fact, in considering two alternative routes, the planner may have chosen this 
specific one precisely because of this very belief. These kinds of COIs reflect the 
importance of recognizing and adapting to events that increase the risks of failure.  
A very different category of COI addresses the importance, in some operations, of 
adapting to increased opportunities, where we see risks as “opportunity costs,” rather than 
chances of failure per se. Thus, when forecast thunderstorms dissipate, opportunities arise 
for shorter, faster, and safer routes.  
Any NCOW system should enable processing entities to get the high-value information 
they need in a form that makes it easy and quick for them to react to it. This can be done 
by enabling each PE to specify its own COIs, reflecting its own knowledge, expected 
plans, and concerns about various kinds of risks. The ability to delegate and monitor 
COIs seems critically important. Systems intended to foster information superiority must 
provide this essential capability to the human operators and automated processing 
entities. This is probably the single greatest way to use computing power to increase 
process efficiency and to assure that limited human bandwidth can focus on important 
information. 
Using COI monitoring this way supports the objective of every processing entity 
receiving valuable information at the right time (VIRT). Networks that embrace this 
process design approach will manage the flow of bits to maximize the value of those bits. 
We term that approach to network management flow by value (Hayes-Roth, 2004b, 
2005a).  
To enable processing entities to specify their COIs new language systems will be 
required, and these will constitute improved query languages. Such new language 
systems will require three principal components: 
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1. Domain-specific ontologies. The concepts, variables, value intervals, and similar 
attributes required to describe the information needed for effective missions 
collectively define the domain ontology. As an example, an ontology for the 
helicopter missions would include concepts such as turbulence, icing, anti-
aircraft missile, vehicle track, ground speed, and fuel consumption.  
2. Domain-specific expressions and conditions. Expressions specify how to 
calculate quantities useful in determining whether a significant value exists, as 
well as particular values signifying important events, i.e., instances of conditions 
of interest. Examples would include expected fuel exhaustion, expected airframe 
icing, or expected detection by a capable anti-aircraft enemy system. 
3. Condition monitors. Monitors are programs that take responsibility for 
computing conditions and alerting the interested processing entities that specified 
them. These monitors will access relevant data, compute the expressions 
associated with the conditions, and determine when the resulting values warrant 
notifying the interested entity or operator. In systems with extensive amounts of 
information, this function will be a heavy consumer of machine computing cycles. 
(Hayes-Roth & Brown, 2005, specifies an architecture for one such capability.) 
Specialized tools to help construct and continually improve these three kinds of 
components will prove extremely valuable. We might consider such tools three additional 
types of components, making a total of six important types of capabilities required to 
make COI monitoring routinely available within NCOW.  
Beyond the technology, organizations will need to adapt their processes as well. In the 
military, tactics and procedures should evolve to make COI monitoring a routine process 
suitable for automation. The military already has a related concept termed the 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). Loosely speaking, these 
define conditions whose occurrence justifies “waking the Commander up.” In today’s 
practice, Commanders delegate CCIRs to human staff officers, and so these COIs are 
expressed informally in natural language.  
 
In order to make every processing entity efficient, we look forward to the development of 
excellent formal systems that enable people to state their COIs precisely and simply in 
terms of familiar domain ontologies. In most cases, the humans should use interactive 
language tools that allow the computer to construct unambiguous formal interpretations 
while, at the same time, simplifying human performance requirements. Once formulated, 
the COIs would be routinely delegated to computing machines that would monitor them 
reliably.  
 
We might expect these COIs to be termed something like Dynamic Operator Information 
Requirements (DOIRs). It seems straightforward to adopt a practice of explicitly defining 
DOIRs as a part of the planning process. DOIRs would be expressed in terms of the 
ontology and expressions appropriate to each domain of operation. Because all 
organizations spend most of their time repeatedly performing standard processes, most 
organizations should create a catalog of frequently used DOIRs. This would make it 
quick and easy to specify DOIRs for today’s mission, which often would be just a slight 





I’ve shared earlier drafts of this paper with a number of colleagues throughout 
government, industry and academia. They have raised a number of points that I’d like to 
mention and consider here. There are four specific points that we’ll consider in turn, and 
these are: (1) the best architecture will need to support both smart push and smart pull; 
(2) push and pull may be misleading or harmful terms; (3) people shouldn’t depend on 
automation to provide the information they need; and (4) smart information flows require 
better semantics than our systems possess. 
 
Point 1: The best architecture will need to support both smart push and smart pull. I’ve 
tried to emphasize to this point in the paper the significant advantage of smart push over 
smart pull. The earlier example showed an advantage of more than five orders of 
magnitude in terms of reducing information to what’s essential. This is the single greatest 
quantitative advantage in efficiency that I’ve encountered in my IT career. This 
advantage isn’t yet widely understood, and many people have a poorly informed negative 
bias toward smart push, mostly stemming from early Internet products that deluged 
enterprises frequently pushing graphical data to users. Moreover, most of the GIG/NCES 
and DoD policy documents emphasize access so users can seek and pull relevant data. 
Collectively these conditions make it important to argue against the idea that smart pull is 
the solution. Not only is it not the solution, it’s not even a tolerable approach for many 
operational contexts. 
 
However, as I suggested earlier, there are many contexts where smart push is not the 
answer either. Many of these contexts involve intelligence gathering or other open-ended 
investigations. We can be confident there are countless tasks where operators would 
benefit from an ability to seek and quickly find pertinent information. After all, the most 
useful function of the Internet today would seem to be search, which is a kind of pull. So, 
a broad, effective, general IT architecture will need to support both push and pull. My 
intent is to put smart push on the agenda and to move it to a high-priority position that 
reflects its enormous advantages in many operational contexts. 
 
Point 2: Push and pull may be misleading or harmful terms. Readers have made me aware 
that these terms have been used in a variety of ways, ranging from technical to marketing 
communications, with some attendant over-loading and confusion. Hopefully, readers of 
this paper understand that I’ve been focusing on the flow of information to recipients, 
distinguishing pull flows that require recipients to periodically look for relevant data from 
push flows that cause relevant data to arrive at the recipient’s inbox. Some readers point 
out that these functions are implemented in various ways, depending on the nature of the 
distributed infrastructure, and sometimes the implementations share common elements. 
Many of the elements of the end-to-end flows, as shown in the two process models, are 
similar, of course. 
 
Nevertheless, I think it’s instructive to look at the process models at a high level and 
consider which method provides more precise information to the operator and which 
method requires less work by the operator. It should be clear that two things are required 
to maximize the ratio of value to effort: (a) the operator’s dynamic context must be used 
to determine precisely how current estimates differ from expectation, because those 
differences constitute the candidate bits of value; and (b) the system must maintain 
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dynamic context and past data to detect changes of interest. In addition, additional 
benefits accrue if the system also can project future states and detect deviations between 
prior expectations and now-predicted situations. Because information becomes valuable 
by improving an operator’s expected outcome, operators will most value bits that 
correctly alert them to the need to change course to avoid a predictable problem or 
exploit an emerging opportunity. 
 
In short, there shouldn’t be any confusion about the terms, as used in this paper. Smart 
pull means getting the most relevant information you can when you search for it. Smart 
push means letting others know your context and relying on them to alert you when they 
determine you are at risk. 
 
Point 3: People shouldn’t depend on automation to provide the information they need. 
Automation is often considered dangerous or harmful, because people may become over-
reliant upon it. When automated systems fail or when novel problems arise beyond the 
system’s boundaries, we need people to take over and provide agility and robustness. In 
this paper, for example, a reader might worry that our operators will become over-
dependent on systems to tell them what they should know. One consequence, the 
argument goes, is that we weaken our operators as a result. Smart push lulls them into a 
kind of false level of comfort and excessive dependency. 
 
I don’t think there’s anything specific to IT or smart push in such concerns. All 
automation ultimately creates dependencies and, in fact, people lose the skills previously 
required to do those functions used prior to automation. We don’t have many skillful 
slide-rule operators today, as handheld calculators and spreadsheet software have made it 
possible for everybody to do complex mathematical computations at the push of a button. 
Few people can write database queries or Boolean information retrieval queries, yet 
everybody can seek and find more data, more easily, with Internet search engines. Pilots 
of complex aircraft regularly rely on GPS for navigation, autopilots for flying, and flight 
management systems to determine routing and fuel management decisions. In short, 
technology makes us more productive precisely because it eliminates tasks that can and 
often do become obsolete. 
 
With respect to the specific question of whether smart push can provide productivity 
advantages, there’s no doubt. Will this necessarily mean operators lose the ability to find 
relevant information when they want it? Will it mean that operators will no longer be 
effective when their systems break or are unable to address new contexts? We are 
certainly a very long way from having to address those questions, because we have 
scarcely begun to address the question of how we’d give operators just the high-value 
information they’d want in various dynamic contexts. At this low baseline level on the 
productivity scale, with little technology assistance, we know that operators can’t get the 
information they need easily and quickly by any means. It seems obvious then that the 
preponderance of risk is associated with poor performance due to poor information. We 
should look forward to an eventual problem of having extremely high performance due to 
automation that provides precise, high-value information. Before operators become 
overly dependent and vulnerable in that eventual state of information superiority, we can 
introduce back up measures to increase robustness and maintain essential human skills. 
 
Point 4: Smart information flows require better semantics than our systems possess. The 
examples in this paper show how smart push or pull can find relevant information and 
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compute conditions of interest. To do that, operators define COIs using expressions that 
computers can evaluate. The expressions or queries use a vocabulary of entities or 
variables, attributes, and values, and often these are indexed with spatial and temporal 
coordinates. Finally, these values might be indexed by additional aspects corresponding 
to different perspectives, hypothetical cases, or other context-indicating factors. A 
schema for all these data defines what kinds of bits are stored and how they’re organized. 
 
To match data to COIs, we must recognize the correspondence between the operators’ 
concerns and the type of information modeled in the schema. In short, we need to have 
alignment in meaning between operators and the people who supply bits. Semantics is the 
term we use to refer to such meaning. As any system designer or data engineer knows, 
getting agreement on meaning is tough work, and the requirements continue to evolve as 
missions and contexts change.  
 
So smart information flows will depend upon our machines incorporating semantic 
models suitable for the tasks we apply them to. The semantic models will underlie the 
tools users employ to express their COIs and to view the alerts and events the system 
pushes to them. Information will need to be registered against appropriate coordinate 
systems and other reference frameworks for the semantics to be meaningful and correct. 
Furthermore, information might be supplied using one semantic framework, compared to 
information in another semantic framework, and ultimately presented to operators in a 
third, context-sensitive framework. All of this suggests that semantics will be important, 
and a continuing area of learning and improvement. 
 
There are many efforts underway throughout industry and government to create improved 
semantic frameworks, including ontologies and tools for comparing and translating 
between different category systems. I don’t expect this work to move especially quickly 
or reach completion in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, we don’t need complete 
solutions to begin to deliver great value to operators. We only need enough semantic 
foundations to understand COIs in specific operational contexts and correctly monitor 
evolving data relevant to those COIs. In this way, we can deliver value to operators “one 
thread at-a-time,” by implementing the semantics-enabled processes across just those 
information sources needed to monitor those COIs. If we plan for continuous 
improvement and evolution of the semantic frameworks and semantics-supported 




When we don’t really know what information we need or how it will change our 
behavior, we have few means of achieving great efficiency. In such a case we have little 
choice but to browse all potentially relevant information sources in the hope of noticing 
something interesting and, even better, something significant with respect to our situation 
or planned actions. This type of information system, consistent with Model 1, places a 
great burden on processing entities. They must seek information broadly, they must have 
broad access, and they must acquire large volumes of generally relevant information. 
Then they must process it, interpret it, look for significance, filter and prioritize it. In a 
network-centric operation, we should expect such processing entities to have long 
latencies, to induce bottlenecks, and to exhibit large backlogs of interim products 
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awaiting further processing. Some functions probably must be based on Model 1, such as 
some general intelligence operations, but we should expect efficient organizations to have 
few such processes. 
 
On the other hand, we should expect mature, efficient organizations to have well 
integrated value chains, where each processing entity allocates most of its time to near 
immediate adaptive responses to exceptions, events that don’t jibe with expectations and 
that jeopardize desired outcomes still in process. Efficient systems strive to achieve the 
best possible results by using reliable processes, each step adding value in predictable 
ways, and all operating within an envelope of nominal conditions. These systems spend 
most of their resources adding value by building in predictability through methods that 
minimize variance, reduce friction, and prevent the off-nominal unexpected. In the rare 
cases where conditions go off-nominal and the expected consequences are negative, the 
systems quickly notice them, because they are actively monitoring for just those kinds of 
expectable problematic conditions. In these systems, significant events occur 
infrequently. Further, the processing entities have mostly short queues with no backlogs, 
meaning they have capacity to deal with urgent events. As a result, these systems can 
give priority immediately to understanding a surprising event, contemplating its negative 
impact, and considering adaptive responses. Model 2, in short, allocates scarce attentional 
and problem-solving resources, often dependent on humans, in a near optimal way to 
recognizing and responding to vital and urgent events.  
 
The theory of NCOW, roughly, predicts that we should be able to accomplish better 
results by distributing information quickly to everyone who could benefit from it. That 
seems like a good idea. However, Theory 1 and Theory 2 suggest two complementary 
strategies for achieving those improved outcomes. This paper shows that most advances 
in information technology, ranging from increased processing power to formal semantics, 
advanced query processing and knowledge-based inference, contribute significantly 
greater productivity gains in the context of integrated supply chains operated according to 
Theory 2. For this reason, organizations should give priority to designing and 
implementing processes as Theory 2 suggests. 
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The “Mission Statement” re VIRT 
(v0.2) 
Rick Hayes-Roth 
Revised Nov. 23, 2005 
 
The Problem  
 
Information management has mostly focused till now on the question of what shall I 
make of the most recent snapshot of the state of my business. 
 
On the other hand, superb competitors out-think their competition, demonstrating a 
superior awareness of what’s happening. They adapt to problems before the problems 
actually occur and thereby avoid them. They seize opportunities before their competitors 
perceive them. The intelligent competitor acts in a predicted future state to bring about 
superior results.  
 
In the words of professional hockey’s greatest scorer, “I skate to where the puck is going 
to be.” 
 
Our first problem is that current DBMSs don’t support envisioning the future and 
adapting to it. 
 
The second problem is that all organizations have limited resources, especially limited 
time of key decision-makers. As the extent of operations increases, as the number and 
variety of digital information sources continue to increase, and as we look at more past 
and possible future states to choose winning actions, the people who have to make 
decisions face unmanageable volumes of information. Much organizational activity is 
goal-directed, plan-driven, and process-based. Productivity is directly related to how 
efficient each knowledge worker is in those processes. Just as lean manufacturing, JIT, 
and supply chain integration produced huge productivity increases by optimally 
scheduling the flow of materials (molecules), we need a similar transformation in the 
flow of information (bits). 
 
Our second problem is to optimize the flow of bits in operational networks: how do we 
deliver valuable information at the right time (VIRT) to each recipient? 
 
Our third problem is that many of the things we want to think about, monitor, and adapt 
have dynamic physical dimensions, so that spatio-temporal reasoning must be easy and 
efficient. In addition, when we think about the future, we’re often confronted with 
multiple alternatives as when we think about best cases or worst cases or when we must 
hedge against uncertain events. When we only needed to record snap-shot data, we 
avoided and masked the complexity of most realistic processes. If we want to use 
enhanced DBMS technology to represent the past, present and future states for decision-
makers, we will need to support richer models of dynamic and intentional entities that 
operate and interact in four dimensions (space and time).  
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Our third problem is to enhance DMBS technology with richer models of dynamic and 
intentional entities that interact with each other and environmental entities. We will need 
to compute inferences, queries, and expressions efficiently over extremely large datasets. 
 
Summing up: We aim to improve results by enabling each organization to adapt 
intelligently to problems and opportunities: by anticipating them, focusing on them, and 
responding smartly. We need to extend DBMS capabilities to project and reason about 
significant conditions of interest, especially in the future. We need systems that assure the 
bits decision-makers consider valuable get to them promptly and get their attention. 
 
The Opportunity  
 
The US Department of Defense has embarked on its own version of a next-generation 
Internet-enabled service-oriented architecture for the extended enterprise. The overall 
infrastructure is called the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the planned services are 
called Network-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES). This is motivated by a 
transformational vision of network-centric operations in which agile virtual organizations 
employ the GIG/NCES to put together effective processes and exploit information 
superiority to achieve unsurpassed competitive advantage. The total outlay for this 
program is likely to exceed $10B over the next 5-10 years. Many other nations are 
cooperating with the US, and two consortia (NCOIC and W2COG) have sprung up to 
invest in and participate in these developments. Oracle participates in both. 
 
Our colleagues working through the World-Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG), 
especially some professors at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, have identified 
a technology agenda that would meet the needs outlined in the previous section. They 
have created an ecosystem that can bring together new technology, important customers, 
and policy makers. In addition, Prof. Rick Hayes-Roth teaches a cadre of fast-track 
military officers in a “capstone” masters degree course the advantages of VIRT 
technology as a means of achieving the DoD vision of information superiority. He’s 
working closely with Oracle to define our proposed roadmap. Here are some of the points 
he has made to us and to the leaders in DoD: 
 
− The DoD vision cannot be accomplished without extending traditional DBMS 
technology to support VIRT services 
− Military operators cannot afford the time or effort to sift through increasing 
amounts of “relevant” but insignificant information. In their time-stressed 
critical missions, they must rely on computers to do that sifting. The viability 
of GIG/NCES depends on implementing personalized, context-sensitive VIRT 
services that deliver high-value information promptly, while simultaneously 
filtering out low-value information. 
− VIRT can reduce the amount of information that people need to process by 
orders of magnitude. One documented example shows an advantage of 5 
orders of magnitude! 
 
Several emerging technologies are combining to make this the right time to undertake 
developing VIRT services. These include: 
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− Semantic modeling and ontology tools (XML, XML Schemas and DTDs, 
RDF, OWL, Protégé, Microsoft InfoPath, and others) 
− Standard off-the-shelf ontologies created by communities of interest (e.g., 
C2IEDM, OpenCyc, SUMO, OWL-Time, etc.) 
− Symbolic reasoning, rule processing, dynamic projection, spatial and temporal 
computations 
− Agents and service-oriented computing 
− Flexible and powerful expression manipulation (making it possible to treat 
expressions as data) 
− Low cost, high volume storage 
− Low cost, high power multiprocessors, grids, and clusters 
− Ubiquitous communication and mobile wireless devices 
 
It’s our belief that we can capture and exploit these emerging technologies to provide a 
powerful solution to the problems faced by DoD and other competitive organizations 
seeking to improve the speed and quality of their adaptive behaviors. Specifically, we 
plan to develop an extension to our DBMS products that has the following principal 
functions: 
1. Enables an organization to express the critical assumptions that underlie its plans, 
so the system can monitor these. In fact, each operator and decision-maker’s role 
in the plan is used to personalize the definition of “conditions of interest” (COI) 
that would significantly impact him or her. 
2. Uses models of the environment and dynamic entities to describe past, present 
and probable future states of the world, as needed to monitor the COIs. 
3. Represents COIs in user-friendly expressions and vocabulary, supported by 
domain-specific off-the-shelf ontologies. 
4. Utilizes advanced indexing, queuing, and evaluation techniques to evaluate 
continuous queries for the COIs, making it possible to guarantee timely detection 
of COI events (changes that occur causing COIs to become true). 
5. Delivers valuable information at the right time (VIRT) to each user, thereby 
reducing the user’s information processing load by orders of magnitude and 
reducing communication loads proportionately. 
 
Objectives & Goals  
 
Our objectives are to develop and apply increasing levels of product capabilities in an 
iterative way, spiraling through the following dimensions as our products attain ever 
greater capacity, competence and performance: 
− Dynamic entity models, ranging from simple vehicles to complex coordinated 
and distributed actors 
− Domain ontologies, ranging from military and business objects to 
environmental features and processes 
− Plans, including entity models, constraints, and assumed conditions 
− Conditions of Interest, from violations of constraints and assumed conditions 
to achievable future states 
− World Model state materialization, from continuous past to near-present to 
longer-term future predictions 
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− Spatiotemporal modeling, from 2D to 4D, from uniform grids to adaptive 
gridding methods that optimize storage and performance 
− Expression and vocabulary tools, from SQL99 to semantic web tools (e.g., 
Protégé) to domain-specific semantic editors constructed atop rich semantic 
models and ontologies 
− Implement VIRT in lighthouse applications to demonstrate the advantages in 
terms of faster, better decisions resulting from high-value information flows, 




In the most profound way, VIRT should usher in a whole new generation of information 
management, giving the DBMS a new heart that is well suited to the network-centric 
environment that threatens to inundate operators and decision-makers with relevant but 
unimportant data. To convert those data into high-value information, we need a new 
system that can filter out the expected but draw attention to the unexpected significant 
things that signal detection of new problems or new opportunities.  
 
This means we need a technology suitable for managing the future, not merely reacting to 
the last snapshot of the past.  
 
This, in turn, means we need to be able to understand and monitor important conditions 
as dynamic events unfold. To do that, we will enable our customers to describe the 
dynamic entities in their application domains and to tell us how best to predict or obtain 
forecasts for those entities. Our next generation database will be able to represent these 
time-indexed states of important entities, variables, and expressions, and this will enable 
us to continuously evaluate when important conditions are about to occur. By alerting our 
customers to those anticipated events, we enable them to adapt before the opportunity is 
lost.  
 
In short, we are creating a capability for all organizations and users to leverage advancing 
IT to improve their ability to foresee and control events.  
 
By assuring that our systems convey just important information to people, we are also 
making the exploding information environment hospitable. We are reducing the 
information glut by giving focus and priority to news that significantly affects the 
recipients. That eliminates the need for them to receive and sift through huge amounts of 
information, something that is increasingly impossible. 
 
In short, our VIRT project should mark a sea change. Our current products focus on 
recording and reporting on the recent past so that managers looking backwards might 
attempt to improve the future. Our new products will directly enable managers to see the 
impending future, to hear when it violates their critical assumptions, to generate and 
evaluate potential changes in plans, and to select optimal courses of action. It’s no 
overstatement to say that the new products will bring us into the age of proactive, 
intelligent enterprise management. 
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Technical Work Required  
 
We must work through the technical dimensions described with a spiral approach, 
climbing to ever higher levels of capability on interacting dimensions, over successive 
spirals. As our first spiral, we aim to develop the following levels of capability: 
 
Spiral 1 (built up in three successive increments, each 4 months optimally). 
− Dynamic entity models: rich semantic tracks (entities that move over time and 
space in predictable ways), for tracking vehicles, people, parcels, containers, 
etc. Also applicable to environmental entities such as weather fronts, 
hurricanes, etc.  
− Domain ontologies: specific entities that instantiate tracks; also basic 
transportation networks where tracks move. 
− Plans: plans for such tracks, and plans for managing the transportation 
networks. 
− Conditions of Interest: tracks deviating from acceptable behavior profiles; 
likely conflicts between tracks. 
− World Model state materialization: assuming excellent adaptive decisions can 
be made whenever we have T minutes advance warning of COI events, we 
will project ahead 2T, materializing the World Model state using adaptive 
grids and lazy computations. 
− Spatiotemporal modeling: We will provide both rich spatial modeling for 
surface of the earth and coarse modeling to 3D spaces for aviation 
applications, with time scales proportionate to decision cycle time T. 
−  Expression and vocabulary tools: We’ll develop a flexible syntax for 
expressions, built atop a flexible meta-model for vocabulary terms, so that we 
can provide a flexible, easily modified stack of tools that culminates in 
domain-specific form-filling end-user editors for COIs and vocabulary. We 
will make these work with Microsoft Office (InfoPath). 
− Implement VIRT in lighthouse applications (TBD) 
 
Models, Semantics, Inference  
 
As you know, the Semantic Web is a hot topic and is anticipated to be a driver for vast 
amounts of computing cycles. Most of the W3C effort on the Semantic Web is addressing 
broad classes of low-value information, where the technology aims to identify more 
relevant information without being able to identify significant information. Our focus is 
to add some additional depth to what is modeled so that we can understand, for each user, 
what is important. All current efforts to provide better decision-making tools focus on 
understanding what the data means, which is the subject of semantics. Semantic models 
range from simple agreed vocabularies and schemas to rich, rigorous logical systems with 
commonsense knowledge of the world (as in Cyc). We believe that one way to hit a 
bulls-eye on detecting and delivering important information is to detect when people’s 
plans are at risk because their critical assumptions are turning out to be wrong. We 
believe that detecting such critical assumption violations will be highly valued by many 
customers. So, this guides our focus on what we must model and what kinds of 
computations we need to do on these models. 
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As suggested in the list of Spiral 1 objectives, we intend to model the following things: 
 States of dynamic entities, from the past to the projected future 
 Space and time 
 Intentional beings, especially those operating or traveling in vehicles 
 Physical things, especially vehicles that transport other things or carried in 
vehicles 
 Environmental things, that interact with the intentional beings and physical things 
 
The types of inference that we must support include: 
 Relating observations and reports to entity models, so that we “track” things. 
 Materializing the future states of dynamic entities, from most probable to merely 
likely. 
 Determining when tracks and COI-relevant spatial envelopes intersect. 
 Determining when important variables attain particular values, in some space-
time region of interest.  
 
Over time, we expect to leverage worldwide work on building reusable ontologies for 
other domains. We are grounding our work on problems common to many defense, 
government, and civilian management problems, where plans are common, where future 





8. Reference Implementation Documentation of Humanitarian 
Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Network 
 199
 
HP NetTop™ Demonstration 
 
Recent environmental disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have highlighted the 
requirement for establishing hastily formed networks by the responding relief organizations. The 
first-response organizations must have the ability to establish a private Local Area Network (LAN) 
and secure Wireless LAN (WLAN) to enable information sharing/gathering in support of the relief 
mission. Some of the information gathered could be of a sensitive nature, such as Social Security 
Numbers and/or Medical information, etc., while other information could be of a collaborative 
nature, such as location, capabilities and/or supplies, etc. Communication infrastructures can 
become intermittent or unreliable based on the magnitude of the event. The creation of secure 
WLANs could allow first-responders to establish communication without relying on typical 
communication infrastructure.  
 
The relief organizations must have the ability to share collaborative information enhancing the 
mission, while maintaining the security and integrity of the private information on the network. HP 
NetTop™ allows a single computer to access different network security domains. The separation 
can provide access to sensitive internal information and external resources to enable safe 
interaction between coalition and other partners. HP NetTop™ provides an environment 
supporting typical COTS productivity software, enhancing worker efficiency while maintaining the 
separation of sensitive information located on isolated networks. The HP NetTop™ architecture 
could be expanded to enable the addition of wireless connectivity capabilities. Secure multiple 
wireless networks could enhance the mobility of first-response personnel, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness and decreasing the time-to-delivery of critical services.  
 






















HP NetTop™ Demonstration Concept 
For more information contact:                                                 
Quinn Smith 
Planning Systems Inc. 
 200
Ph: (703) 788-7706 
qsmith@plansys.com 
 
NetTop is a trademark of the National Security Agency. 




The National Security Agency (NSA) researched methods to provide cost-effective high-
assurance applications using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. NetTop™ 
was developed by the NSA to provide an architecture capable of executing multiple 
concurrent operating systems (OS) while maintaining complete isolation between the 
systems. Each of the concurrent OS can be attached to a different security domain; 
effectively creating isolated workstations with access to multiple isolated networks on a 
single computer. 
 
Each of the OS is associated with a different network through a dedicated network 
interface card (NIC). The NetTop™ software establishes a policy-based virtual air gap by 
preventing data crossover between security domains. The separation and isolation 
provided to each OS by NetTop™ allows the operator to use COTS productivity software 
that is typically unavailable to high-assurance installations.  
 
The Hewlett-Packard Company, in a licensing agreement with the NSA, offers HP 
NetTop™ as a full-service solution to public and private enterprises. HP NetTop™ is a 
highly secure, layered environment of SELinux, VMware™ and customized security 
policies. It is backed by the HP Technology Solutions Group to provide assessment, 
planning, policy definition, rollout, and support tailored to your organization. 
  
Ultimately, HP NetTop™ is simple and transparent to the end user. The user simply 
clicks between OS windows just as they do between application windows. The 
underlying NetTop™ software works in the background to maintain system isolation. 
Each guest OS executes in its own virtual machine (VM). The VMs are indistinguishable 
from a standalone workstation on the Internet or company intranet. Applications work 
transparently within the HP NetTop™ VMs. The VMs run independently from the host 













Two Enclave HP NetTop™ Installation 
 
In a typical installation like the one shown above, each VM is connected to a different 
network to separate and isolate the applications from the other VM. HP NetTop™ is 
effectively a secure software KVM switch for virtual machines. This document will 
identify the hardware and software requirements for duplicating a specific two-enclave 
reference installation. Additionally, a hardware specific instruction set will be added to 




• HP NetTop™ 1.2 Installation and Configuration Guide 




The HP NetTop™ software operates on a variety of hardware platforms. Other models 
are documented in the HP NetTop™ Installation and Configuration Guide including other 
notebook and desktop models. The following are the hardware specifications for the 
reference implementation, which include a notebook computer and a PCMCIA NIC. 
 
• Compaq nc8000 Notebook Computer (p/n PF076US#ABA) 
o Upgrade to 1GB of RAM 
• One of the following PCMCIA NIC: 
o 3Com 3C574-TX Fast Etherlink PCMCIA Card with dongle  
(p/n: 16-0096-000 Rev:A) 
o 3Com 3C589D EtherLink III PCMCIA Card with dongle 
 (p/n: 16-0037-000 Rev:A) 




• HP NetTop™ version 1.2 software installation CD 
o Contact: nettop@hp.com 
o Further information: www.hp.com/go/nettop  
• Software license for guest operating system for each virtual machine (VM) 
o Example: (2) Microsoft® Windows® XP Professional licenses 
• Software license for any additional software 









Hardware Specific Supplemental Instructions: 
 
Please read the HP NetTop™ 1.2 Installation and Configuration Guide (1.2 ICG) and the 
HP NetTop™ 1.2 Users Guide (1.2 UG) carefully. No other special hardware, databases, 
software or specialized testing is required for the reference implementation. Other 
installations may require databases or other software to provide the functionality required 
as the circumstances dictate. The majority of the items included below are in the 1.2 ICG 
but are added here for clarity. 
 
• The PCMCIA NIC must be installed prior to installation. The topmost VM listed 
on the Start menu binds to eth0, which is the laptop Ethernet adapter. 
• Once to the configuration menu, select Video Configuration and select (5) 
custom. Select 1400x1050 resolution, 32 bit depth, use the default sync ranges, 
Analog and under Dualhead select No. (The default 15 inch LCD/Laptop (4) will 
work as well but the screen size is more functional at the larger resolution. Other 
settings may be appropriate depending on the specific installation.) 
• Go into the mouse configuration and set for USB rather than PS2 and start the 
installation. 
• Note the instructions for associating the CD to the individual VM in the 1.2 UG. 
• In the Troubleshooting section of the 1.2 ICG there are instructions if “installing a 
Windows guest OS is extremely slow”. Follow the instructions and the 
installation will be quicker. 
• Do not be concerned with poor graphics resolution after installing the Windows 
OS and rebooting. Continue to follow the instructions and install the VMware 
Tools. The screen resolution and display should be normal after installation of the 
VMware Tools.  
• Once the guest OS has been installed in each VM, the administration and 
installation of secondary software is handled as if each VM was a completely 
separate computer.  
• Once all settings are satisfactory, continue to follow the instructions in the 1.2 
ICG and make the system secure. Do not make the system secure until all 
functionality has been verified and no modification to the installation will be 
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World Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) 
1895 Preston White Dr 
Reston VA 20191 





January 23, 2006 
via email transmission David.Scantling@DFAS.MIL 
 
Business Transformation Agency 
Attn: Mr. David Scantling 
1851 S. Bell St., Suite 1002 
Arlington, VA 22240 
 
SUBJECT: W2COG Institute Proposal for Support to Business Transformation Agency 
 
Dear Mr. Scantling: 
 
Please accept this input for an Executive Summary and supporting slide deck 
describing how the W2COG Institute can support the Business Transformation 
Agency enhance DoD business enterprise visibility.  
 
The principle elements of this proposal include: 
 
• W2COG Background and Accomplishments 
• Development, Execution, Validation and Value-Add of Lighthouse Pilots 
• Conduct of Case Studies on Business Processes and Policies 
• Justification for Series A Funding 
 
I and the membership of the W2COG Institute look forward to becoming an integral 










Managing Director, W2COG Institute 
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W2COG Background and Operation Construct:  
 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) represents a fundamental shift by the DoD in information 
management, communication, and assurance to meeting the timely needs of both the warfighter 
and the business user. Senior OSD leadership recognized that implementing this vision would 
require vastly higher levels of collaboration across heretofore autonomous organizations and 
would need leveraging of commercial technologies augmented to meet DoD's mission-critical 
user requirements. They also recognized that the current DoD acquisition landscape neither 
provides incentive to nor convenient processes to encourage cross domain collaboration. They 
were encouraged by successes in the e-business private sector that have found ways to adopt 
collaborative practices to achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
 
Accordingly, the Office of Force Transformation, ASD Networks & Information Integration, DUSD 
Advanced Systems and Concepts, and DARPA, collectively provided $1.7M “angel money” to the 
Naval Postgraduate School to establish the World Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) 
research initiative. The project objective is to create a self-sustained not-for-profit open 
consortium that applies the Internet “open” e-business process to accelerate the GIG.  
 
The W2COG research initiative discovered that the principles of netcentric operations (NCO) can 
be effectively applied to engineering. That is, self-synchronized teams of vendors taking their cue 
from the Open Source movement can rapidly bundle their separate products to create 
incrementally more powerful information processing capability. This idea led to two central 
themes: The first is Valuable Information at the Right Time (VIRT); the power of NCO is in 
enhancing information utility, not moving data. The second is Value off the Shelf (VOTS); the 
power of netcentric engineering is in creatively re-using interoperable (i.e. off-the-shelf) 
components. Hence, W2COG projects demonstrate quantifiable improvements in information 
processing capability by bundling excellent off-the-shelf components.  
 
The W2COG research initiative spawned the not-for-profit W2COG Institute in July 2005 to 
establish and maintain the infrastructure required to achieve the goals of the W2COG vision. 
 
The tenets of the W2COG Institute are to 1) create a forum and facility to discover commercial 
and government best practices and solutions for network and collaboration technologies; 2) 
establish and maintain a readily searchable data base of government, industry, and academic 
experts in operational, engineering, and programmatic aspects of net centric operations required 
to create the solution(s) required; 3) demonstrate the utility of off-the shelf network and 
collaboration components, and how they can be bundled and used to rapidly satisfy NCO 
requirements, to include placing them on commercial or government procurement schedules; 4) 
produce documentation that accompanies the successfully demonstrated bundled capability, and 
to perform independent testing and validation of the solution (“Underwriters Laboratory” function); 
and 5) sponsor Research and Development projects and provide grants in areas pertinent to 
networking and collaboration technologies and their Independent Validation and Verification. 
 
Achievements to date include provisioning of an IPv6 transition strategy to the Australian Defense 
Force; fielding a reference implementation of an unclassified, multi-level security domain that 
allows disparate organizations responding to a humanitarian disasters to share some information 
while keeping other information private; a functioning prototype architecture that applies semantic 
web technology to the DoD’s C4 “track” construct; acquisition of a COTS/GOTS Sensor-Net for 
Perimeter Protection for US forces in Iraq, and deployment of Hastily Formed Network solution for 
Katrina relief and distance learning. Potential new starts being negotiated include: 
 
 DISA 
– Review of GIG SOA standards 
– Assessment of DT&E and OT&E requirements on COTS procurement  
– Pilot efforts on ECM and on Applications Services 
 
 
 National Guard Bureau 
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– Operations Center support in collaboration with NORTHCOM, DHS and state and 
local governments 
 
 NASA & FAA 
– Assistance in leveraging GIG development for federal aviation applications  
 
 Joint and Coalition NCO experimentation through JFCOM and EUCOM R&E relationship 
with NPS 
 
W2COG Institute Value Proposition to Business Transformation 
Agency 
 
The W2COG Institute proposes to support the BTA by organizing and managing projects to 
enhance DoD business enterprise visibility by delivering reference implementations in well 
defined increments of DOTMLPF. W2COG Institute recognizes that application of commercial 
techniques will necessitate speed to market; thus it recommends that each pilot be based on a 
maximum duration of 6-9 month refresh cycles. 
 
The W2COG Institute proposes to develop criteria for pilot selection and governance and apply 
these criteria to at least one lighthouse pilot chosen to demonstrate financial and/or warfighter 
business enterprise visibility. The financial pilot, might, for example be a COTS application of 
SFIS to manage funds allocation, collection, control and disbursement. The warfighter pilot might 
make use of RFID technology on the Army GSM network for a logistics application in Iraq; and 
incorporate wired and wireless infrastructure, to include GIG-BE, Bluetooth, WIFI, WIMAX and 
SATCOM. The essential ingredients of such “Lighthouse Pilots” include: operators and engineers 
working together; quantitative productivity targets; and reference documentation to support 
government-approved “user’s manual”.  
 
Finally the W2COG Institute proposes to Conduct and manage Pilot(s) and then assess their 
value-add to current and future Programs of Record. Pilots will deliberately explore ways to apply 
consumable and/or service contracts to rapidly field successfully demonstrated capability.  
 
To accomplish this work, the W2COG Institute requests that the BTA provide Series A funding to 
carry on the significant work begun during the W2COG 18 month start-up phase. We estimate 
that to accomplish the above described tasking would require funding of $875 K over one year. 
These funds would be used to provide salaries and other direct cost expenditures dedicated to 
W2COG Institute employees executing and providing administrative support of the above tasking; 
delivery of one lighthouse pilot; and providing two case studies on Business Processes and 
Policies. Project leadership and technical performers are comprised of experts and thought 
leaders from government, industry and military operators chosen from Consortium membership 
based on past performance and peer review. Additional expertise for any part of this project will 
be solicited, as required. 
 
We require two distinct funding tracks; one will cover salary of the government project officer, and 
the other will support the non-government W2COG Institute. Due to the non-profit status of the 
Institute we recommend funding in the form of a grant to the W2COG Institute. Options to cover 
the government project officer include direct hire, IPA, or research grant to the Naval 
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REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION: GIG-lite Netcentric Test & Evaluation, 
Validation & Verification Runtime Environment 
 
TAB A: Equipment, Data, and Interfaces 
TAB B: How to Publish to a GIG-cast Channel 
TAB C: Mission Thread Descriptions 
 
Summary: The GIG-lite is a web service oriented, IP based, runtime environment 
designed for demonstration and evaluation of network enabling services. Geographically 
distributed developers can easily configure computer network-related artifacts over the 
Internet via standard open interfaces, and evaluate their performance against customer 
designed mission threads (i.e., use cases) in an environment that simulates actual 
conditions. The intent is to demonstrate sufficient computer network utility and security, 
while measurably enhancing productivity via these deployed artifacts.  Artifacts will be 
combinations of hardware, software, tactics, techniques, processes, policies, etc. GIG-lite 
is designed to encourage co-evolution of technology, doctrine, and policy. Customers of 
computer network capabilities can use the GIG-lite as an on-line shopping service, per e-
Bay and Amazon.Com models.  A reference implementation of a rudimentary GIG-lite 
was delivered to the W2COG Working symposium 24 May 2005.  It was hosted on a on a 
small suite of generic PCs connected via local IP backbone. Functionality was provided 
by three existing DoD C4ISR systems, Precision Air Drop System, NetTop multi-level 
security thin client, and Commercial Web-enabled Service Toolkit (CWEST). 
Demonstration scenarios were a Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence cell 
“tipper to target” problem, a humanitarian disaster air-logistics problem, and a 
international border crossing identity validation problem.   
 
Configuration. Figure 1 is a logical sketch of the GIG-Lite reference implementation.  
TAB A lists GIG-lite equipment, interface documentation, and data types. TAB B 
explains procedures for publishing and subscribing to services. Mission scenarios, use 
cases, and desired capability enhancements are described in TAB C. All of the 
capabilities available within the GIG-Lite are currently operational in various US DoD 
C4ISR applications or operations.  Systems represented are: 
 
 Precision Air Drop System (PADS). PADS uses computer generated predictions 
to estimate wind fields at a target area. In situ data is then collected during the operation 
and the wind fields are updated to provide a higher resolution estimate of the winds. This 
estimate is then used to compute a Computer Air Release Point (CARP) based on the 
payload, altitude and speed, aircraft and station.  
 
 NetTop. NetTop allows a user to display, concurrently, on the same desktop, two 
levels of security separation. In the reference implementation demonstration, these are 
treated as track data at the Top Secret SI level and tracks at the Secret coalition level. 
Although these are operationally separate enclaves, for purposes of ease of operation, 
they are shown here on the same network—however, the interfaces to the system are 
separate. There is no actual classified data in this GIG-lite reference implementation, only 
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test sets are being used. The demonstration provides Common Operational Picture COP 
views for track data at a simulated TS SI and Secret Rel.  
 
 Commercial Web-enabled Service Tool (CWEST). CWEST allows users to set up 
a GIG-cast “channels” interface for a publish/subscribe implementation that can support 




Figure 1: GIG-Lite Topography 
 
Availability: The GIG-Lite will be deployed on the W2COG.org web site and available to 




TAB A: Equipment, Data, and Interfaces 
 
GIG-Lite v 0.6 Interface Documentation 
    
Host Machine 
Name Equipment Operating Systems Mission Thread 
    
Background 
Fields Dimension T800r: 800MHz Pentium III, 
256MB PC100 SDRAM, 
40GB HDD 
Red Hat Enterprise PADS, Your 
Solution 
    
PADS Receiver Dimension T750r: 
750MHz Pentium III, 
256MB PC100 SDRAM, 
40GB HDD 
Red Hat Enterprise PADS, Your 
Solution 
    
Secret (S) Tracks Dimension T800r: 
800MHz Pentium III, 
256MB PC100 SDRAM, 
40GB HDD 
Red Hat Enterprise NetTop S Path, 
Your Solution 





800MHz Pentium III, 
256MB PC100 SDRAM, 
40GB HDD 
Red Hat Enterprise NetTop SI Path, 
Your Solution 
    
GIGcast Optiplex GX110: 933MHz 
Pentium III, 256MB 
PC100 SDRAM, 40GB 
HDD 
Red Hat Enterprise PADS, CWEST, 
Your Solution 
    
Sun Blade 
Sun Blade 100: 500MHz 
Ultra SPARC-IIe 512MB 
RAM, 15GB HDD 
Solaris 10 Your Solution 
    
GIG-Lite 
Client    
    
NetTop S Path HP D530 
Linux SE Host Win 2K 
(VMware) 
Win 2K OS 
available for Your 
Solution 
NetTop SI Path HP D530 
Linux SE Host Win 2K 
(VMware) 
Win 2K OS 
available for Your 
Solution 
    
PADS Laptop Panasonic CF-29 Win XP Host/RH Linux 
(VMware) 
N/A for Your 
Solution 
    
Your Solution TBD TBD TBD 







GIG-Lite v 0.6 Interface Documentation 
       
Host 
Machine 
Name Data Interface 
Access 






























       
Secret (S) 






       
Special 
Intelligence 






       
GIGcast 
Available 





       
Sun Blade TBD TBD TBD TBD 
Your 
Solution 192.168.10.14
       
GIG-Lite 
Client       
       
NetTop S 
Path XML None 
User: GIG, 
Password:GIG N/A N/A 192.168.10.20
NetTop SI 
Path XML None 
User: GIG, 
Password:GIG N/A N/A 192.168.2.20





wind None None N/A N/A DHCP 
       
Your 





GIG-Lite v 0.6 Interface Documentation 
    
Host Machine 
Name Data Format References 
    
Background Fields MM5 Forecast Fields located 
in folder 
MM5_Forecast_28Apr05 WMO GRIB https://mel.dmso.mil/docs/grib.pdf 
    
PADS Receiver ECEF Formatted wind data 
Specific to PADS Laptop HTTP N/A 
    
Secret (S) Tracks Ship Track XML http://www.polexis.com/pdfs/xis_slick_11-
02.pdf 
    
Special Intelligence 
(SI) Tracks 
Ship Track XML http://www.polexis.com/pdfs/xis_slick_11-
02.pdf 
    
GIGcast  (Ocean 
Channel) 
Bathymetry Data, JOTS-W 
Global Warnings  
Bathy: XML, 
JOTS-W: OTH See attached 
GIGcast  (Atmos 
Channel) 
Surface Temp, Surface 
Pressure, 12_hr Precipitation WMO GRIB https://mel.dmso.mil/docs/grib.pdf 
GIGcast  (MM5 
Forecast Channel) 
See included MM5 GRIB 
description for parameters. WMO GRIB https://mel.dmso.mil/docs/grib.pdf 
GIGcast  




Format See attached 
    





Specific MM5 Parameters for PADS 
GRIB Files    
    
Parameter Description 
GRIB File Parameter 
Names from t2z MM5 
Trimgrib Datasets: GRIB ID Level 
2D Latitude Latitude 230 1
2D Longitude Longitude 231 1
3D Geopotential Height Geopotential Height 7 100
3D Mixing Ratio Mixing_ratio 53 100
3D Temperature Temperature 11 100
3D Vertical Winds 
Pressure_Vertical_veloci
ty 39 100
3D E-W Winds (U) u-component_of_wind 33 100




Surface E-W Winds (U) u-component_of_wind 33 7
Surface N-S Winds (V) v-component_of_wind 34 7
Surface Temperature Temperature 11 105




Terrain Height Model_Terrain_Height 233 1
Altimeter Setting Altimeter_Setting 209 105
Grid Geometry: Projection Type. Two "true" 
latitudes for Lambert-Conformal. Center longitude 
(where latitudes are N-S). Number of grid points. 
Grid spacing. GRIB header info   
Forecast times GRIB header info   
    
Note: for 3D parameters, the levels are 1025, 1000, 
975, 950, 925, 900, 875, 850, 800, 750, 700, 650, 





Wind Profile Forecast & Dropsonde      
Planned Date: 
6-Nov-
03  DD-MMM-YY     
Planned Time: 19:50Z  HH:MMZ      
Planned PI Lat: N 33_22.160 [N/S] DD_MM.MM [Hemisphere Degrees_Minutes.Decimal Minutes] 
Planned PI Lon: W 114_16.513 
[E/W] DDD_MM.MM [Hemisphere Degrees_Minutes.Decimal 
Minutes] 
Planned PI Elev: 1360  Feet above MSL [Planned Point of Impact Terrain Elevation] 
           
Sonde IP Lat: N 33_22.256 [N/S] DD_MM.MM [Hemisphere Degrees_Minutes.Decimal Minutes] 
Sonde IP Lon: W 114_16.761 
[E/W] DDD_MM.MM [Hemisphere Degrees_Minutes.Decimal 
Minutes] 
Sonde IP Elev: 1354  Feet above MSL [Sonde Impact Point Terrain Elevation] 
           
Altitude Wind Profile Ballistic Wind      





(Mag) Knots      
0 999 999 999 999  999  999  
1000 999 999 999 999  999  999  
* 1360    297 4 297 4  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
2000 316 5 308 4  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
3000 352 3 319 4  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
4000 141 6 327 2  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
5000 129 2 8 0  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
6000 230 2 163 0  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
7000 217 5 215 1  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
8000 206 5 213 1  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
9000 204 7 210 2  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
# 9429    204 8 209 2  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
## 
10000     208 9 208 3  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
11000 220 14 211 3  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
12000 231 20 216 5  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
13000 238 28 222 6  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
14000 238 32 227 8  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
15000 236 34 229 10  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
16000 233 35 230 12  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
17000 230 35 230 13  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
18000 228 35 230 14  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
19000 227 37 230 16  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
20000 227 39 230 17  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
21000 226 41 229 18  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
22000 224 43 229 19  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
23000 221 45 228 20  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
24000 219 47 227 21  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
25000 217 50 227 22  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
26000 215 52 226 24  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
27000 213 54 225 25  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
28000 211 57 224 26  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
29000 211 60 223 27  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
30000 211 64 222 28  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
31000 211 66 221 29  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
32000 211 66 220 31  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
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33000 211 66 219 32  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
34000 211 66 219 33  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
35000 211 66 218 34  N 33_22.160 W 114_16.513 
* Planned PI Elevation        
# Sonde First Wind ALtitude        





Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) Message 
Format   
         
JOTS Warnings JOTS-W File       
A JOTS Warnings File is a collection of warning messages in Over-The-Horizon (OTH) format, 
preceded by a file header (created by a transmission protocol, typically DPSR)  
         
    <JOTS-file> ::= <DPSR-header>      
            <OTH-message>*      
         
 A transmission file header <DPSR-header> created by DPSR is a set of lines.  
 The first line contains one word "BEGIN"; the last line of the <DPSR-header>  
 has a single word "END" (immediately followed by a newline).    
         
 An <OTH-message> is a collection of lines; each line is exactly 69-characters  
 long (space-padded if needed) terminated with a #\newline character. 
Line's   
 content is entirely in upper case.      
    <OTH-message> ::= <OTH-header> <body-lines>* "ENDAT" 64#<space> "\n"  
    <OTH-header> ::= <message-id> " " <timestamp> <space-padding>   
    <message-id> ::= 7-alphanum characters, starting with "METX"   
    <timestamp> ::= <JJ><MM><YY><GG>     
       where <JJ> are the last two digits of the year, <MM> is    
        the UTC month of the year, <YY> is the UTC day of the month,   











TAB B:  
 
Tab B: How To Publish To A GIGCast Channel 
 
 
1) Obtain the Java Publisher Client 
The Java Publisher Client is available on GIG-Lite. The client comes as a tar file that 
includes a Java jar file, an associated DTD file and an executable script called 
publisher.sh. Untar the client tar file into a working directory. 
 
2) Run Publisher 





If authentication is needed, enter your username and password in the spaces provided 
and hit “Refresh”. The available channels will be listed in the scroll pane. 
 
3) Choose Channel 
Highlight the channel to which you want to publish and press “Publish”. The 






4) Fill in Metadata 
The metadata associated with the channel will be listed in the scroll pane. Metadata 
text fields that are grey are not editable and are considered to be fixed values by the 





5) Choose Data File 
If you know the absolute path to your data file, you can type it directly into the text 
















TAB C: Mission Scenarios and Threads 
 
You Are There Workshop: Field Intelligence 
 
The Objective: Provide cross-coalition access to vital intelligence by a warrior on the 
ground. 
 
Scenario: A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is operating in a hostile 
environment supported by a military intelligence team. The intelligence team is tasked to 
continuously obtain and evaluate sensor intelligence data, assess threat and opportunity, 
and share results with staff and operational units as appropriate. 2 X Predator and 1 X 
JSTARS Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are shared theater assets whose services can be 
requested by JSOTF The team communicates over a 50KPS SECRET-high circuit.  
 
Sample Value Proposition: Increase the lethality of the kill chain by breaking down the 
administrative barriers separating warriors from advantageous information, regardless of 
classification or who holds it. 
You Are There Workshop: Humanitarian Disaster Relief 
 
The Objective: Execute sense and respond logistics and command and control in support 
of third world disaster relief. 
 
Scenario: After a large-scale natural disaster (earthquake coincident with heavy monsoon 
rains) in SE Asia, a humanitarian effort is undertaken to provide relief and stability in a 
devastated and remote region of a mountainous country. The disaster has eliminated 
roads and airfields used for accessing the backcountry. The government of the country 
has requested aid, and will permit US military forces into its borders to assist with initial 
relief efforts. Additionally, non-government relief organizations are rallying to the cause 
and are being permitted to enter the country. 
 
Sample Value Proposition: Increase the speed of support to chaotic zones by employing 
intelligent agents against rapidly accumulating raw data to accelerate evaluation of 
potential courses of action. 
You Are There Workshop: Border Control 
 
Objective: Establish international border control. 
 
Scenario: The international intelligence community reports that Al Qaeda "Chatter" is 
high. It is height of European tourist season and the Euro is very strong. Airports are 
thronged. The European Union, the United States, and most of the members of the United 
Nations have agreed to collaborate with respect to sharing data that might help identify 
terrorists at border check points. 
 
Sample value proposition: Prevent terrorist movement by cross referencing distributed 
biometrics, stolen documentation, wanted persons, etc. data bases, in real time and in 









Building Multilevel Secure Web Services-Based Components for the Global 
Information Grid 
 




Dylan McNamee , Galois Connections, Inc.  
CDR Scott Heller , Program Executive Office C4I and Space  
Dave Huff , Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic Center 
 
A consensus is growing that the Department of Defense’s vision of a future Global 
Information Grid will be built using architecture that takes advantage of Web services 
and uses standard Internet protocols, interchangeable components, and commercially 
available hardware and software wherever possible. This article describes the features 
and architecture of two systems: the Trusted Services Engine and the Multilevel 
Document Collaboration Server, including their use of a separation kernel with multiple 
independent levels of security, the design and assurance architecture of the cross-domain 
block-access controller, and the composition architecture that extends the inter-level 
isolation property from the block access controller outward through complex services.  
 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) is the overall architecture intended to replace current 
stovepipe information systems. A consensus is growing that the Department of Defense’s 
vision of this future GIG will use an architecture that takes advantage of Web services 
and uses standard Internet protocols, interchangeable components, and commercially 
available hardware and software wherever possible. By adopting modern standards-based 
protocols, the GIG will enhance current capability by enabling people and components to 
work together dynamically with integrated data.  
Protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol, eXtensible Markup Language (XML), 
Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV), Really Simple 
Syndication, and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol allow the GIG to be made of 
off-the-shelf components where appropriate. Where custom components are required, 
pervasive use of these protocols preserves the component-based architecture of the GIG, 
thus protecting the architecture from developing into a stovepipe system.  
Many of these components and protocols are mature and well understood, but they were 
not designed with security as the paramount consideration. Securing the GIG is therefore 
a significant challenge. Particularly critical is securing its cross-domain services. For 
these, the GIG itself must somehow enforce separate levels of security.  
Today, physical isolation enforces separation, though other technologies such as 
cryptography may someday be used. Such separation allows the use of commercial 
components as single-level components not responsible for cross-domain security 
concerns. However, for the GIG to realize its potential, some components must enable 
secure cross-domain data access. Clearly such components, while they must conform to 
commercial protocols, must be developed to higher than commercial standards.  
This article, which describes such a component, has three main parts:  
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1. We describe the security and assurance attributes required of a cross-domain 
component of the GIG.  
2. We describe the architecture and technologies we are using to achieve these 
attributes in the Trusted Services Engine (TSE), a network-enabled file store with 
integrated read-down across security domains.  
3. We conclude by describing a system built on the TSE, the Multilevel Document 
Collaboration Server, to enable cross-domain collaboration withindocuments – an 
example of using simple cross-domain components to build more complex cross-
domain systems using only standard protocols and APIs.  
This article describes the features and architecture of both systems:  
• The design and assurance architecture of the cross-domain block access controller 
(BAC).  
• The use of a Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) separation kernel.  
• The composition architecture that extends the cross-domain isolation property 
from the MILS separation kernel to the BAC and outward through complex 
services.  
This article is focused toward a technical audience familiar with Web services.  
Assurance Requirements for Cross-Domain GIG Components  
The nature and mission of the GIG makes it a prime target for trained, well-funded, and 
resourceful adversaries. The threats posed by such adversaries, coupled with the value of 
the information on the GIG, require us to show that the GIG components are robust in the 
face of these threats. In particular, the greater security risks associated with cross-domain 
components – as compared to single-level, commercial solutions – require a 
correspondingly higher level of trust. The process of generating and evaluating evidence 
of trustworthiness is known as assurance, the most difficult aspect of security 
engineering.  
Two processes in the defense and intelligence communities support each other to 
generate assurance evidence for a GIG component: evaluation and certification. 
Evaluation is the process of validating security claims for a particular component. For 
example, the Common Criteria is an international standard for specifying claims of 
system security functionality and generating assurance that these claims are satisfied. We 
have determined that the cross-domain components we are building will need to meet the 
requirements for Common Criteria’s Evaluation Assurance Level 6 or 7 [1].  
Certification focuses on verifying that a component can be securely deployed at a 
particular site. Certification is best represented by such processes as Secret and Below 
Interoperability, and Top Secret and Below Interoperability. What these processes have 
in common is a way to tailor requirements for evaluation or certification of the following:  
• Sensitivity of the data that the component handles.  
• Severity of the threats it must withstand.  
For example, under Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3, a cross-domain 
component that needs to demonstrate high assurance with respect to confidentiality must 
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satisfy Protection Level 4 or 5 assurance requirements. Evaluating or certifying a 
component to one of those standards requires an extensive investment in time and 
resources. But given the responsibilities of a cross-domain component of the GIG, high 
assurance is a must.  
Architecture for a High-Assurance GIG Component  
The TSE, a government off-the-shelf software development project funded by the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) and National Security Agency, is a 
network-enabled file store with integrated read-down across security domains. The TSE 
provides the file store using the standard WebDAV protocol. It has a separate hardware 
network interface for each network security level and a separate file store for data at each 
level.  
The TSE enforces the Bell-LaPadula policy of information flow [2], in which users on 
each network can read from their own level and below, but can write only to their own 
level. For example, when one security level dominates another (for example, TOP 
SECRET dominates SECRET), the TSE allows read-down – the ability for users at a 
higher level to access data from a lower level, but not vice-versa. All levels share a single 
name space, but views of that name space differ according to the network security level 
accessing the TSE.  
Read-down eliminates the need for low-security data to be explicitly copied for users at 
high security. The single name space combined with read-down makes a wide range of 
applications and user workflows easier, more dynamic, and less error-prone than existing 
solutions.  
Developing, certifying, and evaluating a high assurance cross-domain component such as 
the TSE at acceptable cost requires a fundamentally different architecture from that of 
typical, single-level components. Our approach is the following: Use as few high-
assurance components as possible, each with a single purpose, to keep it small and 
simple, allowing it to be analyzed formally. But security is a property of a whole system, 
not just a component. Appropriate composition techniques can extend the security 
properties of the trusted computing base outward to the rest of the system.  
The TSE’s trusted computing base consists of the minimum number of components: one. 
TSE functionality is decomposed into a set of single-level components and only one 
cross-domain component. The underlying MILS separation kernel separates components 
at different security levels. Each network security level has a set of clients, an 
authentication service, and an integrity checker (see Figure 1). Within the TSE, each 
network level has its own network interface card, hard drive, and software stack 





Figure 1: Trusted Services Engine (TSE) Architecture 
The TSE’s only cross-domain component, the BAC, mediates all access between the TSE 
and each level’s disks.  
How can these components be assembled to provide secure, cross-domain services?  
1. The base must be secure before building on it. We must first establish the 
isolation properties of the cross-domain component.  
2. We can then extend these properties to physically separate networks by mapping 
the software components to separate partitions in the separation kernel.  
3. Finally, the separation kernel is configured to permit communication only 
between appropriate components.  
The Cross-Domain Component 
Together with the separation kernel, the BAC is responsible for isolating each level in the 
TSE. It is, therefore, the component that needs to be evaluated and certified to the highest 
levels of assurance. The BAC’s functions are the following:  
• Mediate all disk block access.  
• Connect single-level disks and partitions.  
• Write blocks to the same level.  
• Read blocks from the same or lower levels.  
The keys to BAC security are that it has a well-defined job and is constructed from very 
few lines of code. The current version of the BAC is 780 lines of C code. To ensure that 
the BAC implements the required attributes, we do the following:  
1. Develop a formal model of the code.  
2. Verify that the model corresponds to the code.  
3. Develop a formal model of the policy.  
 227
4. Use model-based testing to check that the code implements the policy.  
5. Formally verify that the model implements the policy.  
Our formal verification ensures that the TSE security policy maps directly to the model, 
and the model to the implementation. To map the policy to the model, we use the Isabelle 
Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem prover [3]. The theorems we prove in this logic are 
the following:  
• None of the error states are reachable.  
• The noninterference property holds.  
The noninterference property states that all system actions by high security-level 
components are invisible to low security-level components; that is, the final state of the 
low-level component is the same as it would be if no actions had occurred at the high-
security level.  
To map the model to the implementation, a code-to-spec review team of at least two 
people performs a line-by-line inspection of the HOL code and the C implementation.  
The example in Table 1 – a single step of the BAC – shows how closely the model 
matches the implementation. Our model-based testing approach uses the QuickCheck 
tool [4]. Based on a formal statement of the security policy, QuickCheck generates test 
cases that check whether or not the implementation violates that policy. The policies we 
have verified using this method are the following:  
• Read-across: Reads fetch the data written at that same level.  
• Read-down:  
o Valid reads succeed.  
o Invalid reads (that is, read-up) fail.  





Table 1: A Single Step of the Block Access Controller 
Other Key Components  
MILS Separation Kernel  
The BAC, when hosted by the MILS separation kernel [5, 6], is an instantiation of the 
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reference monitor concept [7]. Unlike a traditional operating system that provides many 
services and abstractions, a separation kernel provides only data isolation among separate 
partitions and controlled communication between partitions. Porting an application to 
MILS also requires choosing a runtime or operating system to run within each partition 
that provides the higher-level system services the application requires, or porting one of 
your own choosing.  
It is not enough simply to port a single-level application to a MILS separation kernel, 
however. The system needs to be thoughtfully decomposed and mapped to MILS 
partitions. Further, some key components (such as the file system) may need to be 
radically restructured to function in a multilevel environment.  
While the TSE project aims to be portable across separation kernels, the initial target is 
Green Hills Software’s INTEGRITY Server. This platform allows us to deploy software 
components from different security levels on the same hardware, thus reducing space, 
weight, and power requirements while retaining isolation properties equal to those 
provided by networks on physically separate hardware.  
The WebDAV Server  
The single-level components of the TSE are the WebDAV server, the file system, the 
network stack, and the secure sockets layer/transport-layer security (SSL/TLS). To 
provide the security aspects of WebDAV with high assurance, we implemented the 
WebDAV server using Haskell, a type-safe functional language [8]. We ported the 
Haskell runtime system to INTEGRITY server. The Haskell runtime system encapsulates 
services such as networking, threading, and memory management.  
The Wait-Free File System  
As Figure 1 shows, the TSE file system is a single-level component. We were surprised 
to find that no existing single-level file system met our requirements. The problem is 
caused by read-down – a user on a high-level network can read files from a lower level 
while a user on the low-level network changes those files. Ordinarily, locks could be used 
to solve this problem, but cross-domain locks violate non-interference and are 
unacceptable in this case. How can the TSE present consistent data without introducing a 
proscribed communication channel, overt or covert?  
Designers of algorithms for shared-memory multiprocessors face a similar problem that 
they solve using a method called wait-free synchronization [9]. Wait-free synchronization 
guarantees that interactions with concurrent objects take a finite number of steps instead 
of using critical sections, which block competing processes for an indeterminate time. 
The wait-free file system adapts this idea for its own synchronization method. This 
preserves the isolation property by the following:  
• Writers are oblivious to readers.  
• Readers can proceed independently of writers.  
Outside Services  
To minimize the trusted base and avoid duplication of function, the TSE will use, or uses 
outside services wherever possible. Key services are authentication and integrity-
checking; so far we have evaluated Navy enterprise single sign-on for authentication and 
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one-way file transfer for integrity-checking, but final decisions will be driven by the 
demands of specific installations at customer sites.  
Though it is conservative and efficient to draw on outside services, it also means that we 
must build a chain of trust from our base to the outside service. We use several methods 
to help us do so:  
• Outside services are all single-level, which minimizes their trustworthiness 
requirements.  
• We choose services specified and trusted by our customers that have been vetted 
in similar deployment scenarios.  
• The TSE and companion services use the standard cryptographic protocols 
SSL/TLS and digital certificates to manage communication between them.  
The sum of the TSE and a specific set of external services is submitted for the 
certification prerequisite to multilevel deployment.  
Building Complex Multilevel Services on the TSE  
The TSE can be used as a building block for more complex cross-domain services, as 
demonstrated by another current Galois project, the Multilevel Document Collaboration 
Server (DocServer). Its architecture reuses the decomposition structure of the TSE to 
provide multilevel secure document-based collaboration.  
The DocServer allows a user at a high network level to make private modifications to an 
XML-based document stored at a lower level. The DocServer supports ongoing 
modifications at multiple network levels; modifications from the high network are visible 
only to users on the high network, while modifications from the low network are visible 
to users at that level and above.  
The DocServer also supports publishing regraded documents from high network levels to 
low, using XML filtering and integration with an outside regrading system such as 
Radiant Mercury or ISSE Guard. These systems enable transfer of documents from high 
security to low security by enabling a human reviewer to reliably review all of a 
document’s contents (including possibly hidden content), and, upon successful review, 
write it to the low network.  
In the case of the DocServer, a high-level user marks up the document according to a new 
set of security levels, and submits it for regrading. The DocServer filters the document 
and sends the filtered version to the regrading system. After human review, the filtered 
version of the document is written to the DocServer’s low-level file system.  
Figure 2 shows the publish, edit, merge workflow of the DocServer. At left, a user on the 
Secret network publishes the document to the Unclassified network. The DocServer 
filters the Secret content and submits the resulting unclassified document to the regrader. 
After regrading, users on both network levels make modifications to the document. 
Modifications made at Secret are not visible below, but Unclassified modifications are 






Figure 2: DocServer Merge Operations 
The DocServer is a Phase 1 Small Business Innovative Research project funded by 
SPAWAR.  
Conclusion  
The DocServer uses the TSE for file storage and its sole cross-domain component. 
Reusing the only high-assurance component gains us a great deal – the DocServer should 
be certifiable to the same level as the TSE with little additional work.  
The DocServer’s use of the TSE to achieve high assurance, cross-domain function 
mirrors the TSE’s internal use of the BAC. By building the DocServer from this core 
component, we once again take advantage of the BAC, effectively extending its security 
policy through to increasingly complex systems.  
The TSE’s component architecture demonstrates a powerful technique for extending the 
security properties of a formally analyzed core component to a wide scope. In a similar 
manner, the DocServer uses MILS to extend the security properties of the TSE outward 
to provide complex multilevel functionality.  
TSE Status  
Development of Vers. 1.0 of the TSE will be complete in summer 2006, and will be 
followed by certification at a customer site. We expect to begin Common Criteria 
evaluation at evaluation Level 6+ the following year. Phase 1 of the DocServer is near 
completion. We hope to begin Phase II in spring 2006, and commercial transition 
sometime in 2007.  
 231
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Statement of Work - Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) 
Netcentric Certification Office (NCO) 
 
Principle Investigator: C. R. Gunderson, Department of Information 
Science, and the Cebrowski Institute, Naval Postgraduate School 
Period of Performance: 1 April 06 – 31 Dec 06 
 
Background and Approach  
 
Today’s test and evaluation process for C4ISR acquisition programs is system 
centric. That is, we formally evaluate whether a particular combination of 
hardware and software meets “system performance specifications” in formal 
developmental and operational test environments before fielding the stand alone 
“system”. This is a long, expensive, one-size-fits-all, serial process that is out of 
touch with the rapid information processing technology refresh cycle. 
 
Conversely, Global Information Grid (GIG) Netcentric Enterprise Service (NCES) 
vision calls for deploying a system of services, wherein distributed composable 
software components will be fielded rapidly and piecemeal, in deliberate 
expectation that the services will be “discovered” and applied netcentrically in 
unpredictable and uncontrolled ways. To realize this vision, the Director of DISA 
has mandated an Adapt, Buy, Create (ABC) policy that calls for first Adapting 
existing tools, or after determining that existing tools are inadequate, Buying 
generic commercial tools and adapting them to solve specific problems, or as a 
last resort, Creating specialized solutions. Emphasis is squarely on innovative re-













































Statement of Work for JTIC 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School Cebrowski Institute will leverage lessons learned 
in its W2COG research initiative and apply expertise resident among Naval 
Postgraduate School Faculty and Students to assist JITC create the Netcentric 
Certification Office and thereby accelerate incremental fielding of NCES and JC2. 
In particular, the Cebrowski Institute will assist JITC to design pilots and follow-
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Consortium Jump Starts Network-Centric Interoperability  
September 1, 2005 
by Capt. Chris Gunderson, USN (Ret.)  
 
Semantic interoperability is an age-old problem that 
has confronted mankind since the Tower of Babel. 
Finding a solution to the confusion of tongues is the 
next plateau in the U.S. Defense Department’s 
Global Information Grid strategy. In pursuit of that 
modern day Rosetta stone, an organization 
comprising representatives from the military, 
government, industry and academia has created an 
open forum for technical experts to brainstorm and 
rapidly field interoperable information-processing 
solutions across Defense Department and coalition 
partner networks. 
 
The World Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) is the brainchild of Peter Denning, 
professor and computer science department chairman, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California. It is a working meritocracy based on the principle that networks 
of motivated experts, independent of central authority, are the best and only way to 
solve complex problems, Denning says. “The focus is operational, on real-world 
mission-thread-analysis-driven communications-architecture solutions to top-down 
Department of Defense Global Information Grid policy,” he explains. 
 
“There are two major challenges to achieving robust interoperability across 
distributed networks—one is technical and the other is organizational,” Denning 
maintains. "The technical challenge is how to put together the best information 
environment to speed and ease information sharing among systems that were not 
originally designed to talk to one another. The organizational challenge is 
determining how to get bureaucracies to adopt new practices that cut across 
organizational boundaries and harness collective expertise. The W2COG 
simultaneously addresses both of these challenges.” 
 
To facilitate evaluation and comparison of operational network-centric solutions, the 
W2COG’s Web site will host a portal to a credible virtual simulation of the enterprise 
architecture envisioned for the GIG. The simulation is called GIG-Lite. Working 
engineers and technical experts on the GIG domain and network-centric operations 
are encouraged to join the consortium via the site. All ideas and solutions members 
propose will be quickly evaluated and selected based on merit for informal and 
formal field-testing by technical peers. 
 
To launch the new consortium, the Naval Postgraduate School jointly sponsored an 
inaugural W2COG Working Symposium in May. Other symposium sponsors included 
George Mason University, the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium, the 
Association for Enterprise Integration and the Association for Computing Machinery. 
More than 130 network-centric experts from the active duty and retired military, 
civilian agencies, coalition allies, industry, academia and nongovernmental 
organizations participated.  
 
Conference attendees identified six engineering pilot projects to advance the 
consortium’s mission, including one that leverages portable hastily formed networks 
developed at the Navy’s corporate university. As a result of the success of the first 
symposium, a second is planned for February 2006. 
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The W2COG’s founding team was inspired by the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), a key catalyst for Web technological innovation that currently has more than 
400 member organizations. Don Brutzman, associate professor of information 
sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, and founding W2COG team member, is the 
W3C’s liaison to another key group, the Web3D Consortium (Web3D). Web3D is 
developing the Extensible 3D (X3D) graphics specification for three-dimensional 
graphics on the Web, a project in which Naval Postgraduate School faculty and 
students are playing major roles.  
 
“We’re now at an exciting threshold to the GIG,” Brutzman relates. “The Rosetta 
stone for getting data to semantically interoperate and structuring information for 
use on the Web is XML [extensible markup language], a meta-language for writing 
other computer languages; and interoperability using XML, in turn, is the heart of the 
Defense Department’s Global Information Grid strategy. So we now have all the 
pieces to do network-centric operations—they just need to be put into place. That’s 
the reason for W2COG.  
 
“We’re taking full advantage of past successes in deciding how to set up W2COG,” 
Brutzman notes. “The Internet gave us data communications; the Web made any 
raw data available; and the third plateau, which we’re now working on, is semantic 
interoperability.Once that’s in place, truly new and exciting Web capabilities can 
emerge. W2COG’s early members will be those who want their organizations to 
communicate using XML, the GIG and Web services. That’s a big step, but it’s the 
future of all defense, government and intergovernmental communications—working 
together like never before.”  
 
The Office of Force Transformation; the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networking 
and Information Integration; the Undersecretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and 
Concepts; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; and the Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command were the Defense Department sponsors for the 
W2COG’s planning phase. The Naval Postgraduate School will take the lead in 
coordinating research that addresses W2COG-identified topics and will provide access 
to its large pool of master’s degree students who conduct thesis research.  
 
Denning says that a long-term W2COG goal is to develop a prioritized agenda of 
technical questions that need to be researched. “These will be matched with Naval 
Postgraduate School student thesis topics through a formal, coordinated process, as 
well as coordinated with the wider university community," he explains. 
 
The professor has asked Maj. Angela Burth, USAF, communications officer, to help 
create and lead the W2COG’s market/broker solutions working group. “The main goal 
of the GIG is interoperable information sharing among a large number of often ad 
hoc partners, and markets are the planned transaction space for such a practiced 
adhocracy,” Maj. Burth says. “One means to achieve this goal is using market 
mechanisms to stimulate and facilitate information sharing. In fact, W2COG itself is a 
network-centric solution, e-transaction space, which is why it’s a true force for 
change.”  
 
The W2COG is forming strategic partnerships with two related industry consortia: the 
Association for Enterprise Integration (AFEI) and the Network Centric Operations 
Industry Consortium (NCOIC). The AFEI will concentrate on policy, while the NCOIC 
will focus on engineering standards and the W2COG will work on building and testing 
prototypes.  
 
Capt. Chris Gunderson, USN (Ret.), is an associate research professor of information sciences at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, and the executive director of the World Wide Consortium for 
the Grid. He can be contacted at chris.gunderson@w2cog.org. 
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Netcentric Warfare Looks Like Commercial E-Business. Just Ask 
Al Qaeda.  
By Chris Gunderson. 
 
Successful enterprises understand their business model and use technology to support it. 
The model comes first.  
 
Let's say you are the boss of a multinational outfit that owns a giant computer network 
made up of hundreds of independent systems built, operated and maintained by scores of 
subordinate organizations. You've made new business decisions around the idea of 
globally distributed operations. Wisely; after all, that strategy works for Wal-Mart, 
FedEx, and many others.  
So, you task your heretofore autonomous subordinates with pooling their resources and 
building a global computer network that allows interoperable connectivity with legacy 
and ever-increasing new data sources and network services. Obviously, you want to 
encourage these subordinates to continuously improve the interoperability and 
accessibility of the connected data sources and services. Name a company with success at 
these kinds of tasks. Here's a hint: Rhymes with "bugle." Name a giant which has, so far, 
failed. No hints.  
Meanwhile, let's say your business rival is beating the pants off you when it comes to 
distributed networked operations. Shockingly, your rival is a tiny little outfit that doesn't 
even own its own network infrastructure. It just buys services.  
This isn't hypothetical. The big outfit is the Defense Department, with its visionary 
network known as the Global Information Grid (GIG).  
The rival is Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda uses the Internet, common wireless technologies, cell 
phones and commercial security packages to coordinate its extraordinarily effective 
operations. By first hand accounts I've heard, they're better at it than we are. Any credible 
approach to fielding the GIG must turn this asymmetric disadvantage into an 
overwhelmingly symmetric advantage.  
Immediately.  
We've got more money, people and eye-watering technology. We should rule the 
information-processing marketplace, but we don't.  
So, there are lessons to be learned from e-business service providers like America Online, 
Yahoo, and Google, and successful e-business service consumers like eBay, 
Amazon.com and Travelocity. This is not a surprising suggestion – especially from me. 
After all, I am a researcher sponsored by Office of the Secretary of Defense to study the 
Internet community. Neither is this a unique idea. Many in the DOD are already getting 
good-enough commercial technology fielded for military applications.  
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What I am suggesting is not that DOD merely learn lessons from the best practitioners of 
e-business. Rather, I am suggesting that DOD literally join the e-business ecosystem. I 
propose that DOD harvest the benefit of technology as it matures using the same 
approach and realize the same economies and speeds enjoyed by successful Internet 
technology consumers.  
Conventional wisdom says DOD requirements are just too unique for generic solutions, 
but conventional wisdom is an anathema to transformation. And conventional wisdom 
isn't helping us beat the insurgency.  
What I am suggesting requires a transformation. DOD must change from being a builder 
and operator of networks and become an enabler and manager of network services that 
will give our soldiers information advantage over our adversaries in the way Wal-Mart 
overwhelms its competition.  
The transition has five steps.  
First, develop a business model and two business targets. The business targets are to 
decrease network costs by leveraging economy of scale as a peer of Google, AOL, Yahoo 
and others. And to reinvest the savings in "innovation" just as Google et al do. DOD's 
objective, of course, is to gain "information edge" over an adversary.  
Second, structure contracts as e-service consumers, not as program managers. Govern 
and create incentives for improved metrics in quality of service metrics, security, 
productivity and cost rather than system specifications.  
Third, select GIG service providers based on success in e-business rather than defense 
systems.  
Fourth, create test and evaluation methodologies that get network services into the field 
faster, then continuously improve them. Listen to user suggestions for improvements.  
Fifth, align DOD engineering processes and human resources with the new mission 
model. Make auditing and budgeting tools match these transformational objectives. 
Converting legacy process and people to the new model will require a sustained sense of 
urgency and a relentless incremental approach.  
If it is not a big change -- fast -- it is not transformation. If it doesn't help us win, it's not 
worth it.  
Chris Gunderson is executive director of the Worldwide Consortium for the Grid 
(W2COG) Research Initiative, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is 
also associate research professor of information science for the Naval Postgraduate 
School. He retired as captain following 27 years as an oceanographer for the Navy. 
Contact him at Chris.Gunderson@w2cog.org.  
 
 242
DoD Turns to Industry for the Internet it Wants 
GCN Home > 04/03/06 issue 
By William Jackson, GCN Staff  
The Defense Department recognizes Version 6 of the Internet Protocols as central to its 
concept of network-centric warfare. But enabling a worldwide network to pass IPv6 
packets is not enough to realize its goal. It requires applications and tools. 
 
This is the job of the World Wide Consortium for the Grid.  
 
“The DOD was taken by surprise by IPv4,” said W2COG executive director Chris 
Gunderson.  
 
Commercial products developed to open technical standards helped the Internet develop 
in ways never envisioned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DOD 
wanted to leverage that power for its Global Information Grid.  
 
But “leadership realized that DOD wasn’t wired that way,” Gunderson said. “We 
continue to develop the same capabilities with different vendors again and again and 
again. That’s why [DOD] felt it needed to invest in an organization like this.”  
 
W2COG was formed as a commercial incubator in late 2004 with $1.6 million in DOD 
seed money and was incorporated in June 2005. It helps the department work with 
academia and the private sector to develop commercial products for its own net-centric 
operations.  
 
Is it too late for DOD to influence the commercial development of IPv6 for its own ends?  
 
“Nobody is very far along in kicking the tires on it and figuring out what it can do,” 
Gunderson said. “There is still plenty of time for DOD to be on the leading edge.” 
 
W2COG still is ramping up. “We have only now started to collect dues and get our first 
products on the table.”  
 
The first product making its way through the pipeline is an ultrawideband, wall-
penetrating radar device that could create a security “bubble” for troops in the field. 
When an area, building or room has been cleared of combatants, a device could be 
installed that would alert troops if anyone re-entered the area.  
 
The Marine Corps Systems Command is funding testing and development of the device, 
which now is in the demo stage. “By May it will be a product in the field,” Gunderson 
said.  
 
W2COG in January announced a partnership with the IPv6 Forum to promote and 




 “IPv6 gives us the opportunity to improve current communications capabilities, 
especially at the edge of the network,” where it is needed most in DOD net-centric 
operations, Gunderson said.  
 
Incubators such as W2COG are helpful in developing new technologies, because 
established companies often are reluctant to take these risks.  
 
 “The small companies hungering at the edge are going to come up with these ideas,” 
Gunderson said. “What we’re providing is a place where you can fail fast and cheap,” so 
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A Market-based Approach to Building the Global Information Grid: 
Valued Information at the Right Time and  




The US DoD intends its enterprise architecture, the Global Information Grid, to deliver 
high-value services aimed at two key objectives: enhance mission effectiveness through 
more efficient information processing, and enhance programmatic efficiency through 
more efficient acquisition process. Both depend on the concept of netcentric operations 
(NCO), i.e. effective interaction of distributed, composable, modular components. 
“Effective” means measurably improves netcentric productivity, where “productivity” is 
defined as effect/effort. Hence we must focus on how to improve the value of the 
information that NCO processes manipulate. 
 
Therefore, we should pursue a market-based approach to defining information value. Call 
this operational concept "Valuable Information at the Right Time" (VIRT) and the 
acquisition concept "Value Off The Shelf" (VOTS). Communities of interest (COI) will 
define the value attributes of VIRT and VOTS, i.e. what DoD has coined “net-ready” key 
performance parameters (NR-KPP). COIs will require new doctrine and methodologies to 
accommodate this new concept. W2COG proposes that we adapt the “Internet model” of 
enterprise engineering -- which we call an NCO Incubator -- to rapidly field information 
processing reference implementations. A reference implementation is a successfully 
demonstrated instance of incrementally improved information processing capability, one 
increment of NCO productivity.  In addition to reference implementations, the NCO 
Incubator will deliver documented lessons learned with respect to both reference 
implementation technology and supporting COI process and doctrine. 
 
The NCO Incubator differs from existing government rapid prototyping efforts in an 
important way: vendor innovation and internal R&D are leveraged up front and the 
government will work to place successfully demonstrated products immediately on the 
GSA or other convenient consumable procurement schedule. Thus the implementation of 
the NCO incubator requires a component inside government and a component outside, 
working together. 
 
The W2COG Institute, with its network of government and industry experts, is the non-
government component of the NCO Incubator. We propose that the government establish 
a pilot project to demonstrate in-government component, which we refer to as the 




A Market-Based Approach to Defining Information Value 
 
DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG) is an approach to service-oriented enterprise 
architecture that aims to improve mission effectiveness and programmatic cost 
effectiveness. The key to achieving both goals is net-centricity, i.e, effective distributed 
collaboration among composable, interoperable, components. Adopting netcentric 
operations and engineering represents profound change in DoD practice, i.e. 
“transformation.” Fielding GIG will require the following two doctrinal imperatives.   
  
1. Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT): an approach to the 
increasingly vast market place of data that encourages careful choices 
regarding how valuable time is spent “buying” and “consuming” information. 
We get competitive advantage from finding opportunity and acting quickly. 
We lose competitive advantage if we waste time processing insignificant data. 
Time spent acting on critical information makes money and wins battles. A 
decision made too late is not a useful decision.   
 
2. Value Off The Shelf (VOTS): an approach to delivering “good enough” 
capability fast enough to take advantage of the rapid advances taking place in 
the information technology market. This approach emphasizes bundling 
interoperable off-the-shelf components in an architecture optimized for VIRT. 
We get competitive advantage from finding opportunity and acting quickly. 
We lose our advantage if we waste time on processes that are inherently too 
slow to exploit current opportunities. Time spent fielding capability makes 
money and wins battles. A system fielded after the battle is not a valuable 
capability.  
 
Notice that these doctrinal imperatives depend on an entrepreneurial market behavioral 
model. Neither existing DoD operational nor acquisition doctrine confront 
entrepreneurial market models. Both dictate disciplined hierarchies with associated rigid 
behavior models. Netcentric transformation requires change to, or at least addition of, this 
value-oriented approach to focusing basic behavior across all levels of the enterprise.  
  
VIRT Architecture improves effectiveness by increasing the fraction of time spent 
processing valuable information. Important characteristics of VIRT-based organizations 
include the following: 
 
1. Operators request “bids” from various potential providers to satisfy 
information requirements for specific tasks and desired outcomes. 
2. A system of systems automatically, but sparingly, delivers context-sensitive 
information culled by intelligent agents that detect significant changes in the 
state of important parameters.  
3. The system rewards information providers whose products tangibly enhance 
productivity. 
4. The system pressures operators to make effective selections of information 
and information sources. 
5. The system applies pressure to operators and information providers to 
reinforce and improve productive choices. 
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6. The system decomposes mission performance threads into information value 
delivery chains, comprising essential tasks, desired outcomes, and information 
exchange elements (IEE).  
7. Mission thread analysis determines objective value characteristics of IEEs. 
8. Mission outcomes determine productivity where “productivity” is defined as 
effect/effort.  
9. Organizations design system specifications and associated performance 
metrics based on this definition of productivity  
10. A process continuously implements and improves all of the above   
 
A VOTS delivery process continually increases the productivity of employed systems by 
drastically reducing the time, cost, and bureaucratic friction for implementing 
improvements. This process has the following characteristics: 
 
1. VOTS process delivers VIRT products and components that work 
immediately, “out of the box,” in standard computational environments.  
2. Customers shop for VIRT products and components from various potential 
providers to satisfy specific information requirements for specific tasks and 
desired outcomes. (e.g., finding these preconfigured on the GSA schedule) 
3. The system tangibly rewards providers of VIRT products and components that 
tangibly enhance productivity. 
4. The system pressures program managers to make effective selections of 
VIRT-enabling components.  
5. Product or component “value” depends only on its ability to enhance 
operators’ productivity = effect/effort.  
6. Product and component specifications and associated performance metrics 
depend on ability to deliver IEEs in ways that demonstrably enhance value.  
7. A process continuously implements and improves all of the above   
 
Examples of VIRT architectures and VOTS delivery processes occur in the commercial 
marketplace. Target Stores uses one such implementation (Hewlett Packard’s version) 
called Zero Latency Enterprise (ZLE) to operate all its retail activities. (Picture the 
magnitude of Target’s retail activities!) ZLE links multiple heterogeneous legacy 
information systems, tracks tens of millions of daily transactions and hundreds of 
millions of inventory items in real time, links various independent organizations, 
manages terabytes of on-line and archived data interactively, assesses and integrates 
human factors, scales up or down, and is highly reliable 24/7. Target uses productivity 
metrics to identify and track key IEEs. Furthermore, they employ business rules and 
intelligent software agents to analyze the data continuously and to trigger human actions 
intended to enhance productivity. For example, fraudulent transactions drain productivity. 
ZLE implementers developed an agent that selects the few most relevant IEEs required to 
predict whether a particular transaction is fraudulent from the best sources of that data.  
As a cashier blithely executes what is likely to be a fraudulent transaction, the agent 
automatically sends an alarm to enable real-time intervention by security officers.  The 
full-scale pilot project that launched ZLE as a product took ~90 days to execute. Upon 
completion of the pilot, ZLE was offered as a consumable product.  Impressed by the 
demonstration, various retailing enterprises bought ZLE “off the shelf” and quickly 
scaled, tailored, and fielded it.    
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Communities of Interest and the Internet Model 
 
Although VIRT architecture and VOTS sustaining and improving process are not yet 
prevalent in DoD, emerging GIG policy includes both ideas. The DoD Architectural 
Framework (DODAF) emphasizes the need to establish architectural measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) based on VIRT-like principles. Further, DoD’s “NET-READY” 
Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) requires that all major information systems 
demonstrate netcentric value added.  Likewise, GIG policy intends for DoD to 
collaborate with industry to realize the potential of service-oriented architecture to 
employ re-usable, plug and play (i.e. VOTS) network service components. A goal here is 
to drive down the cost, and increase the speed to market of, net-enabled capability. OSD 
has introduced the notion of “Communities of Interest” (COI) to flesh out the detail 
associated with these imperatives, but we must define the specifics of such COI activity.   
 
To field netcentric capability, COIs must understand netcentric requirements, i.e., define 
the specific characteristics of information “value” for a given application.  The value of 
information depends on its ability to improve productivity. Often we struggle to define 
“productivity” in the context of information processing activities. One proxy for 
productivity is “speed to better decision.” After all, “speed to better decision” correlates 
directly to “time not wasted evaluating irrelevant information.” By working with 
operational units to analyze specific, critical, recurring, mission threads, COIs can 
quantify both “speed” and “better” in terms of the IEEs associated with particular 
families of recurring decisions, and thereby define the VIRT requirement.     
 
Consider this scenario and associated mission thread. A commander wants to find and kill 
an elusive mobile target. The notional mission thread components are as follows: (1) 
receive “tipper”; (2) confirm validity; (3) evaluate risk of collateral damage; (4) evaluate 
and select weapon options; (5) kill target; (6) assess results.  The commander might value 
IEEs such as unattended ground sensor reports, human intelligence reports (HUMINT), 
commercial satellite imagery, very high resolution classified satellite imagery, blue force 
location reports, etc. If the window of kill opportunity is short, timeliness becomes a 
value multiplier. If the target is tiny, low resolution imagery is useless. HUMINT is 
potentially very valuable, but only if judged reliable. Data is valueless if it is too highly 
classified to share with those who need it. Data requiring lengthy analysis processes will 
be too late to be useful. Etc. COIs can use these factors to define an information value 
hierarchy, and associated business rules, analogous to the way Target employs ZLE.  
 
 
Netcentric Operations Pilot Process 
 
W2COG proposes superimposing convenient, cost-effective, opportunities for COIs to 
rapidly field pilot reference implementations of VIRT NR-KPP specifications and MOEs 
while at the same time “stocking the shelves” with VOTS components. Certainly, DoD 
already uses the concept of pilot projects to inject innovative technology or concepts 
aimed at enhancing critical capability. Some of these DoD pilots are large-scale with 
respect to time, money, and impact. Others have more modest goals, smaller budgets, and 
shorter time scales and may even include COTS components. However, in every case the 
intended sustaining mechanism for successful demonstrations is “acquisition” via the 
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Program of Record (POR), i.e. the procurement system designed to field military-specific 
systems.  A common result is that local units benefit temporarily from the “left behind” 
capability, but the POR fails to adopt it. Even in the cases where the new capability is 
embraced by the POR, it generally takes the acquisition process years to field it broadly. 
A capability late is thus years of productivity lost. 
 
W2COG pilots will depart from other DoD pilot methodology by using the “Internet 
model.” Loosely organized participants, motivated to demonstrate interoperability, 
bundle their offerings together through mutually agreed open standards. Pilot projects 
rapidly demonstrate incrementally improved capability at low, shared, cost. The 
demonstrated tool(s) is called a “reference implementation” of the targeted capability. 
Customers help develop the tool, adopt it when demonstrated to be useful, and adjust 
their training and doctrine accordingly. The productized tool is put on the market, and the 
COI carefully studies, distills, and shares lessons learned from the reference 
implementation demonstration and ensuing customer feedback. An important 
discriminator of W2COG pilots will be emphasis on the procurement mechanism 
appropriate for sustaining short life cycle and broad applicability, i.e. the “consumable” 
model, rather than the DoD POR “acquisition” model.  Specifically, W2COG will broker 
across traditional domain boundaries to combine various netcentric government, vendor, 
and academic activities. The W2COG teams will execute rapid information processing 
pilot projects with the following deliverables: 
 
1. Immediate posting of successfully demonstrated VOTS components on the 
GSA or other convenient procurement schedule.  
 
2. NET-READY reference implementation specifications and metrics for 
continuing use as “government furnished equipment” (GFE), as follows: 
• Effective COI activity  
• Hardware/software 
• COI-defined VIRT requirements 
• NCO doctrine 
 
3. Process to empower and incentivize industry to innovate toward GIG 
objectives 
 
4. Leverage of vendors’ internal R&D resources  
 
5. Fielded capability for participating customer(s) within twelve months.  
 
6. Virtual GIG (VGIG), a distributed web service-oriented run-time environment 
that simulates the GIG objective vision.  VGIG will serve as an on line 
depository of VIRT products and components, i.e. a VOTS capability 
inventory. It will include mission thread simulation data bases and evaluation 
tools that will allow customers to evaluate offerings in proper context: a fast, 
low-friction delivery mechanism for VOTS products.  It will also serve as an 
open source development environment for an interoperable service-oriented 
“substrate” of the GIG.  .   
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A Netcentric Operations “Incubator” 
 
The W2COG project has designed an “NCO Incubator” to facilitate the pilot project 
activity described above. This NCO Incubator will have both an industry and government 
component.  
 
The industry component is a not-for-profit brokering service among agile and technically 
expert government and industry providers and consumers of network-enabling artifacts.  
Because its activities occur outside the POR, this industrial component is unconstrained 
by DoD acquisition regulations. It is free to choose participants and technologies on the 
basis of value added alone. Likewise, vendor participants in the not-for-profit industrial 
venture are not constrained regarding future dealings with the government. For example, 
the government frequently contributes resources to help develop open industrial standards 
in projects facilitated by not-for-profit organizations. Vendors also participate and 
contribute. Vendors benefit when they help develop a successful open standard in this 
way because their offering is immediately compliant and therefore marketable. A 
program manager within the DoD POR may or may not choose to consume the vendor’s 
off-the-shelf product as a system component to comply with the new standard. 
Meanwhile others in DoD, or anywhere else, are free to use mission funding to procure 
and sustain the “consumable” product if it suits their mission needs.  
 
The industry component of the NCO Incubator is the W2COG Institute, an incorporated 
non-government, not-for-profit organization of technically expert providers and 
consumers of netcentric artifacts from government and industry. The W2COG Institute 
provides an excellent venue for defining project parameters, selecting and organizing 
participants, and serving as a clearing house for artifacts, best practices, and lessons 
learned 
 
The government component of the NCO Incubator should be a “working capital” activity 
designated as a “software test range.” Such ranges are described in US Title 10 and may 
accept reimbursable funds from government and industry sources for shared use of range 
infrastructure. Call this government activity a “unifying netcentric program office” or 
UN-Program Office (UNPO). The UNPO will facilitate use of DoD laboratories as 
venues for pilot projects and distribute reimbursable funding accordingly. UNPO activity 
will include capturing hardware, software, and COI NR-KPP specifications and metrics 
required to replicate reference implementation results.  The UNPO will populate and 
maintain the Virtual GIG and develop procedures to apply approved NR-KPP 
specifications and metrics in the VGIG test environment. That process will apply a stamp 
of approval on demonstrated NET-READY vendor offerings. Further, UNPO will ensure 
that these NET-READY products are immediately placed on a GSA or other convenient 
procurement schedule. 
 
The UNPO and the W2COG Institute should be linked with an “Other Transaction 
Authority” (OTA) or Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) 
contract.  The objective of the OTA/CRADA would be mutual discovery and 
development in the realm of netcentric science. Terms of the OTA/CRADA will require 
W2COG Institute to provide reimbursable funding through the UNPO for shared use of 
DoD “Software Range” infrastructure and/or consultation with government technical 
experts as appropriate. Government activities that wish to charter W2COG Institute pilot 
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projects will MIPR funds to the UNPO for further transfer via the OTA/CRADA to the 
W2COG Institute. Neither organization will charge the other “pass through.” A single 
contract vehicle will allow low friction, netcentric interaction among multiple 
government and commercial activities.  
 
Proposed Incubation Projects 
 
These projects will be designed to rapidly field useful capability within less than a year, 
and at the same time provide reference implementations of netcentric architectural 
components that can be used to accelerate the programmatic NCO-enabling engineering 
process. The NCO Inc will broker among operational units, sponsors, government 
programs and labs, academia, and vendors to put together teams of operators and 
government/industry engineers to quickly field well-defined solutions to specific 
operational issues with "shrink wrapped" components designed to be reusable in other 
applications.  NCO Inc will carefully select these projects on the basis of the following 
critical success criteria.  
 
   Compelling and urgent operational use case whose mission outcome can be 
demonstrably enhanced by delivery and timely exploitation of more valuable 
information.  
 
  Mission performer willing to participate actively on the team. 
 
  Funding source with "now year" money. 
 
  Finite, well-defined, deliverable composed of shrink wrapped NCO-enabling 
components and achievable in < 12 months.  
 
  Applicable technologies and engineers expert in their use on the team. 
 
  Viable vendor business model defined to sustain the application and the users. 
 
  Support by appropriate leadership & legal bases covered.  
 
  Well-defined dedicated FTE and management structure.  
 
Project participants will be funded to some level, but will be expected to donate some 
resources as well. Intellectual property donated and developed will be shared, and 
participants will be protected, according the W2COG IPR policy. Participants will be 
selected from W2COG members on merit via process sanctioned by W2COG governance 
policy.  
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Mobile Collaborative Networks 
Where "privacy" can be maintained by participants according to their own situation-based 




Project 1  
 
Netcentric Humanitarian/Disaster Response  
 
Disaster response and humanitarian aid are critical issues for DoD. The military needs to 
do better at interacting with multi-national agencies including NGO's, UNOs, and OGOs. 
Trust is an issue. Communications is an issue. Interoperability is an issue. Net Centric 
Operations (NCOs) offer some ready made solutions. This need offers an outstanding 
opportunity to apply existing, and further develop, netcentric capabilities in "Operations 
Other Than Warfare" (OOTW) – we learn fast when working real world compelling 
issues!    
 
The BIG IDEA is to use shrinkwrapped COTS communication, collaboration, 
publish subscribe, and Multi-Level Security MLS) technology to develop plug and 
play netcentric disaster relief components. These components can then be assembled 
as required to provide a tailored package for a specific relief or humanitarian mission. We 
will use W2COG status as a non-threatening NGO to facilitate NGO – military 
interaction. Initial steps are to provide a demonstration of the capability and environment 
using the available components, and work with the training being done at California State 
University, Monterey Bay. As part of the training effort, we will work with the 
stakeholders to demonstrate an unclassified MLS environment which can be used for 
mission sharing based on peer-to-peer transaction among mission participants.  
 
Extended Benefit: We will use lessons learned and components developed as NCO 
architectural reference implementations for other applications. Components include chat 
tool, privacy technology, pub/sub, modular privacy policy, and router suite. 
 
Approach: Work with vendors, universities, ONOs, OGOs, USGOs and NGOs 
interested in humanitarian relief. Identify compelling use cases such as 
training/education and/or e-commerce for disaster survivors or evacuations needs 
during a government collapse. Create MLS "privacy" domains with COTS packages 
used by, e.g., commercial entities, governments, and private users. . Include "chat." 
Include COTS publish/subscribe tool. Load specific client on a lap top for each 
individual domain participant; provide data and server interfaces as required. Link 
NGOs and others via "fly away" or wireless router. This will create a mobile 
collaborative network where "privacy" can be maintained by participants at an 
extremely high level of assurance according to their own situation-based release 
policies to a level of assurance already accepted by, for example, the banking and 
health industries.. Various network components (chat tool, privacy technology, 
pub/sub, modular privacy policy, and router suite) are all "plug and play" NCO 
reference implementations that, having been demonstrated to be effective, can be 






"Private" but UNCLAS Cross Coalition Collaboration Network  
 
 Terrorists' network is "UNCLAS" and populated by various "open" sources of 
intelligence. Bad guys' info-sharing is unencumbered by US security policies regarding 
security risk for information release under need to know.  Good guys info sharing ability 
is encumbered by monolithic security policy associated with classified network. The 
consistent message from US and collation participants in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is 
that they are at a disadvantage because they are unable to share Critical Time Targeting 
(CTT) or Putting Ordinance on Emerging Targets (POET).  
 
The BIG IDEA is to use COTS to change bad guys' asymmetric info-sharing 
advantage into a symmetric info-sharing advantage to the good guys. Emphasize 
IED defeat.  The key is to use high assurance readily available MLS components to 
enable a network in which mission critical, but unclassified can be rapidly collected and 
shared appropriately, according to the need to share requirements of each of the 
participants.   
 
Extended Benefit: We will use lessons learned and info-sharing components as NCO 
architectural reference implementations for other applications. Components include: chat 
tool, privacy technology, modular security policy, pub sub, mobile router 
 
Approach: Work with operational ground unit. Work with NCOIC to identify 
vendors interested in developing mobile network, cross-domain security, and 
collaboration products available for commercial high assurance but not necessarily 
meeting NSA assurance levels for classified information. Work with NASA to 
leverage their work with mobile routers and multi-spectral sensors. Create multi-
level "privacy" domain with COTS packages used by commercial enterprises, such 
as banks and health organizations, which must comply with many privacy and 
identity requirements similar, but not at as high an assurance level, as MLS/CDS 
networks. Include "chat." Include COTS pub/sub. Load specific client on a lap top, 
provide data and server interfaces as required. Put mobile router and UNCLAS 
spectral and chemical sensors on UAV, helo, balloon, satellite, etc to establish on 
demand wireless network and find anomalous signature information generated by 
hidden IED and generate reports using interoperable semantics. Use NASA and 
commercial, such as CNN and FOX News, mobile network technology to link 
sensor image to expert analyst and analyst to operator. Use UNCLAS private cross 
coalition collaborative network to publish and update IED alerts.  This will create a 
mobile coalition "UNCLAS" network where "privacy" can be maintained by 
coalition members according to their own situation-based release policies to level of 
assurance accepted by banking and health industry. Leave classified system as is. 
Various network components (chat tool, privacy technology, modular security 
policy, pub sub, mobile router) are all reference implementations that can be used 
by other operators with similar info sharing requirements. 
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Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT)  
A critical design objective for netcentric communication architecture is to favor delivery 




Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT)/Rich Semantic Track:  
 
A critical design objective for netcentric communication architecture is to favor delivery 
of valued (as defined by the individual user) information at the right time. Semantic web 
technology will be critical to enable the appropriate automated machine-to-machine 
transactions. DoD's GIG policy addresses these points in its Community of Interest (COI) 
approach to metadata tagging of "information objects."  Information objects, in this 
context, can include not only traditional stateful objects, such as contact locations; but 
also more dynamic objects, such as time-rate of change or threshold crossings. There are 
two aspects of the current approach which create concern. First, many existing notions 
and definitions of COIs are themselves based on traditional stove-pipe notions and are 
not well aligned with the intent of NCO. Second, the access to information, such as track 
or contact information, which is critical for situational awareness, is also based on stove-
pipe systems, interfaces, and formats.  For example, the "track", i.e. the time rate of 
change of an object of interest, is a particularly critical information object which is not 
available as an object, but rather is information in multiple formats and contexts which 
must be somehow rationalized by the consumer.  Further, defining the technical interface 
specifications for exchanging track and other situational awareness information across the 
boundary of an enterprise information-sharing domain and closed real-time systems (e.g. 
weapons or sensors) is critical for GIG success.  
 
The BIG IDEA is to incentivize industry to "productize" semantic web using the 
DoD "track" use case as the prototype application. Capitalize on the success enjoyed 
by industry in creating a semantic environment in which common sharing can develop 
rather than the current method of each COI defining those elements of interoperability in 
a vacuum, or conversely, at higher levels in the organization, defining them so that are 
much too complex for implementation. This includes working with rate of change and 
threshold objects at differing levels of security and developing a common semantic alert 
approach.k based on participants need to share and resources.  
 
Approach: Work with SIAP, PEO IWS, and SOSCOE (others?) to identify specific 
key information transactions and the associated "semantic team" expert in the 
critical information exchange elements.  Work with NCOIC to identify vendors 
interested in venturing IRAD toward semantic web development. Work with 
National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA) and various geospatial analysis 
tools and vendors to develop and demonstrate an interoperable semantic web 
construct for VIRT. Develop a scaleable framework for rich semantic software 
development, and field a working VIRT prototype for at least one cross domain 
scenario of interest. Various VIRT components (e.g. ontology model, intelligent 
agent model, semantic team, track model, pub/sub model) will serve as NCO 






Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT)/Cross Domain Change 
Detection  
 
 Define "change detection" as an automated process to compare newer volumetric data 
sets with previous versions and alerting operators if and only there is an unexpected 
change of state. The BIG IDEA is to implement VIRT by applying change detection 
to key data bases maintained at various security classifications and at various 
locations around the world, and then issuing the appropriate tailored alert to the 
affected operator regardless of that particular operator's bandwidth or security 
limitations.  
  
Extended Benefit: We will use lessons learned and VIRT capabilities as NCO 
architectural reference implementations for other applications. Components include 
geospatial search tools, visualization tools, collaboration tool, change detection 
algorithms, pub/sub model.  
 
Approach: Work with National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA). Work 
with NCOIC to identify vendors interested in developing geospatial analysis, 
collaboration, and cross domain security products.  Link COTS and/or GOTS 
web-enabled geospatial search tools to an NSA approved virtual machine cross 
domain solution. Apply COTS geospatial analysis tools to identify user-defined 
change detection criteria at each level of system security classification. Create 
VIRT change detection visualization products at each level of system security 
classification. Publish an unclassified alert message using cross-domain 
collaborative tool in each case. Various VIRT components (e.g. geospatial search 
tools, visualization tools, collaboration tool, change detection algorithms, pub/sub 
model) will serve as NCO architectural reference implementations for other 
applications.   
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Network-Centric Command and Control—A Logistics 
Application  
 
Effects-based maneuver warfare and distributed, multi-dimensional operations require a 
high level of operational adaptation. To be effective, the support subsystem must be 
designed to be an adaptive, network-centric system with dynamic optimization of 
sourcing options and delivery of critical supplies like ammunition, food, parts, fuel, and 
even troops all driven by commander’s intent. Some companies, e.g. WALMART, have 
become very successful through optimization across supply chains within their business 
models. Further, agent based technology can be applied to generate decision support tools 
associated with supply chain issues. BIG IDEA: Apply best of breed of commercial 
supply chain management tools, real-time assessment models, real options theory to 
integrated supply/service chains (risk management) and agent-based decision 
support tools (DSTs) to enable distributed, adaptive logistics capability. Work 
funded by both DARPA and the Office of Force Transformation has led to important 
discoveries that can be heavily leveraged toward this end.  
  
Extended Benefit: We will use lessons learned and service oriented mediation 
technologies as NCO architectural reference implementations for other applications. We 
will explore how SOAs and agent-based DSTs can increase the speed of command and 
quality of delivering operational effects. Components include, "rules engine", pub sub, 
intelligent agent decision support model.  
 
 Approach: Work with USMC operational units. Align with NOMADD ACTD.  
Use technology delivered to OSD OFT Sense and Respond Logistics (SARL) 
initiative as a base line. Deliver a working suite of network embedded Logistics 
C2 decision support services.   
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NETCENTRIC Business Process:  
The same concepts that make NCO an effective approach to operational mission 




Netcentric Preparation of Budget Exhibits for multiple budget 
reviewers:   
 
Because of the large numbers of reviews required for moving budgets through the fiscal 
process of any large enterprise, there are always a multiple budget exhibits that must be 
prepared. Although the same basic information is required for each exhibit, the method 
for presentation and the details of the schedule and the highlights are very often different, 
depending on the budget reviewer.  
 
BIG IDEA: Leverage the commercial industry investment in fiscal report 
preparation to enable and facilitate government reporting. Banking and investment 
firms have a very similar problem insofar as they must report on the same two basic 
variables, time and money, but in many, many different ways.   
 
Extended Benefit: We will use lessons learned and info-sharing components as NCO 
architectural reference implementations for other applications. Components include: 
collaborative tool, privacy technology, modular security policy, re-useable report 
generation software, pub/sub. 
 
Approach: Work with existing government acquisition and reporting 
organizations, such as DoD Systems Commands and Program Execution Offices, 
and with existing commercial banking and investment tools to exploit and deliver 
a set of resources that can be made available for multiple reporting requirements. 
In current banking and investment operations, although some of the business rules 
differ from government requirements, for example regarding taxes, the basic 
method of exposing the required variables are common. By exploiting this 
common framework and putting different business logic under the reports, and 
reusing the methods, we will demonstrate an ability to reduce cost for these 
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Achieving the extraordinary improvement DoD seeks by fielding Netcentric Enterprise 
Services (NCES) will require extraordinary non-traditional adjustments. Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) represents a powerful, but immature C4 paradigm. It has been 
successfully and incrementally applied in some e-business sectors, but not yet 
universally. Hence, rather than invent its own solution, DoD should harvest the benefit of 
SOA technology as it matures following the same approach and realizing the same 
economies and dexterity enjoyed by the most adept Internet technology consumers, i.e., 
(a) Capture huge benefit of scale to drive down infrastructure and integration cost; (b) 
Invest savings massively in innovative business process improvement. Success requires 
that DoD collaborate in new ways with new partners among the e-business market 
place’s best of breed, leveraging their infrastructure, and fueling their innovative 
processes in precisely the same way successful firms conduct e-business in myriad 
sectors like finance, travel, gaming, etc. The task requires a conceptual mission 
transformation from builder and operator of networks, to superb enabler and manager of 
network services that will give our warriors information advantage over our adversaries. 
It will require five major change initiatives: (a) Develop a business model and business 
targets associated with cost reduction and netcentric productivity; (b) Structure 
contractual partnerships as e-biz consumer vice acquisition program manager (govern and 
incentivize by customer defined objective Quality of Service, security, productivity, and 
cost metrics vice system specifications); (c) Select prime contractors on the basis of 
success in e-biz vice defense systems; (d) Develop and govern collaborative V&V 
methodologies for SOA; (e) Incrementally align process and human resources with the 




NCES is brilliant in that it recognizes both the emergence of a new era in information 
technology-- the era of service oriented distributed computing -- and the need for DoD to 
embrace it as an a powerful and cost-effective enabler of netcentric operations. GIG, and 
especially NCES, is deliberately intended as a transformational initiative. 
“Transformation” means “big change fast.” It is not realistic for any organization, DoD 
included, to effectively exploit a disruptive technology without undergoing substantial 
internal disruption. The danger is to get distracted by details of the enabling technologies 
and lose sight of the underlying objectives. The power of the concept is its notion of 
guaranteed level of service to multiple disparate consumers from any number of trusted 
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providers. Therefore the required big change is in focus: concentrate on the guarantee of 
quality and trustworthiness of the service, not the detail of the technology. We must 
monitor, invest in, and govern increasingly powerful ways to productively share and/or 
protect information in an increasingly competitive, heterogeneous, and dangerous 
network landscape. We should not unilaterally build and operate a monolithically 
“secure” DoD C4 system.   
 
Tom Friedman’s popular book The World is Flat describes how savvy organizations have 
joined in symbiotic Internet-enabled ecosystems to achieve a huge economy of scale and 
deliver unprecedented levels of success. The DoD objective similarly should be to join 
appropriate ecosystems and harvest the benefit of technology as it matures following the 
same approach and realizing the same economies and speed to capability enjoyed by the 
most adept Internet technology consumers. Conventional wisdom says DoD requirements 
are just too unique for generic Internet solutions, but conventional wisdom, by definition, 
is an anathema to transformation.  
 
See TAB B for multiple impressive examples of ultra economies of scale achieved by e-
business providers and consumers that allow them to invest massively in business process 
improvement. DoD organizations can achieve similar economies and opportunity not by 
competing or copying, but by partnering with the e-business market place’s best of breed, 
leveraging their infrastructure, and fueling their innovative processes in precisely the 
same way successful firms conduct e-business in various sectors, including finance, 
travel, gaming, etc.  
 
The task will require DoD activities to develop a business models and associated business 
targets, structure the appropriate contractual partnerships, select the right partners, and 
deal with legacy issues pragmatically.  All this must be achieved in bite-sized chunks, 
and will require creative new approaches to well known problems.  
 
Business Model and Targets 
 
The big change is not about technology per se; it is about fielding and using technology 
more adaptively and collaboratively, deliberately seeking economies of scale, and 
leveraging emergent strength against emergent opportunity. Auditing and budgeting tools 
that match these transformational objectives can be implemented rapidly and wholesale. 
Converting legacy process and human capital to the new world model will require a 
sustained sense of urgency, and a relentless incremental approach to re-aligning 
resources.  
 
In one sense, the netcentric task is to transform into a Great practitioner of e-business 
…the business just happens to be warfighting. Transformation from Good to Great (as 
explained by Jim Collins in his book of the same name) requires designing a business 
plan around the intersection of: 
 
1. Your passion 
2. Your economic engine 
3. The thing you can feasibly do better than anyone else in the world. 
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Outsourcing an organization’s passion is suicide. Outsourcing everything else is fair 
game. I assume that DoD passion is war fighting success.   
 
The economics of the DoD network are on a scale of tens of $B/year. The majority of that 
investment is used to maintain an increasingly archaic, expensive, and vulnerable legacy 
infrastructure. The economic engine of network innovation must be based on the 
remaining margin. And Peter Drucker would say that the principal responsibility of top 
managers is to shift as many resources as possible toward these capability improvements.  
 
It is unrealistic for the DoD to compete with Google et. al. in trying to build the world’s 
best network services. It is entirely realistic for DoD to become the world’s best manager 
of defense-appropriate network services.    
 
Given that DoD C4 overhead is far greater than commercial firms with similar data 
volume and actual (if not required) quality of security, it is feasible to find resources 
through improved efficiency. Therefore, the DoD business model should aim to drive 
down basic C4 infrastructure and integrations costs and re-invest savings in business 
process innovation, including proactive computer network defense. The first task is to 
develop a disciplined GIG business model, based on a symbiotic public/private 
“ecosystem,” agnostic about particular technology, which marshals resources and applies 
them to achieve objectively defined business targets.  
 
ACTION: Draft business plan. Include POA&M for ACTIONS 1-10 
described below. (See TAB C) 
 
Objective #1 is to drive down cost of operations and infrastructure. DoD’s requirements 
for communications security and reliability for the majority of its traffic are on par with 
requirements in specific identifiable industry sectors. E.g., security services that satisfy 
Sarbanes/Oxley privacy requirements in the financial sector will satisfy a large subset of 
DoD’s less critical security requirements. Drive down costs by embracing open IT 
standards and outsourcing basic network services via frequent competitive bid. Seek bids 
from basic Internet service providers (e.g. AOL, Yahoo, AT&T) for their excess capacity, 
and from value added Internet providers (e.g. Google, AOL, Yahoo, AT&T, Akamai, IA 
"boutique" vendors, etc.) to customize content and security services to DoD 
requirements.  
 
ACTION #1: Measure, or at least closely estimate, current DoD “network” 
costs. Objectively quantify the various DoD levels of service and security 
requirements. Set fiscal targets for infrastructure cost reductions by 
surveying e-business providers on the basis of cost vs. service delivered.  
 
Objective #2 is to partner with customers and invest cost savings in business process 
innovation. Again, the approach is to free government human resources to focus on 
achieving organizational objectives, rather than designing and/or building systems -- 
manage the forest, don’t plant the trees. Incentivize customers to make big changes fast 
by ensuring they recapture cost savings for re-investment in their critical requirements; 
make them active champions of this approach vice bystanders. 
 
ACTION #2: Work with customers to set measurable netcentric productivity 
targets. E.g. a time sensitive strike community of interest (COI) aims to 
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decrease average time between detection and engagement of targets; a 
logistics COI aims to decrease its inventory at rest; a training COI aims to 
improve test scores and decrease time in school; a C2 community aims to 
decrease decision timeline and increase decision quality.  
 
E-business Contractual Partnerships 
 
Traditionally government program managers carefully design and develop government 
systems, including C4 systems. Defense vendors build to carefully designed top-down 
mandated system specifications. Compliance is tested at every milestone. It takes many 
years to field systems. Equivalent C4 capability is fielded and refreshed much faster in 
the e-business sectors.  
 
Noticing its speed to capability disparity, DoD has tried in some cases to emulate the e-
business model through managed service contracts. This “consumable” acquisition model 
is much less ponderous than the system acquisition process, and managed service 
contracts have proven to be effective for life-cycle maintenance of basic capability such 
as telephone service. However, DoD has had limited success applying the idea to 
information processing capability because of: (a) Insistence on control of the specific 
technical solution and (b) Selecting prime contractors who are not expert in e-business 
transformation.  Success on the order of the accomplishments described in TAB (B) will 
require DoD to execute managed service contracts as a true consumer vice program 
manager.  
 
A case in point is that the current RFQ for NCES Collaboration Services. The RFQ is 
much more detailed and constraining than a commercial version would be. It describes 
use case scenarios but not targeted productivity outcomes. It dictates a solution composed 
of a good list of standard features and one good price model rather than invite vendor 
innovation around a problem statement.  By comparison, the truly transformational RFQ 
that TWA issued to build the world’s first airliner was a half page long.  
 
The objective is to perform Enterprise Service Management by designing, monitoring, 
and enforcing carefully designed high level Service Level Agreements (SLAs) among 
GIG Service Providers (GSPs) to continuously develop, deploy, and upgrade services via 
managed service contracts. This model is employed by many of today’s most successful 
e-businesses (e.g. H&R Block, Lending Tree, Travelocity) and is supported by the kind 
of “business services” you see IBM pitch in its “On Demand” marketing campaign.  
 
The job becomes to design observable and enforceable SLAs that link directly to military 
business targets, and then negotiate relatively short term contracts with bonus and 
extension clauses that are keyed to delivered and measured service.  DoD shouldn’t care 
if its contractors employ nine or 109 enterprise services as long we get X.X content 
delivery, at X.X latency, X.X information assurance at X.X reduced cost; and gets X.X 
increase in enterprise netcentric productivity units and X.X measured security quality. 
DoD should care deeply about what those X.X’s should be, especially the ones that 
describe netcentric productivity, and partner creatively with industry by investing in 
commercially viable solutions that keep the numbers moving in directions DoD cares 
about.   
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The alternative, DoD attempting to lead the development of web SOA technology by 
building it like a weapons system, is unrealistic given the DoD’s small IT market share 
and ponderous development process. (That said, government activities should be free to 
compete with the commercial market place to offer their managed GIG service offerings.)  
 
Picture GIG as a black box that provides GIG services via dynamic knowledge portals. 
Portals are designed to deliver customer-defined Valued Information at the Right Time 
(VIRT).  Call this idea my-VIRT. Customers vary widely. E.g., my-VIRT could 
simultaneously and automatically deliver targeting data to a fast moving jet and its 
controlling C2 center when a critical pop-up target is identified by an un-attended ground 
station. Likewise, my-VIRT might deliver an IM to a desktop announcing that it’s time for 
the customer’s annual dental check up and an opening at the clinic matches a free slot on 
the customer’s calendar.  DoD communities of interest (COI), or “ecosystems” as they 
would be described in e-business jargon, including contracted innovative service 
providers, should partner on the basis of the art-of-the-possible to continuously improve 
my-VIRT for COI purposes. (Note that this my-VIRT concept applies to machine-to-
machine, machine-to-human, and human-to-human GIG transactions.)   
 
The GIG innovative service providers will adapt to specific mission application, but 
conform to the same kind of customer satisfaction SLAs, and architectural principles (i.e. 
GIG as an ISP) that DoD dictates, monitors, and enforces.  DoD C4 providers should 
therefore work with their operational customers to define SLAs in terms of specific 
mission performance improvement targets. Contractors whose innovative services 
demonstrably enhance DoD productivity per these mission thread targets should be 
rewarded with bonuses and renewals.  
 
ACTION #3: Per objective #1, drive down cost by outsourcing network 
infrastructure and streamlining network operations. Avoid getting caught up 
in vendors’ technical solution by issuing very short RFQs based on SLAs 
around price points, reliability, and security for basic GIG services. Include 
any DoD-owned network infrastructure as government furnished equipment 
in these contracts.  
 
ACTION #4: Per objective #2 field nces (lower case deliberate) incrementally 
via innovative services time-and-material clauses in GIG managed service 
contracts. Use the same legal basis as for life cycle maintenance contracts, i.e. 
technology refresh. “Maintenance” in the Internet world means 
“innovatively refreshing technology.”  Use netcentric productivity targets to 
design nces SLAs based on improving the value of the information delivered, 
not the technology that delivers the information.  
 
ACTION #5: Execute NCES Discovery/Mediation/Collaboration pilot project 
per ACTIONs #5 & #6 above. The VIRT example is not notional. Task the 
pilot project to leverage the existing VIRT COI (TAB D) The VIRT 
ecosystem is an open IP environment that includes large and small 
companies from defense and IT sectors (all of which have contributed IRAD) 
as well as DoD researchers. The VIRT COI has developed a commercially 
viable first-of-breed semantic web architecture and is ready to demonstrate a 
reference implementation.  The commercial partners are eager to be first to 
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market with cutting edge semantic web products and services, which 
happens to be developed around the DoD requirement.  
 
Choose Contract Partners Carefully 
 
Business logic defined above dictates that DoD select GIG-service providers on the basis 
of demonstrated success in e-business rather than success in defense industry. Choose 
prime contractors who understand effective, interoperable, distributed, information 
processing as e-business providers do.  Prime contractors shouldn’t be allowed to bid on 
a piece of the GIG if they can’t show quantitative examples of their success, or their sub 
contractors' success, with respect to the kinds of SLAs DoD requires. The prime 
contractors who win GIG work shouldn’t necessarily be traditional defense contractors.  
 
ACTION #6: Develop selection criteria for GIG service providers. 
 
Collaborative Validation and Verification for SOA 
 
GIG governance requires a fundamental change to C4 system Validation and 
Verification. Designing, monitoring, refining, and enforcing (through appropriate 
auditing methods) these SLAs will take hard work and creativity.  
 
This is an opportunity for DoD to take a global leadership role in accelerating the 
deployment and utility of SOA technology. The fundamental change required is implied 
by the term “collaborative.” By its nature SOA requires “trusted” transactions among 
"discovered" unknown entities in a dynamic enterprise. The ability to validate and verify 
on the basis of risk vs. reward, and need-to-protect vs. need-to-share, criteria in an open, 
and potentially infiltrated, architecture is crucial, but as yet immature.  
 
Further, traditional approaches to C4 system V&V stress wringing out all the bugs before 
risking exposure to the customer community. Collaborative Internet approaches to V&V, 
e.g. as used by the LINUX open source community, stress the opposite approach. That is, 
deliberately use the customer community to assist in the V&V process prior to wringing 
out all the bugs so that on-the-fly adjustments can tweak in favor of greater utility as 
mutually discovered by partnered customer and provider.  (All the bugs may never be 
wrung out, but the advantages of a faster rate of evolution more than compensate.) 
 
ACTION #7: Create, govern, and help operate, a global center of excellence 
for SOA Collaborative Verification &Validation (CV&V) that balances 






Convert Legacy Capability  
 
The best Internet service companies invest massively in innovation, achieving ratios on 
the order of 10 employees innovating for every employee “keeping the lights on.” If DoD 
is going to meet the innovative cycle requirement of the GIG, it must achieve a similar 
ratio. Likewise, the most successful e-businesses have evolved ultra efficient “flat” 
organizations that enhance netcentric opportunity within their own organizations. DoD 
Combat Support Agencies that hope to achieve e-business-like flexibility will need to 
develop similar less hierarchical organizational models. 
 
ACTION #8: Design the ideal work force and work processes for a great 
netcentric services managing organization. Derive management organization 
accordingly.  
 
ACTION #9. Set targets for decreased manpower required for basic 
Computer Network Operations (CNO) and increased manpower for CNO 
developmental activity  
 
ACTION #10: Develop training and incentive plan to convert current work 





C. R. Gunderson 
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TAB A: Panel of Experts 
 
Geoff Brown, Oracle, geoffrey.brown@oracle.com 
Dr Aaron Budgor, Aaron Budgor & Associates, budgora@comcast.net 
Mike Daconta, Department of Homeland Security, Michael.Daconta@dhs.gov 
John Emerson, Amberpoint, jemerson@amberpoint.com 
Mike Friedel, Akamai, mfriedel@akamai.com 
Greg Gardner, Oracle, Greg.Gardner@oracle.com 
Jack Golden, AT&T, jagolden@att.com 
Steve Graves, The Corner Group, steven.graves@thecornergroup.com 
Martin Guttmann, Intel Corp, martin.guttmann@intel.com 
Dr Rick Hayes-Roth, Naval Postgraduate School, fahayesr@nps.edu 
Rick Jones, Intel Corp, rick.jones@intel.com 
Dawn Meyerreicks, America on Line, Dmyrix@aol.com 
David Minton, Planning Systems Incorporated, dminton@plansys.com 
John Nagengast, AT&T, nagengast@att.com 
Ash Parikh , Raining Data Cor., ash@rainingdata.com 
Dr Raymond Paul, ASD NII C2 Policy, Raymond.Paul@osd.mil 
Hans Polzer, Lockheed Martin Co, hans.w.polzer@lmco.com 
Ajay Ramachandran, Raining Data Corp, ajay@rainingdata.com 
Prof Paul Strassmann, Former Director of Defense Information, paul@strassmann.com 
Chris Thomas, Intel Corp., chris.s.thomas@intel.com  
Erick Von Schweber, Synsyta & Neological, erick@infomaniacs.com,  
Linda Von Schwebeber, Synsyta & Neological, linda@synsyta.com  
Mike Wolf, Green Hills Software, mwolf@ghs.com 
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9 Akamai operates 17,000 servers across 1100 physical networks, in 2500 locations 
in twenty countries guaranteeing 100% content delivery to 2000 commercial and 
government firms using a single network operation center manned by six people.  
 
9 AT&T has implemented an order of magnitude greater reliability on its B-t-B 
service-over-IP than on its voice telephone service.  
 
9 Price points available to AOL and its communication service peers are drastically 
less than those available to DoD despite comparable market share.  
 
9 Prof Paul Strassmann, former Director of DoD Information, is conducting 
research on computational infrastructure cost reduction. He has discovered a 
number of impressive examples including: 
 
o Google has fielded nearly 300,000 servers in clusters distributed around 
the world, effectively the largest super computer on the planet, yet the cost 
of their hardware infrastructure in terms of procurement, installation, 
maintenance, and operations, is a small percentage of their capital outlay.  
 
o RightNow Technologies, which operates an extensive global C4 enterprise 
to execute its Customer Relations Management business model, spends 
only 6% of its revenue on hosting costs. (per quote from RightNow 
Technologies CEO Greg Gianforte) 
 
o Alexa (www.alexa.com a subsidiary of Amazon.com) offers effectively 
on-demand web-enabled super computer services on an affordable per/use 
basis. E.g. $1 per cpu hour ; $1 per Gigabyte storage per year (with multi-
terabyte is available to store user applications, source code and data 
processing output); $1 per 50 Gigabyte processing (for data transfers to 
and from the computers reserved for the processing of applications); $1 
per Gigabyte of data uploaded or downloaded (for data transfers to and 
from the user’s own computers); $1 per 4,000 web services requests (for 





TAB C: List of Actions 
 
ACTION: Draft business plan. Include POA&M for ACTIONS 1-10 described below. 
 
ACTION #1: Measure, or at least closely approximate, current DoD costs. Objectively 
quantify the various DoD levels of service and security requirements. Set fiscal targets 
for infrastructure cost reductions by surveying e-business providers on the basis of cost 
vs. service delivered.  
 
ACTION #2: Work with customers to set netcentric productivity targets for NCES 
RFQ’s. E.g. a time sensitive strike community of interest (COI) aims to decrease average 
time between detection and engagement of targets; a logistics COI aims to decrease its 
inventory at rest; a training COI aims to improve test scores and decrease time in school; 
a C2 community aims to decrease decision timeline, and increase decision quality.  
 
ACTION #3: Per objective #1, drive down cost by outsourcing network infrastructure 
and streamlining network operations. Avoid getting caught up in vendors technical 
solution by issuing very short RFQs based on SLAs around price points, reliability, and 
security for basic GIG services. Include any DoD-owned network infrastructure as 
government furnished equipment in these contracts.  
 
ACTION #4: Per objective #2 field nces (lower case deliberate) incrementally via 
innovative services time-and-material clauses in GIG managed service contracts. Use the 
same legal basis as for life cycle maintenance contracts, i.e. technology refresh. 
“Maintenance” in the Internet world means “innovatively refreshing technology.”  Use 
netcentric productivity targets to design nces SLAs based on improving the value of the 
information delivered, not the technology that delivers the information.  
 
ACTION #5: Execute NCES Discovery/Mediation/Collaboration pilot project per 
ACTIONs #4 & #5 above. The VIRT example is not notional. Task pilot project to 
leverage the existing VIRT COI (TAB C) The VIRT ecosystem is an open IP 
environment that includes large and small companies from defense and IT sectors (all of 
which have contributed IRAD) as well as DoD researchers. The VIRT COI has 
developed a commercially viable first-of-breed semantic web architecture and is ready to 
demonstrate a reference implementation.  The commercial partners are eager to be first to 
market with cutting edge semantic web products and services, which happens to be 
developed around the DoD requirement.  
 
ACTION #6: Develop selection criteria for GIG service providers. 
 
ACTION #7: Create, govern, and help operate, a global center of excellence for SOA 
Collaborative Verification &Validation (CV&V) that balances requirements for security, 
operational continuity, etc., with the need for speed.  
 
ACTION:#8: Design the ideal work force and work processes for a great netcentric 
services managing organization. Derive management organization accordingly.  
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ACTION:#9. Set targets for decreased manpower required for basic Computer Network 
Operations and increased manpower for CNO developmental activity  
 
ACTION #10: Develop training and incentive plan to convert current work force and 
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16. Collaborative Validation and Verification for Service Oriented 
Architecture 
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Collaborative Validation and Verification for Service Oriented Architecture 
 
Today DoD test and evaluation (T&E) process for C4ISR acquisition programs is system 
centric. ACAT programs are driven by formal DoD requirements. DoD specifies 
performance parameters from those requirements and designs and implements systems 
accordingly. System developers assemble components, and verify satisfactory 
incremental and system performance per specific milestones. Prior to fielding it, 
operational testing (OT) authorities install the system on a test platform, and observe as 
operators verify that it meets system performance specifications under stressful 
operational loads. OT may be conducted off-line from real operations, but is always 
conducted in an operational environment.   
 
GIG represents a fundamental change to our C4ISR capability model. GIG is not 
intended to be a system, but rather a service oriented system-of-systems. A simplistic 
abstraction is that GIG will consist of (a) “plumbing” made of networked hardware, (b) 
“services” made of software, (c) clients, which may be thought of as hardware and 
software consumers, such as operators, or provides of services; (d) and middleware, a 
combination of hardware and software, which links the services and clients together.. 
Consider software services as independent software modules sitting on independent 
hardware components. Operators will “discover” these networked software modules. 
Metadata will describe how to use and combine the service, e.g., may provide service 
level agreements (SLA). Clients will then combine distributed services as necessary to 
perform C4ISR operator tasks. “The network”, whether LAN or WAN, becomes the 
computer. No need to “hardwire” the software modules together inside a box labeled with 
an acronym like WWMCCS, JOTS, or GCCS.   
 
GIG policy aims to continuously field both plumbing and services to support operators 
who will also be part of the GIG. Each incremental addition to the GIG should contribute 
holistically. That is, GIG topology should exponentially expand in ever increasing 
creative and innovative ways as tools and services are fielded and operational users 
discover more rapid and more powerful ways to find and use information. GIG policy 
specifies that this process will not be controlled centrally and COTS development of the 
World Wide Web has proved it cannot be centrally controlled successfully.   
 
This description of SOA CONOP is grossly simplified and leaves out important technical 
detail. However, the take-away is that in order to be successful, the GIG must be 
developed and tested as information-centric, not system-centric. GIG developers must 
tackle the technical detail in ways that make this simple vision possible. Therefore, we 
need an information-centric T&E model to help iron out GIG technology and 
methodology.  Our old C4ISR T&E model aims to assure that unique information 
processing systems work properly. The new GIG T&E model should assure that 
networked information is properly treated by increasingly generic networked tools. For 
example, because much of information sharing is about transactions and domain sharing, 
the new T&E model should focus on these type of metrics rather than system types of 
metrics.  That is, we need a T&E model designed to assure that information available on 
the GIG is (a) protected as necessary, but (b) broadly and increasingly useful.  
 
The T&E model NSA uses for certification and accreditation (C&A) is instructive in this 
regard. NSA tests the way information is secured rather than just how systems perform.  
NSA “type certifies” software associated with a particular Information Assurance (IA) 
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reference implementation and documents "owner's manual" details associated the 
certification particulars, for example configuration options and interfaces. A program 
manager can get an NSA security certification without invoking the rigorous unique 
system requirement by, (a) using the same “type” off-the-shelf IA software, and (b) 
adhering to the NSA "owner's manual". With this certification in hand, it is then easier to 
get an operational accreditation for a specific installation or implementation. 
 
The new GIG T&E model can leverage the NSA C&A model over a much broader 
spectrum of information processing capabilities and services. The "net-enabling" C&A 
process should field reference implementations to develop and validate netcentric 
specifications, and then verify that a candidate software “type” process, resource, or 
capability satisfies them. For example: does the software comply with GIG information-
centric technical policy; does it align with COTS standards, trends, and investments; are 
there transition risks; is it useful in mission context (e.g. power requirements, user 
friendliness, bandwidth reality, durability, size/weight); does it measurably enhance 
netcentric information and transaction productivity?  
 
This new GIG net-enabling C&A process should co-evolve with NSA’s Information 
Assurance (IA), or, net-protecting, C&A process. The two together, net-protecting C&A 
plus net-enabling C&A, will constitute Net-Ready C&A.  U.S. Title 10 has a provision 
that authorizes DoD to operate software test ranges, and accept funding from commercial 
companies for their use. Net-ready C&A process should exploit that provision and 
rigorously apply the distributed suite of DoD network test facilities to evaluate candidate 
commercial and government reference implementations. The evaluation should generate 
“owner’s manuals" that document how to install and to use the “type certified” net-
enabling software to achieve the validated and verified netcentric benefit.  
 
A program manager who bundles components that are type-certified as net-ready, and 
satisfies an audit on the test range that the bundling is consistent with the approved 
owner’s manuals, will earn a net-ready accreditation for his system. The remaining 
question is how to perform information-centric OT of this system accredited as net-
ready?  As discussed, the GIG will be a service oriented system-of-systems. Therefore, 
the OT model should consider a candidate “system” as a GIG service -- a service-of-
services. This “system-of- services” abstraction scales infinitely.  
 
DoD should design tests to verify that the new GIG system/service adds value to the 
enterprise per the targeted netcentric productivity specifications. That kind of verification 
can only be performed collaboratively with other GIG services, and the customer 
community. Fortunately, because the new service has already been accredited as net-
ready, the OT can be conducted “on-line.” Successful e-business practitioners use this 
kind of on-line collaborative T&E. They invite their customers to help wring bugs and 
make on-the-fly improvements. They have learned that all the bugs may never be wrung 
out, and that operational customers have limited time to spare to assist in development, 
but that the advantages of a faster rate of evolution are sufficiently compelling. DoD can 
capitalize on their lesson by following their model per the following proposal.  
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NET-READY CERTIFICATION OFFICE (NCO) 
 
Proposal: Establish a government working capital activity, a Net-ready Certification 
Office (NCO), which will serve as a distributed test range for Certification and 
Accreditation of network-enabling off-the-shelf software per the following 
characteristics:  
 
1.  Coordinates activity of existing distributed assets rather than create new 
infrastructure or bureaucracy.  
 
2.  Provides government activities immediate access to broad spectrum of 
industry, government, and academic information processing experts and 
products via standing contractual vehicle(s) with not-for-profit W2COG 
Institute  
 
3. Facilitates rapid formation of “ecosystems” of operators, vendors, labs, and 
sponsors formed around compelling operational issues, mature technology, 
and ~90 day spirals to demonstrate, prototype, and productize bundled 
information processing software.  
 
4. Assists operational units and other customers to develop netcentric 
productivity metrics, i.e. measurable increase in the value of information 
available to the operators as a result of a new or “improved” tool.  
 
5. Coordinates authorizing, scheduling, and funding for commercial use of DoD 
network test facilities. 
 
6. Engages appropriate un-biased warranted authorities to test according to the 
following criteria:  
 
a. Compliance with published SOA/GIG technical reference and 
policy documents. 
b. Alignment with COTS standards, trends, and investment 
c. Transition risk assessment including schedule 
d. Utility in mission context (e.g. power requirements, user 
friendliness, bandwidth reality, durability, size/weight)  
e. Netcentric productivity  
 
7. Certifies and/or accredits that off-the-shelf network-enabling software 
satisfies government requirements including documentation of reference 
implementation details: hardware, software, and interface specifications; 
training and doctrine requirements.  
 
8. Facilitates placing certified and/or accredited software on approved 
consumable procurement schedules. 
 
9. Establishes and maintains a “GIG-lite” distributed on-line repository of off-
the-shelf network enabling software (both certified and pending certification) 
and mission thread based modeling and simulation demonstration suite.   
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1. Project Manager. (1 FTE X 2.5 years. Six months research + Two years 
operational implementation = 2.5 years. Full time government employee. )  
2. Chief Engineer (1 FTE X 2.5 years. Government employee or contractor. 
Dedicated or shared time.) 
3. Software range manager (1 FTE X 2.5 years. Government employee or contractor. 
Dedicated or shared time.) 
4. Contracts officer (1/2 FTE X 2.5 years. Government employee. Shared time. ) 
5. Marketing officer (1/2 FTE X 2.5 years. Government employee or contractor. 
Dedicated or shared time.) 
6. Administrative support (1/2 FTE X 2.5 years. Government employee or 




1. OSD mandate 
 










17. Hard Problems in Network Operations 
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Addressing the Hard Problems in NetOps: A White Paper Posing Novel Solutions to 
Overcome Tradition-Based Thinking 
 
Preface: NetOps, the three-component approach to modern communications support to 
military operations using the Global Information Grid (GIG), is in the midst of what 
might be considered its “sophomore year.” GIG Network Management, GIG Network 
Defense and GIG Content Management (up until recently known as Content Staging) 
comprise the three core components of NetOps.94 NetOps promises to improve military 
communications by assured system and network availability, assured information 
protection and assured information delivery.95 Although the concepts and components are 
essentially a given at this point, this White Paper seeks to ask strategic questions about 
NetOps and the GIG and thereby help us pass the entrance exams into our “junior year” 
and beyond. We must begin to exploit what we have been exploring to this point. We 
must apply what we have learned, and execute graduate-level NetOps as soon as possible. 
 
Author Jeff Cares recently asked in his book, Distributed Network Operations,96 whether 
or not we are “getting it right” with Net Centricity and Net Centric Operations, major 
conceptual justifications for the GIG. Considering our nation’s investment in the GIG and 
how hard we’ve worked to push the power of networked communications to the edge of 
the GIG, Jeff’s is a timely and strategically significant question. Let us then frame the 
hard NetOps problems with two fundamental categories of questions: how do we know 
we are getting it right (i.e., doing the right kinds of things); and, given that we are doing 
the right things, what can we do to effectively and continuously improve on our 
investment and support to our nation’s warfighters? In summary, then, the framing 
questions for considering NetOps Hard Problems become: “are we doing the right things 
and are we doing them right?”  
 
Are we doing the right things? 
 
Fundamentally, the first question we must ask is do we think in terms of network 
centricity or do we think in terms of knowledge centricity?97 Is it about the network or is 
about the information that flows within the network? Why does the network exist in the 
first place? Is the warfighter interested in how the network does its job, or rather if the 
network does the right job (i.e. provide especially useful information)? The answers to 
these basic questions revolve around the old management saw: do the right job, then do it 
right; effectiveness first, then efficiency. Frankly, in the midst of our sophomore year, it 
is not yet clear then that GIG NetOps is about doing the right job first and foremost. 
We’ve gone to some length to seek efficiencies in what we think is “good NetOps,” but 
we must challenge ourselves by asking if we are network focused or knowledge focused. 
Most of our technological innovations in support of NetOps suggest that we are network 
focused. The network is necessary, but not sufficient to provide graduate-level support to 
the warfighter. 
                                                 
94 Relevant acronyms used throughout this paper: GIG Network Management – GNM; GIG Network 
Defense – GND; GIG Content Management – GCM. 
95 JTF-GNO Draft Global information Grid NetOps ConOps, Version 3, with comments, March 2006. 
96 Cares, Jeff, Distributed Network Operations: The Foundations of Network Centric Warfare, 2005, 
Alidade Press, Newport, RI 
97 Although one could argue the distinctions between data, information and knowledge, those distinctions 
are not necessary here – this is not a knowledge management paper. The terms data, information and 
knowledge are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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On the other hand, relevant and timely knowledge, whether delivered by the GIG or not, 
is both necessary and sufficient to support the warfighter. By now, we are compelled to 
believe the GIG is necessary to deliver knowledge, but let’s not confuse efficiency with 
effectiveness. It is useful to consider the hypothesis that GIG Content Management, the 
least defined and least mature component of NetOps, is actually the most important of the 
three. Network Defense exists not only to protect the network, but also to protect the 
information that flows within it. Network Operations exists to ensure the network is 
available and efficiently managed, again to provide an access path for the information the 
warfighter needs. If there was no information available, would the warfighter invest time 
and resources in the GIG? The answer is “not likely.” As Lt Gen Charles Croom, 
commander of the JTF-GNO has said in many public forums, “it’s about the information, 
not the network.” It follows that GIG Content Management, or at least a knowledge-
centric focus, is the right thing to do. 
 
According to the most recent approved version of the GIG NetOps ConOps, Global 
Content Management (called Information Dissemination Management /Content Staging 
in the current version) is the “…technology, processes and policy necessary to provide 
awareness of…” relevant and accurate information available to users of the GIG. Its core 
services include content discovery, content delivery and content storage.98 On behalf of 
the commander, these core services seek to: 
 
- Permit commanders to adjust information delivery methods and priorities for 
enhanced Situational Awareness 
- Allow information producers to advertise, publish and distribute information to 
the warfighter 
- Enable users to define and set information needs (profiles) to facilitate timely 
and efficient information delivery and/or search information databases to retrieve desired 
products as required 
- Improve bandwidth use 
- Enhance all aspects of the GIG transport capabilities99 
 
Having established that the network should in fact play second fiddle to the information it 
transports and protects, we must still confirm the criticality of the network and the assets 
it can bring to bear to do the right job. However, our new recognition of the most 
important elements of effectiveness, should change the way we prioritize our efforts and 
marshal resources. For that reason alone, it is critical to make certain we are doing the 
right job in the first place. GIG Network Management and GIG Network Defense are 
therefore two important elements of doing the job right, but let us acknowledge that they 
soak up the bulk of resources to the exclusion of doing the most important job at the dawn 
of GIG-based net-centric operations.  
 
In order to ensure we graduate to our junior year, we need to properly align our priorities.  
Fortunately, many of the general concepts that support GIG Content Management also 
support operations and defense. We can use what we already know and have available. 
                                                 
98 JTF-GNO Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid NetOps, Version 2, 10 August 2005 
(Final Approved Version). 
99 Ibid. 
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Hence, NetOps is the right thing to do on behalf of warfighters to guarantee access to 
knowledge they need. Now let’s look at what we can accomplish to “do the thing right.” 
 
What can we do to improve? 
 
To align effort and investment across DoD, we must define “improvement” in universally 
understood and measurable terms. Such a definition requires clear delineation of the 
productivity we hope to achieve through knowledge-centric NetOps. Oddly, this 
definition of productivity does not yet exist. However, if delivery of relevant and timely 
knowledge is the necessary and sufficient condition for success, then it follows that 
productivity will increase as the value of the bits exchanged increases, where “value” is 
specifically defined in terms of relevance and timeliness for particular applications. The 
principle applies to both offensive and defensive aspects of what we could call “agile 
NetOps.” An example of this agility, or metaphoric “maneuver,” would be demonstrated 
if we could measurably subtract value from the bits exchanged by adversaries through 
diversionary or disruptive techniques, achieving the same effect as adding value to our 
own exchanges. We will discuss maneuver and mobility/counter-mobility as part of the 
“Other Questions,” below. 
 
Almost all NetOps and Information Assurance conferences raise the issue of metrics. 
Effective collection and assessment of metrics could provide the baseline for significant 
progress that we have been missing in NetOps all along. Even the claim that situational 
awareness of the GIG is the “holy grail”100 of NetOps moves beyond hyperbole with the 
addition of metrics. Meaningful metrics help us know what we are actually visualizing 
and what difference modification and adaptation really make. One of the first steps we 
must take to improve NetOps and solve the “doing it right” framing problem is to 
introduce NetOps Instrumentation and Mensuration. Instrumentation is a straightforward 
concept, even if we don’t do it well yet. Mensuration, on the other hand, a term borrowed 
from the intelligence and mathematics communities, is where the even harder work starts. 
 
To set the stage for how to instrument the GIG, and more appropriately GCM, let’s 
discuss what should be measured. The term “mensuration” comes from the studies of 
geometry and calculus, denoting the measurement of areas, volumes and the lengths of 
curves.101 The Imagery Analysis community uses this term to indicate precise 
measurement of volumetric surfaces (e.g., multi-dimensional) when obtained from an 
apparent flat surface such as a photograph. Mensuration also seems to accurately capture 
the idea of precision measurement of network geometries such as the GIG expresses.102 
“…mensuration, in its practical aspect, is of importance for giving reality to the formulae 
themselves and to the principles on which they are based…”103 Translation to “reality” is 
the exact problem we face in measuring the success or failure of the GIG. The GIG is a 
high-dimensional network that actually defies even the term “grid” and therefore 
measurement requires techniques that transcend simple matrix or lattice measures of 
axes. The term “mensuration” seems to align well with this challenge. 
 
                                                 
100 Observations from both the JTF-GNO J3 and J5, in various briefings and conferences since the 
inception of the NetOps CONOPS, June, 2004. 
101 “Mensuration,” LoveToKnow 1911 Online Encyclopedia. © 2003, 2004, LoveToKnow. Found at: 
http://25.1911encyclopedia.org/M/ME/MENSURATION.htm, accessed 29 March 2006. 
102 For an excellent primer on complex network geometry, see Cares, pp. 149-172. 
103 Ibid, “LovetoKnow” 
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But “value” is the operative term regardless of the specific techniques we use to assess 
that value. We just need to understand value in a consistent manner that translates across 
the community. Accordingly, we need to design NetOps instrumentation, modeling, 
simulation, and mensuration techniques as part of the process to analyze the parameters 
of relevance and timeliness that define value for the various NetOps communities of 
practice (both friend and foe!).104    
 
This NetOps process analysis will provide a holistic systems engineering perspective on 
the myriad programmatic elements of the GIG, a perspective that will highlight “the most 
important jobs” and the associated critical system components. The “most important 
jobs” in NetOps will define the vital functions in the supporting acquisition process from 
basic research through life cycle maintenance. It will also map the critical and supporting 
interactions that produce the rich complexity of emergence we seek in this approach.105  
 
An example of complexity-producing interactions reflects a convergence of disciplines 
such as those that compose NetOps. The complexity of mixing GND and GNM produced 
at the same time more challenges for the JTF but offered deeper insight into effective 
operations and defense of the GIG. Like Clausewitz’s wrestling analogy where two 
wrestlers can achieve conditions together that they cannot achieve apart, the fusion of 
GNM and GND allowed the JTF to achieve new insights that were not possible before.106 
 
Now add the third component of NetOps, GCM, to this convergence and we have the 
potential for even greater richness and opportunities for warfighter support that could 
never have happened if the components were kept apart. And, as we have argued 
throughout this paper, GCM offers to provide the greatest opportunity for enhanced 
support to warfighters and their supporters throughout the entire enterprise. At the very 
least, we should be able to substantiate this claim once we have discovered the sweet 
spots of interaction and emergence in content management as a function of NetOps…and, 
once we can affix value to these interactions as manifested by content “points of 
presence” within the warfighter’s domain. 
 
Success in measuring value in the basic NetOps functions of GCM, GNM and GND can 
cascade throughout all GIG-related functions. Armed with that information we thus can 
design, execute, and iterate a DoD knowledge-based business plan that will balance 




The GIG, and most importantly GIG Content Management, must be accurately measured 
to ensure we are doing the job right. What should we measure in the content management 
component to ensure we are doing the right job? There are several conventional 
                                                 
104 There is considerable value in considering the enemy as part of the Community of Interest (or ecology) 
of the GIG, a point worthy of additional research, as well. 
105 In this paper, “complexity” is a positive trait rather than something to be avoided. It reflects interactions 
and emergence as functions of sophisticated organizations and processes that demonstrate the capacity to 
evolve and generate adaptive capabilities. See Cares, 2005, and Kauffman, 1995. There is a rich body of 
research and application in the area of complex adaptive systems which this paper and the accompanying 
proposal will seek to leverage. 
106 Bassford, C., “Clausewitz and His Works,” 
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZSUMM/CWORKHOL.htm, accessed 19 April 2006.  
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measurements that contribute to understanding the value of content to warfighters and 
those who support them. These measures include statistics on number of times accessed, 
number of times edited or forwarded, utility voting metrics (e.g., “popularity votes” in the 
commercial internet environment),107 and value calculated from “willingness to pay” for 
certain information (a type of economic-based schema that may also be useful in the 
GCM world). Other measures that are less conventional but require examination to 
determine their potential in assessing value include: 
 
 - productivity enhancements related to GCM and the other NetOps components; a 
further discussion on productivity measurement follows below 
- entropy-related measures that reflect declining or expiring utility of knowledge 
or increased disorganization of that knowledge and its components 
 - organizational- or mission-pattern matching measures that infer other likely 
customers of knowledge to predict where information should be staged in the GIG 
- economic-related measures that reflect trade, upgrade, or other value-added 
functions concerning the construction of new and inferred knowledge108 
- semantic web-related ontologies and taxonomies that also predict relationships 
of definitions and context that will assist in staging knowledge throughout the GIG109 
 
Warfighter productivity must increase in measurable ways or the GIG and NetOps are not 
only inefficient, they are ineffective. An early action we must take now is to analyze, 
measure and report upon the productivity the GIG has delivered and offers to warfighters 
in the near- and long-term. The warfighter’s access to, and use of, knowledge provide us 
especially important mensuration points of GIG effectiveness, and thus explains why this 
paper stresses GCM as the key parameter to measure. Productivity, as reflected in the 
attached proposal becomes the initial thrust for instrumentation and mensuration of 
NetOps and the GIG. 
 
Instrumentation for mensuration of the non-linear and irregular surfaces of the GIG 
require novel approaches to tool development. Jeff Cares suggests what he calls “The 
Information Age Combat Model” as a way of understanding the complex interactions of 
weapons and sensor platforms in a non-linear combat model. Tools that evolve out of 
Cares’ networks of nodes will also affect mensuration of NetOps. The initial network 
nodes he suggests include the following: 
 
 - sensors: objects that receive and transmit signals about observed phenomena 
 - deciders: objects that receive data from sensors and determine the present and 
future arrangement of other nodes within the network 
                                                 
107 The use of “live votes” on www.msnbc.com is an example of this approach. Although hardly scientific, 
this method allows readers to judge in coarse terms the value of an article or predict some outcome in a 
very quick poll. This information has problems in terms of accurately assessing true value, but can provide 
top-level insight when other metrics are not available or too difficult to attain. When taken as part of a 
broader profile, these metrics may become more valuable as we become accustomed to using them. 
108 Inferred knowledge refers to an emerging intelligence community concept known as evidence-based 
inference. See Andrews, Twining and Schum, 2005. David Schum has published numerous papers on the 
use of evidence organization techniques to support the generation of new evidence and knowledge. These 
techniques offer great promise for GIG Content Staging and will be explored in detail in the project 
proposed in this white paper. An automated version of this technique was proposed in “Agent Based 
Evidence Marshaling”, in Hunt, 2001. 
109 Future proposal presentations will deal in significant detail about how value may be calculated as part of 
multiple interactive metrics and as independent metrics. 
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 - influencers: objects that take direction from deciders, interact with other nodes 
and take some action that affects the states of those other nodes 
 - targets: objects that are nodes on the network that are not sensors, deciders or 
influencers 110 
 
Cares’ “Information Age Combat Model” suggests an entirely new family of 
measurement devices that can sense and transmit information about the actions taking 
place on the GIG within all three components (GCM, GND and GNM). These tools will 
also enable eventual machine-to-machine interaction to stimulate self-healing and self-
synchronization, two important objectives of the next generation Global Information 
Grid, according to Lt Gen Croom. These mensuration points also offer insights in 
measuring productivity relative to GCM, as well. 
 
NetOps is not a uniquely military concept. On the contrary, there are many practitioners 
of virtually identical ideas in the e-business sector. The successful Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) all invest massively in innovative process improvements to gain 
increasingly rich knowledge of network state in order to ship more and better information 
content, and to protect against both denial of service and unintended disclosure. Clearly 
there are superb existing industrial capabilities that the DoD can simply port or outsource. 
Arguably, since all major ISP’s contract and/or partner with a company called Akamai to 
help them perform “InternetOps,” Akamai with its “God’s eye view of the Internet” 
represents best of breed in this regard.111 Akamai stages information content at the 
tactical edge of the Internet in servers strategically located on the basis of traffic analysis. 
This approach prevents the need for Internet consumers to access Akamai customers’ 
core infrastructure. Further, Akamai monitors activity and seamlessly routes packets in 
the most efficient and effective manner and employs a suite of productivity metrics to 
continuously improve the service. By using its distributed sensor technology to perform 
post-time diagnostic audits of malicious network activity, Akamai can help clients 
perform agile network “counter maneuvers”.  Akamai is in 2,500 locations, more than 
1,100 networks, in 70 countries and routes 20-25% of all traffic on the World Wide Web. 
Their NOCC is manned by only six people whose principle task is to deploy and monitor 
new applications “live” on the network.112   
 
So, what can we do better? According to Professor Chris Gunderson, Naval Postgraduate 
School, “In order to tackle the technical challenges described in earlier paragraphs, we 
should certainly consider following the industrial e-business model of deliberately 
driving down infrastructure costs, and then reinvest massively in innovative business 
process. To do that, we must re-think our current tightly controlled contractual model in 
favor of more enlightened partnership and incentivized managed service contracts that 
can harness the IT industry’s innovative baseline to address government requirements on 
Internet time scales.”113    
 
                                                 
110 Cares, pp. 75-106, with a description of a littoral battle scenario on pp. 110- 122. 
111 Wired Magazine, issue 11.07 Jul 2003, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/slammer.html, 
accessed 5 April 2006 
112 Quoted from Mike Friedel, Akamai Director Sales, Public Sector, by Professor Chris Gunderson, Naval 
Post-Graduate School, 5 April 06. 
113 Quoted from Professor Chris Gunderson, Naval Post-Graduate School, Executive Director of the World 
Wide Consortium for the Grid, 6 April 2006. 
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Other Important Questions Related to Hard NetOps Problems: 
 
Initial discussion of hard problems generally poses more questions than it answers. 
Accordingly, to resolve the hardest of the NetOps problems, we must ask questions that 
help us understand and model the complex process interactions around those problems. 
Only then can the problems be solved by invoking non-intuitive, multi-discipline 
approaches. A representative sampling of these questions includes the following. 
Questions without answers, or at least hints, are of limited use to busy people. Hence, 
simple beginnings to possible answers accompany the questions. 
 
- What are the key interactions and linkages that must occur to ensure the GIG is doing 
the right job? Doing the job right? 
 
Until this point in history, the DoD has tended to treat GCM, GND and GNM as separate 
entities. Only with the advent of the JTF-GNO did we introduce an entity theoretically 
designed to integrate all three constructs. While we have made limited progress 
integrating GND and GNM, there is still much to do. We have only just begun to 
consider how to integrate the third element, GCM. Further, all progress to date has been 
halting and discrete. Meaningful success will require a new effort, perhaps the new PEO-
NetOps within DISA, to pull all three components together so that progress in one area 
deliberately contributes positively, and by design, to the other areas. The vision will be 
complete when all three components are systemically enhanced by improved processes 
that support each other in a continuingly synergistic feedback loop. We will observe key 
interactions and linkages through deliberate NetOps planning and design models and 
simulations that require all components to complement each other. 
 
- Are the current blend of GNM, GND and GCM the right components for NetOps today 
and tomorrow? 
 
As a conceptual framework, it’s enough for now. Certainly we need to apply emerging 
technologies such as semantic web capabilities (ontologies and service-oriented 
architectures) effectively to make the concepts increasingly useful for warfighters and 
their support teams. A future component candidate for NetOps might include Mission 
Mapping as a separate but fully integrated capability that GNM, GND and GCM all 
affect equally well.  
 
- What value does the JTF-GNO add to NetOps? 
 
To build what the JTF-GNO J5 calls NetOps Forces we must explore this question in 
detail. The JTF-GNO does add limited value today, but when mixed with the right blend 
of relevant forces, it can emerge as a full-partner warfighter in GWOT and all other 
operations that our Combatant Commanders will undertake in the future. Effective 
compositions of NetOps Forces are key to success of the GIG and NetOps, and deserve 
treatment within a separate paper that could be delivered in future treatments of the 
NetOps Hard Problems. Examples like Akamai, as discussed above, offer clues on how 
NetOps forces may eventually emerge. Today, however, the JTF-GNO adds value as an 
organizing entity, as a first generation capability to integrate the current components of 
NetOps, and as a research lab for warfighters to assess the effects of a NetOps-enabled 
Global Information Grid. 
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- Is Net Force Maneuver a useful construct? 
 
If information is the commodity of interest; if information dominance is the objective of 
the game; if “the network” is the playing field; and if our adversary is clever, then it 
follows that we need a dynamic and multi-faceted strategy to win both the battle and the 
war. The idea behind maneuver is to pose a fundamental shift in thinking about defense 
and operation of the GIG, as well as suggest the themes of mobility and counter-mobility 
for all three current components (GCM, GND and GNM). There are emerging 
technologies that have already been tested for worm and virus defenses, as well as 
diversionary tactics, that offer substance to this new form of network warfare. However, 
we must refine the questions about maneuverability as well as test the answers to these 
questions in ways disciplined by NetOps thinking that focuses all three components in 
synergistic ways. 
 
- What new acquisition techniques can we develop to facilitate a rapidly evolving GIG 
that exploits disequilibrium rather than fall victim to it? I.e., how do we collaboratively 
build the GIG so that useful co-evolution occurs in manageable ways to dampen the 
effects of disruptive technologies and attacks? 
 
Wake up one day and check out what’s happening at JTF GNO. Then go to the Internet 
and take a look at all the top of the line personal information processing equipment you 
can purchase on line: cell phones, TiVOs, iPods, laptops, ISP services, Internet sites, 
Travel & Financial services, etc. Go to sleep and wake up a year later. Check out what’s 
happening at JTF GNO. Then go back to the Internet…..  There’s an answer in there 
somewhere; it has a lot to do with the way we come to define “manageable.” Our 
acquisition model must be relevant and co-evolve with the warfighter’s needs. The 
Internet thrives in a constant disequilibrium state that naturally imposes its own 
limitations and dampening effects, without particularly strict rules and design criteria 
apart from data and transmission standards. There are clearly examples resident in the 
emergence of the World Wide Web and the Internet that offer us insights in how the GIG 
will emerge in future iterations. We will likely witness Government-academic-
commercial collaborations materialize that will streamline acquisition policies and 
techniques. We must build environments that accommodate the development of simple 
rules that more closely mimic natural “acquisition” systems to ensure co-evolution occurs 
in meaningful ways that work on behalf of the warfighter and the underlying support 
system.  
 
- What are the appropriate risk mitigation techniques that we can use to reduce the 
apparent fragility of the GIG and how do we measure success of these techniques if they 
work and prevent disaster from occurring in the first place? 
 
Once again, modeling and simulation will be of great value to help us visualize the 
threats and potential mitigations we can bring to bear in risk management and 
overcoming the fragile nature of the GIG. We have built the GIG and it’s linkage to 
warfighters using the best technologies available, but we must better understand the 
dependencies that have grown up around our communications networks (or any network 
for that matter). And, to avoid experimentation with the real network and warfighter’s 
bread-and-butter communications systems, we must rely on disaster and recovery testing, 
as well as threat prevention in silico. From these models, we will develop tactics, 
techniques and procedures to deal with problems before they occur. We must design 
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these models so that they reveal linkages and dependencies and provide early indicators 




This white paper proposes that there are hard problems for the NetOps community of 
interest to solve in order to maximize early, if limited, success in implementing the first 
years of NetOps. We have framed these problems in the context of doing the right thing 
and then ensuring we are doing it right. We are essentially sophomores in NetOps years 
and have learned enough to make us either dangerous or appear that we know more than 
we really do. We must now ask the very hard questions about our purpose and intent, 
acting on behalf of the warfighter, and harness a blend of art and science within a 
sophisticated modeling and simulation environment. As an extension to asking hard 
questions, we must also measure key parameters such as enhanced productivity to ensure 
we are doing the right job in the first place. This will reveal both shortcomings and 
strategies in ways that cost less money but produce worthwhile insights. It is also likely 
that success in our consideration of effectiveness and efficiency in NetOps will reveal 
meaningful ways to pose the requirements necessary to build the next generation GIG. 
The accompanying proposal demonstrates a viable way-ahead in accomplishing this 
purpose. 
 
Prepared by: COL Carl Hunt, Ph.D., US Army, Director of Technology, JTF-GNO. 
Assisted and reviewed by Professor Chris Gunderson (CAPT, USN, Ret), Naval Post 
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